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Abstract  
 
This study deals with the development, position, nature and significance of health non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and their collaborations with governments in changing 
health systems by analyzing Kenya and Finland as case countries. It has two main aims: (1) to 
portray a systematic and analytical picture of the health system operated by NGOs in Finland and 
Kenya with regard to three dimensions (or 3Ps) service provision, promotion and participation in 
policy making; and (2) to examine the collaborations between the public and NGO health systems 
in the two countries in these dimensions. The aims are addressed through four questions: (1) how 
the health systems are organized in each country in terms of the systems size and configuration 
with analysis of the NGO systems focusing on their health functions in the three dimensions; (2) 
how the two sectors collaborate; (3) the context of health NGOs operations in the countries in 
terms of the influences or implications the socio-political and economic context of health 
development has on their development in the countries; and (4) how the two countries’ 
experiences and trends compare.  
 A variety of approaches involving review of literature on theories and discussions on the 
development of health and social policies and systems, and empirical studies encompassing 
consultations of policy documents, key informant interviews and seminar participations are used. 
134 key informants were interviewed, 60 in Finland and 74 in Kenya, from different levels of 
government – national (17 and 19, respectively), provincial (4 and 13, respectively) and 
municipality or district (11 and 6, respectively) – NGOs (18 and 24, respectively) and among 
health policy or systems experts or commentators (10 and 12, respectively). A snowballing 
technique was used to identify the key informants. Separate question guides were used for the 
different key informant interviewees’ categories. The leading NGO health institutions (3 and 2, 
respectively) in two provinces, one in each country, were analysed as illuminative cases. The data 
collection lasted about 14 months in different phases during 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
 Analysis of the data used multi-method approaches to identify, illustrate, and present the 
findings along a descriptive and interpretative systems approach analytical-thematic framework 
developed for the research in which the data are presented in the form of systematic text, graphs 
and tables. The findings show evidently that despite obvious differences in systems development 
and coverage, and socio-political and economic development, the NGO health system is large in 
both countries and is undergoing regeneration and increasing policy recognition. In terms of 
system size by share of national health facilities, in both countries, NGOs account for 20% while 
the share of personnel, expenditure and provision varies for the two countries being overall large 
for Kenya and small for Finland. In the health promotion fields, NGOs are more widely 
predominant, visible and acknowledged (than in services provision) in Finland and play a 
particularly major role in the HIV/AIDS work in Kenya.  
Participation of NGOs in health policy has become a central and broadly accepted feature 
of only recent policy-making processes in both countries so much so that the rhetoric is being 
normalized into law in some areas in both countries. The findings also show that the 
collaborations are reflected with a good amount of clarity capturing a variety of responsible 
institutional dynamics, activities and resources in current health development policies. The 
context of collaborations in both countries is very favourable in terms of the policy environment 
although there lacks broad legislative measures for its institutionalisation and systematisation. 
This, and measures to address the shortcomings of comprehensiveness in systems data and 
information crucial to decision making, and more systematic collaborations and coordination, or 
management of partnerships, are argued to be some of the central issues to be addressed by 
policy-makers and stakeholders in enhancing continuing health systems developments.  
 
Key words: health systems, NGOs, organization, government, health policy, social policy, 
collaboration, development, transformation, Finland, Kenya.                 
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PART I: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM, CONTEXT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION  
 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION   
 
Health systems are of great importance to the health of human beings and society. 
Hence concern with good health is one of the central elements of social policy in both 
the developed and developing countries. One of the main features of health care is its 
delivery system, which vary across countries. Typically, advanced welfare states in 
Scandinavia have comprehensive systems guaranteeing universal access while most 
countries, especially in the developing world, have multiple micro- or -mixed systems 
(World Health Organization (WHO), 2000). From the point of view of countries 
connected to this study, Finland fits the former and Kenya the latter type. Strictly, 
however, “no pure forms exist, and all contemporary health systems are mixed” 
(Freeman, 1999: 89; Chakraborty and Harding, 2003: 77). In reality, health 
infrastructures and functions are organized across diverse sectors – the public, the private 
and the third sector. Differences in organization of delivery systems reflects specific 
country historical, socio-economic, political and cultural contexts while it is clear that 
health developments in the past two decades brought by an internationalisation of 
health policy thinking has created an impetus or convergence on national reform 
policies (e.g., Rossetti and Bossert, 1999: 4; Ollila, Koivusalo and Baru, 2002). As it 
is argued, the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration on Health for All by Year 2000 marked a 
“global strategy in health and health services development” (Koivusalo and Ollila, 
1996: 111).  
 
The distribution and how the systems operate in respect of each other has increasingly 
become a topic of great interest worldwide in improving health functioning and 
organization (Hanson and Berman, 1994a; Berman et al, 1995; Salamon, 1995; Bennett, 
McPake and Mills, 1997; Wango’mbe, 1998; Palmer, 2000; Harding and Preker (Eds.), 
2003; Taylor, 2003; Lindelöw and Wagstaff, 2003). These questions have formally 
received renewed global interest following publication of the 2000 World Health Report 
titled Health Systems: Improving Performance. Growing interest in health systems 
arises from the need for reforms to improve accessibility, affordability, efficiency, equity 
and quality of health care and organization, including increasing the role of the private 
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and third sectors. In this light, interest on collaboration is based on the “programmatic 
advantages” such relations can produce (Salamon, 1999a: 340), increasing awareness of 
“the importance of the private sector” (Harding and Preker (Eds.), op. cit.: 1) in light of 
government and market failure discourses, and an awakened “liberal pragmatism” 
(Salamon, 1995: 203). The collaborative or partnership paradigm, as contrasted to the 
paradigm of competition, emphasizes the complementary roles of the state and NGOs 
(ibid.; Young, 1999: 34-41; Singh, 2002: 8). In his article on the Role of Governments, 
Markets and Civil Society in effective health care, Singh, writes:  
 
“In [this] new health paradigm, many of the tasks and services provided by 
governments will no longer be performed by them. The private sector will step 
in where it finds profit. This will not take care of everything. The vacuum will 
have to be filled up by civil society. Moving from health as a ‘public good’ to 
health as a ‘common good’ would create important roles for groups, 
communities, associations and individuals” (p. 18). 
 
Between the private and third, or non-profit, sector, the latter has attracted tremendous 
scholarly interest in the past decade in a context of paradigm shift in social policy and 
social development (e.g., 6, 1994; Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Aubrey, 1997; Fisher, 
1998; Salamon et al, 1999; Fowler, 2002). This dissertation is structured around the 
questions of transforming social policy and public-private collaboration in health care, 
using the vehicle of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a sub-organizational 
form within the third sector. The special interest in NGOs can be justified from many 
points of view. Firstly, their increased number and relevance in today’s world is itself 
a call for focused research on the phenomena. More subtly, in the present social 
policy discourse, the third sector represents an acknowledged legitimate organizer and 
provider of welfare services (Deakin, 1998) as distinct from the state (Johnson, 1998) 
and private (Brunsdon, 1998) sectors. Thirdly, as voluntary non-profit institutions, 
NGOs have historically been active in health and social welfare production (e.g., WHO, 
op. cit.: 11; Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 3-4). Fourthly, NGOs embody an organizational 
form within which the popular discourse on trust, social capital, civil society and 
democracy (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Fine, 1999; Newton, 2000), and associational life and 
health status (e.g., Hyyppä and Mäki, 2001), has emanated.  
 
As a public good (Le Grand, Propper and Robinson, 1992), health is of great public 
interest and thus raises certain reservations about its ‘marketization’ especially in 
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underprivileged populations (WHO, op. cit.: 4; Chakraborty and Harding, op. cit.; 
Taylor, 2003: 164). In this thinking, NGOs have potential for securing an “ideological 
space” in government-dominated social welfare contexts (Kuhnle and Selle, 1992b: 
24). In addition, NGOs have numerous comparative advantages in health services 
provision such as serving in remote places and proximity to community (e.g., Vogel 
and Stephens, 1989: 480; Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.: 103). This would tend to 
create a situation in which governments may prefer, or ‘innovate’, to work with them 
rather than with profit-making firms (e.g., Marmor, Schlesinger and Smithey, 1987; 
Gates and Hill, 1995). Due to all this, NGOs also tend to enjoy unique ‘favoured 
child’ relationships with government (Edwards and Hulme, op. cit.: 5; Barrow and 
Jennings, 2001: 7; Harding, 2003: 29). Finally, as Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs (1997: 
157) point out, “the study of non-governmental organizations is of fundamental 
importance in any study of globalism and social policy”. A basic point about limiting 
the scope of the study to NGOs and government, thus excluding the (for-profit) 
private and other informal sectors, is the practical question of time and interest.  
 
Expressly, this study is an investigation in the health delivery systems run by NGOs 
because of their special features. A final issue to be mentioned here regards the choice 
of country cases (Finland and Kenya). This derives primarily from physical 
attribution: both are the countries in which I have experienced active residency having 
lived in Finland over the last 6 years and Kenya being my country of origin. As such, 
I have had wide familiarity with both contexts. It is certainly scholarly satisfying that 
this ‘fate’ provides a remarkable possibility for cross-cultural comparisons. 
Undeniably, close familiarity may pose fundamental challenges to objective research 
for as Gilbert, Specht and Terrell (1993: 20) point out, the study of process “is heavily 
dependent on the analyst’s basic intellectual and philosophical assumptions about the 
social context”, assumptions that often influence the analyst. This challenge is 
however resolved by acknowledgement and in the methodological design.  
 
With regard to the advantages of the cross-country study, some key issues can be 
cited. In an era of increasing internationalisation, cross-cultural studies have become 
increasingly attractive, possible and desirable (e.g., Oyen, 1986; Macpherson and 
Midgley, 1987; Ginsburg, 1992: Øvretveit, 1998; Clasen, 1999; Gyekye, 2001; 
Hanhinen, 2001). Crucially, Evan (1976) notes the relevance for a comparative 
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approach in the development of interorganizational relations theory. The approach 
allows a possibility to “maximize the chances of identifying the antecedents and 
consequences of contrasting organizational climates” (p. 145). Internationalisation 
also means that societal problems are no longer isolated in any one country 
(Hanhinen, op. cit.: 108) even as they may differ in magnitude hence the appeal to 
compare (or contrast) trends.  
 
In this context, the dimension of transferability of knowledge, lessons and models 
becomes important. For example: MacPherson and Midgley (op. cit.: 9) put a strong 
argument for a global approach to social policy thinking to facilitate “more discerning 
exchange of experiences” in solving social welfare problems; McPake and Mills 
(2000) write about learning from international comparisons of health systems; 
Nissinen, Berrios and Puska (2001) convincingly argue for transferring to developing 
countries community-based non-communicable disease interventions model, 
developed in North Karelia Finland; and Bigsten (2001) discuss the relevance of the 
Nordic model for African development. More immediately in the study context, 
international learning has recently been exercised by Kenya when its Ministry of 
Health (MOH) embarked on a mission comprising NGO representatives to Europe 
and East Asia to study the health insurance systems in those countries in order to 
develop a comprehensive health insurance institution of its own (Mwaniki, 2002a).  
 
1.1. Finland and Kenya: Some General Introductory Observations   
 
To be sure, Finland and Kenya’s health systems differ remarkably as some summary 
examples reveal. The World Health Report 2000 attempted to compare health systems 
performance among its member countries. Using a combined three-dimensional 
measure – provision of good health, as expressed in life expectancy; responsiveness to 
population’s expectations; and fairness of the individuals’ financial contribution 
toward health care – Finland emerged number 31 while Kenya stood at 140 (WHO, 
op. cit.). Average life expectancy at birth also differs with Finland scoring an average 
of 77.4 years (UNDP, 2001) to Kenya’s 54.7 years in 1999 (UNDP, 2002: 15). On 
another measure, health expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 
was 6.9% for Finland in 1998 while Kenya’s was 7.8% during the same year (World 
Bank, 2001). Of these figures, the share from private sources was 1.6% and 5.4%, 
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respectively (ibid.). Out-of-pocket financing constituted 20% in 1999 in Finland 
(Järvelin, 2002: 31) and 49% in 1994 in Kenya (Republic of Kenya (henceforth, 
ROK), 1999c: 12). These data show that private participation in health care financing 
is much larger in Kenya. Another crucial difference is that while Kenya’s health care 
financing is heavily dependent on direct out-of-pocket collections as shown above, the 
Finnish system relies overwhelmingly on taxation as reflected by 60.8% in 1999 
(Järvelin, op. cit.: 31).  
 
The countries also differ in the types of disease burdens. Whereas Finland’s disease 
burden is in non-communicable diseases (NCDs), with high morbidity in circulatory 
diseases and cancer (Järvelin, op. cit.: 8), Kenya’s burden is in communicable 
diseases, with high morbidity in malaria and HIV/AIDS (ROK, 1999b: 3-4). In these 
senses, health dynamics between the two countries differs quite substantially. Yet it is 
paradoxical that both these dependencies face uncertainty in an era of shifting donor 
policies, with regard to Kenya, and ageing population and high unemployment levels 
in Finland. Again, there are also fundamental differences in the concept of citizenship 
and accessibility to health care. In Finland the comprehensive statutory National 
Health Insurance (NHI) covers every person in Finland as defined by the legislated 
criterion of residency; all welfare and health services are provided upon the basis of 
universal citizenship whether financed by the NHI or the municipal taxation and 
income support systems. In Kenya, on the other hand, there is no such universal and 
comprehensive system. Rather, the statutory National Hospital Insurance Fund 
(NHIF) is a contributory system covering its members and their families, accounting 
for about a third of the country’s population (research interviews).  
 
Finally, the two countries have distinct cultures. Finland is a largely homogeneous 
country with respect to language and religion. On the other hand, Kenya is a very 
heterogeneous country with over 40 distinct tribal languages and cultures and a 
multitude of religions. As Last (1987: 219) points out, “traditions, customs, religious 
beliefs and practices [and] health-related values” all influence health. Culture 
influences our health outlook, the meanings we attach to it and how we devote 
resources to it (Helman, 2001). A typical example today would be how the cultural 
milieu influences attitudes and actions towards communicable/preventable diseases 
such as HIV/AIDS vis a vis NCDs among Finns and Kenyans; Kenyans regard 
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alcohol problems less of a health problem (Partanen, 1991: 19-20) unlike the case in 
Finland. It is also a well-known fact that some African cultures approach HIV/AIDS 
with myth while the response towards this in developed countries is more scientific. 
Another important part of culture is the behaviour of political systems or “value 
systems” (Saltman and Figueras, 1997: 250). In summary, “health systems are cultural 
systems”, i.e., the organization, tradition, practices and values in health are products 
of culture (Freeman, 1999: 91).   
 
These differences are highlighted here to emphasise the diversity of the two contexts 
the research is dealing with. The research however does not aim to point out such 
differences but to highlight them as the contextual background in analysing the 
claimed converging international transformations in health policy thinking. In this 
regard, the comparative assumption arises from the postulation that both developed 
and developing countries are facing “striking similarities in the objectives they seek” 
in health policy reforms thus “conforming to a new paradigm” (Rossetti and Bossert, 
op. cit.). In this context, the role of the state is diminishing with increasing emphasis 
being laid on civil society and greater collaboration. Arguably, in both these 
countries, government-NGO collaborations, at least in rhetoric if not so much in 
reality, have increased in the 1990s along the privatisation and reform ‘routes’ 
discussed by Salamon (1999a: 344-6; see below). The research is interested in 
examining how different socio-economic, historical, political and cultural contexts 
adapt to these forces in the field of health. NGOs are looked at as potential 
institutional dynamics for mediating the challenges. This is the subject of further 
discussions in the next chapter.   
 
 
CHAPTER 2. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY, PROBLEM AND RATIONALE: A 
NEW SOCIAL POLICY PARADIGM  
 
“In an age of crisis for the welfare state and increased demand of care 
services, there is now a widespread opinion that future welfare systems will 
see more space occupied by private and non-profit organisations taking direct 
responsibility for providing services and meeting client’s needs” (International 
Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR), 2002: 7). 
 
The current long-term policy frameworks for health development in both Finland and 
Kenya have been designed by collaborative efforts between government and NGOs. 
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In Finland the 2001 Health 2015 (MSAH, 2001b) has been developed by the tenured 
National Advisory Board for Public Health comprising NGO representatives while the 
1994 Kenya Health Policy Framework (KHPF 2010) (ROK, 1994a) had comparable 
NGO input. These policy statements reflect an apparently similar process occurring at 
a similar time in significantly different country contexts. Thus, they are evidence to 
the fact that recent and on-going developments of health care systems in both 
countries have firmly taken into account the role of health NGOs. The processes have 
embedded NGOs in health policy making as the societies seek out institutional 
solutions and division of labour between government, NGOs and other private actors. 
This is strikingly echoed in Finland’s medium-term National Project for Securing the 
Future of Health Care 2007 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (henceforth, 
MSAH), 2002b: 11). And in Kenya, the medium-term National Health Sector 
Strategic Plan 1999-2004 is promoting the shift of the burden of service delivery to 
the NGO/private sector (ROK, op. cit.: 63). The context upon which this “paradigm of 
partnership” (Salamon, 1995: 203) is possible reflects the global transformations of 
the state and society in the post-1990s contemporary world (e.g., World Bank, 1997). 
The paradigm reflects a global approach in tackling growing problems in the system 
operations and availability of health services championed by the WHO Health for All 
(HFA) by year 2000 programme.     
 
Growing interest in, and relevance for, cross-cultural social policy studies has resulted 
from combinations of demographic, economic and political imperatives in a 
globalized world (e.g., Clasen, 1999: 3-4; MacPherson and Midgley, 1987; Wilensky 
et al, 1985). As Clasen (op. cit.: 4) notes, “together, these developments have exerted 
similar pressures on the traditional social policy arrangements and influenced national 
debates about policy reform”. Furthermore, there is “growing interdependence 
between and similar challenges across countries” (ibid.). Health care development is 
one field of social policy that strongly exhibits a common trend globally. Notably, 
health care organization has undergone a series of reforms over time (WHO, 2000: 
13-17). Primordial systems of traditional (herbal) medicine were overtaken by 
hospital systems in much of the 19th century that was partly operated by voluntary 
organizations (ibid. 11; Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 3-4). Initial reforms saw the taking 
over of the charitable hospital system after WWII and colonialism with the 
development of state systems. However, by the end of the 1960s “costs were rising, 
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especially as the volume and intensity of hospital-based care increased in developed 
and developing countries alike” (WHO, op. cit.: 13). As a result, the concept of 
primary health care (PHC) was introduced in the 1970s with the promise of improving 
accessibility, affordability and quality services, as epitomized in the HFA. 
  
Current generation of health reforms from the 1990s echo the profound political and 
socio-economic transformations over the past 15 years, notably, the collapse of 
communism in East and Central Europe and the neo-liberalist emphasis on 
minimization of pervasive state intervention in economic and political life leading to 
deregulation, decentralization and the introduction of increased competition in the 
organization of social welfare and health services, and growing reliance in market 
mechanisms (Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.: 143-5; Kanavos and McKee, 1998; WHO, 
op. cit.; Gwatkin, 2001). The reforms revolve around the issues of responding to 
increasing demand, strain on public systems, cutting spending, improving equity and 
access to marginalized and poor populations, participatory innovative collaborations 
with private providers, and shifting health care burdens from the public system to the 
private sector (Berman and Hanson, 1993; Hanson and Berman, 1994a; WHO, op. 
cit.; Palmer, op. cit.; Gwatkin, op. cit.; Harding and Preker (Eds.), op. cit.; Rosen and 
Simon, 2003).  
 
Until recently, the advancement of society globally was analysed and explained on the 
basis of state-dominated- and -directed models of economic growth and social welfare 
provision (e.g., Ginsburg, 1992: 12). In Europe, the post WWII ‘golden age’ was an 
era of unprecedented expansion of the public economy and the emergence of the 
modern welfare state characterized by large-scale provision of welfare services by the 
state. Dominance by government became the main feature of modern social policy 
development (Myrdal, 1960), an era that saw the development of the flagship National 
Health Service (NHS) in Britain, for example (e.g., Busfield, 2000). Today, the belief 
around the world that a bulky state system would suffice to tackle societal problems 
and needs has evanescenced (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Ploug and Kvist, 1996; Mullard 
and Spicker, 1998; Kautto et al (Eds.), 1999). The 1980s and 1990s brought radical 
changes fundamentally destabilizing the old social policy model in the West (e.g., 
Mullard and Spicker, op. cit.; Harris, 2002) following Thatcherism and Reaganomics 
(e.g., Olsson, 1987: 76-8; Ferge and Kolberg, 1992: 23; Schwartz, 1994). The 
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advanced welfare state struggled to cope with adaptation and introduction of 
fragmentary systems of welfare in Scandinavia (e.g., Ploug and Kvist, op. cit.; 
Marklund, 1988; Johansen, 1986). At the same time, African political economies 
underwent pervasive and controversial structural adjustments to reverse centralization 
and to minimize the state in economic and socio-political life (e.g., Chaudhry, 1993; 
Fine and Stoneman, 1996). 
 
The challenges to state welfare provisions and social policy across the globe were 
exacerbated by the neo-liberalist assault on the state (e.g., Braathen and Dean, 2002) 
brought forth by a “‘crisis of confidence’” (Salamon, 1999a: 341) or diminishing 
political legitimation (e.g., Habermas, 1975: 128; Marklund, op. cit.: 77-81; Ploug and 
Kvist, op. cit.: 27; Andersen et al, 1999; Newton, op. cit.: 210), and a rapidly ageing 
population (Flora, 1986: xxvi; OECD, 1988; Hein, 1989: 34-8; World Bank, 1994; 
Pierson, 1998: 169). At the same time, the globalized economy became a “major 
source of the [celebrated] welfare state crisis” (Esping-Andersen, op. cit.: 5; Ploug 
and Kvist, op. cit.: 30-33). Questions of efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness 
of generalized state provisions cast a grey shadow on the future welfare state 
accelerating debate on possible remedies (e.g., Johnson, op. cit.). ‘Decentralization’, 
‘de-institutionalization’, and ‘deregulation’ of the state systems in Finland and Kenya 
created spaces for new kinds of organizations and relations in the non-governmental 
third sector. These labels, including ‘self-help’, ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘citizen 
participation’, became part of official government policy on social welfare and health 
development in both countries beginning, strikingly, around the same year, 1982 
(Mutiso, 1986: 213, on Kenya; Hägglund and Modeen, 1988, on Finland).  
 
In this new context, the nature of social policy and social development thinking has 
changed (e.g., 6, 1994; Mullard and Spicker, op. cit.: 209; Harris, op. cit.). The 
proliferation of NGOs in the 1990s has partly mediated this transformation (Room 
and 6, 1994; Salamon et al, op. cit.; Barrow and Jennings, op. cit.; Mwabu, Ugaz and 
White (Eds.), 2001), a common phenomenon in both country case studies. For 
example, about 2,500 NGOs were established annually in Finland in the 1990s 
(Newton, op. cit.: 210) and in Kenya NGOs as known today have only existed in the 
1990s during when about 100 were established every year according to data obtained 
from the government registering agency. The significance for this proliferation is the 
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increased role these organizations have acquired, or been given, in society, 
acceleratedly in the decade, leading to a new spirit of collaboration across societal 
actors. Persistent challenges surrounding transforming societies pose challenges to 
health care systems in many countries (WHO, op. cit.). With changing disease 
burdens focus on health care is shifting from institutionalised treatment systems 
towards promotive health education and preventive interventions (e.g., WHO, 2002).  
 
Indeed, as part of community organization, NGOs have become major players in the 
health care action arena. For example, they have been central in achieving success in 
combating NCDs in Finland (Puska et al, 1995; Nissinen, Berrios, Puska, 2001) and 
in furthering primary health care and combating HIV/AIDS in Kenya (Berman et al, 
op. cit.; Wang’ombe et al, 1998; Hearn, 1998; Kimalu, 2001). In the HIV/AIDS area 
in Kenya, NGOs are implementing 60% of a World Bank funded four-year project 
(see Part IV Section II). In Finland, the largest share of the earmarked health 
promotion funds (41%) since 1997 is being implemented by NGOs according to 
calculations of original data obtained during the research (see Part IV Section I). 
NGOs also operate 20% of the hospital institutions in the country and 20% of Kenya’s 
entire formal health institutions (see Part III). 
 
The collaborative paradigm is also the result of international initiatives and targets in 
healthcare (e.g., WHO, 1978, 1986, 1988; Hearn, op. cit.; Dror, Preker and Jakab, 
2002). For example, targets set in the 1978 vision of the WHO in the HFA, the 
Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion in 1986, and the Bamako Initiative of 1987 in 
Mali have compounded health development in both countries. With these global 
policy frameworks, “focus shifted from governmental health systems to 
empowerment of communities through” “their ownership and control of their own 
endeavours and destinies” (WHO, 1978 and 1986, respectively). Other shifts included 
decentralisation of decision making to the health district, introduction and 
reinforcement of systems of co-management and co-financing with communities, and 
procurement and distribution of essentials drugs (United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 1999).  
 
Advancing theoretical impetus to these processes, Salamon (op. cit.: 340-6) has 
discussed three different ‘routes’ to the collaborative model: ‘corporatist’, 
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‘privatisation’ and ‘reform’. According to this view, Finland and Kenya fits readily 
with the last two. These are reflected in the trends towards dismantling central 
administration, enhancing competition, market approaches and new ‘activation’ 
policies for citizen participation and civil society. In light of the privatisation route, 
deregulation and decentralization was a way of relieving the “fiscally overburdened 
‘welfare state’” (ibid. 344). As pointed earlier, major decentralization processes began 
in the early 1980s in both Finland and Kenya. An example fitting to the Finnish case 
is the deregulation of central administration granting the municipalities greater 
freedom to purchase services from private sources, including NGOs (e.g., Helander 
and Sundback, 1998: 22). Some of these processes also entered into legislation, for 
example, the 1995 Finnish Local Government Act (Section 2 and 40). Fees for 
primary health care services were introduced only in 1993 (Järvelin, op. cit.: 37). 
Delegation of duty is also perfectly captured in the decision in 1997 to grant an NGO 
umbrella body responsibility for administering the largest share of earmarked funds 
for health promotion (research interviews). According to the reform route, numerous 
activation tendencies that gave “new impetus to the third sector” have been referred to 
in Finland (Kinnunen, 2000: 101; Julkunen, 2000: 65; Matthies, 2000; Newton, op. 
cit.: 210; Heikkilä and Karjalainen, 1999: 16). Furthermore, growing poverty and 
social exclusion were also responsible for the increase of “NGO-based activity” 
(Halleröd and Heikkilä, 1999: 213).  
 
With regard to Kenya, deregulation has continued through the mid 1980s into the 
1990s (ROK, 2002a: 1). A major reform in the health sector was the introduction of 
cost sharing in government health facilities in 1989. As part of the reforms in Kenya, 
the Public Health Act was amended in 1992 to create local administrative structures 
that “represent community interests in health planning and to co-ordinate and monitor 
the implementation of projects at the district level” (ROK, 1999b: 12). The NHIF was 
also liberalized to a quasi-governmental organization in 1998 to allow it more 
flexibility and is now the main insurance payer to NGO and private hospitals (Berman 
et al, op. cit.: 62). Another feature of the reform route in Kenya is the tremendous 
growth of the financial support given to NGOs by international donor agencies and 
the conditionalities for government to engage them in the social development 
processes (INTRAC, 1998); all the recent government policy documents are emphatic 
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of partnerships with NGOs. Lately, NGOs have also been involved in restructuring 
the organization of the public health care system (Hearn, op. cit.; MOH, 2000). 
 
Government-NGO collaborations have been going on in the context outlined above 
through the 1990s. Yet the charting of these collaborations occurs under conditions of 
vague understanding of NGOs both as phenomena, e.g., roles, size and scope, and a 
sector, as well as loosely defined relationships. Fundamental to this is the lack of 
guidelines or policies for systematized partnerships. Moreover, strategic relations as 
suggested in the Finnish and Kenyan health policy documents cannot be forged 
without three key issues: (1) knowledge among policy makers about the configuration 
of the sector; (2) communication among the stakeholders; and (3) institutional policy 
tools for the interactions, key among them being funding, regulation, and information 
dissemination (Harding, op. cit.: 16-19; Chakraborty and Harding, op. cit.). NGO 
systems play an important primary, complementary and supplementary role in health 
care delivery in both countries. But as Järvelin (op. cit.: 25) readily observe: 
 
“[In Finland] private and public sector services are neither coordinated with 
each other nor are they real competitors with each other”. 
 
In fact, this is a predicament facing both country cases. Lack of knowledge, 
coordination and strategic relationships wields a problem in the parallel health 
organizational structure in both country cases (ibid.; research interviews). Apart from 
these concerns is the lack of scholarship and theoretical investigations into the 
phenomena (Salamon, 1995: 35; Siisiäinen, Kinnunen and Hietanen, 2000: 6). 
Salamon (op. cit.) attributes lack of a strong theoretical pull to the research into the 
relationships. The lack of a systematic legislation on NGOs in Finland has long been 
blamed on the lack of systematic scholarship (Modeen, 1989: 3) as well as 
crystallization of the sector in the eyes of decision makers (research interviews). In 
light of these concerns, and accelerated by the expanding NGO health system, 
growing collaborative efforts and contribution and participation of NGOs in health 
provision, promotion and policy-making, there is an urgent need for research that not 
only maps the system configuration but also characterizes current trends in the 
relationships in different contexts (see, Chakraborty and Harding, op. cit.: 75-76). 
This is possible thanks to a common framework in the current globalizing world that 
utilizes universalist concepts in debate on society and transformation.  
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Recent efforts to create strategy frameworks for greater collaborations in both Finland 
and Kenya reflect the growing need to enhance recognition of the NGO systems in an 
effort to institutionalise them with the public sphere. There are remarkably similar 
examples, at least in approach if not in essence, from each country with this regard. In 
Finland, the MSAH has published a document produced by a working group 
comprising 10 NGO and government representatives titled NGOs as Actors in Social 
Welfare and Health Policy: Strategy for NGOs Activities (MSAH, 2003a). In Kenya, 
a similar process involving 10 NGO and government representatives established in 
1997 is, however, yet to bear such fruits although there is renewed impetus to 
complete it in 2003 (research interviews). Explanations for this development could 
only be located in the international sphere of changes and convergences in the 
government-NGO discourse in social policy. These two processes, informal as they 
were, have tried to document data on the NGO systems, highlight the challenges and 
forge strategies for better working relations.  
 
Indeed, documentation of health care systems is of both scholarly and practical 
importance.  One reason is the obvious contribution to scientific research. Such data 
and information can be used for further research such as hypothesis testing and theory 
development. Again, research is important in determining health outcomes (e.g., 
Lindelöw and Wagstaff, 2003: 22). Thirdly, sound profile data and information are 
valuable for decision- and -policy-making. A comprehensive system data can be used 
for designing strategic interventions and monitoring changes in availability and 
distribution of health facilities and improving collaborations (ibid.; Chakraborty and 
Harding, op. cit.). In spite of these benefits, documentation on health care systems 
appears context biased. In Finland such survey focuses largely on government actions 
(e.g., Aromaa, Koskinen and Huttunen, 1999; Järvelin, op. cit.) with little or no regard 
for the NGO health system. Recent work in Kenya has tried to map the NGO/private 
systems (Berman et al, op. cit.; Wang’ombe et al, op. cit.; Hearn, op. cit.; Johnson, 
2001) but still falls short in breadth and detail.  
 
In addition to documenting public- and -NGO-provider health systems, there is also 
need to examine their interrelationships. Again, a clear motivation is the need to 
understand, for example, the flow of “public expenditures from central government to 
regions and districts and thence to providers in the periphery” (Lindelöw and 
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Wagstaff, op. cit.: 6). Government funding is a key policy instrument that can be used 
to influence health outcomes and performance of the providers. The nature of data 
available on transfer of public funds to NGOs is poorly documented and fragmented 
in both countries. Although health NGOs in Kenya receives little or no government 
grants, Finnish health NGOs receive funding from numerous public sources, some of 
which is earmarked (see Part IV). With increased participation of NGOs in health 
provision, promotion and policy processes, it is timely to examine their 
interrelationships with the governmental system. Understanding the practical 
implications, dynamics and processes of implementing current health policy 
frameworks in both countries through collaborative efforts between the two systems is 
crucial to modern social policy analysis. Where old social policy paradigms focused 
on the dominance of the state, the new one is about “moving beyond state-based 
welfare, to focus not only upon public services but also upon partnerships between the 
state and other providers of welfare and well-being and on the role of the state as 
subsidizer and a regulator of the actions of others” (Alcock, 1998: 12). Central to this 
new juncture is the “paradigm of partnership” between the state and NGOs, which is 
rooted in “liberal pragmatism” (Salamon, op. cit: 203).  
 
 
CHAPTER 3. AIMS OF THE STUDY  
 
This study has two major aims: (1) to portray a systematic and analytical picture of 
the health system operated by NGOs in Finland and Kenya with regard to service 
provision, promotion and participation in policy making; and (2) to examine the 
collaborations between the public and NGO health systems in the two countries with 
regard to these three dimensions. Rather than testing a stated hypothesis, the study is 
more investigative (Øvretveit, 1998: 47) for several reasons. First is the lack of a 
comprehensive theory of NGOs (e.g., Salamon and Anheier, 1998) and of 
comparative health systems (Wilensky et al, op. cit.). Second is the general lack of 
readily available and sufficient data (Øvretveit, op. cit.) on the health NGO sector. 
Third is the interplay and influence of complex internal and external economic and 
political forces on the phenomena (e.g., Aubrey, 1997). And fourth is the question 
surrounding cross-country comparison. As such, the research will explore, identify 
and illustrate the systems, producing a primer study on the subject. Exploratory case 
studies – treating the two countries as cases – identify phenomena and help generate 
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“hypotheses for later investigation” while illustrations help describe the phenomena 
through in-depth examples (Morra and Friedlander, 1999: 3; Miller and Crabtree, 
1992: 6). Thus, the research will also suggest questions for future research.    
 
With regard to these aims, the study addresses four broad questions. The first is how 
the health systems are organized in each country. By ‘organized’ here is meant the 
systems size and configuration. Thus, the question seeks to detail the systems’ 
infrastructure development, i.e., the health facilities they operate – the number of 
hospitals, health centres and other health infrastructures as well as organization and 
financing for both the NGO and public systems. Related to this question is the need to 
focus on the NGO health system beyond number of facilities. In particular, analysis of 
the NGO systems will focus on their health functions in three dimensions (or 3Ps) – 
provision, promotion and participation in health policy making. The second question 
is how the two sectors collaborate. On this question, data and information on 
partnerships, interactions or contacts between NGOs and government agencies at 
national, regional or local levels are identified and analysed. In addition, a broader 
variety of information and analysis will look at, for example: the dynamics or 
practices of how this partnership or contact is conducted and maintained, i.e., 
especially the identification of institutional mechanisms for doing so; the various tools 
of interaction, such as the amount of government grants and payment for services, and 
work activities of the NGOs; and the existence of a legal basis and policy statements 
or processes and programmes put in place for collaboration.  
 
The third question addresses the context of health NGOs operations in the countries, 
i.e., what influences or implications do the socio-political and economic context of 
health development has on the development of health NGOs in the countries? This 
question is important also because it informs our understanding and discussion on 
question two. Developments in policy, legislation as well as the environment of 
funding, issues addressed in question two, also inform this overall context and are 
thus crucial to addressing this question. The fourth question, albeit a lesser one that 
the other three, is how the two countries experiences and trends compare. In this 
regard, the data is put into perspective to see how the health systems compare, or 
differ. Discussion on the development of the reforms and collaborative processes, 
their foundations and magnitude, and the role of NGOs in health helps to put the 
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country experiences into an international perspective. Developments in the legislative, 
policy processes and practices in the health care organization, development and 
reforms informs our understanding of the importance of health NGOs and processes 
for their functioning in two different countries. Thus, the comparative dimension 
cannot be ignored nor should a research of this nature assume no such implications 
are perceivable.  
 
Through this question, the research also provides an opportunity to assess the 
assumption that NGOs can play an expanded role in the development of social policy 
in the area of health as part of civil society at the national level, and how this is seen 
as part of a wider global trend. The study focuses primarily on the system level 
institutional mechanisms of delivery, financing, distribution, policy and 
collaborations. Presentation of the findings of the research questions forms the 
structure of the dissertation. Thus, it can readily be pointed out here that question one 
is presented in Part III and IV, question two in Part V, question three in all these three 
Parts while question four permeates through the dissertation and forms a genuine 
basis for the synthesis conclusion in Part VI (see chapter 6 below). What emerges is a 
detailed investigation in the case countries using multiple discourses of transiting 
health care systems and information, health systems research, and comparative NGO 
studies. The knowledge gathered in these investigations will help fill gaps in research 
knowledge of health NGOs and health systems and contribute to practical purposes as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Other contributions include the potential for 
comparing two systems that have been well researched for the first time in a broad 
light in accordance with the approaches detailed in the following chapter.   
 
 
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES OF HEALTH SYSTEMS: 
METHOD AND DATA 
 
There are three critical issues to the study of comparative social policy: theoretical, 
conceptual and methodological (Clasen, 1999: 1). In this chapter I address the latter 
while the next one addresses the conceptual concern; theoretical aspects are dealt with 
in Part II of the dissertation. This study deals with health system organization and 
development, policies and programs. As such, it utilizes both an analytical and a 
health systems research (HSR) methodology, thoroughly discussed by Grodos and 
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Mercenier (2000: especially, 13-23). While the analytical approach focuses more on 
the constituent parts, the HSR looks at the whole system and emphasizes the 
interactions between the subject and its environment. Thus, multi-methods involving 
combining quantitative and qualitative techniques in data collection and analysis are 
used (see below) in identifying, describing and explaining-generating the research 
phenomena (Miller and Crabtree, 1992: 6-8). 
 
As far as policy issues come to fore, the basic intellectual stimuli in the study’s 
methodological concerns is informed by Gilbert, Specht and Terrell’s (1993: 17-20) 
analytic perspectives for the study of social welfare policy: process, product and 
performance. Although the study does not focus on a ‘policy process’ – defined as 
“the series of events that a reform initiative follows from the definition of the problem 
and its incorporation into the public agenda, to the consolidation of the intended 
policy change” (Rossetti and Bossert, 1999: 8) – these approaches are relevant in 
varying degrees. This definition encompasses five stages of a policy process – 
formulation, legislation, implementation, institutional change and reform 
consolidation (ibid.) – and thus incorporates all the analytic perspectives. The notion 
of a ‘policy process’ helps us understand “the actions of public institutions, 
governmental and non-governmental … as outcomes of social processes” 
(Mackintosh, 1992: 4). As discussed by Gilbert, Specht and Terrell (op. cit.: 17-18), 
process studies are “most concerned with understanding how the inputs of planning 
data and the relationships and interactions among the various political, governmental, 
and other organised collectivities in a society affect policy formulation”. They 
“generally deal with such questions as the societal context in which policy decisions 
are made” (ibid. 18).  
 
With this view in mind, the notion of ‘process’ in the present study is to be 
understood in so far as it tries to illustrate contextual factors influencing the 
development of NGOs and makes various references to their actions in the course of 
policy processes. As such, the description of the “political and technical inputs to 
[the] decision making” (ibid.), i.e., the socio-economic and political context in which 
actions and negotiations for health policy formulation and systems development 
occur, and of relevant data crucial to decision-making (e.g., Berman et al, 1995) is a 
major target of the study. To capture this context, a product-studies approach is 
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employed in as much as it refers to the “values, theories, and assumptions” as well as 
plans that support the policy choices in program development (Gilbert, Specht and 
Terrell, op. cit.: 18). This approach is valuable because of its applicability in the two 
societal contexts of the present study since, as the authors note, it does “not vary in 
any considerable way from one social context to another” (p. 20). Finally, a 
performance-studies approach is utilized albeit minimally in so far as it refers to the 
implications of health reforms and developments of the 1990s on health NGOs in the 
countries. In sum, certain images reflecting various levels of a policy process emerge 
in discussing key health policy programs in the countries although no rigorous 
methodology or trace of a policy process as extensively discussed by Rossetti and 
Bossert (op. cit.) is employed.  
 
4.1. Research Instrumentation and Data Analysis  
 
In Conducting A Private Health Sector Assessment (PHSA) Chakraborty and Harding 
(2003) provide a comprehensive guideline on gathering and evaluating information 
about private (for-profit and non-profit) health systems (see also Hanson and Berman, 
1994b). The process involves assembling of relevant system organization data and 
information and the background political economy environment, consultations with 
key-stakeholder informants to identify policy issues, and in-depth studies and analysis 
on a pressing issue (p. 82-85). The primary focus and sources of data and information 
are the ministries of health and related agencies and the providers. This research 
largely fits well with, but is not restricted to, this framework. Implementation of the 
research employed a ‘hybrid’ multi-method mix of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Miller and Crabtree, op. cit.; Morra and 
Friedlander, 1999: 6; Cockburn, 2000; Reinikka, 2002; Chakraborty and Harding, op. 
cit.: 97). Also referred to as triangulation, the approach allows for scrutinizing the 
relationship between the two kinds of information: statistical data and interview 
narratives.  
 
The qualitative approach included the following: oral interviews; consultative 
discussions; and participation in work groups, seminars, workshops and training. 
Unstructured open-ended questionnaire check lists were used to guide the interviews 
allowing for flexibility to suit the circumstances so that respondents would express as 
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much their knowledge and experiences and give the relevant and available data and 
information. Three different lists were used for each of the three key-informant 
interview groups (see below) (see appendix for a sample list of the questions). 
 
Figure 1. Circle of Data Sources  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 above more readily shows the sources of data and information. The circle 
identifies three source groups: (1) interviewees; (2) written documents; and (3) 
participation. There were three main interview groups: (1) NGO leaders or staff; (2) 
government officials; and (3) prominent NGO personalities and other knowledgeable 
experts on the subject, namely, academics/researchers, commentators and politicians 
(see table 1 for the interviewees’ data). All the government and NGOs respondents 
were senior officials in their respective agencies. All the interviews were conducted in 
English and transcribed on the spot or recorded on tape depending on prevailing 
practical circumstances. Most of the respondents were interviewed more than once 
and interviews lasted one-two hours with the exception of a few that lasted over 2 
hours. In Finland, the interview transcriptions were emailed back to the respondents 
for feedback; this was not possible in Kenya due to practical reasons of general lack 
of widespread use and availability of such connections and time and distance.  
 
As pointed out, the research adapted as well a quantitative approach in order to give 
the study a tool for generalizing findings and other crucial benefits (see, e.g., 
Cockburn, op. cit.: 59-60). Quantitative data was assembled from records maintained 
by different levels of government and various key NGOs. In light of the central 
importance of statistical data, the oral interviews served two purposes: firstly, as 
sources of information and data, either as source themselves or for giving direction to 
NGOs  Documents
            
          Government 
 
Participation   
        
Commentators 
       
   Experts
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sources; and secondly, for giving perspective to data and institutional dynamics. 
Identification of contact persons followed a snowballing technique in which the first 
contact suggested another and so on until a desirable target (factuarial information or 
data) was achieved. Primary and secondary sources and literature by government 
bodies, NGOs and other agencies including reports, brochures, books, and press 
releases were extensively referred for data and information.  
 
Table 1. Key Informant Interviewees by Categories  
 
Government 
Country 
National  Province Municipality/District
NGOs Experts/ 
Commentators 
Total
Finland 17 4 11 18 10 60*
Kenya 19 13 6 24 12 74*
 
Notes: * Two persons were interviewed as NGO representatives and experts. 
 
Participation involved attending and actively taking part in work group meetings, 
forums, seminars or workshops where a variety of discussions were held. These 
provided invaluable process insights or ‘observations’. In Finland I participated in a 
one-week international health promotion course organized by the National Public 
Health Institute (abbreviated as KTL in Finnish) on the North Karelia Project. The 
course included travel to the field in North Karelia and visits to the central hospital in 
Joensuu, the health centre in Juuka municipality, the community, and seminar lectures 
given by government, hospital and community leaders or workers. During July 2003 I 
also participated in a large consultation forum in which about 90 Finnish NGOs of 
diverse fields and other interests groups as well as the media were invited by the 
Finnish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to discuss the European Union 
Constitution. In Kenya I participated in a two-day workshop as part of the process of 
making a policy for NGOs in the country organized by the National Council of 
NGOs, the quasi-government/NGO umbrella body for all NGOs in the country. In the 
workshop I was an ‘active participant’ as a presenter of a theme on conceptual 
concerns of NGOs and their role in socio-political development. I also participated in 
two meetings discussing the NGO policy process. In these ‘observations’ I wrote 
down notes, and extensively interacted and discussed with participants (the key 
persons I engaged questions with are included in the appended list of interviewees).  
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Because of concern for having a more general analysis, early considerations for case 
studies of a matching or equal x number of NGOs were abandoned. However, since 
research in the field included visits to a number of NGOs and interviews with their 
leaders or staff, description of the cases, and program activities are used in the 
analysis as illustrative examples as described by Morra and Friedlander (op. cit.: 3). 
However, as the study, for obvious reasons of time, financial resources or even 
scientific necessity, could not cover the entire countries with the interviews, two 
administrative regions – the Province of Southern Finland and Central Province in 
Kenya – were targeted. The two regions were purposely selected because of more 
familiarity and they are more similar than (or different from) other regions in both 
countries in terms of population concentration, area and other indicators (see tables 3 
in Part III). Again, interviews could not be achieved with all health NGOs or all 
government bodies in the provinces thus concentration of the study was narrowed to 
lower levels of administrations (municipalities/districts) in the regions. The leading 
NGO health institutions in the provinces were identified and analysed as illuminative 
case studies for the budding role of NGOs. These considerations did not however 
preclude discussions with other NGO institutions or visits to other parts of the 
countries. Naturally, all consultations were done to fulfil the purposes of the research.    
 
I conducted the interviews in several major phases lasting bout 14 months. In Finland 
the phases were June 2002, October-December 2002 and January-April 2003, and in 
Kenya, they were undertaken in May 2001, July-October 2002, and May 2003. 
Consultative correspondences with some researchers and actors had already been 
made in 2000 in Kenya and in 2001 in Finland and have also been done at other times 
in 2003. The ‘observations’ in North Karelia took place in January 2003 while those 
in Kenya in September 2002.  
 
Analysis of Data and Presentation  
 
As Brewer and Hunter (op. cit.) and Miller and Crabtree (op. cit.) show, multi-method 
approaches employ diverse analytic techniques that involve sustained recursive and 
integrative steps or cycles in research and analysis and interpretation. I approached 
my data sets with the aim to identify, illustrate and analyse the questions of the 
research. To this end I developed the analytical-thematic framework (or template) 
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presented below. Thus, the research uses a diagnostic interpretation process (Miller 
and Crabtree, op. cit.: 19) that allowed for systematic analysis of both the statistics 
and interviews information along this thematic framework. My data and information 
were treated as factual. While a policy analysis-approach (Rossetti and Bossert (op. 
cit. 11-19) has informed the interpretation, quantitative data was analysed through 
simple cross-tabulations and charts developed with Microsoft Excel and Word. The 
systems approach interorganizational relations analytic model (figure 2) (see more 
details of the approach in Part II, chapter 2) was constructed to act as a hypothetical 
tool (or template) for representing the sphere, “process or system” of investigation 
and analysis in the health systems research (Grodos and Mercenier, op. cit.: 14). In 
other words, both the levels and interrelations shown were expected and formed the 
research and analytic domains. By systematically focusing on the themes or frames of 
the health system framework, and the collaborative framework depicted in the figure, 
the overall analytic method ensured to obtain consistency and flow across the case 
countries. Involving an explanation-building exercise, the aim and approach of 
analysis was thus both descriptive and interpretative for best discussing the findings.   
 
Figure 2. A Pictogram of the Systems Approach Interorganizational Relations 
Analytic Model 
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Figure 2 is also relevant here for illustrating the presentation of the findings: the two 
vertical systems (the government and the NGO) are shown with their 
horizontal/vertical levels of interactions. The presentation of the public systems uses 
the common thematic framework developed by the World Health Organization 
(WHO)1, which is expanded somewhat by the WHO European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems in the publications Health Care Systems in Transition (HIT) (e.g., 
Järvelin, 2002; WHO, 1996). This framework portrays comprehensive information 
that goes into understanding a health system in a particular country. Elements of 
country socio-economic, demographic and political context, organizational structure 
and administration, financing and expenditure, reforms and development are of key 
central importance. The framework is also used to a more or less extent in Kenya’s 
official Health Management Information Systems (HMIS) (ROK, 2001e). According 
to these frameworks, access and distribution of the system (primarily, facilities and 
health personnel) to the population are good indicators of the level of development of 
the health system (these are depicted in tables 3 in Part III).  
 
Presentation of the NGO health systems combines some of these elements with 
frameworks used by the Harvard School of Public Health Data for Decision Making 
Project (e.g., Berman et al, 1995; Hanson and Berman, op. cit.) and, more recently, in 
the World Bank’s Private Health Sector Assessment (PHSA) guidelines (Chakraborty 
and Harding, op. cit.). The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project 
(Salamon et al (Eds.), 1999) (and Salamon, 1995) is also instrumental in presenting 
data and information on NGOs. The expanded combination allows a systematic 
analysis of overall context of the NGO system, i.e., its development, organization, 
size, scope and significance as well as the collaborations with government. The 
framework is most suitable for this study due to its very nature. Finally, collaborations 
between the two systems is analysed through the horizontal/vertical/diagonal levels 
shown along three dimensions of health NGOs functions investigated.  
 
Experiences and Limitations of the Research  
 
I have above presented a multi-method approach to the research and data analysis and 
interpretation. Collecting and handling the data and information was not always easy 
                                                
1 See: http://www.who.int/country/en/.  
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due particularly to its diversity, diversity of sources, access and language challenges. 
To start with the latter, the nature of the research meant a great deal of reliance on 
government and NGO documents. Only a handful of published material about the 
Finnish health care system – such as government and NGO 
policy/annual/budgetary/planning or progress reports and documents – were available 
in English; in Kenya, all such publications are in English. Although my understanding 
of written Finnish is good, in some difficult cases I have had translation support from 
colleagues and the interviewees. Pertaining to challenges with accessing data, both 
country cases can be mentioned. The difficulty with accessing national NGO 
institutions system data in Finland was markedly due to lack of its proper 
administration or documentation. Although the used national data on the hospitals was 
procured from the National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health 
(STAKES), it is acknowledged that the data was not definitive. The alternative would 
have to procure the data from all the 12 provincial offices charged with licensing. 
Although I mailed these offices based on the information from STAKES, given the 
timing the response was not satisfactory to have made a major difference. In the end, 
rather than present an exhaustive view of the NGO hospital system I deepened the 
focus with regard to the illuminative cases.  
 
With regard to Kenya, NGO institutions system data is better documented in the 
Ministry of Health’s Health Information Management System and more so by their 
umbrella bodies. In the first place a government permit to conduct research in the 
country is always required and took about two weeks to procure. Procuring the 
definitive data from the institutions or umbrella bodies themselves often involved a 
lengthy process requiring submission of letters requesting an interview. Related to this 
problem is diversity of sources. Because of the multiple sources, in a number of cases 
the data and information on the same issue differed between a government source or 
different departments, NGOs and the research publications. The one example is the 
data on public hospital institutions supplied by STAKES and those available in 
individual hospital districts in Finland and the interpretation of sub-sectors of NGOs 
between the NGO Council and the NGO Bureau in Kenya. The cases are explained in 
the presentation and/or both sets of data presented and discussed. On the other hand, 
as key informants, the interviewees were experts in their work and this allowed for 
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critical insights as well as good judgement into the material and information given. 
Thus, there were no major concerns regarding the quality or reliability of the data.  
 
In general, the use of triangulation was very helpful in identifying the issues to be 
included in the research and analysis, identifying sources as well as in dealing with 
these challenges. In this regard, the quantitative and qualitative data and information 
obtained through interviews, observations and documents served to inform and 
reinforce my understanding of the research phenomena as well as to confirm accuracy 
of/and interpretations. For example, to clarify the claim that there is increasing 
visibility of NGOs and collaborations with government in health care required 
evidence of statistical information such as funding appropriations, policy documents 
beyond rhetoric, and even development of an institutional dynamic, i.e., the 
establishment of a specific body charged with such or related tasks. Thus, the 
analytical framework was also not a static or fixed phenomenon nor highly developed 
from the beginning although it emerged as the best way to organize writing the 
findings and present the aims of the research. To have validity and reliability of the 
data analysis and interpretations, the overall experience meant going back to the 
‘field’ (when not physically, referring to the data sources, emailing or telephoning to 
inquire or clarify about a certain data or pieces of information) several times. So-
called “member check”, in addition to the triangulation, this enhances the validity and 
trustworthiness of the research (Gilchrist, 1992: 86-87).  
  
Though this was done in both countries, it was largely only possible to do so in Kenya 
whilst still in the country although I did manage to contact a number of the sources by 
phone from abroad and through a third party. In Finland, as was pointed out above, 
the interview transcripts (whether tape-recorded or not) were emailed back to the 
interviewees for validation of my recording or/and interpretation as well as any 
translations. In addition, pieces, chapters or whole sections of the manuscript (though 
only on Finland due to the reasons given above on Kenya) were checked by some of 
the key informant interviewees and one expert who are identified by name in the 
acknowledgements. On the other hand, because I had anticipated the complexity of 
having a similar referral process in Kenya, I wrote most of the sections on the country 
while there, which made it easier to make further inquiries and discussions with key 
persons on the ground.    
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In the empirical analysis I have throughout referred to my interview sources – both 
persons and a few printed materials obtained during the research that are not 
referenced such as annual reports, brochures or letters – as “research interviews”. The 
justification for doing this is the avoidance of repetitive long descriptions of 
personalities and references or their affiliations in the body of the text that I felt could 
distract the reader as well as the need to retain a level of anonymity of the 
interviewees. However, this does not mean, of course, that whenever the reference is 
made it refers to any certain number of interview sources. In general though, the 
format only partly protects anonymity and the interview sources could be detected. 
The curious reader may find that often the references occur in themes from which 
corroboration can be made with the help of the appended list of the sources.  
 
Note on Comparison  
 
“Cross-national social policy-oriented studies describe, analyse and map 
different countries’ welfare configurations, their policies, or their responses to 
common issues. They are used to test or develop theories or hypotheses … to 
show more clearly the contours of one country’s arrangements … or the 
borrowing of policies or practices (Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999: 54).  
 
The notion of comparison in this research is conceived on the above premise and the 
usefulness of international comparisons in health systems research (e.g., Green and 
Thorogood, 1998: 157-8). By claiming a comparative efficacy, the study assumes 
several legitimate contentions. Classen (op. cit.: 3) suggests using “contextually rich 
case studies” in comparative social policy. In the field of health policy research, the 
case study approach – e.g., the description of country-specific systems – is more 
pervasive due to an acknowledged complexity of health systems and health research 
(Wilensky et al, op. cit.; Øvretveit, op. cit.). As a consequence, the approach 
highlights the differences among systems in order to “offer contrasting examples” of 
the health systems (Wilensky et al, op. cit.: 48-9). However, since the complexity is 
attributed to the “lack of theoretical development in comparative health policy” 
research (ibid. 48), it suggested that a strong theoretical basis for comparison should 
involve an analysis of “cross-national similarities (or differences) in health systems” 
in relation to the “differences (or similarities) in political, economic, or cultural 
contexts” in specific countries (ibid. 4).  
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On the other hand, “fundamental differences between nations does not, in itself, 
constitute an obstacle to comparison” (Hanhinen, op. cit.: 109) nor does the “item or 
the concept” need to “be exactly the same” (Øvretveit, op. cit.: 69). Furthermore, 
“findings of social policy research in the industrial and developing countries can be 
compared and cautiously integrated” (MacPherson and Midgley, 1987: 131). What is 
important is that national contexts are taken into consideration in devising the 
research questions and measures taken to avoid cultural bias (ibid.). As Mabbett and 
Bolderson (op. cit.: 55) conclude, “the case study approach allows the researcher to 
tell a country-specific story, and thereby escapes the problem of operationalizing 
concepts in a uniform way across countries”. In the context of the present study, 
understandings of collaborative actions and NGOs will be augmented through a ‘thick 
description’ of the country’s health systems and the political economy contexts. A 
second point crucial to Wilensky et al’s (op. cit.) critique of paucity of theory in 
comparative health policy research is lack of examining it “in relation to other 
policies or to social policy as a whole”. As already shown in the introduction, this 
study goes beyond common health researches in that it approaches the field from both 
the social policy and the NGO points of view with an underlying notion that:  
 
“As precursors of the welfare state everywhere, voluntary organisations have 
re-emerged everywhere and are playing a crucial role in the welfare state 
today as well as futuristic ones. This re-emergence is a process influencing 
and guiding the future of the welfare state regardless of their cultural context, 
whether the ‘crises’ are real or constructed and how well or poorly developed 
they are” (Oyen, 1986: on back cover of the book).  
 
This contention provides the third and most immediate basis for the comparative 
rationale of this study. The research follows the common framework discussed in 
chapter 2 above in which both case countries have experienced a shift in social policy 
thinking and process in the 1990s with the view that NGOs should play a greater role 
in health care and services promotion as contained in their recent policy frameworks 
(ROK, 1994a; MSAH, 2001b). This development is reflected by a new social and 
health policy paradigm anchored in the neo-liberal discourses on less state (e.g., 
Bennett, McPake and Mills, 1997: 3-5; WHO, 2000: 15-17; Braathen and Dean, 2002; 
Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 9), and more civil society and citizenship participation, 
strengthening community actions, and re-orienting health services towards 
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collaborative efforts among individuals, households, communities, organisations and 
health institutions (e.g., WHO, 1978, 1986, 1988).  
 
A final point is drawn from international comparative studies on NGOs and 
globalization. The most significant and notable example in this regard is The Johns 
Hopkins Comparative Non-Profit Project (CNP), which has covered both countries. 
The underlying rationale for comparing the sector across countries (42 countries from 
all continents have been covered) is the possibility for theory development (Salamon 
et al (Eds.), 1999). With this regard, countries were selected on the basis of 
differences along several dimensions: (1) level of economic development; (2) level of 
social welfare spending; (3) legal framework provided; (4) religious, social and 
cultural diversity; and (5) social and economic histories (ibid. 464). Finland and 
Kenya fit remarkably well in this comparative model. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
This research will use several key conceptual terms as follows: NGO, health system, 
collaboration, and social policy. A working definition of each is discussed here.  
 
Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
 
Definitional understanding of the term ‘NGO’ is one of the most elusive although 
increased interest in the phenomenon has gradually converged on a number of 
consensual features (Marshall, 1996). Studies of the world wide Comparative 
Nonprofit Project (CNP) by the Centre for Civil Society Studies at The Johns Hopkins 
University in the US show an inventory of common minimum attributes known 
collectively as the International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO) 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1997). According to this widely used classification, NGOs, 
otherwise referred to as non-profit organizations here, have five defining features. The 
entities: (1) are formally organised; (2) are privately organised; (3) do not distribute 
earned profit to their members or owners; (4) are independently controlled; and (5) 
are voluntarily organised (Salamon et al, 1999: 3). These features agree with the 
European Union definitions (European Commission, 1999). The most recent attempt 
at a comprehensive definition of the term is by Martens (2002). Using a juridical and 
sociological perspective, he defines NGOs as: 
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“Formal (professionalised) independent societal organizations whose primary 
aim is to promote common goals at the national or international level” (p. 
282).  
 
Owing to the fact that Finland and, lately, Kenya have been included in the CNP, and 
these definitional criteria seen fitting (Helander and Sundback, 1998: 19; Salamon et 
al, op. cit.; Institute for Development Studies, 2002), the term shall not need further 
explanation. Some country specific information may be given however. In Finland, 
the term ‘NGO’ is not widely used in local publications although it appears in, e.g., 
Heikkilä and Karjalainen (1999) and MSAH, 2003a. In stead, the term ‘third sector’ 
or kolmas sektori (in Finnish) is more common albeit with a passing conceptual 
reference as an entity “consisting of associations, foundations and co-operatives” 
(Siisiäinen, Kinnunen and Hietanen, op. cit.: 5). ‘Voluntary association/organization’ 
is also widely used by many Finnish authors (see, e.g., Siisiäinen, 1989; Nylund, 
2000; Helander and Sundback, op. cit.). This variation evidently presents itself in the 
field. For example, organizations operating in the country but with wide international 
exposure or operations readily use the term NGO. On the other hand, public officials 
and others in the sector not very familiar with the international scene are generally 
unacquainted with the term. In Kenya, the state provides the conceptual definition of 
the term. According to the 1990 Non-Governmental Co-ordination Act, an NGO is: 
 
“A private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations, not operated for 
profit or for other commercial purposes but which have organised themselves 
nationally or internationally for the promotion of social welfare, development, 
charity or research” (ROK, 1991);  
 
Any organization operating as an NGO must by law register with the NGO Co-
ordinating Board, otherwise it is illegal. The term is the most widely used in Kenya in 
line with recent discourses on international development (e.g., Korten, 1987; 
Kanyinga, 1993; Edwards and Hulme, op. cit.; Fowler, 1997; Aubrey, op. cit.; Fisher, 
op. cit.). NGOs are organizational forms within the wider concept of civil society, 
which refers to “the totality of organizations formed by citizens outside the state and 
the market (that is, for-profit sector) to support aspects of social life where a common 
interest exists” (Rojas, 1999: 88). In the conceptual relationship, NGOs are regarded 
as the “backbone of civil society” (Hyden, 1995: 44).  
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A final point on usage of the term should be mentioned. Despite the growing use of 
the CNP model, it has potential flaws and, in practice the field of NGOs varies widely 
across countries and meanings (e.g., Fowler, op. cit.: 32).  In general, NGOs are “too 
diverse, too vague, to be pinned down to a single definition” (Barrow and Jennings, 
op. cit.: 2). One crucial example with regard to this research is that while Church 
missions were included in the CNP study, the two state-sponsored Churches 
(Evangelical Lutheran Church and Orthodox Church) were not included in the Finnish 
study (Salamon et al, op. cit.: 66; Mathies, 2000: 216) on this logic. In Kenya the 
Church missions are the largest health actors. Characteristics of health NGOs along 
the legal dimension does not vary as compared to NGOs in other fields although there 
have been recent attempts to define their special roles in both Finland and Kenya. The 
term ‘health NGO’ will then be used to refer to a private formally organized voluntary 
health care provider working outside the direct control of the state on a non-profit 
distributing basis. Thus, a ‘health NGO’ is an NGO defined by its actions in health.   
 
Health System 
 
My usage of this term relies heavily on the notion institutionalized in the World 
Health Organization and health economics. The World Health Report 2000 (WHO, 
2000: 1) defines health systems as “all the organizations, institutions and resources 
that are devoted to producing health actions”. In a broader sense, a health system 
includes “all the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or maintain 
health” (ibid. 5). By health actions, the world health authority refers to “any effort, 
whether in personal health care, public health services or through inter-sectoral 
initiatives, whose primary purpose is to improve health” (ibid.; Griffiths and Mills, 
1983: 52). The model health system presented by Grodos and Mercenier (2000: 22) 
encompasses several elements: environment (physical, social, economic, political), 
health services, specific agents (diseases or health problems), and population 
(heredity, culture, behaviour). A typical institutional view regards health system 
functions as the “mechanisms of finance, delivery and decision-making” in health 
care (Freeman, 1999: 81). Health systems vary in form, function and content.  
 
They are largely identified by the health care services in place in a particular country 
as witnessed by the system of provision and investment on a range of interventions 
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such as curative, palliative and preventive that are directed at individuals or whole 
populations. Health systems have three key objectives: (1) improving the health of the 
population they serve; (2) responding to people’s expectations; and (3) providing 
financial protection against the costs of ill-health (WHO, op. cit.: 8). Formal official 
and private modern high technology services, hospitals, professional medical 
treatments, traditional medicine, home nursing, health insurance, health promotion 
and education are all part of a health system (Griffiths and Mills, op. cit.: 52; Pedersen 
and Baruffati, 1989; WHO, op. cit. 11). Health actions are typically distinguished 
between “curative” and “preventive” services. Curative services are actions aimed at 
treating an already acquired illness. Prevention refers to efforts that aim to stop the 
occurrence of ill health (Last, 1987: 10) such as child immunization, screening, 
antenatal care, and sanitation (e.g., Berman, 2000: 793). Health prevention is 
analogous to health promotion, which is defined as “the process of enabling people to 
increase control over and improve their health” (Last, op. cit.: 10). Such processes 
include public policies, measures and actions for a healthy lifestyle. Promotive health 
is directed at the individual, the community or whole populations (Harding, 2003: 45-
46). The term predominantly used in this research is promotion and elements covered 
in respective case country presentations will be identified and clarified in Part IV. 
 
Collaboration  
 
Collaboration is a broad concept reflecting a formal or informal partnership 
relationship between interacting agencies (e.g., WHO, 2003). Collaboration is 
purposive and of a pragmatic nature regardless of level of design, detail or definition 
(Salamon, 1995: 12). Functional collaboration has various forms such as legal, 
economic, political, cultural, interpersonal relations, participation and networking. 
The aim of collaborative relationships is to “benefit the organizations involved, 
resulting in greater achievements than either would accomplish alone” (Keengwe et 
al, 1998: 6). Partnerships may be elaborated through legislation, policy statements or 
other documentation. They may occur in different levels or variations depending on 
the types of parties involved, purpose or field of action. In service provision or 
promotive education, formal relationships are typically entered into a paper, 
especially when it concerns a contract or a grant. Aspects of size or time period of the 
contract, grant, sale or purchases are typically irrelevant.  
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There are numerous kinds of other collaborative actions that encompass largely policy 
processes participation and decision-making. In one study of nearly 200 self-help 
voluntary groups in Finland, the researcher identified various forms of collaborations 
that included organizing meetings, informing of, and invitations to, lectures, seminars 
and trainings, “and acting as a link between group members and professionals” 
(Nylund, 2000: 94). To these can be added formal and informal meetings, hearings 
and contacts, information and mail exchanges, presentations, representation, 
discussions and consultations, both physical and through telephone, mails and other 
literature materials (see also, Heikkilä and Karjalainen, op. cit.: 18). Organizational 
dynamics, here described as formations of working parties or groups, are a 
particularly crucial indicator of collaborative relations. Such working groups may be 
constituted officially – by a legislatively or administratively documented policy 
having a clear mandate and operational procedures – or more loosely and ad hoc in 
operational procedures and constitution. Contracting is a particularly advanced form 
of collaboration where relational contracts produce long-term collaborations while 
transactional contracts produce short-term collaborations (Palmer, 2000: 824). 
 
Social policy  
 
It would be extremely arduous to construct a general conception of the term ‘social 
policy’. The attempt made here will simply outline the rudiments of the notion as 
understood from its roots and tradition. Simply put, social policy is used to “describe 
actions aimed at promoting well-being” (Alcock, 1998: 8). In the modern world, 
social policy is understood as the central element in the concept of the welfare state, 
which is used to characterize large-scale provision of welfare services by the state. 
Governments do this by establishing policies under which the population has access to 
health care and education, a civilizing standard of living, and adequacy of economic 
opportunity. The welfare state came to embody social policy as the provision of 
public goods free of charge or at heavily subsidized prices (Olsson, 1987: 48) in 
responding to the problem of poverty and industrialization (Martin, 1990: 21; Gilbert, 
1983: 3). But social policy is not an exclusive embodiment of the welfare state, nor 
was it invented by it (Ginsberg, 1999: 19-22; Martin, op. cit.: 20; Marshall, 1965a).  
 
Social policy was the original preoccupation of charitable organizations (e.g., Alcock, 
op. cit. 8-9) and is today practiced by a combination of various sectors – the state 
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(Johnson, 1998), the private (Brunsdon, 1998), the NGOs (Deakin, 1998), and even 
the informal (Ungerson, 1998). Therefore, in a broader sense, social policies are the 
decisions, actions and processes organized in a society for promoting welfare with the 
state generally acting as a “network” frame to which the other actors refer (Kangas, 
1991: 5). Social policy has traditionally focused on education, health, employment, 
housing, and insurance in both developed and developing countries (e.g., 
MacPherson, 1982; Alcock, op. cit.: 9-10). Thus, the present study on health is but 
just one branch of social policy.  
 
Social policy, as contrasted to economic policy, is tied to the wider discourse of 
public policy (Mackintosh, 1992). In this regard, characterization of the notion of 
social policy is from the point of view of policy process. This question is important in 
the present research as discussed in the previous chapter. An additional effect, suitable 
for a more complete understanding of the way social policy is used in this study, is the 
notion of public action for public good. According to Dréze and Sen (1989: 259, in 
ibid), “public action is not … just a question of public delivery and state initiative. It 
is also … a matter of participation by the public in the process of social change”.    
 
 
CHAPTER 6. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Part I. The Research Problem, Context and Method 
 
This part has provided a general introduction to the dissertation. It is meant to provide 
a link to the rest of the text, as discussed in the separate chapters. The first chapter 
provide a brief introduction to the study and attempted to do four things: provide a 
view of the current discourse on health systems; discuss why the research in NGO 
health system is uniquely important; highlight the importance and rationale of the 
international cross-cultural study; and present a justification note on the consideration 
of the two countries. The second chapter has discussed in more detail the background 
and general rationale. It starts by presenting the research problem in the context of 
government-NGO collaboration in the current health policy framework in both 
countries and moves on to discuss the broad international context. The chapter also 
highlights a theoretical background for the collaboration in current context of 
privatisation and health reforms in the two countries. It closes by summarizing the 
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problem and specific rationale for the study. Chapter three has focused on the aims of 
the study while chapter four presented the methodological approach and research 
technique for the cross-country study as well as gives a note on comparability. The 
fifth chapter has defined the main terms and concepts used while the present chapter 
closes with details of the dissertation structure.    
 
Part II: Theories of Social Welfare, NGOs and Health Development Discourses  
 
Part II reviews the relevant literature and locates the study within the theoretical ideas 
that have informed it. It contains four major chapters. In chapter one, theories of 
social welfare policy are discussed as they establish the basis for grasping the deep-
seated societal concerns with social-economic problems. The second chapter 
examines the implications and usefulness of interorganizational relations theory to the 
study. Chapter three places the study in its immediate relevance discussing various 
theoretical debates and research on NGOs as phenomena. Finally, a review of 
literature on current and on-going international health developments is outlined in 
order to place the research more centrally in health.  
 
Part III: The Socio-Economic Context of Health Care Organization and 
Development in Finland and Kenya  
 
Part III focuses the dissertation on the context of the two countries (Finland and 
Kenya). It is meant to provide a thorough grounding for the understanding of health 
systems and collaborative relations using data to depict the trends. Each case country 
stands as a separate section and will be discussed in light of four themes each forming 
a separate chapter. The first chapter will briefly describe the prevailing socio-
economic and political context in the countries. Chapter two will present an analytical 
description of the health care systems in the countries with particular regard to 
structure, distribution, financing and utilization. A third chapter will focus substantive 
attention to healthcare reforms and development each country in the context of global 
processes with special regard to the WHO HFA. Chapter four takes a critical look at 
the implications of the health reforms on NGOs using field interviews and 
documentary perspectives.  
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Part IV: Organization of the NGO Health System in Finland and Kenya  
 
In this part, the discussions concentrate on the organization of the NGOs health 
system; each case country is depicted in a separate section. It is intended to be a 
source map or overview of available data and information on the NGOs health system 
and issues in service provision, health promotion and participation in current health 
policy process. This is done in four main chapters with the first describing the overall 
context and working environment of health NGOs. In the next three chapters, the 
scope and roles of NGOs in the health sector will be discussed in line with the three 
main areas of analysis: service provision, promotion, and participation in policy 
making. The discussions will use the latest available data on this sub-sector of NGOs 
while using cases to illustrate the phenomena. 
 
Part V: Government-NGO Collaborations in Health Care Provision, Promotion, 
and Participation in Policy-Making in Finland and Kenya  
 
This Part will discuss government-NGO collaborations in health care following the 
three main areas of analysis in each country, discussed in a separate section. The aim 
is to synthesize the main collaboration lines with the help of these three key pointers 
while tying the discussions to Parts III and IV. In the discussion, critical look will be 
made covering the overall context and rationale for collaborations, the inter-
organizational relationships and the forms of collaboration in health care provision, 
promotion and participation in policy-making. It will seek to synthesize (1) the extent 
to which the collaborations are based on legislation or/and (2) other policy including 
the environment and processes fundamental to understanding relations between the 
sectors. Relevant information and knowledge will be used in the discussions as well 
as illumination of cases using the research materials. 
 
Part VI: Conclusions and Summary of Findings: A Comparative Synthesis  
 
This final Part will summarize and conclude the results of the dissertation in a 
comparative approach. It has two main chapters. The first synthesizes on the trends in 
the changing health care systems, the nature and scope of the NGO health system and 
types of collaborations. Chapter two discusses the research implications and raises 
some questions on areas for further research.  
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PART II: THEORIES OF SOCIAL WELFARE, NGOS AND 
HEALTH DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES 
 
CHAPTER 1. SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY THEORIES 
 
The welfare state as both a political entity and an institutional social policy apparatus is 
hinged on the economic and administrative achievements of twentieth century 
industrialized nations. Although social policy predates the welfare state (Ginsberg, 1999: 
19-22; Martin, 1990: 20; Marshall, 1965a), it is today the very nature of the welfare state 
(Alcock, 1998: 9). Social policy and practice has its roots in the English Poor Laws of the 
sixteenth century (e.g., Marshall, op. cit.). On the other hand, the welfare state is post-
WWII phenomena (ibid. 75). Pre-welfare state societies were shaped by classicism but 
with industrialization and the expansion of political rights, social change was inevitable. 
Social policy derives from societal concerns with poverty while the welfare state can be 
seen as the extension of these concerns through political and economic development 
processes (e.g., Martin, op. cit.: 21). The development of social policy, as opposed to a 
free market system, was intellectually heavily influenced by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal 
with their “vision” of “productive” social policy as the provision of public goods free of 
charge or at heavily subsidized prices (Olsson, 1987: 48).   
 
Gilbert, Specht and Terrell (1993: 15-16) summarize four general theoretical 
explanations for the development of modern social welfare; they are general because one 
cannot hope to explain all aspects of social welfare policy across the diversity of societies 
using a single model (see, e.g., Spicker, 2000: 4-6). These are: functionalism, welfare as 
citizenship, technological determinism, and neo-Marxism. They represent a diversity of 
perspectives and argue that cultural, historical, economic, and socio-political ideological 
factors are key to understanding social welfare development and divergences in different 
societies. Functionalism is associated more with cultural norms, welfare citizenship more 
with socio-political progression towards democracy, determinism more with historical 
evolution of industrialization, and Marxism with politico-ideological processes of class 
and power struggle. I will discuss each below and give a conclusion at the end of each to 
indicate the relevant understandings we draw for the present study. Before doing so I will 
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highlight the key features of the modern social policy institution that these theories refer 
to. The following captures most of the classic features of the (ideal) welfare state.  
 
“A welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through 
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at 
least three directions – first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum 
income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by 
narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet 
certain ‘social contingencies’ (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) 
which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that 
all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards 
available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services” (Asa Briggs, in 
Ku, 1997: 2-3).  
 
The understanding we gather from this view is that the state provides welfare on strong 
moral, libertarian and pragmatic motivations. Hence, the main feature of the modern 
social policy is intervention by government (MacPherson and Midgley, 1987: 2). Karlson 
(1993: 176-180) refers to the welfare state as the state of state, a mid-way compromise 
between totalitarianism and socialism. It is a “society which is heavily dominated by the 
state”: with countless “taxes, subsidies and regulations”; which is inflexible; on which a 
majority of citizens are heavily dependent; and where “resources are taken from everyone 
and given to everyone by means of politics” (ibid. 179). Principally, this entails three key 
elements: (1) guaranteeing of a “minimum standards, including a minimum income”; (2) 
“social protection in the event of insecurity”; and (3) “the provision of services at the best 
level possible” (ibid. 146). The welfare state is also illuminated by “collective action for 
social protection” (Spicker, op. cit.: 5).  
 
In The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Goodin et al (1999) suggest that advanced 
welfare states could be investigated on the basis of six pre-determined traditional-moral 
values, which they call “‘external standards of assessment’”. Five of them are to promote: 
“economic efficiency, social equality, social integration and avoiding social exclusion, 
social stability and autonomy”; and the sixth is to reduce poverty (p. 22). No one would 
argue that certain states exist to do otherwise and, therefore, these “moral ideals” of the 
state are universal (Mazrui, 1995: 28). However, the breadth and definition of social 
policy can vary broadly between countries and depends on many factors. Typically, it 
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would mean the employment of a certain share of economic resources measured by gross 
domestic product (GDP) (e.g., Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1958: 156; Ku, op. cit.; Karlson, 
op. cit.; Esping-Andersen, 1990) to achieve “the best level possible” in welfare (Spicker, 
op. cit.: 146). GDP is used to measure welfare exertion or effort (Wilensky et al, 1985: 9) 
although it is inadequate since it cannot quantify regulation or political influences 
(Karlson, op. cit.: 135-6). Indeed, MacPherson and Midgley (op. cit. 128), for example, 
are particularly convinced that the political determinants are more primary to explaining 
social welfare development in the developing world.  
 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) devised a useful 
analytical framework of ‘regime clusters’ (Goodin et al, op. cit.: 84-86). Following his 
popular classification, historical and contemporary scholarship on the welfare state has 
developed three distinctive types of welfare state ‘regimes’: social 
democratic/institutional, corporatist, and liberalist/residualist (see, e.g., Esping-Andersen, 
op. cit.; Spicker, op. cit.: 144-150; Goodin et al, op. cit.; Stephens, 1996: 33; Pierson, 
1998: 173-175; Ginsburg, 1992). Each of these can be summarized as follows. The 
Scandinavian model is institutional and social-democratic with broad universal statutory 
and non-contributory coverage. According to this type, the comprehensive (cradle-to-
grave) welfare is for everyone. However, remarkable variations do appear among these 
countries (e.g., Stephens, op. cit.). The corporatist model on the other hand exists in 
various variants in continental Europe (ibid.; Wilensky et al, op. cit.). Here, state welfare 
is ancillary to other forms of producing welfare. By contrast, the liberal welfare state is 
residualist, with minimum welfare benefits where welfare is for the poor; this model is 
best applied to the U.S. These regime types differ in the degree or extent of coverage of 
their social policies. Of course, none of these models characterize state welfare in the 
developing world although they provide potential for learning from the point of view of 
the world systems theoretical framework advanced by Amin and Wallerstein (see, esp. 
MacPherson and Midgley, op. cit.: 1-12).  
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1.1. Social Welfare as Institutional Functionalism  
 
“‘Institutional frame-works define the ends and shape the means by which 
[societal] interests are determined and pursued’” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 
28).  
 
According to the functionalist view of social welfare policy, the organization of 
“essential social functions” is primordial to all societies (Gilbert, Specht and Terrell, op. 
cit.: 3). Functionalism is especially rooted in Parsonian sociology, which sees society as a 
“system of action” in which myriad social units interact (Holt, 1965: 87). According to 
this notion, various dynamic and independent societal institutions, such as “kinship, 
religion, economics, mutual assistance, politics”, and their corresponding organizational 
forms – “family, Church, business/union, voluntary agency, government” – each existing 
to perform specific “social function”, are fundamental to all human civilization (Gilbert, 
Specht and Terrell, op. cit.; Mulkay, 1971: 40). Functionalist sociology posits that we can 
only understand the social system by describing the interrelationships of the otherwise 
independent units (ibid.). Primary to the functionalist theory is the notion that social 
welfare fulfils integrative and cohesive social functions (Gilbert, Specht and Terrell, op. 
cit.: 15). As such, the question to ask is, what roles do the different social institutions play 
in society as a whole?  
 
In his The Sociological Imagination (1959), C. Wright Mills finds that the need to create 
a social order, or to standardize the interactive sphere, arises from the desire to make 
those expectations “enduring and stable” (p. 32). Hence, the emergence of the social 
system, defined as “the system of interdependent roles and corporate structures of 
society” (Holt, op. cit.: 87).  It is in this continuity illumination that we must understand 
the systemness of society. Parsons conceptualized four functional “requisites” of the 
social system, as discussed by Holt (op. cit.: 92-94): the maintenance of social order; 
“goal attainment”; adaptability of productive resources; and the “integration” of 
differentiated roles of individuals and units. Accordingly, the four functional requisites 
are described as the “operational conditions that must be satisfied if the system is to 
continue to exist” (ibid. 88).  
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Applying these rudiments to the operation of government, defined as an institutional 
“corporate structure”, Holt uses the structural-functionalist approach to demonstrate its 
theoretical application. By function he refers to “system requiredness” (ibid.; original 
emphasis). As relates to state, Holt defines the concept of structure, as “interrelated 
roles” played “purposively as a collective” (ibid.). He notes how government evolves to 
support the maintenance of cultural patterns and values in traditional societies, and as 
“the dominant organization within society” (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 236). Most 
notably is the manner in which government functions are shaped – by normalizing, 
social, cultural, economic and political activities through legal sanctions. Eastby (1985: 
116) asserts that the single “dynamic factor” giving birth to the welfare state is “the 
desire for a more comfortable life”. Thus, once the polity achieve consensus an 
appropriate organization is rationalized to pursue society’s “material functions” (ibid. 
10).  According to this view, the actions assumed by government, such as the regulation 
of health production sphere, are in line with the systems functions of conformity, goal 
attainment, adaptation and integration. We can, for example, note market regulation, e.g., 
health producers in the market sphere, as a role of the (now apparent) welfare state for 
achieving adaptation efficiency and integration in the social system (Holt, op. cit.: 105-6).  
 
Esping-Andersen (op. cit.) renders two functionalist strands – the systems/structuralist 
approach and the institutional/functionalist approach – both of which assert the function 
of the welfare state in social cohesion and economic reproduction. Accordingly, the 
welfare state, as a structural system, exists to provide “some basic modicum of welfare 
for its citizens”, in which state responsibility and provision of needs are institutionalised 
(Esping-Andersen, op. cit.: 18-9; Mishra, 1976: 30); Esping-Andersen (op. cit.: 13) 
regards this as the “welfare function’” of the state. The state however functions as a 
“social policy-making network” which becomes a “frame of reference” for other actors 
(Kangas, 1991: 5). Hence, it does not, in fact, eliminate other actors. Flanigan and 
Fogelman (1965) also apply the structural-functionalist approach in analyzing political 
systems. Accordingly, they assess the functional requisites of the polity, defined as “the 
subsystem primarily concerned with the mobilization of resources to meet system goals” 
(p. 117).  They view the social system holistically as a “political phenomena”, with 
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politics being the key to unravelling its four requisite functions (p. 125). As for Mitrany, 
the attainment of welfare is the fundamental objective of the “political community” 
(Eastby, op. cit.: 3).  
 
Perhaps the best functionalist articulation in regard to a theory of the welfare state is the 
one given by Robert Merton. In their triple exposition of functionalism, Flanigan and 
Fogelman (op. cit.: 113-5) discuss Merton’s analysis of the social function of the state as 
“empirical functionalism”. Quoted in Holt (op. cit.: 85-6; original emphasis) specifically 
as “machine”, and more generally as the “corporate structure”, the welfare state “fulfils 
the important social function of harmonizing and personalizing all manner of assistance 
to those in need”. Further, it discharges the function of “providing alternative channels of 
social mobility for those otherwise excluded from the more conventional avenues for 
personal ‘advancement’” (ibid.).  
 
In conclusion, bureaucratization reflects a core internal feature of the welfare state 
(Willensky et al, 1985: 12), and serves primarily to accentuate the functional aspects of 
the administrative organs created. In a context of diverse social and institutional actors, it 
acts to integrate, adapt and regulate the other actors thus creating interdependencies in the 
social system or political community. In this sense, the functionalist view of social 
welfare is useful in the present study. It helps us understand four key points. First is the 
basic thesis of institutional diversity in society (e.g., NGOs, and the state) where each 
fulfils certain social functions. This helps us capture the notion of ‘system’ and function 
such as health care organization. Third are the primary goals of the state and rationale for 
the social welfare function. Crucially, it introduces the expectations we have regarding 
state-NGO interdependences from the point of view of collaboration rather than conflict 
in harmonizing the social system, taking health care as our function.  
 
1.2. Welfare as Citizenship 
 
According to the welfare (as) citizenship theory, social welfare policy is the product of an 
evolution of rights in the societal institution to which belonging individuals have a right 
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(Gilbert, Specht and Terrell, op. cit.: 15-16). The construction of citizenship as the basis 
for welfare sheds greater light to the functionalist view of institutions. While the 
functionalist approach analyses the role of social institutions, the citizenship theory has as 
its central emphasis the individuals who constitute the institutions. That is why it is 
regarded as the sociological approach to social policy (e.g., Ginsburg, 1992: 10-11). The 
individuals’ rights become the rationale for the existence of the social system in which 
social entitlements are based not on market criteria but on citizenship (Johansen, 1986: 
141). As such, the pertinent issues are the determination for belonging or qualifying, and 
the rendering of credibility, to the institution.  
 
Welfare citizenship is most central to T. H. Marshall’s sociology. In what he calls the 
three elements of citizenship – civil, political and social citizenship – Marshall (1965b) 
regards citizenship as the essence of social welfare. He characteristically refers to these as 
the rights to “life, liberty and welfare”, respectively (ibid. 258). In his Class, Citizenship 
and Social Development Marshall argues that these rights evolved progressively as a 
political process in three distinct historical eras spanning three centuries. According to his 
classic view: civil rights, such as individual freedom and liberties, developed in the 
eighteenth century; political rights, such as the right to vote, in the nineteenth; and social 
rights in the twentieth (ibid. 78-91). The extended social rights encompass:  
 
“The whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security 
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (ibid. 78).  
 
The existence of these rights is emblematic of the modern advanced democratic societies: 
the attainment of welfare citizenship completes the rights of individuals in the civilized 
society. Accordingly, societies that are still advancing are urged to pursue this goal of 
“ideal citizenship” (Marshall, op. cit.: 92). Mills (op. cit.: 36) refers to the role of 
legitimation as “necessary” for justifying the institutions “in terms of ‘public service and 
trust’”. In Marshall’s (1965b) sociology, the legitimacy of the system is based on the 
defined rights of citizens. By the “rights of citizenship”, Marshall refers to “the admission 
of all to full membership of the society, which carries with it rights and freedom, to 
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political power and to welfare” (ibid. 150). Social welfare is, therefore, a system of trust 
and universal suffrage for the allocation of public goods to which qualified citizens have 
equality of rights. Thus, welfare citizenship refers to the “political aspects” of social 
welfare in the industrialized society (Gilbert, Specht and Terrell, op. cit.: 16). This system 
is arrived at and maintained through mileages in social solidarity (Ginsburg, op. cit. 11) 
and political acts (MacPherson and Midgley, op. cit.: 128) through a gradual process of 
democratisation and economic equalization (Myrdal, 1960: 36-40).  
 
This theoretical strand is therefore extremely important in understanding the development 
of health care systems in modern societies. As we shall see later in chapter 4, the 1978 
Health for All by Year 2000 promulgated by the WHO sought the commitment of nations 
to a rights approach in health care through the development of a primary health care 
system in which individuals were not merely passive consumers but fully participated 
(WHO, 1978). The rights approach has required enshrinement of health as a basic right in 
Finland and Kenya’s constitutions, although to a more or less degree. In practice, of 
course, the picture is far from perfect, again in differing degrees, with regard to the key 
issues of equity and access welfare citizenship theory would demand.  
 
1.3. Technological Determinism or Development Theory  
 
“Economic growth makes countries with contrasting cultural and political 
traditions more alike in their strategy for constructing the floor below which no 
one sinks” (Wilensky, 1975: 25).  
 
Technological determinism contends that the development of social welfare policy is 
predicated on industrial capitalist expansion and that a society’s path toward development 
can be predicted. According to this theory, particular technical developments, rather than 
human factors, are the prime antecedent causes of change in society. Consequently, 
technology and economic advancement are seen as the fundamental conditions 
underlying the pattern of social welfare organization at certain stages in history regardless 
of the underlying political ideologies (see, e.g., Wilensky, op. cit.; Mishra, op. cit.; 
Wilensky et al, op. cit.). Technological determinism is central to industrialization theory, 
or industrialism logic, and welfare capitalism (see below). These are so-called 
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convergence theories according to which industrial expansion of technology and 
economy draws traditional societies towards a “common institutional pattern” or goal 
(Mishra, op. cit.: 49; Skinner, 1976: 3); Wilensky’s hypothesis above represents the 
sharpest convergence thesis (for fuller exposition, see, Wilensky et al, op. cit: 9-12). The 
role of industrialization in social welfare development is explained through convergence 
theory according to which industrialization causes economic growth and social welfare to 
converge regardless of political ideology (ibid.; Ku, op. cit.: 64-5). In other words, “with 
economic growth, all countries develop similar social security programs” (Wilensky, op. 
cit.: 86).  
 
Best espoused by John Maynard Keynes through his revolutionary general theory of 
economic growth and employment, industrialization theory suggests that as industrial 
mass production expands so does welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 3; Ginsburg, op. cit.: 
12; Wilensky et al, op. cit.: 5-12; Mishra, op. cit.; Marshall, 1965b: 92). Indeed, data 
constructed for both developed and developing countries show that “programs to protect 
against … basic risks of industrial life are primarily responses to economic development 
and [are] independent of regime types” (Wilensky et al, op. cit.: 11). The logic of 
economic determinism is that without industrialization there would be no welfare 
services to be provided or the professionals and administrative apparatus to distribute 
them: “industrialization so vastly increases the income of a society that it makes such 
expenditures possible” (Wilensky and Lebeaux, op. cit.: 14). Similarly, Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 13) notes, “industrialization makes social policy both necessary and possible”. In 
another study conducted by Wilensky et al (op. cit.: 6) in seventy-six countries, for 
example, social security “most powerfully correlates with the level of economic 
development”.  And in Kenya, Kanyinga (1995: 72-73) found out that as “economic 
performance improved, public expenditure tended to rise and vice versa”. As the 
arguments purport, economic development leads to, rather than merely increases, 
welfare. 
 
A particularly especial concept associated with the logic of industrialism is welfare 
capitalism or welfare corporatism. The concept refers to industry’s consideration for the 
 45
“social needs of workers through an assortment of medical and funeral benefits, as well 
as provisions for recreational, educational, housing, and social services” (e.g., Gilbert, 
1983: 3). The underlying contention for welfare capitalism is that motivated by the need 
for continued manufacturing, industrial “manors” (Jacoby, 1997) extended “their concern 
for the conditions of employee life beyond the production line” (Gilbert, op. cit.). Hence, 
welfare expansion and social change is arguably determined by the needs of industry, 
(Gilbert, Specht, Terrel, op. cit.: 16; Ginsburg, op. cit.: 9; Gilbert op. cit.). In other words, 
the social interests of labour and the technical interests of capital converge (Gilbert, 
Specht and Terrell, op. cit: 16). 
 
Welfare capitalism, or “welfare for profit” (Gilbert, op. cit.: 3-32), has several 
characteristic features. One is the need for maximizing industrial profits. As Gilbert (op. 
cit.: 3) explains, began in the late nineteenth century as ‘welfare work’”, it was driven as 
much by the self-interest of industry – the continued production for profit – as by 
philanthropic motives for corporate responsibility. A second feature is an “ethical 
impulse” (Jacoby, op. cit.) predicated on religious beliefs according to which huge 
accumulation of wealth beseech the entrepreneur to share some of the wealth with 
workers (Wilensky and Lebeaux, op. cit.: 161). In their Industrial Society and Social 
Welfare, these authors illustrate the industrial optimism from the position that “men in 
pursuing their self-interest would inevitably contribute to the general good” (p, 29). “By 
providing amenities and other fringe benefits, the belief was, bonds between the 
employer and employee would be strengthened (Jacoby, op. cit.: 14; Gilbert, op. cit.: 16). 
Described as the “Protestant (Social) Ethic”, the impulse drives man to the need for 
“‘belonging’” to the group, for conforming and for social responsibility (ibid. 39-40). 
Another feature of welfare capitalism is its variation across towns and across firms 
(Jacoby, op. cit.: 14).  
 
Ku (op. cit.: 4) identifies four constructions of welfare capitalism. The first is the use of 
welfare capitalism as an apparatus for the distribution of goods and services. In this view, 
the combination of welfare and capitalism denote the “mixing of public and private 
sectors” for resource distribution through non-market channels. This approach is well 
 46
explicated in Galbraith’s The New Industrial State (1967). Pierson (1998) also supports 
this logic-of-industrialism’s view of the welfare state. He notes: “the welfare state is 
embedded in an industrial order which is itself premised upon economic growth” (p. 98). 
In this regard, “the actions of the state in capitalist society are related to the interests of 
the capital” (Skinner, op. cit.: 13). According to Galbraith (1967: 71), the linkage 
between the state and the capitalist market system is central to the rise of the 
technostructure – the organization of decision-making in the firm by expert management. 
Thus, government action, seen as “serving the needs of the industrial system”, is driven 
by “a strong aspect of social purpose” (ibid. 379). In this construction, social welfare has 
moved from industry patronage to state patronage.  
 
Thus, the second construction of welfare capitalism, according to Ku (op. cit.), is “as a 
form of state economy”. Galbraith’s view of state is one having a strong purpose in 
supporting economic growth. Hence the development of state policies takes place in the 
market economy. This is the doctrine underlying the Keynesian revolution, which 
establishes the welfare state proper (Wilensky and Lebeaux, op. cit.; Myrdal, op. cit.; 
Galbraith, op. cit.; Jacoby, op. cit.; and Ginsburg, op. cit.). Most compellingly, Jacoby 
(op. cit.) traces welfare capitalism from its traditional rooting to the age of the welfare 
state. Distinctly, he regards the welfare state as the “legacy” of welfare capitalism (p. 
206-220). Hence, the triumph of the welfare state is predicated on the victory of 
Keynesianism over the private welfare corporatism or “enterprise welfare” (Mishra, op. 
cit.; Ginsburg, op. cit.: 9). Mishra (op. cit.: 214) views this development as inevitable: “as 
our civilization becomes more complex, it is only natural that government will have a 
little more to do with it than it had in the past”.  
 
Although, as demonstrated by Jacoby (op. cit.: 5), welfare capitalism did not completely 
“die” as a result of the Depression, “it went underground” only to re-emerge in a 
modernized fashion from the 1930s to the 1960s with intense labourist and “government 
activism” (ibid.) Indeed as he further asserts, “without doubt, welfare capitalism had to 
change if it were to survive what was becoming a hostile climate, one in which company 
unions were unlawful, collective bargaining was public policy, and a nascent welfare 
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state promised to shield workers from uncertainties of industrial life” (ibid.; original 
emphasis). Nevertheless, enterprise welfare was to become a dominant feature of 
advanced industrial societies (Mishra, op. cit. 31), although, as Jacoby (op. cit.: 236-262) 
observes, welfare capitalism has continued to exist beside welfare state and unionism, 
albeit dominated by the welfare state.  
 
The third characterization of welfare capitalism interprets the phenomenon as a result of 
conflicts of power between contending groups. This is a central argument in the Marxist 
analysis of social welfare and is thus more appropriately looked at in the next sub-
section. In the fourth interpretation, welfare capitalism is discussed “as a regime”, most 
notably propagated by Esping-Andersen (Ku, op. cit.). This characterization can also be 
seen as a Marxist view because the regime emerges to socialize economic life and end 
class domination for the purpose of eliminating “barriers to political unity” and, thereby, 
ensuring continuity in capitalist production (Esping-Andersen, op. cit.: 12). Esping-
Andersen (op. cit.) makes this point clear by stating: “the strategic value of welfare 
policies is that they help promote the onward march of productive forces in capitalism”. 
Ku (op. cit.) finds this interpretation “more comprehensive” because of the factors it 
combines.  
 
To conclude, we can draw some useful understandings from this theory. From the logic 
of industrialism, we understand the central role of economic growth and expansion in 
developing social and health care systems. Most fundamentally is the central role of the 
state and governments in economic development (e.g., Wamai, 2003) and, in particular 
regard, their vantage position in harnessing the fruits thereof towards more generalized 
social welfare. Development and economic constraints and limited public-sector capacity 
readily explain the lack of achievement of stated social policy goals in Kenya as in other 
developing countries. Development theory can therefore help explain the differences 
between the level of advancement in health systems development in Finland and Kenya. 
Welfare capitalism is also useful in reflecting on market and non-market mechanism of 
health care delivery. Welfare capitalism can centrally be applied in the health discourse to 
underpin the development of health insurance or occupational, or workplace, health. For 
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example, provision of occupational health in Finland is statutory (MSAH, 2001e) as well 
as in Kenya (Berman et al, 1995: 60-63), although in both countries other non-statutory 
insurance schemes exist.  
 
1.4. Marxist View on the Emergence of Social Welfare Policy 
 
“The ruling capitalist class was forced to expand social policy in order to 
guarantee its security in the face of growing working-class political strength” 
(Martin, op. cit.: 23; emphasis added). 
 
From the Marxist point of view, social welfare is “fundamentally a way” of regulating 
and controlling “the conditions under which work is organized and wealth is distributed” 
(Gilbert, Specht and Terrell, op. cit.: 16; Pierson, op. cit.: 91-2: Spicker, 1988: 99). 
Spicker (op. cit.) defines the institution of state through the concepts of “power and 
authority”. In his analysis, he presents two models of power distribution. One is the elitist 
model explored within the Marxian tradition and argues that the use of (state) welfare is a 
means for controlling people. The second is the pluralist model, which encourages 
organizational welfare, or “control by self-determination”, to achieve the same goal (ibid. 
101). Marxist accounts are not entirely different from welfare capitalism (distinguished 
here from technological determinism) because they are rooted in the relations between 
labour and capitalism and also look at structural elements of the industrial society and 
economic development. However, Marxism, or historical materialism, characterizes the 
class conflicts struggle for power and control and is interested in radically changing the 
social order (Myrdal, op. cit.: 5); Himmelstrand et al (1981) and Pierson (1986) give a 
particularly thorough class analysis of labour, state and capitalism – and a defence of 
Marxism – in especially Sweden and Britian. Unlike functionalism and determinism, 
Marxism recognizes as fundamental socio-political and economic influences on welfare 
(Myrdal, op. cit.) and articulates the theory of class mobilization.  
 
Marxist approaches directly locate welfare social policy in the consequences of capitalist 
industrialization (Himmelstrand et al, op. cit.: 44-50; see also Flora, 1986: xii-xvi, on the 
“common origins of the European welfare state”).  
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“Thus we can identify the central factor in the sociohistorical emergence of the 
welfare state social policy as the urban-sited class struggle of industrial 
capitalism. In addition to producing the modern class struggle, industrial 
capitalism was the basis for demographic changes, such as the aging of 
populations, which also furthered the emergence of the welfare state social 
policy” (Martin, op. cit.: 24).  
 
Thus, whilst welfare capitalism attributes altruistic motives to the emergence of welfare, 
the Marxist approach attributes it entirely to its “strategic value” in capitalist production 
(Esping-Andersen, op. cit.: 12). Supporting this position, Himmelstrand et al (op. cit.: 
18), note the “unequivocal evidence” that businesses give more consideration to the 
dictates for profiteering than to acts of social responsibility. According to these views, 
welfare did not develop out of capitalism’s altruistic motives “but because of the political 
threat represented by organized workers” (Martin, op. cit.: 23). Indeed, more than any 
other factor, class struggle is argued to have heralded the welfare state (see especially, 
Pierson, op. cit.: 110-128). This critique of corporatist welfare capitalism contends that 
welfare work could not survive on its own, nor could paternalistic relations be sustained 
too long. It was exploitative and manipulative and sought to weaken their power and 
activism, and to keep wages low (Jacoby, op. cit.: 15; Martin, op. cit.: 22).   
 
Propelled by the Great Depression, unions “were viewed as the exemplar of a laborist 
alternative to welfare capitalism” (Jacoby, op. cit.: 17); this is where the Marxist views 
depart from the altruistic version of welfare capitalism. Accordingly, welfare is not a 
munificent manifestation of industrial ‘manors’ but something, which had to be wrestled 
from them through a class-political struggle. Marxism does not see the welfare state 
emergence as a solution that entirely eliminates inequality and class dominance, or more 
perceptively put, capitalism dominance, only now in the form of a new structural 
arrangement of power, the state. Rather, in Esping-Andersen’s (op. cit.: 30) third 
contention for “the causes of welfare state regimes”, the classes become institutionalized, 
albeit to different preferences in different regime types. Indeed, the thrust of the Marxist 
theory is that the state will remain “autonomous from class directives” providing welfare 
for the “collective needs of capital” “regardless” of any class control (ibid. 14).  
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The relevance of the Marxist views of the development of social welfare policy in the 
present study regards its acknowledgement of differences between social classes or 
groups in accessing services. It helps us understand the development of the welfare state 
aimed at achieving comprehensive and universalitistic social and health care through 
capitalist means closely connected to or rallied by the state. As Green and Thorogood 
(1998: 175) assert, Marxist accounts to health policy fundamentally help us understand 
questions of “who profits” from health care arrangements and “in whose interests it is 
organized”. Notably, the model sheds light on organizational welfare in an environment 
of institutional pluralism even when the political regime assumes major responsibility for 
the collective needs as a means of justifying its legitimacy (Mills, op. cit.: 36; Habermas, 
1975; Scott, 1991: 169). The primary goal for this is the elimination of inequality. Both 
Finland and Kenya have pluralistic systems of politics and health care organization 
despite the much more advanced welfare state in the former. The shortcomings of politics 
and planning and administration, and markets, seen through a Marxist lens, can help 
explain adamant inequalities and exclusion in both countries.        
 
 
CHAPTER 2. INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
 
“‘All organizations have relationships with other organizations’ with which they 
interface and interact. This interfacing and interaction defines their organizational 
relational environment and grows out of the very fact that many organizations are 
not self-sufficient and cannot operate alone” (Aubrey, 1997: 13).  
 
Interorganizational relations (IOR) theory is introduced to analyse relations between 
interacting agents (Negandhi, 1975) working “towards a particular goal” (Aubrey, op. 
cit.: 9). Although the theory has its historical roots in the discipline of sociology, it has 
also achieved prominent recognition in economics. Parsons’s quest to understand how 
seemingly individual units interacted in maintaining the social system formed the 
sociological foundation for IOR (Holt, 1965: 92; Evan, 1976: 120). From the sociological 
perspective, society stands as the overall level of analysis. Society is seen as comprising a 
collection of subunits, which together make a social system (Zeitz, 1975: 40). 
Institutionalists such as Friedland and Alford (1991), define a society as “an 
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interinstitutional system”. Accordingly, institutions are perceived as “supraorganizational 
patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material life in time and space, 
and symbolic systems through which they categorize that activity and infuse it with 
meaning”.  
 
IOR has attained central importance in the post-industrial pluralistic “‘society of 
organizations’” characterized by service delivery (Druker, 1986: 173-4) and in the 
development discourse (Aubrey, op. cit.). The interorganizational framework helps us 
analyse and understand interlinked systems, networks and partnerships in such complex 
environments. As described by Scott (1991: 173-4) the framework can be employed to 
investigate not only the “sources of normative and cognitive influence” and funding, 
among other things, but also “non-local as well as local connections, vertical as well as 
horizontal ties, and cultural and political influences as well as technical exchanges”. It 
can be used to measure economic variables such as financial transactions and exchanges 
but also the flow of information, influence and personnel (Evan, op. cit.: 130). At the 
same time, IOR employs boundaries determined, for example, by geography, function 
and by field. There are several sub-groups of IOR theory as discussed by Negandhi (op. 
cit.). Among those, which argue from an economic point of view refer to scarcity and 
efficiency in the (re)distribution of resources. Sociological theories have socio-political 
and cultural leanings. I discuss each of these below.  
 
According to economic theories (e.g., those discussed in the following chapter) there are 
no innate reasons why organizations should interact (e.g., Zeit, op. cit.; Adamek and 
Lavin, 1975; Evan, op. cit.; Milner, 1980; Friedland and Alford, op. cit.). It is argued that 
organizations generally prefer to have independence so as to be able to directly control 
their own resources and actions. However, they could hardly work independently if only 
for the primary reason that resources are hardly ever enough (Zeit, op. cit.: 40; Milner, 
op. cit.: 11; Aubrey, op. cit.: 9). Hence inadequacy of resources leads to two possible 
outcomes: competition, as occurs in the market; or organizations may agree to collaborate 
by pooling their resources in order to increase both production and distribution (Milner, 
op. cit.: 11). As such, the underlying motive that drives an agency to interact with another 
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and to build partnerships is maximizing profits. This is the essence of exchange theory, 
which seeks to unravel why otherwise autonomous organizations interact (e.g., Zeitz, op. 
cit.). Its main starting point is that there would be no need for agencies to cooperate if the 
elements needed to fulfil agency goals were in unlimited supply (Levine and White, 
1961: 587). The theory assumes that actors are “already constituted, rational and 
functioning entities who enter into [relations] to make up for specific deficiencies through 
exchanges” (Zeitz, op. cit.). As Milner (op. cit.) observes in his study, Unequal Care: A 
Case Study of Interorganizational Relations in Health Care:  
 
“Joint activity is most likely if there are both a common scarcity and 
complementary resources in reducing that scarcity”. 
 
According to him, interorganizational relations are mediated by three key variables: 
scarcity, uncertainty and interdependence. These acknowledge a far more complex 
interorganizational system, for as a study by Adamek and Lavin (op. cit.: 206) found out, 
“organizations with the greatest abundance of elements were most likely to engage in 
exchange”. In this light, Milner (op. cit.: 9) determines three crucial factors that define 
interorganizational relationships in health care: (1) dependencies with regard to resources 
and needs; (2) the institutional practice and expectations of the relations; and (3) the 
easiness or investment in time and energy in negotiating the relationships. Here, 
coordination is seen to emerge as a process in social action mediated among markets, 
governments or dualistic decision-making organs (ibid.). According to this argument, 
networking is driven by the demands for greater efficiency in public sector performance. 
In order to increase efficiency, decentralization of the public sector is favoured because it 
can nurture dynamism in the private sector, localized ideas for dealing with social 
problems and be more pluralistic by increasing civil society participation (ibid.).  
 
This discussion underscores some inherent limitations of exchange theory. Thus, while 
still going beyond organizational theory, exchange theory is bare in terms of addressing 
the embedded socio-political contextual environment under which exchange is facilitated. 
More fundamentally, exchange theory fails to analyse organizations as part of a changing 
societal structure, a matter on which Zeit (op. cit.) sheds light. Exchange theory uses a 
 53
utilitarian individualistic approach and has serious limitations of rational choice (at the 
individual level) efficiency (in market mechanisms), and trust (in unfamiliar situations) 
(Friedland and Alford, op. cit.: 233). Hence, other than the economic rationale, aspects of 
power, control, influence and other subjective behavioural factors are important in IOR.  
 
Introducing some further sociological thoughts in the case for IOR, Zeitz (op. cit.: 41) 
observes that calls by public agencies for “‘coordination’” among diverse “health and 
social service agencies” are largely influenced by ideological (and political) 
underpinnings of power mediation and resources structures in the society. The 
significance of the position of the collaborating agencies with regard to power is 
important (Aubrey, op. cit.: 10). With this respect, a vast inequality in power may force 
an action on the weaker party and this reduces the likelihood of “interorganizational 
integration” (Milner, op. cit.: 69-70). While accepting that organizations interact (for 
whatever reason), Zeit hence opts for behavioural variables lying in the wider social 
system in understanding how interorganizational interactions occurs. Thus:  
 
“This interaction is conditioned by the power of groups who control or who are 
affected by organizations, and by established political, legal, and administrative 
structures. Individuals or groups, which may ‘control’ organizations, do not do so 
voluntarily. They are themselves acting as the result of their positions as 
individuals or groups in a societal system” (p. 46).  
 
An implication of this proposition is that attempts to analyse organizations as units 
separate from society or as rational agencies do not help us understand their overall place 
in society. This view is supported by the structural-functionalist approach that 
emphasizes the “whole system as the unit of analysis” (Flanigan and Fogelman, 1965: 
116). Any organization is “a subsystem of the more inclusive social system” (Evan, op. 
cit.: 119-120). As such, using a societal approach to unravel IOR gives us a better chance 
of understanding also the “environmental constraints on organizations” (Flanigan and 
Fogelman, op. cit.: 47). Scott (op. cit.) also supports this argument. Referring to the 
increased ‘structuration’ of interorganizational relations, he emphasizes that 
“organizations are not only involved in a set of exchange relations with other social 
actors; they are also located in a network or framework of relations which their own 
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activities create but which also acts to shape and constrain their possibilities for action” 
(p. 171). Furthermore, structuration creates vertical and horizontal relations, leading to 
increased complexity. Hence, due to the multiple working environments, we would 
expect organizations to make certain choices about how they relate (ibid. 170).  
 
A Model of Interorganizational Relations  
 
In his Organization Theory, Evan (op. cit.) developed the IOR theory by adopting a 
‘systems approach’. The approach is based on the rationale that “organizations are ‘open’ 
systems which, of necessity, engage in various modes of exchange with their 
environment” (p. 149). It identifies four components: “input”, “processes” and “output” 
elements, and “feedback effects”.  In this approach, Evan uses what he calls the 
“organizational-set model”. This refers to the interactions of an organization with diverse 
organizations “in its environment” (ibid. 149; Grodos and Mercenier, 2000: 9). By 
tracing the above four elements in the systems approach, an “interorganizational system” 
emerges. The simple model is depicted in figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Interorganizational Systems Model  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: Evan (1976: 151).  
 
The input “organization-set” refers to the variety of organizations providing all manner of 
resources to the “focal organization”. On the other hand, the focal organization acts as an 
intermediary processor of goods and decisions that are passed on to the “output 
organization-set” for delivery and distribution. These systems levels are the suprasystem, 
the organizational system and the subsystem, respectively. The feedback loop helps 
assess the success of the systemic relations. Although Evan develops the model using the 
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motorcar manufacturing industry to illustrate its application, it is valuable in the present 
research on health care.  
 
Evan does demonstrate the application of the model using only two-level systems as well 
as multiple suprasystem organizations. At the same time, he shows that it is not necessary 
to investigate the feedback effects, depending on the problem of research and also 
because of the complexity this presents. The model will be used here in the form shown 
below. The feedback loop is maintained to represent one of the components of this 
research – policy participation – but will not assess outcome effects.  
 
Figure 2. Application of Interorganizational Relations Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In its application, the input organization-set shall refer to the variety of government 
organizations: in Finland these include the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Slot 
Machine Association, the municipal and regional authorities, and the National Health 
Insurance (NHI); in Kenya, they include the Ministry of Health, the National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) and other government departments or levels in the scale of the 
public health system (see the system portrayal in figure 2 in Part I). The focal 
organization shall represent all the NGOs from whom the data and information is 
collected. Evan’s IOR model is immediately relevant following its application by Lisa 
Aubrey (1997) in a study of the interrelationships between a Kenyan NGO and the 
government and international donor agencies on gender work in social development.  
 
In this context, this work can be seen as part of a growing body of literature on social 
capital (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Newton, 2000; Hyyppä and Mäki, 2001). The literature 
argues for the advantages of social interactions and government-NGO interrelationships 
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in enhancing social development (e.g., Lam and Perry, 2000: 366). As these authors 
observe, the interrelationships have two elements. On the one hand is complementarity, 
which “refers to an effective division of labour among the three sectors in such a way that 
each sector is allocated tasks that it is good at handling, and that the tasks handled by 
different sectors are well connected to one another” (ibid.). The second is embeddedness 
whereby “a particular sector operates to enhance the effectiveness of the other” (ibid. 
369). Continued discussion along this line will lead us to the questions of the role of 
NGOs in enhancing the welfare sector. This issue is handled more appropriately in the 
following chapter. But to clarify here further the concept of embeddedness in 
government-NGO relations more specifically, we refer to Lune and Oberstein (2001).  
 
Embeddedness is interpreted in terms of the relations between the organization and its 
institutional environment since organizations tend to specialize in certain spheres of 
operations (ibid. 18; Scott, op. cit.: 174-181). Lune and Oberstein (op. cit.) identify three 
forms of embeddedness: “direct, outsider and mediating”. The first refer to relations 
where an organization primarily depends routinely on the state in carrying out its 
operations. This is most common in the field of service delivery in advanced welfare 
states (ibid. 19) such as Finland. On the other hand, outsider relations are evident in 
activist NGOs or social movements whose main goals are to challenge and cause to 
change policy making, leadership and power (ibid.). In contrast, mediating NGOs 
represent community-based interests and aim to influence relations between community-
based NGOs and the state (ibid.). However, it is not necessary for an NGO to play one 
and thus not the other role. More to the point is that they tend to specialize in one area in 
order to engage more effectively. This interpretation of NGO-government relationship 
emerges clearly when put into a wider perspective as has appeared in vast amounts of 
recent literature on the subject (e.g., Bratton, 1989; Salamon, 1995, 1999a; Young, 1999; 
Kanyinga, 1995, 1999; Munishi, 1995; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Ohtonen, 2000; 
Karjalainen, 2000). In this literature, a four-relationship model emerges  (figure 3).   
 
In applying this model, it should be recalled that this research investigates NGO-
government relations using the paradigm of collaboration – as opposed to that of conflict 
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 Collaborative 
or of competition. In accordance with the aims of the research the analysis focuses on 
three components (3Ps): provision, promotion and participation in policy making in 
health care. The model shows four scenarios and two action-processes (funding and 
service delivery). In the first instance, the field is dominated by the state in both delivery 
and funding. The second scenario is dominated by NGOs in both action-processes. The 
third and fourth scenarios represent the nature of interactions. In the third (dual) scenario, 
both the state and NGOs produce services and funding independently. The fourth sphere 
shows collaborative relations in both funding and service provision.   
 
Figure 3. Four Models of State-NGO Relations in Service Production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Karjalainen (2000: 153-4), developed by author.  
 
According to Karjalainen (op. cit.), Finland and Scandinavian countries readily reflect the 
first scenario of state dominance while the U.S., Canada and New Zealand are put in the 
second. Examples of the third and fourth model are the U.K. and Germany, respectively. 
Kenya would arguably fit in the third model. The model is however overly simplified and 
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fit exclusively in any zone. However, it is theoretically relevant in the present study. In 
spite of its usefulness, the model does not show relations in one component of the 
research – participation in policy making, which is nevertheless met by Evan’s 
interorganizations systems approach model earlier presented.   
 
 
CHAPTER 3. LOCATING NGOS IN SOCIETY, THE STATE WELFARE 
SYSTEM AND SOCIAL POLICY  
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical issues and literature surrounding NGOs as recent 
phenomena while tying it to the overall discourse on social policy development. Presently 
I give a brief introductory rationale followed by six sub-chapters on the theories and 
context of the discourse on NGOs. Historical studies on social policy show that voluntary 
action predates the nation-state and the welfare state (see, e.g., Marshall, 1965a; Martin, 
1990: 20; Karlson, 1993; Ginsberg, 1999: 19-22). Consequently, the discourse places 
them in the context of social welfare development and democracy as asserted by several 
authors. To start with, Ginsberg (op. cit.: 19) notes, “churches, communities, tribes, and 
feudal lords” provided social services prior to any establishment of political government. 
In the modern world, Grant (2000: 17) writes that NGOs developed as a “system of a 
safety net” in an environment of deprivation where people felt that the state had failed on 
its duty. Echoing Ginsberg (op. cit.), she stresses: “the organizations have largely 
remained close to the needs of the people within a locality and or complementary to weak 
state driven programs of health, education and training and are usually managed by 
church and benevolent societies” (Grant, op. cit.).  
 
Contemporary writers echo Hegel’s idea, which locates ‘civil society’ as/at the core of 
the state (Hegel, 1952: x) (see the discussion below, especially Karlson, 1993). Recent 
discourses on civil society have sought to understand its configuration, interpretations 
and role (e.g., debates in the International Society for Third Sector Research). One of the 
most widespread organizational forms is the ‘NGO’. NGOs are a historical sub-set of 
civil society. The term dates from its use in the United Nations system, with consultative 
status at the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and is thus a post-WWII 
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phenomena  (Martens, 2002: 271). In the development discourse, this term has achieved 
greater international usage from the mid 1980s (e.g., Hossain and Myllylä, 1998; Barrow 
and Jennings, 2001). On the other hand, the term ‘Third Sector’ emerged from the late 
1980s following the “re-discovery” of voluntary organizations in the welfare state 
(Kuhnle and Selle, 1992b: 169). This resulted from various explanations discussed by 
Salamon (1995: 255-61) as four “crises” – of the welfare state, of development, of the 
environment, and of socialism – and two “revolutions” – the communications revolution 
and the bourgeois revolution. A great deal of literature has emerged around these 
conceptions in the last quarter of the twentieth century (see, e.g., Hansmann, 1980; 
Weisbrod, 1988; Bratton, 1989; Fowler, 1993, 2002; Fisher, 1998; Grant, op. cit.).  
 
Much of this literature and research concerns itself with the question of public service 
problems, poverty and development and social change. As such, it has only haphazardly 
attempted to define civil society. Often, NGOs are confused or passed along as the civil 
society. Among early theorizers include Weisbrod (1977), Hansmann (1987) and James 
(1990). The work of these authors is based on classical economics and has been the main 
source of contemporary theoretical discourses. In this chapter, I follow the mainstream 
theoretical discourses as presented by Salamon and Anheier (1998). These authors 
present a concise discussion of six major theories developed from various research 
traditions rooted largely in economics but also political science and sociology. The 
theories are: (1) government/market failure; (2) supply-side; (3) trust; (4); welfare state; 
(5); interdependence; and (6) social origins. International discourse of the theoretical 
framework on NGOs has been primarily advanced by this work of the Johns Hopkins 
University global Comparative Nonprofit Project. As was earlier determined, the term 
NGO will have dominant usage in keeping with the definitions given in Part I chapter 5.  
 
3.1. Government/Market Failure Theory 
 
Also known as the failure performance approach or demand theory (Badelt, 1990), the 
fundament of this theory is the inherent limitation in the “market’s ability to supply 
sufficient quantities of ‘public goods’, i.e., goods that are available to all whether or not 
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they pay for them” (Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.: 220; see also: Weisbrod, op. cit.; 
Kuhnle and Selle, 1992a: 20; James and Rose-Ackerman, 1986: 20; Badelt, 1990: 55; and 
Hansmann, 1990). As the theory argues, market failure justifies government intervention. 
However, in a democracy, the government provides goods and services on political 
considerations at a level that satisfies the “median voter” (Hansmann, 1987: 29; Kuhnle 
and Selle, op. cit.: 21). This “collective choice mechanism” determined by majority 
voting (James and Rose-Ackerman, op. cit.: 27) exacerbated by the “free-rider effect”, 
due to the externalities (Le Grand, Propper and Robinson, 1992: 124), ushers in good 
grounds for the emergence of voluntary organizations to meet the “unsatisfied residue” 
(Kuhnle and Selle, op. cit.).  
 
However, where markets fail, there is no reason to presume that the government will not 
(Weisbrod, op. cit.: 8-9). Indeed, the new development paradigm of today subscribes to 
the view that “both markets and governments have pervasive failures” (World Bank, 
1998: 11; Myles, 1996). The crisis of the welfare state is widely acknowledged (e.g., 
Salamon, op. cit.: 255-56; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Pierson, 1998). Problems of 
efficiency and free riders are compounded also by other factors such as “excess” or 
“differentiated demand” (Kuhnle and Selle, op. cit.; and James, op. cit.: 23). Using 
empirical material, James (op. cit.) argues: “nonprofit provision has emerged as a 
response to excess or differentiated demand” and “tastes”. As such, the more 
heterogeneous the society is, the larger the private sector would be (ibid.).  
 
“The greater the heterogeneity of individual demands, the greater is the expected 
amount of undersatisfied demand and the larger is the expected role of the 
voluntary sector” (Weisbrod, op. cit.: 84). 
 
And because the dictates of service provision requires that organizations are 
“ideologically motivated” (James, op. cit.), such heterogeneity can be used to explain the 
multitude of NGOs that are formed along cultural, religious, linguistic (ibid.) and even 
regional-tribal-ethnic-professional lines. What is more, heterogeneity positively 
influences individuals and government philanthropic behaviour towards NGOs (James 
and Rose-Ackerman, op. cit.: 28). Hence, “the most efficient producer of ‘public’ goods 
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will be the nonprofit firm” (ibid.), which is funded exclusively by private philanthropy 
rather than government or market transactions (Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.: 221). 
 
 3.2. Supply-Side Theory 
 
The central fundament of the supply-side theory is the availability of “‘social 
entrepreneurs’ – people with incentives” to establish NGOs in fields not fully served by 
government or the market (Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.: 221). The theory is a critique 
to the government/market failure theory. It is difficult to explain the “demand-driven” 
theorem in the proliferation of NGOs in developing countries and even heterogeneity in 
industrial societies, as Salamon and Anheier argue. For as, Kuhnle and Selle (op. cit.: 22) 
assert, the emergence of NGOs is an “organized response to unsolved social problems” 
(see also, Hulme and Edwards, 1997: 5). To be sure, there has been a “‘global 
associational revolution’” in the last 20 years (Bratton, op. cit.; Fowler, 1993b; Salamon, 
1994, 1995; Salamon et al, 1999: 4). Crucially, supply-side theory refers to a “bourgeois 
revolution” characterized by the growth of middle-class people “frustrated by the lack of 
economic and political expression” (Salamon et al, op. cit.). Their organization has 
furthermore been made possible by a telecommunications revolution: the Internet, 
wireless communications as well as literacy have made the flow of and access to 
information easier to large number of people providing new modes and tools for 
associating and organizing (Salamon, 1995: 259-61).  
 
The theory also posits the tendency for organizations to emerge in areas that attract 
followers and funding, hence the “positive relationship between” the entrepreneurs and 
private philanthropy (Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.: 222). Furthermore, heterogeneity of 
needs and entrepreneurs would also reflect the expansion of the sector. As some 
examples point out, it is a well-known fact that post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe 
experienced a tremendous growth in the number of NGOs in the “expanding structure of 
political opportunities” following the collapse of communist political repression (e.g., 
Tarrow, 1991: 13). At the same time, the wave of democratisation that swept through 
sub-Saharan Africa after this accelerated the formation of civil society. But the supply 
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side was also augmented by many factors. As (Ndegwa, 1996: 43, 50) observed in 
Kenya: “civil unrest, nascent opposition parties, and international donors demanding 
political pluralism allowed NGOs to organize effectively and coordinate their resources”. 
In Finland there was a large increase in the number of NGOs during economic recession 
in the early 1990s, particularly those formed by rising numbers of unemployed people 
with 2,500 new registrations annually (research interviews; see also Newton, 2000: 210).  
 
 3.3. Trust Theory1  
 
The principle thesis of trust theory is that due to ‘imperfect information’ and externalities, 
consumers are unable to acquire an accurate assessment of the quality and quantity of 
goods and services the market provides (James, op. cit.: 22; Kuhnle and Selle, op. cit.: 
20; Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.). Also known as “contract failure” theory or “the 
asymmetric information argument” (James and Rose-Ackerman, op. cit.: 21; Gui, 1993: 
67), it is another form of market failure. The theory is deeply rooted in the “uncertainty 
inherent in transactions” (Kuhnle, and Selle, op. cit.: 20). As the term suggests, 
consumers’ ‘demand’ for goods and services is to be fulfilled by the ‘supply’ of those 
commodities in conditions of symmetric information. This ‘contract’ arguably fails when 
these conditions are not satisfied (Hansmann, 1980, 1987). The importance of 
information according to the theory is central to trust. That is why, in market economic 
conditions, efficiency will be achieved where consumers are well informed because “they 
are able to judge the quality of the commodities they consume and are able to act on 
those judgments” (Le Grand, Propper and Robinson, op. cit.: 229). The result of 
transactions under conditions of imperfect information is lack of “trust” in the system.  
 
“In such situations, consumers may be more willing to trust nonprofits, because 
profit-maximizing managers would have an incentive to downgrade quality, but 
this incentive is weakened in nonprofits by the non-distribution constraint” 
(James, op. cit.: 22; emphasis added). 
 
The fact that NGOs do not distribute earned profits to their members is “the hallmark” 
thesis of the trust theory (James and Rose-Ackerman, op. cit.: 19). As argued, “the 
                                                 
1 Trust theory is applied here in the economic sense and does not touch wider sociological applications.  
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consumer, finding the nonprofit firm more ‘trustworthy’, is willing to contract it for 
goods whose quality cannot be monitored” (ibid. 21). In particular regard to health, the 
existence of, and “demand” for, nonprofit hospitals is, therefore, according to the theory, 
understood to be a result of the “asymmetry in information between patients and 
providers of health care” (Hansmann, 1987: 29). In short, “nonprofits arise where 
ordinary contractual mechanisms do not provide consumers with adequate means to 
police producers” (ibid.). 
 
3.4. Welfare State Theory 
 
“The ‘social democratic’ tendency which exists in the Scandinavian countries 
emphasizes the state’s social responsibility and therefore produces a relatively 
less developed and less important nonprofit sector” (Bauer, 1990: 275). 
 
“[Within the Scandinavian social democratic model there is] no ideological space 
for voluntary organizations” (Lorentzen, in Gidron et al, 1992: 16).  
 
Here, Salamon and Anheier (op. cit.) refer to the welfare state theory in the extent to 
which it has ignored the question of NGOs. As the above theses by Bauer and Lorentzen 
suggest, the advancement of the welfare state pre-emptied the relevance of NGOs. Thus 
the higher the level of economic development and state dominance in social welfare 
production the more curtailed is the development of a strong NGO sector. However, as 
another variant or critic to this view of welfare state development – the “public subsidies” 
model – argues, availability of government subsidies to NGOs in many countries is a 
significant factor in the emergence of the sector (James and Rose-Ackerman, op. cit.: 29). 
Indeed, as Modeen (1990: 360) argue for the case of Finland:  
  
“The government’s willingness to support the private independent sector in 
Finland is the most important reason for its survival. Without money or other 
advantages coming from government, the [NGO] sector engaged in welfare 
activities would hardly exist in Finland”. 
 
As argued by the government/market failure theory, NGOs are seen as more efficient 
producers of public goods in a heterogeneous society and hence also governments would 
assume “funding responsibility” and delegate “production responsibility” to the NGOs 
(James, op. cit.: 24). And as James and Rose-Ackerman (op. cit.) also assert, “it is unclear 
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whether market forces or political forces lie behind the formation of NPOs, since large 
nonprofit sectors are rarely found without substantial government grants”. In particular 
government preference for supporting NGOs results from a number of factors such as the 
desire among policy makers to provide differentiated services in heterogeneous areas, for 
reducing costs and the benefit of additional resources from the NGOs own sources (ibid. 
30; James, op. cit.). In other words, the welfare state explains the existence of NGOs:  
  
“[NGOs] exist, however not because of independent choices of many small 
donors, but rather, because one large donor with power to set basic contractual 
terms - the government - is seeking a method for providing quasi-public goods 
which involve the least political cost” (James and Rose-Ackerman, op. cit.: 31). 
 
On NGOs, Social Policy and the Welfare State: A Synthesis of the Origin of the 
Discourse  
 
The theoretical discourse on the question of NGOs and their role in the welfare state 
needs to be expanded here in order to capture its historical basis. In pre-welfare state 
societies, social welfare was the preserve of voluntary agencies and collective networks 
(Rooff, 1957; Marshall, 1965a; Wiman, 1992). Importantly, this helps explain the origin 
of the notion of collective action in modern day welfare states. In his analysis of the case 
for the welfare state, Marshall finds voluntary agencies at the heart of the problem of 
poverty: they were playing a significant role in 19th Century Britain helping the feeble 
and impoverished. He observes: “the relief of poverty … was a field of action in which 
both public and voluntary bodies were active, often with a fairly equal distribution of 
responsibility between the two” (Marshall, op. cit.: 33). However, voluntary welfare was 
largely uncoordinated and non-standardized (ibid.), and was inadequate (Spicker, 2000: 
171). For Karlson (op. cit.: 137), “their means and resources were entirely insufficient to 
handle all the urgent problems” and “only the state could meet the ever more pressing 
need for coordination” (Myrdal, 1960: 48).  
 
Following WWII, and through the golden age, the welfare state expanded tremendously, 
becoming the “final arbiter” laying the regulatory ground rules according to which the 
existing “organizational infrastructure” would function, all with the view of advancing a 
harmonious welfare arrangement (ibid.). According to Spicker (op. cit.), state 
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involvement in welfare provision eliminated much of the voluntary networks in 
industrialized countries through three major forms: (1) building on the existing structure, 
“by accepting and supplementing” it; (2); incorporating the existing structure; and (3) 
replacing “it with their own mechanism”. Institutional welfare states, such as Finland and 
the U.K., adopted the second approach; Marshall (op. cit.: 72-3) gives many examples on 
the systematic development of this process in the U.K. Myrdal (op. cit.: 92) however 
predicted that this development would actually come into full circle where the state social 
and economic interventions are gradually replaced by citizens’ organizations creating a 
“‘welfare culture’”.  
 
According to Karlson (op. cit.), the rise of the welfare state was driven by two logics: 
conceit and opportunism. He points out to the inextricability of the links between the civil 
society and the state (also, Kramer, 1981: 50). Firstly, well-meaning voters and 
munificent politicians guided by an interventionist deliberate value-rational ideology give 
rise to the welfare state (Karlson, op. cit.: 136-159). Voluntary agencies, he argues, 
feeling that “their means and resources were entirely insufficient to handle all the urgent 
problems”, such as those Marshall deals with, in society looked to the state for support 
(ibid. 137). Thus, the state is perceived as ensuring economic security and social justice 
in light of the deficiency and need prevalent in the civil society (Marshal, op. cit.). 
Karlson’s theory of opportunism, or public choice, suggests that welfare is a cumulative 
result of the self-interests of political actors and organizations in an unconstrained 
democratic society (159-174). It is the exact opposite of the conceit approach because 
opportunism implies competition and manipulation among prejudiced and narrow 
decisions using democratic techniques, such as the median voter, for aggregating or 
directing political decisions and policies.  
 
Karlson sees the welfare state as a rationalizing agent of civil society without which civil 
society would be disorderly and largely comprised of “inefficient markets” (ibid. 127-8). 
This argument submits the claim of the legitimacy and authority of the formal state 
structure for providing welfare vis a vis voluntary agencies (Spicker, op. cit.: 172). 
However, the welfare state is not entirely successful in taking over voluntary action for a 
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number of reasons and voluntary organizations have continued to persist. One is the 
“strength of [voluntary and market] arrangements as a basis for social protection” (ibid.). 
In addition, as some research in Finland has shown, rather than excluding, the welfare 
state gave them “a very special position” (Matthies, 2000: 211). The sector continued to 
exist on three legitimations: neither as a replacement or competitor of the public system, 
but to develop innovations in new ways of solving social problems, and to cooperate with 
public authorities as part of the state welfare system and social policy (ibid. 212).  
 
3.5. Interdependence Theory: From Comparative Advantage of NGOs to 
Collaborative Relationships in State Welfare  
 
“Voluntary agencies are an important part of the policy-making system of social 
welfare” (Gilbert, Specht and Terrel, 1993: 173). 
 
Interdependence theory concerns the partnership relations between NGOs and 
government in the context of (continued and growing) presence of NGOs in the welfare 
state. The relationship between the two sectors has been characterized largely by two 
differing schools of thought: conflict and collaboration (e.g., Chabal, 1986; Chazan, 
1988; Bratton, op. cit.; Salamon, 1995; Ndegwa, op. cit.; Fisher, op. cit.; Boris and 
Steuerle (Eds.), 1999; Heikkilä and Karjalainen, 1999). The “paradigm of conflict” posits 
an inherent competition between government and NGOs and “views the growth of the 
latter as a threat” to the former (Salamon, op. cit.: 203). On the other hand, the “paradigm 
of collaboration” stresses the benefits of partnerships (ibid.). Later, Salamon and Anheier 
(op. cit.: 225) have observed that conflict can also be a potential impetus to collaboration. 
The logic of collaboration is elevated by the recognition of voluntary failure (ibid.). In 
this regard, NGOs have been seen as the “primary response” to market failure (Salamon, 
op. cit.: 44) and to social problems (Rooff, op. cit.: 3-16; Marshall, op. cit.: 33; Kramer, 
1979: 173-192) thus precipitating government response. Interdependency is seen as the 
political outcome of “liberal pragmatism” (Salamon, op. cit.: 203). It is mediated at the 
same time by policy demands to guard society against social and economic problems and 
by factors of power and control (Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.; Spicker, 1988: 99-108). 
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The thrust of the interdependence theory derives from the assumed inherent strengths of 
NGOs vis a vis the state, and their limitations. Deeply rooted in economics, the concept 
of ‘comparative advantage’ is used here to refer to the relative competitiveness of NGOs 
both in cost terms and efficiency, among others, in public goods production and delivery 
(e.g., Bratton, op. cit.: 572; Karlson, op. cit.: 100-1; Gilbert, Specht and Terrel, op. cit.: 
168; Biggs and Neame, 1995: 40; Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.; Therien and Lloyd, 
2000: 25). These include creativity, expertise and specialization and thus effectiveness, 
innovation and flexibility, ability to mobilize political support, speed, and low costs of 
operations (for detailed lists, see, e.g., Rooff, op. cit.: 277-83; Biggs and Neame, op. cit.).  
 
Kramer (1981: 236) observed that voluntary organizations have four basic roles in the 
welfare state and society: that of vanguarding the welfare programmes which they helped 
initiate in the 19th Century; as value guardians with respect to volunteering and 
participation in skills, time, fundraising, service giving, and as an important aspect of 
citizenship and democratic participation; as improver and advocacy agencies for services 
and issues affecting minorities or marginalized peoples; and as providers of services. 
With particular regard to services provision, Kramer further observes that NGOs have 
three basic functions: (1) as primary providers in an area of specialization or localities; 
(2) as complementary providers, where they provide equivalent services as government; 
and as supplementary providers, where services are secondary or an addition that may be 
only on a temporary basis (ibid.).  
 
Because of their central position in the issues of poverty, social equity and exclusion and 
creating “links between the citizens and the public services”, NGOs have an especially 
important social policy input (Marshall, 1965b: 348). This sets the logic of collaboration. 
Marshal (op. cit.: 353) perceives voluntary action as “part of public policy”. This is 
because he sees the state as having the “ultimate responsibility” for providing social 
welfare services (ibid.). He further argues that the state relies on the NGOs “because of 
[their] strength” (ibid.) and invaluable experience in pre-welfare state. Marshall (op. cit.: 
348) points out that “close co-operation between the statutory and voluntary services is a 
powerful instrument for the realization” of an ideal friend-servant relationship between 
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the citizen and the public authority, which is of vital importance in enhancing effective 
and efficient delivery of social services. The forging of relationships is seen as taking the 
form of service-provider integration into a coherent public policy. In this regard, they are 
an important medium for “implementing new and possibly unpopular ideas” that are not 
carried out by government (Gilbert, Specht and Terrel, op. cit.: 169).  
 
As the interdependency theory suggests, high levels of government social welfare 
spending result into a large NGO sector (Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.). Since the 
existence of both the statutory and voluntary sectors is needed, the development of 
cooperative relations between the two in public policy is desirable while questionable 
(e.g., Marshall, 1965a and b; Gilbert, Specht and Terrel, op. cit.). For as shown by 
Marshall (op. cit.: 72), in the early stages of the welfare state, the two sectors worked so 
well together in a state of “partnership” that the “problem was ‘not whether to cooperate 
but how to cooperate’”. On the other hand, NGOs have many internal and external 
limitations. For example: they are insufficiently resourced and have to substantially 
depend on public sources; they are particularistic, meaning they serve only selected target 
groups; they can be bent by the donor; and they are not always professional (e.g., 
Salamon, op. cit.: 44-48; Porter, Allen and Thompson, 1991: 138); in particular relation 
to the health care discourse see numerous weaknesses or tensions in health NGOs in 
Mburu (1989: 595-6), Chatterjee (op. cit.: 134-150), and Allison and Macinko (1993: 35-
39). In describing the multifaceted character of voluntary associations, Charles 
Henderson wrote in 1895 that:  
 
“There are too many [voluntary associations], especially bad ones. They overlap, 
duplicate, and interfere with each other. Some of them seem to be organized 
simply to advertise the benevolence of the executive secretary … But the severest 
judgement of an abuse leaves the normal use untouched. The voluntary 
associations require criticism and regulation but the principle of their life is 
legitimate” (in Gilbert, Specht and Terrell, op. cit.: 168-9).   
 
And there arises numerous problems related to management of the NGO-government 
collaborative relations most notably the decision-making or holders of power within the 
agencies, election of the agency directors, and the public they serve (ibid. 170-175; 
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Marshall, 1965b: 345-358). Marshall (op. cit.: 355) sets the pace for the debate on NGO-
state relations further by proclaiming that NGOs “cannot certainly claim exemption from 
the restrictions of a national-building policy”. And Gilbert, Specht and Terrel (op. cit.: 
171) write: “to the extent that voluntary agencies are supported by government funds, 
they forfeit some degree of autonomy. Consequently, their ability to function as agents 
for the expression of new or unpopular ideas, as critics of public services, and as the 
guardians of pluralistic values may be limited”. In particular, the extent of regulation will 
depend on the mode of financing provided, extent of the funding and nature of programs 
(ibid.). With large government financing, agencies tend to become “instruments of 
government policy” (ibid.) creating financial, as well as political, dependency. In this 
case, cooperation with the government may jeopardize the independence and potential 
development of the sector. Another danger of cooperation with the state is the 
inevitability of bureaucratic growth in the voluntary sector, especially as associations 
coalesce into large national bodies (Marshall, op. cit.: 354).  
 
Marshall (op. cit.: 353) adds that: “the value of a genuine co-operation, on all but equal 
terms, … outweighs the disadvantages of the adjustment the private bodies may have to 
make to the demands of public policy”. In the welfare mix, Marshall agrees that “there is 
no recipe” and urges deftness: voluntary agencies, he says, “must be prepared, like any 
professional association, to assert themselves, when occasion demands, against the state, 
but they must also know when it is their duty to submit” (ibid.).  On its part, the state can 
seek to balance its relationship with NGOs or even leave some services entirely to them. 
In any case, the relationship context is still important since, as Marshall (op. cit.: 354) 
states, the state cannot abrogate its “right to inspect and approve a service whose efficient 
discharge is a matter of public policy”.  
 
3.6. Social Origins Theory 
 
The social origins theory has been advanced primarily by Salamon and Anheier (op. cit.) 
in a recent article, Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross 
Nationally. The theory was also put to public critique in a recent international conference 
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to which I attended.2 Its main fundament is that social phenomena, such as the ‘welfare 
state’, are not the product of a single factor such as economic development. Rather, the 
development of institutions in society is mediated by specific histories that also shape the 
choices we make in patronizing specific service systems. The theory views NGOs not as 
 
“An isolated phenomenon floating freely in social space but as an integral part of 
a social system whose role and scale are a by-product of a complex set of 
historical forces” (p. 245).  
 
The social origins discourse uses the welfare state regime types developed by Esping-
Andersen (1990) to explain how state-society relationships evolved to shape the character 
of NGOs therein. According to the discourse, an understanding of the development of 
NGOs must go beyond the standard “‘small vs. ‘large’” quantitative research on state 
welfare spending (Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.: 228). In line with the welfare state 
regimes, the liberal welfare state, characterized by low social welfare spending, has a 
high presence of NGOs (e.g., the U.S. and U.K.). On the other hand, the social 
democratic welfare states with high government spending are characterized by a less 
significant NGO sector in social, health and education fields although the sector plays an 
important role in politics, culture and recreation (e.g., Finland and Sweden). Corporatist 
welfare states characterized by high government spending also have a large NGO sector 
(e.g., Germany and France). Finally, statist welfare states with low public spending also 
have a small NGO sector (e.g., Japan). (Note that the model developed in figure 3 above 
can be used to analyse the state-NGO relationships in each of these regime types.)  
 
Social origins theory is developed as a critique to all the other (economic) theories 
discussed above and, as its propagators argue, as a “fruitful new line of analysis for 
understanding the nonprofit sector at the global level” (ibid. 245). Kuhnle and Selle (op. 
cit.: 21) also criticise the public subsidies theory of NGOs and focus attention to the 
“historical-contextual processes” of different countries with particular emphasis on 
political conditions. These authors argue that “national patterns of third sector 
arrangements are shaped more by functions of socio-political integration than by criteria 
                                                 
2 The conference, whose theme was Transforming Civil Society, Citizenship and Governance: The Third 
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of economic efficiency” (ibid. 25), also called “organizational style or organizational 
culture” in the work of Scott and Meyer (1991). Kuhnle and Selle (op. cit.: 21) argue for 
the relevance of “historical-contextual processes based on political variables” in 
understanding state-NGO relations with reference to particular countries and individual 
NGOs for the reason that each country is so distinctive in its traditions and political 
characteristics that we can only understand its institutional structure by reference to its 
peculiar history and culture (see also, Kuhnle, 1975; Bratton, op. cit.: 573; Stubbs, 1998: 
65). Indeed, as Kramer (1992: 35) assert, “the relationship between the state and 
voluntary associations is deeply rooted in history”. This notion is especially important in 
the present cross-cultural study.   
 
 
CHAPTER 4. GLOBAL HEALTH DEVELOPMENT FROM THE 1980s: THREE 
CRITICAL DISCOURSES   
 
“The historical and cultural context of nations influences the evolution and 
structure of their health services” (Last, 1987: 281).  
 
“In health, political will means that health care follows, does not create the 
strategy of total development. Changes in the health sector reflect changes in 
national approach to development. They cannot create, support or maintain 
changes which are divorced from other sectors” (Rifkin, 1981: 4, in MacPherson, 
1982: 112; original emphasis). 
 
“Globalization processes outside the health sector redefine the framework for 
health policies that countries can put into practice, influencing the capacities to 
allocate resources to the health sector, the structures and modes of functioning of 
the health care system, as well as the extent to which countries can practice 
healthy public policies outside the health sector” (Ollila, Koivusalo, Baru, 2002: 
243).  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to review some of the main discourses that have shaped 
the organization of health care services particularly in the last 20 years. These discourses 
will be most useful in the present study particularly in tracing health developments in the 
two countries in Part III. Most of the literature dates back to the 1980s during when a 
great deal of debate ensued about reforming the constrained service systems. Before 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sector in an Era of Global (Dis)Order, was organized by ISTR (Cape Town, July 7-10 2002).  
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going into the discussions, the three points raised in the above theses should be 
emphasized. First is that the health systems countries develop are more immediately 
influenced by their specific histories and culture. Second is the fact that concern with 
health care systems and health policies is not an isolated issue but rather a part of the 
overall concern with the political economy. Thirdly, countries’ health systems and 
policies are not isolated from globalization and the international system of ideas and 
actions. Hence, understanding health development in Finland and Kenya requires a 
reflection on these broad perspectives.  
 
The 1980s and 1990s developments are part of a historical evolution in health care 
systems. According to the 2000 World Health Report (WHR) (WHO, 2000), the 
development and reforms of modern health systems through the twentieth century have 
been “prompted not only by perceived failures in health but also by a quest for greater 
efficiency, fairness and responsiveness to the expectations of the people that systems 
serve” (p. 13). The theoretical impetus is the neo-liberalist anti-statist thinking that 
stresses on decentralization and restructuring, and civil society initiatives for welfare 
generation with emphasis on partnerships (e.g., Braathen and Dean, 2002; Bennett, 
McPake and Mills, 1997). It is important to highlight some of these global developments 
here in order to understand the present state of international health policy discourse. 
Three main developments shaped by events of the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s can be 
identified and are, for consistency, presented as ‘discourses’ (or debates): (1) the primary 
health care discourse; (2) the decentralization and marketization discourse; and (3) the 
public-private partnership discourse.    
 
4.1. The Primary Health Care Discourse  
 
A major starting point of this discourse is the second-generation reforms, as referred to 
by the WHR (see Part I chapter 2), that saw the birth of the primary health care (PHC) 
movement following the launching of the ambitious 1978 Alma Ata Declaration on 
Health for All by Year 2000 (HFA) in present day Almaty, Kazakstan (WHO, 1978). The 
HFA set the “global strategy in health and health services development” (Koivusalo and 
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Ollila, 1996: 111). Markedly, it represented a new approach to financing and delivering 
health care away from the hospital system undertaken in the post-WWII era and brought 
a new reemphasis on the role of communities in addressing social exclusion (Dror, Preker 
and Jakab, 2002: 42). Its main target was to achieve universal health coverage by 2000, 
with the primary health care platform promoting “a top-down “global” strategy on health 
policy at the country level” (ibid.). Its main principles were: a rights approach to 
healthcare, in which persons, families and communities could participate in planning, 
organising, operating, and implementing individually or collectively; equity in health 
status; health promotion; international cooperation; recognition of importance of related 
socio-economic sectors on health; collaboration among different players such as 
government, NGOs and funding agencies; and health reforms and launching of national 
action plans towards these goals (WHO, op. cit.).  
 
Commitment to the public health framework set out in the HFA was reiterated in the 
Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion in 1986 that shifted focus from government 
systems to community ownership (WHO, 1986). A year later in 1987 African health 
Ministers promulgated the Bamako Initiative (BI) and committed to implement co-
financing and co-management of the public health service system through 
decentralization (Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.: 43-45; Dror, Preker and Jakab, op. cit.: 
52). By 1999 the BI had been adopted by 35 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
providing sustainable and affordable PHC for “60 million people through the 
revitalization of 6,000 health centres – managed and partially funded by local 
communities or districts” – in Africa alone (UNICEF, 1999). With the HFA, community 
participation in developing PHC became the model of health development in many 
developing countries from the late 1970s into the 1980s (MacPherson, op. cit.: 110; Akin 
et al, 1985; Chatterjee, 1988: 100-124). The idea was to “train and use community health 
workers [CHWs] who could deliver basic, cost-effective services in simple rural 
facilities” (WHO, 2000: 14). Community participation meant that it selects its own 
CHWs and contribute labour and material resources for, e.g., developing village clinics, 
water supply and financial support to the CHWs (Akin et al, op. cit.: 166).  
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The model was touted as an inexpensive way of addressing gross inequality in health 
particularly in the developing countries. This was based on the belief that while 
increasing participation additional resources could be mobilized at the community level. 
Hence it relied “heavily on community organization” (MacPherson, op. cit.: 114). In 
response to the approach, the World Bank policy was reoriented in the early 1980s to 
start direct lending for the development of PHC systems and to support CHWs (ibid. 111-
2). Other multilateral and bilateral agencies increased aid appropriations to promoting 
PHC (Akin et al, op. cit.: 166; Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.: 117-8). The Demand for 
Primary Health Services in the Third World (Akin et al, op. cit.) is one of the notable 
studies on the development of PHC movement in developing countries. This study finds 
the model to “have been successful both in raising awareness of health issues and as a 
focus for mobilizing international resources” (p. 176). Admittedly however, on the 
whole, it achieved mixed results due to, e.g., planning omissions at the outset, 
introduction of selectivity and the quality of care that was being delivered (Koivusalo and 
Ollila, op. cit.: 124; WHO, op. cit.: 14-15).  
 
The involvement of the World Bank was also said to have “meant the death of the Alma 
Ata Declaration” (Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.). One CHW scheme started in Kenya at 
the end of the 1970s failed because the community could not sustain the financial support 
of the CHWs as demand for their services increased (Lee, 1983: 97-98). A similar 
problem of community self-reliance had been observed in BI evaluations (Koivusalo and 
Ollila, op. cit.: 45) in spite of the compelling success mentioned above. Perhaps more 
subtly was the fact that the adoption of the HFA was based on the acknowledgement that 
health improvements could not be achieved independently of overall socio-economic 
development or that this could be done in a constrained resource environment reliant on 
donor funding (Cumper, 1983: 35). However, the CHW concept has continued to be 
useful in the developing world and is emphasized in the present health policy 
development in Kenya (ROK, 1999b: 15). While the CHW approach in PHC within the 
HFA framework was applied widely in the developing world, in the developed countries 
PHC was integrated into the formal care system (WHO, op. cit.: 15) as community 
participation and organization gained importance in efforts to combat non-communicable 
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diseases (Nissinen, Berrios and Puska, 2001: 964-5). The Healthy Cities Network that 
began in Western Europe at the end of the 1980s has also been an important vehicle for 
promoting community organization in PHC and public health, e.g., in Finland (research 
interviews; see later). Recently, the original PHC approach has since been remodelled 
into a “‘new universalism’”, meaning “high quality delivery of essential care, defined 
mostly by the criterion of cost-effectiveness, for everyone, rather than all possible care 
for the whole population or only the simplest and most basic care for the poor” (WHO, 
op. cit.). As a conclusion, what unifies developed and developing countries under this 
discourse on PHC is the commitment to public health under the HFA framework.  
 
4.2. The Decentralization and Marketization Discourse  
 
“Commercialisation, ‘corporatization’ and ‘marketization’ of health care at the 
global level are a phenomena of the last quarter of the 20th century” (Ollila, 
Koivusalo, Baru, op. cit.).  
 
The 1980s marked a radical turn in planning the organization of health care in the 
developed and developing world (e.g., Saltman and Figueras, 1997: 39; Bennett, McPake 
and Mills, op. cit.; WHO, op. cit.: 13-17) as the neo-liberalist health and social policies 
took hold (e.g., Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 9). Notably, as part of radical wide-ranging 
marketization reforms in public services, Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government 
transformed Britain’s National Health Service (NHS) (e.g., Puoskari, 1996: 95-96; 
Busfield, 2000: 87: 93). These developments focused on three main issues: (1) 
decentralization; (2) citizen participation; and (3) outcome-centred management that 
saves or cuts costs and generates revenue for improvement (Pineault et al, 1993). To start 
with, decentralization refers to “the transfer of authority, or dispersal of power, in public 
planning, management and decision-making from the national level to lower levels of 
government” (Saltman and Figueras, op. cit.: 43). Several types of decentralization are 
distinguishable (ibid. 44-5): (1) deconcentration; (2) devolution; (3) delegation; and (4) 
privatisation. The first refers to transferring decision-making to a lower administrative 
level while, in contradistinction, devolution refers to transferring decision-making to a 
lower political level. Delegation is when duties are allocated to a lower level 
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organization. Finally, privatisation occurs with transfer of ownership into private hands. 
Privatisation can be distinguished from autonomization or delegation where the public 
facility remains under public ownership while not totally depending on public support 
(Taylor, 2003: 179).  
 
The main rationale for decentralizing health care organization is that developing local 
controls for securing and allocating resources and services can stimulate efficiency in the 
delivery system and in a more equitable manner while at the same time being sensitive 
and responsive to differentiated needs and demands (Saltman and Figueras, op. cit.: 43-
44). As one form of decentralization, marketization is rooted in neoclassical economics 
and public choice theory (Puoskari, op. cit.: 22-23). The theory favours market 
mechanisms in services production while justifying government intervention in only a 
limited range of social and health services (Harding, 2003: 14; McPake, 1997: 21). To 
place the discourse into the context of the present study, both Finland and Kenya 
embarked on various forms of decentralization programs notably in 1982. Taking the 
case of Finland, the decentralization and marketization were legislated exactly 10 years 
apart with the Act on Administrative Procedures in 1982 followed by the Act on Public 
Procurement in 1992, respectively. In Kenya decentralization began in earnest with the 
1983 District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) overall framework.   
 
Two concepts have characterized decentralization in Finland in the 1980s and 1990s. One 
is “indirect public administration”, which refers more to autonomization and the creation 
of government non-governmental organizations (GONGOS) (e.g., Rosas and Suksi, 
1994). The second is “one-stop-government” that refers to the overall public 
administration reforms (Klee-Kruse, 2000). The reforms have however been limited to 
inter-governmental decentralization rather than radical marketization (Puoskari, op. cit.: 
45-49) or privatisation although the marketization discourse has gained more strength in 
the 1990s (Kiviniemi et al, 1995) with the growth of the private sector (Kauppinen and 
Niskanen, 2003) and is expected to increase in the future according to a recent study 
(Latva, 2002). On the other hand, the introduction of user fees in the primary health care 
system in 1993 (WHO, 1996: 16) can be seen as a form of marketization. In this reform, 
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greater independence was also given to the municipal authorities in organizing social and 
health services. In particular, the 1992 Public Procurement Act aimed at promoting 
competition in the provision of publicly funded services gave local authorities greater 
potential to purchase services from the private sector and NGOs (MSAH, 1998b: 95). It 
should be noted that the Finnish health care system is one of the most decentralized in 
Western Europe (research interviews), with overall responsibility for organization and 
delivery resting with the local authorities (Järvelin, 2002: 28). Overall decentralization 
and marketization of public services in the 1990s Finland has been based on three key 
factors – economic recession, the individualism ideology, and internationalisation 
(Kiviniemi et al, op. cit.: 14).  
 
To a great extent, liberalization through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in sub-
Saharan Africa during the 1980s and 1990s defined public sector development in the 
continent (Mwabu, 1998: 2; Mohan et al, 2000); the most severe SAPs were introduced in 
Kenya in 1993 (ROK, 2002b: 5). Apart from the WHO’s HFA, a major example of 
international health policy dating to the late 1980s is the World Bank’s Financing Health 
Services in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform (1987). The model set four 
main areas of health reforms: (1) introduction of user charges; (2) development of an 
insurance system; (3) increased use and development of the non-governmental sector; 
and (4) decentralization of health services (Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.: 149; Bennett, 
McPake and Mills, 1997: 2; Rossetti and Bossert, 1999: 4). Several actions in Kenya 
along this framework can be cited. First was the introduction of user fees in the public 
health system in 1989 as a form or marketization. Second was the establishment of 
District Health Management Boards (DHMBs) in 1992, a limited form of 
deconcentration. Third was the devolution of the issuance of authority to incur costs 
(AIEs) from the Ministry to the provincial administrations; the latter authorizes DHMBs 
expenditures from the cost-sharing funds. With regard to health institutions, rather than 
marketization, autonomization was the primary method. An early example is the granting 
of parastatal status to the flagship public health institution – Kenyatta National Hospital 
(KNH) – in 1987 (Collins, Njeru and Meme, 1996) and later the corporatisation of the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) in 1998 (Ministry of Health (MOH), 2000).  
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Finally, one of the other two issues shaping development in health care through the 1990s 
is briefly outlined here. As part of its theoretical foundation, one of the hallmarks of 
decentralization is the possibility it offers for citizen participation (Mohan et al, op. cit.: 
92-93). Munishi (2002: 78) writes, “decentralization can, in practice, facilitate the 
mobilization of the interests, goals and efforts of various sectoral players at different 
levels, including donors, communities, etc., in an NGO-initiated complex development 
and organizational arrangements.” Taking hold from the HFA, later developments of 
participation have been shaped by the notions of individualism, activation, 
empowerment, and social capital, located in the overall discourse of civil society and 
public sector accountability (e.g., Pineault et al, op. cit.; Allison and Macinko, 1993; 
Saltman and Figueras, op. cit.; Ball and Knight, 1999; Newton, 2000). Based on these 
readings (esp. Saltman and Figueras, op. cit.: 58-65), some of the dimensions of citizen 
participation in health care can be cited. One is the possibility of citizens to enjoy a 
certain level or degree of a right to health care. Second is the democratic right for citizens 
to elect those responsible for health policy making. Third is the possibility for the citizen 
to chose from different kinds of health products and delivery systems. Fourth is the 
possibility of citizens to participate in decision-making beyond casting the ballot. As 
such, the significance of decentralization and participation is that they build on the 
“governance agenda”, an aspect of the reforms or adjustments (Mohan et al, op. cit.). 
 
Most democratic governments are responsible for providing health care. In advanced 
welfare states, health care is typically universally available as a right. Concerning specific 
patients’ rights to health and quality care, Finland became the first country in Europe to 
enact a specific legislation – the Act on Status and Rights of Patients (785/1992) (ibid. 
61), a decade after the World Medical Association Declaration on the same (World 
Medical Association, 1981). However, there are differences in the way citizens can 
influence decision-making in health care. For example, where like in Finland citizens 
directly elect the responsible authorities influence is high (Saltman and Figueras, op. cit.: 
60). In Kenya, the DHMBs, which have control over decision-making and local health 
strategies, were meant to “represent community interests in health planning and to co-
ordinate and monitor the implementation of projects at the district level” (ROK, 1999b: 
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12). In this light, the community and NGOs in the district have representation in these 
boards (ibid.). A recent significant example of participation is the input made by NGOs in 
decentralizing the organizational structure of the public health care system developed in 
2000 (MOH, op. cit.). With regard to patient’s choice, the possibility to choose provider 
or insurer is central. This can vary greatly among countries as discussed by Saltman and 
Figueras (op. cit.: 62-3). For example, under user-fees or cost-sharing systems, 
affordability can equip patients to greater choice provided that there exists an accessible 
mixed supply in the market.  
 
With the proliferation of democracy globally in the 1990s, it is reasonable to conclude 
that citizen participation in health policy making has increased or become crucially 
important through the expanding civil society (e.g., Allison and Macinko, op. cit.; 
Newton, op. cit) and “customer-oriented public sector” (Puoskari, op. cit.: 40). In this 
regard, the earliest notable example of a government policy on citizen participation in 
policy making is the Citizen’s Charter launched by the government of John Major in 
Britain in 1991 (ibid.). In addition, a Patient’s Charter was introduced in 1992 (Saltman 
and Figueras, op. cit.: 61). Later in the decade, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) launched a working group on “Strengthening 
Citizen-Government Connections” in 1999 and in Canada a “Task Force on Voluntary 
Sector” was set up in 1999 (Ministry of Finance, 2001). Finland started its own project – 
Kuule Kansalaista (“Listen to Citizens”) – in 2000 that committed every ministry to 
develop a strategy on NGOs (ibid. 32). In less developed countries, citizen participation 
has been a central objective in policies towards social development most notably under 
the World Bank/International Monetary Fund’s framework of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) developed in 1999 (International Monetary Fund/World Bank, 2002).  
These are broad and general working frameworks where health is encompassed as an 
important sector in social development policy if to varying degrees in different countries 
(e.g., Dodd, 2002). 
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4.3. The Public-Private Partnership Discourse 
 
“[In the prevailing] political economy framework, the various players in the 
health development game (e.g., the state, the private sector and non-governmental 
organizations) are not alternatives (as was mistakenly believed in the 1980s), but 
are partners who function in a synergistic relationship” (Mwabu, op. cit.: 18).  
 
In the 2000s, health care development discourse is moving beyond the traditional 
market/government failure paradigm and ideological distinctions between the two as 
demonstrated by a very recent World Bank publication – Private Participation in Health 
Services (Harding and Preker (Eds.), 2003). As discussed in The Public/Private Mix 
Debate in Health Care by Bennett, McPake and Mills (1997: 6-7), the discourse stems 
from reforms to increase efficiency in services delivery, encouraging consumer choice 
through competition to state withdrawal and decentralization in both the developed and 
developing countries. Thus, focus has shifted towards developing policy approaches that 
enable the actors in the health system to work together through, e.g., contracting (Palmer, 
2000; Taylor, op. cit.) and division of labour or shifting burdens between the sectors (e.g., 
ROK, op. cit.: 63; MSAH, 2002b; Rosen and Simon, 2003). There is now a universal 
acceptance of the fact that government alone cannot reduce poverty or social polarization, 
unlike the thinking advanced by the social welfare (state) theories discussed in chapter 2 
above. Most aptly, the partnership paradigm refers to “the use of the private sector to help 
provide publicly funded services such as health care or education” (Le Grand, 2003: ix); 
the background of this discourse has already been laid out in the forgoing sub-chapters. 
Having gained ground towards the end of the 1990s as reflected above by, e.g., Mwabu, 
and the New Labour Government policy in the U.K. (Taylor and Warburton, 2003: 327), 
it has strengthened in the current decade.   
 
A focal point of this development is what the WHR 2000 calls the “stewardship” function 
of the state while strengthening the role of NGOs and the private market. In the 
theoretical construction by Saltman and Ferroussier-Davis (2000: 735), the concept is 
best defined as the “function of a government responsible for the welfare of the 
population, and concerned about the trust and legitimacy with which its activities are 
viewed by the citizenry”. In this context, the national-level health administrations assume 
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the role of steering with, as Nenonen and Nylander (2001: 8) observe, norms, resource 
allocation and information. The World Bank (2003: 3) concurs that while acting as 
stewards, tapping the resources outside the government will require:   
 
“A balanced development of the private sector, involved local communities and 
civil society, parallel development of human resources reforms, and strengthening 
of government capacity in areas such as contracting and regulation”.  
 
In this context, it has been recognized that of primary importance is the need to develop 
comprehensive knowledge-based health information systems (HISs) (Nenonen and 
Nylander, op. cit.) through, e.g., facility surveys and consultative exercises (Lindelöw 
and Wagstaff, 2003). As the WHR asserts, “better stewardship requires an emphasis on 
coordination, consultation and evidence-based communication” (WHO, 2000: 132; 
original emphasis). The most notable international effort launched earlier in the 1990s in 
the developing world was the Data for Decision Making Project by the Department of 
Population and International Health at the Harvard School of Public Health. Most 
recently the World Bank has launched its own Health Systems Development (HSD) 
program to advance the Bank’s mission, its commitment to the Millennium Development 
Goals and the strategies set out in the Bank’s 1997 Sector Strategy for Health, Nutrition 
and Population (World Bank, op. cit.).  
 
In conclusion, faced with the preferential view of government intervention in promoting 
equity, access and protecting the poor (WHO, op. cit.; Harding, op. cit. 14) and increased 
tendencies towards marketization, the development of partnership relations is not only 
desirable but also the best alternative. In this new context, contracting of health services 
to the NGO/private sector, with a view to improving performance of public systems, as 
simultaneously a tool of government action and one form of marketization, has 
increasingly gained ground (e.g., Palmer, op. cit.; Loevinsohn, 2002; Taylor, op. cit.). 
Achieving this model is however not without challenges. Governments may be reluctant 
to accept contracting for ideological, theoretical and practical reasons as explained by 
Taylor (op. cit.: 163-4). With regard to ideology, not only do many governments have a 
constitutional duty to provide health care for their citizens, but, more than that, the 
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private sector is often viewed with mistrust and especially with the notions that it caters 
only for the wealthy. Succinctly put by WHR 2000,  “markets work less well for health 
than for other things” (WHO, op. cit.: 4). Theoretical argumentation against contracting 
lies in the nature of health as a public good and market failure, already discussed earlier.  
 
Practical impediments lie in the already existing large public health care system, and little 
knowledge of the private sector system, which makes the designing and implementation 
of effective contracting difficult. Indeed, contracting is a complex process requiring a 
great deal of expertise and evidence-base. As demonstrated by Palmer (op. cit.: 824) the 
development of contractual relationships depends on many factors such as the capacity of 
buyer, nature of the service, nature of the provider, nature of the provider market, 
capacity of the regulatory environment, and the degree of trust. However, despite the 
ideological, theoretical and practical obstacles to contracting, government interventions 
face numerous obstacles from bureaucratic inefficiency to delivery failure thus 
strengthening the rationale for developing strategic contractual relationships (Taylor, op. 
cit.: 164-6). A construct of the ideal-perceived comparative-advantages between the 
public and private sector, such as developed by Taylor (ibid. 169-170), helps to boost this 
rationale. As a tool of government action, contracting “can provide government with a 
means of bridging the gap between desired health objectives and performance” (ibid. 
166). Contracting is also seen as a “more moderate form of incentive” to the private 
sector (WHO, op. cit.: 126). But contracting requires an effective regulatory mechanism 
(Afifi, Busse and Harding, 2003) as part of an overall “stewardship regime” role of the 
state in the partnership interplay (WHO, op. cit.: 132). Contracting is, of course, not the 
only tool of government action as a recent groundbreaking publication – The Tools of 
Government – shows in great detail (Salamon (Ed.), 2002).  
 
 
II-PART: SUMMARY CONCLUSION  
 
Following from the discussions in the last chapter, a few issues can be mentioned to help 
provide a bridge to the following Part and the rest of the study. The Part has reviewed 
broad theoretical discourses in social policy development, interorganizational relations, 
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NGOs and health policy development as the central elements of the study. 
Fundamentally, the social welfare theories help us understand the rationales that have 
guided the historical development of governmental systems in social welfare policy. 
Interorganizational relations theory informs us more readily the functioning of these state 
systems in the context of diverse institutional environment. The NGO theories shed light 
as to the emergence of this unique institutional phenomenon in social policy that is the 
primary focus of the study.   
 
Chapter 4 has closed the background reviews to place the health agenda in the centre of 
the study. The aim has been to highlight the global developments that have led to the 
increased role and visibility of NGOs in health care. Tracing the developments from the 
late 1970s in the form of three discourses, it has given some examples how these have 
influenced health developments in both country case studies. By doing so, it raises the 
interest to understand the country systems in greater detail. As the three theses at the 
beginning of the chapter rightly assert, health system developments are influenced by a 
combination of country historical, cultural political and socio-economic contexts as well 
as the international context. Against this background, the following Part details these 
contexts and gives a comprehensive analysis of the health systems organization and 
development in each country while Part IV looks into the NGO health system more 
specifically. And Part V will then illustriously characterize the collaborative government-
NGO partnerships in the two countries.   
PART III: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL  
 
CONTEXT OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND  
 
DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND AND KENYA 
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SECTION I – FINLAND: CHAPTER 1. PREVAILING SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF HEALTH CARE 
 
 
1.1. Country History and Geographical Background, and Demographic Features 
 
Finland is the northernmost and the seventh largest country in Europe with a total land 
area of 338,145 sq km (STAKES, 2003) (see map). It became a republic in 1917 
following independence from Russian rule. With a total population of 5,194,901, 
Finland is the most sparsely populated country in Europe with a national average 
density of only 17.1 persons per square kilometre (ibid. 4). Most of the people live in 
the southern part of the country with 61.4% living in urban areas (ibid.). Finland is a 
highly homogeneous country with regard to language, religion and culture. Finnish 
and Swedish are the country’s two official languages; only 6% of the population are 
Swedish-speaking. 98% of the population belong to the Lutheran Church, one of the 
two State Churches (Orthodox is the other). The Finnish population has been 
undergoing a rapid demographic transition due to ageing and decreasing fertility rates 
(Aromaa, Koskinen and Huttunen, 1999: 20-22) (table 1).  As in many other Western 
countries, fertility rates are low (1.7% during 1995-2000) (UNDP, 2001) and annual 
population growth rate would remain at zero during 1999-2015 (ibid.) after which it 
will be negative even with an increasing fertility rate (World Bank, 2002). 
 
Table 1. Trends in Demographic Structure (Population in Thousands)   
 
Population 1975 1990 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2015* 2030* 2050*
Total 4,721 4,998 5,147 5,16 5,171 5,181 5,195 5,268 5,257 5,016
Males 2,278 2,426 2,509 2,516 2,523 2,529 2,538 2,573 2,556 2,443
Females 2,433 2,572 2,638 2,644 2,648 2,652 2,657 2,695 2,701 2,573
Age %           
      0–14 21.8 19.3 18.7 18.4 18.2 18.1 17.9 16 16.4 17 
     15–64 67.4 67.2 66.7 66.9 66.9 66.9 66.9 63.9 57.8 57.3 
     65- 10.8 13.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 15.0 15.2 20.1 25.8 25.7 
Dependency ratio, % 69.8 63.5 - - - 49.2 - 56.6 73 74.5 
 
Sources: 1975 data by Aromaa, Koskinen and Huttunen (1999: 21); 1990-2001 
data by Statistics Finland, Demographic statistics; 1975 male and female data 
by UN/DESA (2002); 1975-1990 population and dependency ratio data by 
OECD (1998); 2015, 2030 and 2050 population and dependency ratio data by 
World Bank (2002). 
Notes: * Projections; “–” data not available.    
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1.2. Political and Administrative Structure  
 
Finland is a politically stable country with a longstanding democratic culture. In its 
post World War history, the country has been run by coalition governments between 
four dominant political parties (Soikkanen, 2003) among which the Social Democratic 
Party has maintained electoral and governing leadership the longest (Statistics 
Finland, 2003). The electoral model allows for presidential elections every six years 
and parliamentary and municipal elections every four, but on differing, years all of 
which occur on specific constitutionally legislated days. The number of political 
parties taking part in the latest parliamentary elections in 2003 was 18 and the Centre 
Party emerged as the overall winner returning to power since 1991 (ibid.). With the 
President as the head of state, the Prime Minister heads the government, which has 17 
other Ministers running 13 Ministries and a unicameral Parliament of 200 members 
(Ministry of Justice, 2003). There are three levels of government: (1) the central 
government; (2) five provincial state offices, and Åland1; and (3) 448 municipal 
authorities. Division of the country into the various administrative regions has 
changed greatly in the 1980s and 1990s towards effective public administration (Klee-
Kruse, 2000: 210). Finland joined the European Union in 1995 following a 1994 
referendum and the European Monetary Union in 1999 (Järvelin, 2002: 4).    
 
1.3. Economic and Human Development  
 
Finland is a highly industrialized country with high levels of human and economic 
development (table 2). Every resident is guaranteed equal right of access to a 
comprehensive social welfare and health care system regardless of ability to pay, 
social status or place of residence. The system corresponds to the Scandinavian 
cradle-to-grave welfare state model (Esping-Andersen, 1990) that is the result of both 
economic growth (e.g., ibid. 13; Wilensky, 1975: 86; Wilensky et al, 1985: 11) and 
social democratic politics (e.g., Esping-Andersen, op. cit.). Although it came late as 
compared to the other Scandinavian countries, Finland’s industrialization in the 1960s 
and 1970s transformed the country from an agrarian and forestry dependent economy 
leading to the establishment of a fledgling welfare state. Thus, social welfare 
                                                 
1 The Province of Åland has an autonomous government and its own health administration and legal 
structure. For these reasons it is not included in this study except for the data shown in table 3 below. 
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development in the country can be readily explained by: the industrialism logic in 
which “industrialization makes social policy both necessary and possible” (Esping-
Andersen, op. cit.); the Marxist account in which the societal changes caused by the 
transformation of economic production and the social-democratic principle of 
solidarity (e.g., ibid.; Himmelstrand et al, 1981: 44-50; Pierson, 1986); a rights-based 
approach to social welfare organization through regulation, tax and subsidy-
redistributive measures (Karlson, 1993: 179); and institutional functionalism where 
the welfare state is organized to play specific social integrative roles (Goodin et al, 
1999: 22) as a “social policy-making network” (Kangas, 1991: 5). The 
communication technological revolution of the 1990s has put Finland at the top of the 
world in the use of technology (UNDP, op. cit.).  
 
Finland is a service economy, which accounts for 62% of the GDP, and relies heavily 
on foreign trade accounting for nearly 40% of the GDP (Järvelin, op. cit.: 4). After the 
economic recession of the early 1990s, the economy grew by 4.8% and in 2001 by 
about 2% (U.S. Department of State, 2002). In 2001, the country’s GDP per capita 
was US$ 23,096, which was ranked 5th in the world (UNDP, op. cit.). Average life 
expectancy at birth in 2003 is also relatively high at 77.6 years (see table 2 below). In 
the human development index (HDI) rating, the country is 10th overall with a high 
value of 0.925 (ibid.). In poverty measurements (see table 2 for definition) the country 
ranks as the 4th lowest (ibid.). Education levels are also high with among the lowest 
functional illiteracy rate of adult population at 10.4% (ibid.). In line with the 
Scandinavian model, participation of working-age women in the labour market is very 
high at 72.4% in 2001 (STAKES, op. cit.: 5). The country ranks 9th in the gender-
related development index and 5th in the gender empowerment measure (UNDP, 
2002), and had 47% of the ministerial positions occupied by women in 2003.  
 
Recent Trends and Evidence in Welfare State Transformation 
 
As in other Scandinavian countries, the nature of the social or welfare contract2 in the 
Finnish welfare state is changing (Marklund, 1988; Uusitalo, 1995; Esping-Andersen, 
1996; Pierson, 1998; Kautto et al (Eds.), 1999). In the 1990s the country faced its 
worst economic recession since the 1930s. The 1991-1993 depression forced 
                                                 
2 See, Heikkilä and Karjalainen (1999: 5-6) for a discussion on welfare contracts.  
 87
significant cuts in public spending (Alestalo, 1994; Kosunen, 1997); see Uusitalo (op. 
cit.: 9) for cuts in social policy areas. As shown in table 2, with the dramatic rise in 
unemployment from 3.1% to 16.6% between 1990-1994, government borrowing 
increased phenomenally to support the rising need for protection. Through the decade, 
poverty levels have risen, standing at 10% in 1995 (Hanhinen, 2001: 189), as have 
socio-economic inequalities (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH), 
2001a/b/c; Finnish Federation for Social Welfare and Health (STKL), 2001; Jäntti and 
Ritakallio, 2000; European Antipoverty Network (EAPN), 1999). Growing 
dependency ratio is a major challenge to the future of the welfare state (Kautto et al, 
1999: 3) and health care services are facing a crisis (e.g., Klemola, 2002). 
 
Table 2: Social-Economic and Health Indicators  
 
Life Expectancy at 
birth, years Year 
GDP 
(million 
FIM) 
GDP per 
capita $ 
Social 
protection 
Expenditure, 
% of GDP 
Unemployment 
rate, % 
Gov. 
debt, % 
GDP 
Poverty 
rate, %*
 Men  Women
Infant 
mortality 
1/1000 life 
births 
1990 523,034 16,442 25.1 3.1 11 2.5 70.9 78.9 5.6 
1991 499,357 15,761 29.8 6.8 18 2.9 71.3 79.3 5.9 
1992 486,923 15,208 33.6 11.7 34 2.6 71.7 79.4 5.2 
1993 492,609 15,967 34.6 16 53 2.4 72.1 79.5 4.4 
1994 522,309 16,692 33.8 16.6 59 2.2 72.8 80.2 4.7 
1995 564,566 18,861 31.8 15.4 64 2.4 72.8 80.2 3.9 
1996 585,865 19,408 31.6 14.6 67 2.9 73 80.5 4 
1997 635,532 20,471 29.3 12.7 65 3 73.4 80.5 3.9 
1998 689,523 21,793 27.2 11.4 60 3.9 73.5 80.8 4.2 
1999 721,958 22,702 26.2 10.2 56 3.7 73.7 81 3.6 
2000 787,885 24,841 24.5 9.6 50 -  74.2 81 - 
2001 841500  23.9 8.6 46 - - - - 
 
Sources: MSAH, 2001c: 138-144; Järvelin (2002: 5); OECD (2003).  
Notes: *Poverty rate is the percentage of persons living in households whose 
disposable income is below 50% of the median disposable income for all 
households (MSAH, op. cit.: 143); “–” data not available.  
 
Notwithstanding resumed economic growth in 1994, the decade can best be reflected 
by irreversible transformations towards a market-oriented model in public sector 
operations (Kiviniemi et al, 1995) and decentralized government (Puoskari, 1996). 
Market mechanisms geared towards increased efficiency and effectiveness in the 
provision of public services were based on three key factors: “economic recession, 
ideology of individualism and internationalisation” (Kiviniemi et al, op. cit.: 14). This 
meant the introduction of competition, contracting out and charging fees for public 
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services and the beginning of major reforms in the welfare state administration and 
maintenance (ibid. 11; Uusitalo, op. cit.: 7-10; Julkunen, 2000; Järvelin, op. cit.: 14).  
 
Indeed, in 1992 the Act on Public Procurement (1505) was enacted subjecting public 
contracting entities to follow rules of competitive tendering. Furthermore, as public 
spending reduced (see, e.g., MSAH, op. cit.: 138; on systematic reductions in sickness 
and health care from 1990), charges for primary health care (PHC) services in the 
municipal health centre system were introduced in 1993 – prior to which fees were 
only paid in hospitals – the National Health Insurance (NHI) reduced compensation 
for various health items such as drugs, and hospital care charges grew all of which led 
to spiralling out-of-pocket payments (WHO, 1996: 16; Järvelin, op. cit.: 37). With the 
“fiscal crisis of the state”, neo-liberal pressures, socio-economic changes and 
declining trust and confidence in the public system (Uusitalo, op. cit.: 7) through the 
decade, pressure mounted for greater flexibility ushering in a new era of 
transformations in social policy, which sparked social inclusion and activation 
discourses and giving “new impetus to the third sector” (Kinnunen, 2000: 101 and 
2001: 61; Julkunen, op. cit.: 65; Newton, 2000: 210; MSAH, 2001d: 17-18). For 
example, in 1998, the Ministry of Labour (MOL) published an Employment Action 
Plan intending to create 10,000 jobs in the NGO sector annually (MOL, 1998: 30). 
The workings and job-creation efforts by NGOs and benefits of this initiative are well 
documented in the composite publication New Work – A Joint Third Sector 
Employment Project Towards New Work (Harju and Backberg-Edvards (Eds), 2001) 
Empirical studies show that the significance of the role and relevance of NGOs in 
Finland has increased in the 1990s (e.g., Heikkilä and Karjalainen, 1999; Nylund, 
2000). And as Julkunen (op. cit.: 65) notes, the work of NGOs “is increasingly 
integrated into public social policy”. In this light: 
 
“The goal of social policy has been to develop it into a welfare mix type 
service system that would respond better to different needs and situations of 
living” (Kinnunen, 2000: 93).  
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CHAPTER 2. THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE, DISTRIBUTION, FINANCING AND UTILIZATION 
 
2.1. Organizational Structure, Planning and Administration  
 
The organizational structure of the Finnish public health system is hierarchical (figure 
1) with three main levels of administration: the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 
provincial state offices, and municipalities. The provincial level plays a lesser role 
while municipalities have primary responsibility over the arrangement of health and 
also other social and welfare services. This responsibility is enshrined in a series of 
legislations primary being the Public Health Act (66/1972), also referred to as Primary 
Health Care Act. Subsequent legislation includes the 1989 Act on Specialized 
Medical Care, and the 1990 Mental Health Act (MSAH, 2001e). These legislations 
lay down the main duties of the municipalities (ibid. 14-16). These are the provision 
of: guidance in health issues and preventive education, maternal and child health care, 
reproductive services, medical examinations and screenings; medical treatment and 
care, and rehabilitation (in so far as this is not the responsibility of the social security 
insurance); dental check up and treatment; ambulance and transportation services; 
schools and students health services; occupational health; and mental health services. 
Medical and rehabilitation services can be provided as inpatient care in, e.g., health 
centres and as non-institutional outpatient care in the form of home nursing. 
 
Overall responsibility for the direction, legislation, supervision and reforms of the 
health policy falls under the MSAH at the national level. Provincial state 
administrations occupy a mid level position and operate under various ministries. The 
Provincial departments of social and health services have an intermediate role of 
promoting, steering, monitoring and supervising the implementation of national and 
regional/municipal policies and objectives.3 Their responsibility encompasses the 
licensing and monitoring of private and NGO health (and social) services providers 
and veterinary services, foodstuffs controls, licensing of alcohol sale, managing 
appeals on health care services, decision-making on municipal capital investments in 
medium-sized health and social projects, environmental health services, and the 
management of international activities and, e.g., European Union-funded projects. 
                                                 
3 Research interviews; see also, undated brochure of State Provincial Office of Southern Finland.  
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These tasks are prescribed by law, e.g., the 1992 Social Welfare Act and the Act on 
Central Government Transfer to Local Government (1147/1996) or based on mutual 
consultation with the MSAH (MSAH, 2001e: 23). 
 
Figure 1. Organogram of the Finnish Public Health Care System 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Järvelin (2002: 18); data from the National Research and 
Development Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES) and the Association 
of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (research interviews, April, 2003).  
Notes: MSAH-SII link is more administratively superficial, hence the doted 
line (see below).   
  
The number of municipalities has been decreasing and currently stands at 448. 
Municipal authorities (councils) are directly elected every four years by the local 
inhabitants. The council is the decision-making organ of the municipal duties. It is run 
through a municipal government and various municipal boards – such as of health – 
both of which are accountable to it. Boards are comprised of members of the council 
as well as other persons. All these levels of municipal organization are politically 
accountable to the inhabitants. The health board, municipal government and the 
council are all involved in decisions on planning and organizing health services. 
Social Insurance Institution 
(SII) National Health 
Insurance (NHI) 
Provincial State 
Administration (5) 
Hospital districts 
(20) 
Municipalities (448) 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health (MSAH) 
 
Health Centres 
(278)  
Hospitals (54) 
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Health services are run through a separate department or integrated with social 
services into a single department (research interviews).  
 
The public health delivery system is arranged into 20 hospital districts (table 3) and 
278 health centres.4 Primary health care is provided in health centres, 240 of which 
have inpatient services (ibid.). A hospital district (HD) is an organizational entity 
responsible for organizing specialized medical care within a certain region. Typically, 
a HD has 1-3 acute care hospitals and 1-2 psychiatric care hospitals (WHO, 1996: 8). 
As figure 1 shows, there are a total of 54 public hospitals in the country. According to 
the data, five of these are university hospitals and 16 others are central hospitals. 
University hospitals are at the top of the hierarchy followed down by the central 
hospitals and the district hospitals; Helsinki University Hospital occupies the highest 
level. Access to hospital care and treatment is through a hierarchical referral system 
whereby, unless the case is an emergency, patients are first seen at the low-end health 
centres; referrals from health centres to district and central hospitals amount to about 
60% with most of the rest coming from private hospitals and private practitioners 
(Järvelin, op. cit.: 48). Each municipality must belong to a HD of its choice (ibid. 23), 
and as directed by, e.g., the 1989 Act on Specialized Medical Care, and the Act on 
Special Care for the Mentally Handicapped (MSAH, op. cit.). In most cases, a HD is 
governed through a council elected by the member municipalities. The council then 
elects an executive board for directing practical administration. As the municipal 
councils, the HD councils have a life of four years. Election of the hospital district’s 
executive board members is done with considerations of the political support of 
parties in the municipal elections (research interviews).  
 
While the municipalities directly provide the primary health care services in the health 
centres, they can buy the services from a variety of providers due to radical reforms in 
the 1990s (Häkkinen and Lehto, 2002; Järvelin, op. cit.) (see later). In particular, the 
Act on Planning and Government Grants for Social Welfare and Health Care and the 
Finnish Local Government Act (1995) allows them to: organize their own operations; 
together with other municipalities; buy from the state, other municipalities or joint 
                                                 
4 One health centre is actually run by an NGO from which the concerned municipality buys the services 
(see Part IV Section I). The state also operates 23 hospitals and 16 health centres for prisons, army and 
border guards. These are not discussed in this study, as they are not for public general use.  
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boards, or from a private/NGO provider (MSAH, op. cit.: 21). This gives the 
municipalities a significant amount of freedom in determining the method of delivery. 
Purchase is done by a mutual agreement with the hospitals on provision of specified 
services rather than on a contractual basis (WHO, op. cit.: 9). The costs of the 
specialized services in hospitals in the area are agreed upon by the hospital district 
within a set threshold level. Hence, this must contain a cost-equalization measure in 
which risk of excessive costs are shared by all municipalities in the district. If the 
hospital district’s revenues are not sufficient to cover its expenditure it can bill the 
member municipalities (ibid.). Evidently, this arrangement makes decision-making in 
the municipal health care complex and open to much politicking.  
 
2.2. The National Health Insurance (NHI) 
 
 
 A major organ of the health system is the statutory National Health Insurance (NHI) 
scheme operated under the National Social Insurance Institution (SII), known 
popularly by its Finnish acronym KELA. Established in the 1960s following the 
Sickness Insurance Act (1963), the NHI is a universal and comprehensive system 
(Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 1) providing income and medical benefits for all citizens and 
permanent residents; in addition, beneficiaries needing emergency medical care 
abroad can also claim a refund but only if the incurred costs are not recoverable from 
the health system of the country in which the service was rendered. NHI is under the 
direct administration of Parliament hence the weaker link with the MSAH. It is 
financed mainly by the contributions from employers and employees, paid as a 
percentage of income earnings; since 1998 the state has earmarked an annual 
contribution (Järvelin, op. cit.: 30). The system entitles residents to six major benefits: 
sickness allowances, parenthood allowances, special care allowances, refunds of 
medical expenses, and occupational and student health services (SII, 2002a). The first 
three are compensation paid for loss of income due to illness or parenting of underage 
children while the others go towards health care support. With regard to the student 
health services, the NHI reimburses the Student Health Foundation (an NGO, 
abbreviated in Finnish as YTHS) for services provided to university and college 
students.  For our research purposes, I briefly outline the benefits for medical 
treatment and occupational care (for full details of all benefits, see, SII, 2002b). 
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Medical Benefits, for Services Provided by the Private (Including NGO) Sector5  
 
NHI medical benefits are paid for sickness, pregnancy and confinement covering 
three main areas: prescription drugs; examinations, treatment or prescriptions in the 
private/NGO sector; and transportation needed for diagnosis and treatment. 
Determination of the refunds is complex and only the general more wider or normal 
examples are mentioned here. Refunded costs for drugs include those prescribed by a 
doctor or dentist as well as additional refunds for costs of (special) non-covered 
medicines not exceeding €580.20 annually in 2001. For dental examination and 
treatment, the entire population is covered as of December 1 2002. Doctors’ and 
dentists’ fees and charges for examination and treatment are reimbursed on a fixed 
scale determined by the MSAH. Calculations for charges exceeding the fixed level are 
based on the scale. In 2001, refunds were 50% of all medicine costs exceeding the set 
minimum of €8.41 per purchase. However, according to the scale, certain medicines 
and illnesses qualify for 75% or 100% reimbursements in excess of €4.20.  
 
The refunds are however limited by a given number of visits to a pharmacy. 
Reimbursement for examination and treatment charges over the minimum €13.46 and 
under the set level were 75% if ordered by a doctor. For doctors’ or dentists’ charges, 
the reimbursement in the same year was 60% of the sum not exceeding the fixed 
charge. However, the number of calls, prescription transactions, examination, 
treatment and number of orders from a doctor or dentist are also restricted. The annual 
cover for transport costs was €157.26 in 2001 and any amount exceeding this sum or 
the fixed daily minimum of €9.25 per trip is reimbursed in full; costs for overnight 
stops on transit to a health institution under €20.18 are also paid in full. As in the 
other areas of medical cover, the number of single trips is also specified. 
Reimbursements of benefits are made in three ways. In the first place, persons 
belonging to an occupational sickness fund get their NHI entitlements through the 
fund. Others collect from their SII’s local office. The second method is while buying 
drugs at the pharmacy. An agreement with the SII enables the pharmacy to claim the 
benefit cover while the patient pays the difference. A third system is where a patient 
authorizes the service provider to claim reimbursement of their entitlement while 
paying any difference as in the second case.  
                                                 
5 The discussions in this sub-section and the next are based on SII (2002a).  
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Occupational Health Services  
 
Employers are obliged to provide occupational health care for their employees under 
the 1979 Occupational Health Care Act. NHI is the main insurer for rehabilitative care 
following work incapacitation. As a rule the NHI does not finance the public sector 
and the nearly €200 million annual expenditure is spent on the rehabilitation services 
provided by private and NGO providers (research interview) (see Part IV Section I). 
Thus, most occupational health is provided outside the public sector even if 
municipalities are obliged to provide these services. As some data show, municipal 
health centres are responsible for 22%, workplaces 35%, and private providers 32% 
with the remaining 9% coming from provision shared among firms (Aromaa, 
Koskinen and Huttunen, op. cit.: 205).  
 
2.3. Distribution and Utilization of the Health Care System  
 
As pointed out earlier, the public health system is organized along the jointly operated 
municipal hospital districts as well as the numerous individual health centres. Hospital 
districts more or less correspond to the state administrative structure, as table 3 shows. 
The table shows more comprehensively various public health system distribution 
indicators by province. (The province was chosen as the unit of analysis to correspond 
to the comparative unit used for the Kenya case study as well to the major regional 
government administrative levels.) The rationale for the hospital district (HD) is the 
collective cooperation for producing and providing tertiary care services to the entire 
population living in the HD area. This is because most municipalities are small with 
the inhabitant population ranging from 128 persons in the smallest to 559,718 in the 
largest (MSAH, 2002b: 16). The average size is about 11,000 although 75% have less 
than 10,000 inhabitants (Järvelin, op. cit.: 28). Health centres represent the bulk of the 
public health care system. A health centre is defined as a “functional unit or an 
organization that provides primary curative, preventive and public health services to 
its population. It is not necessarily a single building or a single location where care is 
provided” (WHO, op. cit.: 28). A typical health centre unit has 1,500-2,000 patients 
per physician and 30-60 beds (Järvelin, op. cit.: 46). 
 
 
 
 95
Table 3. Provincial Distribution of Public Health System by Hospital District and Region  
 
Province Southern Eastern Western Oulu Lapland Åland Country
Regions 
- Uusimaa 
- Itä-Uusimaa 
- Häme 
- Päijät Hame 
- Kymenlaakso  
- Etelä-Karjala 
- Savo 
- Pohjois- Savo 
- Pohjois- 
Karjala 
- Varsinais-Suomi 
- Satakunta 
- Pirkanmaa 
- Keski-Suomi 
- Etelä-Pohjanmaa 
- Pohjanmaa 
- Keski-Pohjanmaa 
- Pohjois-
Pohjanmaa 
- Kainuu 
- Lappland 
 
- Ahvenamaa 
 
20  
Hospital  
Districts 
- Uusimaa and 
Helsinki 
- Kanta-Häme  
- Päijät-Hame 
- Kymenlaakso 
- Etelä-Karjala 
 
- Itä-Savo 
- Etelä-Savo 
- Pohjois- 
Karjala 
- Pohjois- Savo 
- Varsinais-Suomi 
- Satakunta 
- Pirkanmaa 
- Keski-Suomi 
- Keski-Pohjanmaa 
- Etelä-Pohjanmaa 
- Vaasa  
- Pohjois-
Pohjanmaa 
- Kainuu 
- Lappi 
- Länsi-Pohja 
- Ahvenamaa 
 
21 
Hospitals (2003) 26 7 24 7 3 2 69 
H. Centres (2003)  64 42 110 41 20 1 278 
Physicians (2002) 7,023 1,712 5,396 1,595 345 54  16,125 
Land Area Sq.Km. 30,174 48,727 74,186 56,857 93,004 1,527 304,475 
Pop. (000) (2001) 23,419 5,684 19,265 5,738 1,800 283 56,189 
Pop/Physician 3,335 3,320 3,570 3,598 5,217 5,241 3,485 
Municipalities (2001) 89 66 204 51 22 16 448 
 
Sources: HUS website; Interior Ministry; Statistics Finland; health centres data from Kunta-Liito; Physicians data from the Finnish Medical 
Association (1 January). Hospital data is based on data from Stakes. However, the data varies by source and I have included data from original 
sources as follows: for Uusimaa and Helsinki from the HUS Hospital District (a count of all facilities with the name ‘Sairaala’ (18 February); 
for Oulu from Provincial Office; for Keski-Suomi from the (Central Finland) Hospital District.  
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As can be seen from table 3, there is a disproportionate distribution of hospital and 
health centre facilities across the provinces along the ratio of the population to the 
health facility, land area and number of physicians. Because Finland is a rather large 
country and the density of population very low, distances to a health centre could 
reach 60 kilometres in certain cases (research interviews). This disproportion would 
furthermore be more evident if data between the regions and the municipalities in the 
provinces were shown. Again, health care expenditures per capita between 
municipalities vary greatly, in some cases this by up to 2.5 times (WHO, op. cit.: 54). 
Need factors, such as demography and low population density do not provide the only 
explanation for such variations. Municipal policy makers play an influential role in 
determining health outcomes as well as productivity and efficiency because, for 
example, they decide on the number of in-patient care (research interviews). In 
addition, disparities may also reflect the differences in mortality rates of adults along 
socio-economic groups and geographical regions (Järvelin, op. cit.: 6).  
 
Another measure of distribution of the health care infrastructure relates to delivery 
across different actors. Data provided in table 4 portrays this picture well. Three key 
observations can be made while putting the welfare state model into perspective. First 
is that the public sector operates 58.8% of the hospitals with the private for-profit 
sector and NGOs splitting the rest by 20.6% each.6 Secondly, the rather high share of 
hospitals run by the NGO and private sectors is not reflected in the share of hospital 
beds. The public system is overwhelmingly large with this regard at 95.9% compared 
to only 4.1% for the rest. Many government hospitals have more than 500 beds while 
most NGO hospitals have less than 100 beds. Thirdly, the government’s share of 
personnel is again dominant at 83.2% as compared to 11.5% for the private sector and 
5.3% for NGOs. The one health centre run by an NGO is, in fact, a unique case and is 
                                                 
6 It should be noted however that it is not easy to count the number of hospitals, because some hospital 
districts with many hospital buildings at several municipalities may count them as one hospital so the 
number by the hospital districts is open to various interpretations. This count is done administratively 
to reflect only independent hospitals in the hospital district that send information to the health care data 
register (at STAKES) using a given hospital code for each case. Information from the hospital districts 
themselves may give a higher or lower number. Hospitals operated by NGOs and private sectors are 
classified as such in the Finnish Business Information System. The best source of data on private and 
NGO health institutions would be the Provincial administrations that register them. However this was 
not possible due to lack of a central information system; the provinces have altogether 12 
administrative regions and each keeps an independent register for the private and NGO institutions 
(abbreviated in Finnish as YKSATU).   
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mentioned in chapter 4 below and discussed more fully in Part IV Section I. Thus, 
although NGOs and the private sector operate a large number of hospital institutions, 
and although a large number of physicians do operate in the private sector (Lehto, 
2002: 252), overall service provision generally reflects the Scandinavian model with 
public sector dominance.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of Major Health Infrastructures by Delivery Sectors 2003*  
 
 Public Private  NGOs Total 
 Municipal University Total % No. % No. %  
Hospitals  54 5 60 58.8 21 20.6 21 20.6 102 
Health centres  278  278 99.6   1 0.4 279 
Hospital Beds  17,171   
Health centre beds 23,910  
41,081 95.9 1,760** 4.1  
 
42,841
Health personnel   127,632 83.2 17,688 11.5 7,998 5.3 153,318
 
Source: Hospitals, health centres and beds data, STAKES (April, 2003); 
Kauppinen and Niskanen (2003, table 4), for personnel data. 
Notes: *Hospitals, health centres and beds data, 2003, and personnel data for 
31.12.2000; ** includes NGO sector data.   
 
Utilization of the Health Facility Systems  
 
In fact the size of the NGO/private system should not be overstated given the small 
share in the number of hospital beds. This is clearly more visible in the utilization 
data. With this regard, the model works out the same reflecting a comparatively large, 
public-sector dominance (table 5). Utilization of the combined private/NGO sector is 
less than 10% throughout the period shown although it has increased slightly from 
8.5% in 2000 to 8.9% in 2001. It should be noted though that the overall number of 
visits to private physicians is much larger, about 16 million in 2001. The number 
shown here is only for those eligible under the Sickness Insurance Act, meaning those 
visits in which the physicians receive reimbursements from the NHI; data on 
utilization of NGO systems is recorded in the private sector category.7 No information 
was found of household surveys explaining detailed current utilization and 
expenditure patterns in the use of NGOs or private health sector in the country. 
                                                 
7 STAKES’, responsible for health and social welfare data, present system of health accounts (SHA) 
does not have a separate coding for for-profit and non-profit (NGO) service producers; an envisaged 
expansion of the SHA (Haapanen, 2003) could provide the needed window of opportunity.  
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Table 5. Utilization of Health Care Facilities by Actor and Number of Visits (1998-
2001)  
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Public Provision 36,121,992 36,101,063 36,177,031 36,295,461 
Private Provision 3,316,100 3,272,600 3,341,705 3,554,589 
 
Source: STAKES (2003: 19).  
 
2.4. Health Care Financing, and Recent Trends in  
 
Health care financing in Finland is largely tax based. As such, the state and 
municipalities are the major financiers of health services. Even so, the private sector 
plays an important role in health care financing, as is the NHI. Of the €8.7 billions 
spent in 2000, municipalities contributed the largest share (42.2%) followed by 
private contributions amounting to nearly a quarter of total financing (table 6). As 
does the state, municipalities have a right to levy taxes for arranging the statutory 
health services. Additional funding to the municipalities can be sourced from the state 
in various forms of subsidies and grants mainly under the 1992 Act on Planning and 
Government Grants for Social Welfare and Health Care. Thirdly, municipalities can 
raise revenue from user charges; the municipalities are allowed to charge fees for 
certain services, which are defined by legislation. In addition, a cap is put on the 
services to which a fee is allowed and starting 2000 a ceiling was put on the amounts 
chargeable.  
 
Free ambulatory care services include, among others, maternal and child health care, 
immunization, psychiatric care, examination and treatment of sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs) such as HIV/AIDS, and the provision of medical aids. Outpatient 
visits can be levied in two ways: either a maximum of €22 for all visits in one year or 
a fixed maximum sum of €11 per visit for the first three visits to the same health 
centre in one year (NOMESCO, 2002: 47). Further charges were added starting 2002 
whereby an extra €15 may be charged for visits during weekdays outside working 
hours and on weekends and public holidays (ibid.). Persons under 18 years are 
generally not liable to a charge. Dental care charges depend on type of care or 
treatment needed. Outpatient charges in a hospital are the same as in a health centre 
whereas in-patient care costs €23 per day (Järvelin, op. cit.: 35). Long-term in-patient 
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care is determined according to income level of the patient (and family members), 
which may be up to 80% of the income (ibid.). From 2000 there is an annual 
maximum limit of €589 that may be charged for in-patient, outpatient and day surgery 
in health centres and hospitals (ibid. 37).  
 
Table 6. Health Care Expenditures by Source of Finance 1990-2000 (%) 
 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
State 35.6 35.5 35.2 31.7 30.3 28.4 24.1 20.6 19.0 18.1 17.6 
Municipalities  34.7 34.5 33.3 32.2 32.2 33.8 37.9 41.3 42.5 42.4 42.2 
NHI 10.6 11.1 11.1 12.1 13.0 13.3 13.9 14.2 14.8 14.9 15.4 
Private Financing 19.2 19.0 20.5 23.9 24.5 24.5 24.1 23.9 23.7 24.6 24.9 
      - Out-of-pocket* 15.6 - - - - 20.6 20.1 19.8 19.5 20.0 - 
 
Source: STAKES, 2002.  
Notes: * Data from Järvelin (2002: 31); “–” data not available.   
 
Expenditure in health services is defined by the direct costs of producing and/or using 
health services (STAKES, 2002). Determined as a percentage of the GDP, health 
expenditure in Finland is quite low at 7% in 2001, relative to other OECD countries 
(OECD, 2003). Furthermore, this has been falling throughout the 1990s (figure 2); the 
marked increase in the face of recession during 1990-1992 has been attributed to a 
decline in the GDP (Häkkinen and Lehto, op. cit.: 8). The main reason for the overall 
decrease is the economic recession of the early 1990s (Järvelin, op. cit.: 30). The 
recession had an immediate impact in spiralled government debt (table 2) and 
declining spending on sickness and health care as pointed earlier.  
 
Figure 2. Trends in Health Care Expenditure as % of GDP (1990-1999)
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Source: STAKES (2002).  
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Although government spending on social protection actually increased as table 2 
shows, the increase was reflected predominantly in paying out unemployment 
benefits, which rose from 5.9% in 1990 of the total social protection expenditure to 
15.6% at its highest in 1993 (MSAH, 2001c: 138). During the same time, the share 
spent on health fell from 27.5% to 20.7% and reached its lowest level the following 
year at 19.7% before improving gradually to 23.7% in 2001 (ibid.). Looking at the 
longitudinal data in table 6, we see that, apart from the cited decline in the overall 
financing for health care, there have also been major changes in the share contributed 
by the different sources. For better clarity, this picture is projected in figure 3 below. 
As shown, the share of state financing while previously the highest has fallen by half 
through the decade from 35.6% in 1990 to 17.6% in 2000. On the other hand, that of 
the municipalities has increased from 34.7% to 42.2% during the same time. The 
changes between state and municipal shares are due primarily to the cost-containment 
reform of 1993 that shifted the larger burden for financing to the municipalities (see 
next chapter for discussion). NHI financing has also grown but to a lesser extent as 
has private financing. Of the cost met by private financing – voluntary (market) 
insurance and direct out-of-pocket payments – the latter constitutes the larger share.  
 
Figure 3. Trends in Health Care Expenditure by Source of Finance (1990-
2000)
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 Source: STAKES (2002).  
 
Over the decade, the burden to the consumer in out-of-pocket payments has grown by 
nearly 5% from 15.6% in 1990 to 20% in 1999. However, most of this money is spent 
on pharmaceutical purchases (Järvelin, op. cit.). In table 7 contribution to the total 
health care services production expenditure for 2000 is broken down along the three 
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sectors: the public, private and NGOs. Of the total 6,926,767,078 Euros spent, the 
government was responsible for 80.1%, the private business sector 16.5% and a 
considerably small 3.4% by NGOs. This shows again that the government-dominant 
model prevails.   
 
Table 7.  Health Services Production Expenditure by Sector in Euros (2000) 
 
Public/Gov. Private NGOs 
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Total 
5,550,368 665 80.1 1,143,720,000 16.5 232, 678, 413 3.4 6,926,767,078 
 
Source: Kauppinen and Niskanen (2003: 19).  
 
 
CHAPTER 3. HEALTH CARE DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
The objectives of the Finnish health care development and reforms have aimed at 
achieving the highest possible level of the health of the population as well as reducing 
disparities among different socio-economic groups. Like in other countries around the 
world, Finland has gone through what the WHO (2000: 13-16) calls three generations 
of reforms. The first was the post-WWII development of the hospital system that took 
over previously voluntary organizations-run systems. Facing rising costs and criticism 
on affordability and quality in the 1960s, a radical change was introduced with the 
coming of the Primary Health Care Act in 1972 to reform the hospital system (WHO, 
op. cit.: 13; Helén and Jauho, 2002: 8). Current third generation reforms revolve 
around responding to increasing demand, strain on public systems, cutting spending, 
contracting and innovating collaborations with private players, and improving access 
(WHO, op. cit.: 16; Häkkinen and Lehto, 2002, 4-7; MSAH, 2002b).  
 
These changes arise from the profound political and socio-economic changes 
occurring in the world in the past two decades, notably, the collapse of Communism 
and growth of the neo-liberalist ideology of minimizing pervasive state interventions 
in economic and political life (Uusitalo, 1995: 7; Helén and Jauho, op. cit.: 10; 
Häkkinen and Lehto, op. cit.). Deregulation and dismantling of state centralization in 
the 1980s (Hägglund and Modeen, 1988; Temmes and Salminen, 1994: 18) and the 
introduction of increased competition in the organization of social policy has brought 
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a growing reliance in market mechanisms in the 1990s (e.g., Kiviniemi et al, 1995; 
Kauppinen and Niskanen, op. cit.: 49). Through these reforms, the Finnish system 
emerged as one of the most decentralized in Scandinavia (research interviews).   
 
Preventive health became an underlying premise of health policy development 
following the adoption and publication of the (1978) WHO Health for All by the Year 
2000 Programme in 1986 (henceforth, HFA 2000). Finland was among the first 
OECD countries to adopt the HFA 2000 (Lehto, 2002: 254), and which became the 
basis for the development of health care policy in the country (MSAH, 1993: 7) (see 
Part II chapter 4 for the main principles of the HFA 2000; WHO, 1978). Although 
Finland’s progress in the first review of the programme in 1991 was criticised for 
“insufficient local input, weak management practices and poor public and private 
sector co-ordination”, the recommendations were outlined in the revised strategy 
(MSAH, op. cit.) and a project launched in 1994 in seven municipalities to chart a 
new broad kind of cooperation (MSAH, 1996). 
 
Table 8. Development of Health Policy in Finland Relevant for NGOs Following 
the 1978 WHO Health for All by Year 2000  
 
Year Major Developments  
1986  Adoption of the HFA Programme as a national strategy  
 Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion 
1987  WHO Healthy Cities Network (WHCN), Turku city membership  
1992  Government approval of 1991 revised Programme  
1993  Major reform in State financing of health care and deregulation (January)  
1994-
1995 
 Health Promotion in the Municipality: The Health for All by Year 2000 
Municipal Programme 
 (1995) Enshrining of health promotion in the Constitution Act (969/1995) 
(Cap 14a and 15a) (August) 
1996  First public health progress report  
 National Healthy Cities Network established (HCN)  
1997  Establishment of Advisory Board for Public Health (at MSAH) comprising 17 
representatives from government, health professionals and NGOs  
1998  Revised, Health for All in the 21st Century (WHO Health 21) 
1999  Target Action Plan for Social Welfare and Health Care 2000-2003 (TATO) 
(October); first time NGOs are fully involved in preparing and implementing a 
broad government programme on social policy 
2001  Strategies for Social Protection 2010 (March) 
 Government Resolution on the Health 2015 Public Health Programme (May)  
2002  Decision in Principle by the Council of State on Securing the Future of Health 
Care (August) 
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 Informal Discussion Group (DG) in the MSAH comprising 10 NGO and 
government representatives to chart a strategy paper on collaboration  
2003  NGOs as Actors in Social Welfare and Health Policy: Strategy for NGOs 
Activities (February 4), MSAH publication of the DG report.   
 
Source: MSAH (various years); Jämsen, 2002; research interviews.   
 
Nevertheless, overall development of this programme in the 1990s was conditioned 
by many factors such as: economic recession; state subsidy system reform; further 
deregulation of central administration and increased competition; and globalisation or 
internationalisation, in particular, membership into the European Union and social and 
economic changes in other European countries (MSAH, op. cit.: 14-19 and 2001b: 13; 
Järvelin, 2002: 79; Kosonen, 2001: 164-5; Lehto, op. cit.: 253-5). In table 8 a timeline 
of the evolution of the programme and related developments most relevant to this 
study on NGOs is outlined. Some of these developments are briefly discussed here 
and in the next chapter and will be revisited in Part V Section I on discussions of 
collaborative relations. As the table, the discussions are intended to detail the notable 
context and health developments in Finland that have raised the visibility of NGOs; 
some of the implications these developments have had on the NGO health system are 
highlighted in chapter 4 below. Presently, I focus on the 1990s and the 2000s.   
 
3.1. The 1990s: System Changes, and State Financing and Deregulation  
 
The Finnish health policy development and reforms of the 1990s had two main 
objectives: to improve efficiency and restrain spiralling costs in primary and tertiary 
care. Changes were made in the system organization and financing. In the system 
organization, one major development was the introduction of an action programme 
during 1991-1992 aimed at reducing institutional or in-patient care. This was done by 
shifting resources to the development of outpatient and ambulatory services that 
would enable elderly persons live in their homes for as long as possible. The goal was 
to reduce primary care inpatient services at health centres and homes for the elderly to 
2.3 bed-days per inhabitant, or only 10%-12% of persons over 75 in all levels of 
institutionalised care (Järvelin, op. cit.: 52). The process was coordinated by the 
MSAH with the involvement of the provincial administration and the Association of 
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (AFLRA) although the actual decisions were 
made at the municipal level.  
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Although municipalities had mixed results, the targets were largely unmet in primary 
inpatient care, which was reduced to 3.3 bed-days per inhabitant, whereas success was 
registered in secondary care institutions at 1 bed-day per inhabitant (ibid.). The 
number of hospital beds was reduced from 11.5 to 7.6 per 1,000 inhabitants (ibid. 57). 
Furthermore, the number beds at nursing homes for the elderly fell by about 30% 
(ibid. 64). And although admissions actually increased, this was unsettled by the 40% 
reduction in the length of stay (ibid. 58). Another notable system change – cited for its 
contextual significance in understanding health care delivery in the country today – 
was the reform in the patient-doctor relations where a general practitioner or personal 
doctor system that had started earlier in the 1980s was introduced in some 
municipalities to maintain continuity of care and reduce intolerable levels of waiting 
time at the primary health care outlets and was further developed into a model of 
“population responsibility” (väestövastuu) whereby a collaborative team of health 
care personnel take responsibility for a geographically defined area having 1,500-
5,000 inhabitants. The model now covers 50% of the country’s population (ibid. 50).  
 
Perhaps the most radical change in the health care system during this period was the 
1993 reform of the state subsidy system to municipalities (Häkkinen and Lehto, op. 
cit.: 4). Before 1993, the municipal health producers (health centres, hospital districts 
and hospitals) received earmarked subsidies matching actual costs. The MSAH issued 
the quotas to the provincial administrations that then disbursed them to the 
municipalities. In the reforms, subsidies are paid directly to individual municipalities 
as block grants capitated prospectively using prevailing demographic circumstances 
(population age structure and morbidity, weighted at the national level), population 
density and land area, and municipality’s financial capability determined by the 
Ministry of the Interior (WHO, 1996 49; Jämsen, 2002; research interviews). In the 
new arrangement, municipalities need not lobby applications (Luoma and Suoniemi, 
1995). The reforms were also deregulatory as municipalities were allowed greater 
flexibility to choose the producers among the public, private and NGO sectors 
(Häkkinen and Lehto, op. cit.: 5; Jämsen, op. cit.).  After its implementation in 1993, a 
transition period was allowed to the year 2000. An adjustment was made in 1996 after 
which the financial capability criterion was removed (WHO, op. cit.: 49). These 
developments are indicatory of the successive changes that the reforms have brought 
in the decade.   
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3.2. The 2000s: Health 2015 and the National Project to Secure the Future of 
Health Care 2007 
 
National health developments in the early 2000s have been contained in the Target 
Action Plan for Social Welfare and Health Care 2000-2003 (TATO), a social policy 
action plan popularly abbreviated as TATO drawn by then incoming social 
democratic-led government following the general elections in 1999. The Plan paid 
particular attention to the social welfare and health concerns of children, elderly 
persons and the mentally ill (Järvelin, op. cit.: 81) and was particularly aimed at 
steering the municipalities in developing services (research interviews). In some of 
the main developments, the state earmarked a subsidy for mental health services for 
children and young people. Guideline recommendations for quality care for the 
elderly were published in spring 2001 and on mental health care in the autumn of the 
same year. One related project on “meaningful life” launched in 1998 to promote 
mental health and inter-sectoral collaboration ended in 2002. Notably, during 2002-
2003, state subsidies for municipal capital investment projects were slashed to 25% 
from 25-50% (ibid. 82). Key developments in the 2000s are shaped by two different 
programmes described here in some detail. The first is on preventive/promotive health 
and the other on the services system.  
 
The Health 2015 provides the overall long-term policy framework for the current and 
future development of the preventive/promotive health system. Its underlying 
principle is that health is taken as a major factor in steering and influencing all levels 
of public decision-making. Based on the revised WHO HFA 2000, now Health 21 and 
programme for the European region, the programme, issued in 2001, raises eight 
targets and 36 lines of action for achievement by year 2015. The targets are to: 
increase child well-being; reduce smoking levels of young people; cut accidental and 
violent death among adult young men; improve functional capacity among working-
age persons; continued improvement of functional capacity among persons over 75 
years; increase life expectancy; maintain present levels of healthiness; and to reduce 
inequalities in mortality across socio-economic groups (MSAH, 2001b: 15-21). 
Health 2015 was produced, and is supervised, by the Advisory Board for Public 
Health (ABPH), a consultative group formed by Decree (67/1997) comprising 17 
representatives from the MSAH, several other Ministries, health professionals from 
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hospitals and health centres, the university, two NGOs, and the local authorities body 
AFLRA. The ABPH has been in operation since 1997 for two 3-year terms (research 
interviews).  
 
Four months after the publication of Health 2015, the Council of State launched the 
equally ambitious National Project to Secure the Future of Health Care (Henceforth, 
the National Project 2007, owing to the fact that it ends in that year). A 
“Memorandum of the National Project on Safeguarding the Future of Health Care 
Services” was produced through a consultative process involving actors from all 
health sectors in April 2002 (MSAH, 2002a) upon which the Council of State issued a 
Decision in Principle on implementing the National Project (MSAH, 2002b). This 
(services system) project is a blueprint for systematic medium-term reforms whose 
“ultimate goal” is to secure quick and equal access to quality medical treatment 
countrywide (ibid. 13). Key objectives include securing speedy access, health 
promotion and prevention, structural reform of the system, staff development, and 
financing. Like the Health 2015, the National Project 2007 reflects a collaborative 
achievement in health policy making. It was developed by five groups of 
administrators, each developing a specific objective area, and consulted almost 400 
health experts and actors from ministries, regional and municipal bodies, labour 
organizations, NGOs and universities, among others (MSAH, 2002a: 9-10). Project 
implementation has already been under way as the following explication shows. 
 
Underlying the objective of ensuring quick access is the 3-3-3 principle according to 
which a patient should obtain medical treatment within three days of taking contact, 
specialist outpatient consultation in three weeks of referral, and the needed medical 
care within three months or an absolute maximum of six months (ibid.). The MSAH, 
in collaboration with the AFLRA, is required to develop national guidelines for 
managing/eliminating pervasively long queues to improve access to treatment. A 
preparatory committee appointed by the MSAH will complete a report, which may 
contain proposals to amend current legislation, by end of 2003 and the objective 
achieved by 2005 (MSAH, 2002b: 14). Already in 2002, the Council of State 
appropriated  €25 million to be used by hospital districts towards the elimination of 
examination and treatment queues.  
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With regard to reforming the structures and functions of the health care delivery 
system, a project has been started in 2002 and will end in 2007. It aims at reducing 
costs and expects to generate €0.2 billion in savings each year after completion 
(MSAH, 2002b: 8). New legislation and national guidelines will be introduced. In 
particular, the Primary Health Care Act and Act on Specialized Medical Care will be 
merged into a single health care Act (ibid. 35). The structural and legislative reform 
will be fashioned on promoting and developing collaboration between public, private 
and NGO sectors (ibid.). On staff development, changes will centre on securing 
availability of health personnel in the public sector, which has been deteriorating in 
recent times (research interviews). For example, in 2001, staff shortage in primary 
health care (PHC) and tertiary care reached 300 physicians and 600 specialized 
physicians, respectively (MSAH, 2002a: 42). In order to increase the number of health 
personnel, legislation will also be revised regarding training (ibid. 36-44).  
 
Other reform areas under the National Project 2007 are on client charges, health 
insurance and rehabilitation and on health care financing. The nowadays-complex 
client charging system (see earlier discussion) will be reformed into “a single coherent 
system” by 2005 (ibid. 47). Health insurance and rehabilitation currently financed 
from different sources – the state, municipalities, the SII, the Slot Machine 
Association (popularly abbreviated as RAY in Finnish) and households – poses 
serious challenges to co-ordination and guidance as well as possible duplication and 
cost-ineffectiveness (ibid. 47-49). Hence, an impact assessment will be done and the 
system developed with a view to reduce compensation for lab tests as well as doing 
away with compensation for minor expenses (ibid. 49. Because of the ageing 
population, migration, technological development, and the general health of the 
population, a major step will be undertaken to increase statutory state subsidies and 
grants to municipalities through 2003-2007. This will be done through savings and 
rationalization of the system. Already, this was increased by €223 million in 2003 
(MSAH, 2002b: 14).  
 
In conclusion, although the National Project 2007 took into account the Health 2015, 
it offers a seemingly competing framework. One expert view raised the concern that it 
was launched for political expediency prior to the general elections (research 
interviews). However, another argument was that since the Health 2015 focuses on 
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preventive and promotive health education while the National Project 2007 targets 
improving the delivery system and access of services, they are quite different. Still the 
two do not enjoy the same political support as shown by the fact that the latter has 
more funds than former, for example. During its publication, it was noted that 
implementation of the Health 2015 needed €420,000 yearly (research interviews). 
However, there was no funding allocated in the first year. In 2002 the budget was 
€135,000 and in 2003 it increased to €270,000. Still, these funds are used mainly for 
publication, and education (research interviews). In contrast, the National Project 
2007 has substantial funding as pointed above. Again, it is not clear how or to what 
extent the two programs are integrated and institutional development towards their 
implementation is still taking shape. Notably, for an example, an international 
evaluation of structures, resources and activities carried out as one action line of the 
Health 2015 has recommended that the ABPH be given more powers and resources, 
among others, to carry out the programme (WHO, 2002: 40-42, 57). On the whole, 
much of the work is still ahead.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1990S AND 2000S HEALTH 
REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENTS ON HEALTH NGOS  
 
This chapter will briefly highlight some of the key prospective implications the 
reforms of the 1990s and 2000s discussed above may have or have had on the 
operations of health NGOs. Specific impact of the 1990s reforms on NGOs would 
need to be assessed as a special topic of research. Here, some notions from the 
interviews are reflected although the main aim is to discern the overall implications of 
more recent developments rather than impacts using various data readings. In general, 
there is wider acknowledgement that impacts arose mainly from the economic 
recession of the early 1990s rather than from the reforms per se (research interviews). 
According to a number of views, the recession forced NGOs reduced some of their 
activities. The state subsidy reform, on the other hand, may have had varied 
implications depending on the health sub-field of particular NGOs. In general, there 
was no noticeable decline in grants for those NGOs that relied less on the 
municipalities and no major difference was seen regarding collaboration (research 
interviews). Developments in medical rehabilitation needs and funding in the 1990s 
have, however, had some implications on NGOs providing these services.  
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During the decade, persons over 45 needing rehabilitation services have increased as 
well as the elderly and those needing mental health services (MSAH, 1999a: 15; 
Järvelin, 2002: 82). Due to the economic recession, municipal provision of 
rehabilitation services declined as well as funding (research interviews). New 
legislation was introduced in 1991 that broadened rehabilitation services. The 
Rehabilitation Allowances Act was again reformed in 1999 giving the National Health 
Insurance (NHI) greater responsibility for funding medical, vocational and social 
rehabilitation of the young and elderly (MSAH, 2001d: 30). As was pointed out 
earlier, NHI funding for rehabilitation services is almost exclusively given to NGOs 
and other private providers. Likewise, RAY’s funds are exclusively given to NGOs. 
Overall rehabilitation expenditure from all sources increased by 27% during 1992-
1997 (MSAH, 1998a) and 9% during 1997-2000 to reach €1,213 million (MSAH, 
2002c). NHI funding grew by 31% and that of RAY by 11% during 1992-1997; 
RAY’s funding has grown nearly five times during 1990-2003 from 10 million Euros 
to 49 million Euros (research interviews). By 2000 NGOs were producing about 15% 
of the rehabilitation services in over 100 units (MSAH, 2002c) (more detailed data is 
provided in Part IV Section I). Thus, this trend reflects a tremendous increase in 
funding available for health NGO providers in this sub-field.  
 
An unprecedented development in health NGO systems occurred in 1997 when one 
NGO took over the entire health system of Karjaa, a rural municipality of about 9,000 
inhabitants in Southern Finland (research interviews). The NGO sells both the 
primary outpatient health and long-term inpatient services to the municipality; 
neighbouring municipalities also buy the in-patient services. This unique case in the 
welfare state was possible because of three main reasons connected to the 1990s 
reforms. One was the policy to reduce institutional care, and consecutively hospital 
beds. The other was the need to cut health care expenditure in the municipality and 
sub-region of Western Uusimaa, which was higher than in other parts of the country. 
The third, and perhaps most remarkable, was the reform permitting municipalities to 
buy services from any producer. Before 1997 primary health care services in the area 
were produced by a federation of three municipalities, which also run the nearby but 
remotely located Meltola hospital, which had been built in the 1930s for tuberculosis 
diseases. (Further presentation and discussion of this case will be provided in Part IV 
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Section I). Three other developments in health policy from the 1990s having 
implications on NGOs are briefly discussed below.  
 
4.1. The WHO Health For All by Year 2000 
 
Although as stated above, in its early years the health for all (HFA) policy had not 
achieved substantial local input or increased co-ordination significantly, the revised 
strategy in 1992 adapted the 16 recommendations of the WHO review (MSAH, 1993). 
Eight strategies were developed in pursing further the HFA 2000 generally focusing 
on health promotion and education. Several notable examples of projects undertaken 
with implications for NGOs can be mentioned. Activities in mental health were 
developed in which additional funding was secured from, e.g., RAY; the “meaningful 
life” action programme mentioned above is a notable example. Other health education 
actions included measures for promoting physical activities and preventive health. For 
example, during 1993-1995 municipal liaison officers and advisory committees 
systems were revised to allow greater collaboration in health education (ibid. 34).  
 
As part of public participation in health care management, NGOs were incorporated in 
the feed back system for information on quality of information (ibid. 49). In 
promoting effective models for collaboration between NGOs and municipal health 
systems, a project was initiated in 1994 in seven municipalities (MSAH, 1996). One 
outcome was that municipalities developed projects that were executed by an NGO. 
As a conclusion, the evaluation recommended: “it would from now on be worth of 
investigating ways of getting the [NGOs and] citizens at large involved in health 
promotion” (p. 24). In addition to the municipal program, a national training 
campaign to get NGOs involved in the HFA 2000 started (MSAH, 1993: 53). At the 
end of the HFA 2000 municipal program in 1996, the municipalities decided to 
continue operations by forming the Finnish National Healthy Cities Network (HCN) 
(research interviews).  The HCN movement had earlier been started by the WHO in 
1987 in an effort to promote the implementation of the HFA 2000 at the municipal 
level. Towards this effort, the European HCN was born in which Turku was among 
the 11 founding member cities. Established after a decade, the Finnish HCN has now 
grown to 14 cities (ibid.); the international movement has now over 100 cities in 
Europe, Asia and North America.  
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Although the Finnish HCN regrettably has no NGO representation, the municipalities 
have employed personnel specifically for carrying out health promotion work (ibid.). 
These are the main persons whose work involves direct contacts and activities with 
NGOs; Turku, Jyväskylä, Kerava, Kainuu, Helsinki and Heinola are the best examples 
where collaboration with NGOs in health promotion is very active. These activities 
had a general effect of establishing, strengthening and broadening contacts and inter-
sectoral relations (ibid.). At another level, in 1997, the MSAH made a remarkable 
arrangement with NGOs when it delegated preparation of the yearly budgetary 
appropriation plan for health promotion programmes targeted directly at the 
population and implemented by NGOs to the Finnish Centre for Health Promotion 
(FCHP), an umbrella NGO for 120 health NGOs. Since then, the FCHP has been 
responsible for the majority (41%) of the government’s health promotion budget (see 
Part IV Section I for further discussions). 
 
4.2. The Health 2015 Programme  
 
The Health 2015 is the main product of the Advisory Board for Public Health 
(ABPH). As pointed out above, it is a product of work involving NGO leaders and 
experts. In achieving its eight targets, the Health 2015 put a particular stress on the 
need for co-operating with NGOs and other actors (MSAH, 2001b: 23). As such, 
NGOs are to be involved at all levels of health development:  
 
“In implementing this programme, evaluating its achievements and reshaping 
it in response to changing circumstances, care must be taken to involve and 
listen to individuals, NGOs and public health organisations both nationally, 
locally and in all administrative sectors involved in the programme. Central 
and local government also carries some responsibility for ensuring and 
furthering ways in which NGOs can exert influence and operate” (ibid. 30). 
 
Such an imposing policy statement and the processes initiated henceforth no doubt 
pose some implications on NGOs. They now have an opportune invitation to 
significantly engage in policy dialogues at the top on all levels of government. The 
main work will be done by the Board, whose task now is to coordinate the 
implementation of the program and to make proposals and initiatives. Obviously 
however, the work could be hampered by the broad independence municipalities have 
in decision-making at the local level, and although the programme have some funds, 
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these are very small (research interviews). As such, policy or legislative tools would 
have to be developed, for example, tied to decision-making on funding so that 
municipalities or NGOs applying for such funds would be required to show plans for 
inter-sectoral cooperation in project implementation.  
 
4.3. The National Project to Secure the Future of Health Care 2007 
 
In the National Project, the group responsible for developing the division of labour 
and co-operation between public service providers and private and NGO sectors 
comprised of two executives from a hospital district and an NGO hospital. The 
Project has generally stressed the need for collaborative relations between the public 
and NGO and private systems. Apart from the policy development level, a major area 
in which the framework will have an impact on NGOs is in the structural reform of 
the service delivery system. This regards the development of local health services, 
specialized care, and information systems. Recognizing the strong role played by 
NGOs and the private sector, the reform calls for a clarification and division of labour 
and co-operation across the three sectors with aims at reducing duplication, improving 
“healthy competition”, and improving the flow of information (MSAH, 2002a: 26). 
Developments in these areas are expected to improve availability, efficiency, and 
cost-effectiveness of services. For example, reference is made regarding the 
organization of local services. The document recommends: “mental health outpatient 
services, psychosocial services, services for intoxicant abusers and associated 
emergency services should be organised as a functional regional unit in association 
with the private and third sectors” (MSAH, 2002a: 29); the sector is already a major 
producer of these services. And in order to further the development of the division of 
labour and collaboration, legislative reforms unifying various Acts into a single 
Health Service Act will be implemented by 2007 (ibid. 35).  
 
Another area that will have an implication on NGO health systems is the coordination 
of training of health personnel. It is proposed that advisory boards be created in 
university hospitals’ areas of responsibilities that should comprise NGOs 
representatives, among others, to work closely with a national advisory board 
established with a permanent secretariat (ibid. 44-45). In addition, reforms on health 
care financing pose a significant implication on health NGOs in a number of ways. 
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First, a monitoring group is to be set up with a broad representation of NGOs and 
other actors, whose work will be to support a steering group at the MSAH. Secondly, 
major statutory funding increases will be made in areas NGOs are particularly active. 
€170 million will be disbursed for outpatient care in mental health, intoxicant abusers, 
cancer, and orthopaedics, among others (ibid. 50). Further funding needs of €95 
million during 2003-2010 will be sourced for the care of the elderly (ibid.).  
 
Thirdly, and more specifically, the main source of public funding for NGOs – RAY – 
will have to shoulder an increased responsibility in footing the government bill for the 
National Project 2007 (ibid. 53), meaning potential increased diversion of funds that 
may otherwise have gone to the NGO sector (research interviews). Additionally, as 
pointed above, plans are under way to assess ways of harnessing the flow of 
rehabilitation funds as part of rationalizing costs. Already since 1993 the state had 
started appropriating a part of RAY’s funds for use in rehabilitation of war veterans 
and affected persons – work that could as well be done by NGOs. The share of these 
funds has grown by the largest margin compared to RAY’s other funding areas to 
25% of its earnings in 2002 (RAY, 2002). Again, RAY’s funding available to NGOs 
has been increasingly constrained by the tax regime on its earnings, which has shot 
from 3% before 2000 to 8.25% in 2003 (research interviews). NGO leaders have 
expressed their dissatisfaction with this development (ibid.). Furthermore, changes in 
RAY’s funding strategy that will cut overall allocations for capital investments, 
currently at 70% of total project costs, will have a severe implication for elderly 
housing services development by NGOs, a matter being developed as government 
policy (ibid.) (see Part IV Section I for further discussions).  
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SECTION II – KENYA: CHAPTER 1. PREVAILING SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF HEALTH CARE  
 
 
1.1. Country History and Geographical Background, and Demographic Features 
 
Kenya is a relatively large country of 582,646 sq. km located in the Eastern horn of 
Africa (see map). A republic, it achieved independence in 1963 from Britain. The 
latest population census of 1999 indicated that the country’s population is 29 million 
majority of whom are concentrated in the central and western parts leaving vast 
swathes of the north eastern parts sparsely populated with 1-5 persons per sq. km. 
(ibid.); average density is 49 (ROK, 2001b: xxxiii). 80% of the population live in the 
rural areas (UNDP-Kenya, 2002: 67) and about 2 million people live in the capital 
city Nairobi. The population is highly heterogeneous: over 40 major ethnic groups 
with unique languages and culture. In addition, there are numerous Christian, Islamic, 
Hindu and traditional religions. After independence, Kenya’s population grew rapidly 
reaching an annual rate of 3.8% in 1979 (Ministry of Health, 1996: 1) This was 
caused by rising fertility rates coupled by declining mortality rates as the health status 
improved; fertility rates rose from 6.8 in 1963 to the highest level of 7.9 in 1979 
before dropping to 5 in 1995 while infant mortality rates fell from 120 to 104 to 67 
during the same period (ibid.). As indicated by table 1, the country’s population will 
continue to grow and age and the dependency ratio will become more favourable. 
 
Table 1. Trends in Demographic Structure (Population in Thousands)   
 
Population 1975 1990 1997 1998 1999 2000 2015* 2030* 2050*
Total 13,577 25,033 33,737 35,225 28,687 30,668 37,493 43,572 55,367
Males 6,756 12,494 16,880 17,630 14,205 15,273 18,901 22,011 27,937
Females 6,821 12,539 16,857 17,595 14,481 15,395 18,592 21,561 27,430
Age %          
 0–14 49.5 51.3 51.9 52.0 43.7 43.5 36.8 29.8 24.3 
15–64 47.3 46.6 46.2 46.1 52.4 53.7 60.3 66.1 67.1 
65- 3.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 3.9 2.8 2.9 4.1 8.6 
Dependency ratio, % 111.4 - - - 111.6 85.8 65.9 51.2 45.3 
 
Sources: 1990-1998 population projections by Central Bureau of Statistics; 
1999 data (actual) by ROK (2001b); all age columns for 1975, 2000, 2015, 
2030 and 2050, and whole 1975 column data by UN/DESA (2002); 2015, 
2030 and 2050 population and dependency ratio data by World Bank (2002). 
Notes: * Projections; “–” data not available.   
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1.2. Political and Administrative Structure  
 
As a relatively young country, Kenya’s post-independence political history is 
characterised by three periods: (1) the first era of President Kenyatta (1963-1978); (2) 
the Moi regime (1978-2002); and (3) the new government of the third President, 
Kibaki (2002-). Owing to the length of its stay in power, the Moi regime presided 
over the most significant era in the country’s political and economic history. After a 
failed coup de é tat in 1982, all political organization was banned and the country 
became a de jure single party state that saw a repressive authoritarianism throughout 
the decade. Multiparty democracy returned in 1991 after the repeal of Section II A of 
the Constitution of Kenya following massive pressure from internal and external 
forces (Kanyinga, 1993). The new legislation also permitted a political incumbent to 
hold the presidency for a maximum of only two terms. Presidential, parliamentary and 
local authorities’ elections are held every five years. The last General Elections held 
at the end of 2002 brought an end to the rule of the independence party, Kenya 
African National Union (KANU), following the landslide victory of the opposition 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) (a coalition of 15 major parties). This also 
ushered in what has now been widely termed as country’s ‘second liberation’, an 
unprecedented era of democratic consciousness and political transparency and 
legitimacy of the government. Since 1998, a new Constitution that will shape the 
country’s political future has been under heated discussions and is now expected to be 
realized in 2004 following the failure of the process to conclude during 2003. 
 
The country has a unicameral Parliament of 222 members (including the 12 
nominees) with the President as head of both government and the state, and 24 
Ministries each represented by a Minister. The country has four levels of government: 
(1) the central government; (2) eight provincial administrations; (3) 71 districts; and 
(4) 175 local authorities. The provincial and district administrations are essentially 
extensions of the central government while the local authorities are directly elected by 
the area inhabitants. Like constituencies and districts, many of these local authorities 
have been created largely for political expediency mostly during the Moi era; for 
example, the number of local authorities has grown from 66 in 1969 to 174 in 2000 
(ROK, 2002a: 96) while the number of districts according to the Constitution are 41, 
but in reality the total number today is 71 (Orlale and Muriuki, 2003).  
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1.3. Economic and Human Development  
 
With a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$ 306 in 1999 (UNDP-Kenya, 
op. cit.: 30), Kenya is among the worlds less developed countries. In the human 
development index (HDI) measure, at 0.514 Kenya is in the medium category with 
countries like South Africa and Ghana (ibid. 14). Like similar economies in sub-
Saharan Africa, agriculture is the mainstay of the economy employing 75% of the 
labour force (ibid.). During 1996-2000, agriculture contributed 24.5% of the GDP 
while the share of manufacturing stood at 13.3% (ROK, op. cit.: 2). During the same 
period, the share of the service sector was 62.2% having grown from 53.4% during 
1964-1973 (ibid.). The country’s economic development is characterised by four 
historic phases. The first was the period of rapid economic growth (1964-1973), 
followed by a period of external shocks – mainly the oil price crisis and coffee boom 
– (1974-1979), an era of structural adjustment and stabilization in the 1980s, and, 
fourth, liberalization and decline in donor flows through the 1990s to the present 
(ibid. 1). Women representation in senior government positions is very low in Kenya 
as elsewhere in the sub-Sahara (UNDP-Kenya, op. cit.: 64). This has however 
changed dramatically in the current Kibaki government, which has three women 
cabinet ministers as compared to none in the previous.   
 
The ideological commitment pertaining to the eradication of poverty, ignorance and 
disease was contained in the 1965 landmark nation-building and socio-economic 
development blueprint, the Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and its 
Application to Kenya. In the decades since, government rhetoric was build along this 
and subsequent generic policy frameworks. The framework was quite functionalist as 
well as rights based since it intended to provide for all Kenyans. But the country’s 
experience with development can be explained by world systems theory and 
underdevelopment theories (e.g., MacPherson and Midgley, 1987: 1-12). According 
to the world systems theory, economic growth of one country follows a similar path 
as that of another (ibid.). This is explained by convergence theory (e.g., Wilensky, 
1975: 86; Wilensky et al, 1985: 6). In spite of the wide economic differences, writing 
in Oyen’s Comparing Welfare States and Their Futures Mutiso (1986: 217, 218) 
found a striking “degree of similarity” between Kenya and industrial welfare states 
explained by the modernization “‘trickle-down model of development’”. The trickle-
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down theory argues that everyone’s share of the national cake expands with economic 
growth. Indeed, in Kenya, as “economic performance improved, public expenditure 
tended to rise and vice versa” during the 1980s (Kanyinga, 1995: 72-73). However, 
the development of social welfare has remained stunted and maligned through the past 
two decades for a variety of reasons (see, e.g., Collier and Gunning, 1999; on 
describing African economic performance), which the world systems and 
underdevelopment theories can help to explain. Notably, economic expansion has 
relied heavily on external factors, such as unfavourable terms of trade in the 
agricultural exports and other external and internal factors as mentioned above as well 
as due to the political/governance problems.  
 
Recent Trends and Evidence in Socio-Economic Transformation 
 
The 1980s and 1990s were periods of radical changes in socio-economic and political 
life in the developing world emanating from a complex of structural adjustments, and 
liberalization and deregulation coupled by the wave of democratisation in the 1990s 
(e.g., World Bank, 1998; Mohan et al, 2000). Perpetual dependency on foreign aid 
during the 1980s made the country vulnerable to policy stipulations and changes in 
the donor camps. Political pluralism, privatisation and civil society participation were 
set as conditions for continued aid (e.g., Clayton, 1994; INTRAC, 1998; Kanbur, 
2000). Like in many sub-Saharan African countries, advances made against poverty 
and improvements in health indicators in the 1970s have deteriorated for the last 15 
years (Mwabu, 1998). Adult HIV prevalence has grown from 5.3% in 1990 to 13.1% 
in 1999 (Office of the President, 2000a: 2). Life expectancy that peaked at 60 in 1993 
dropped to 57 in 1999 (UNDP-Kenya, op. cit.: 15). Economic growth rate declined 
constantly from a high of 6.6% in the 1960s to a bottom of negative 0.3% in 2000 
(ROK, 2002a: v, 1). Paradoxically, both GDP and per capita measures improved. And 
while government expenditure as a percentage of GDP averaged around 35% in the 
mid to late 1990s, the share on social fields remained low. These trends are captured 
in table 2 below.  
 
Although liberalization and deregulation measures renewed economic growth to an 
average of 5% during 1986-1990, the political, security and donor climate of the 
1990s dampened this optimism through the 1990s (ROK, 2002a: 1-2). With the 
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accelerated deterioration in the country’s economic performance from the mid-1990s, 
the level of poverty (those living under a dollar a day) rose to an all time high of 56% 
in 2000 (ibid.). With the richest 20% of the population earning 70% of national 
income (UNDP-Kenya, op. cit.: 31), Kenya became the fourth highest inequal country 
in the world (Throup, 2001: 2). 
 
Table 2: Social-Economic and Health Indicators 
 
Year 
GDP 
(million 
KSH) 
GDP per 
capita 
(KSH) 
Social 
Expenditure, 
% of GDP 
Unemployme
nt rate, % 
Share of 
public debt, 
% GDP 
Poverty rate 
(incidence), 
% 
Life 
Expectancy 
at birth, 
years 
Infant 
mortality 
1/1000 life 
births 
1990 195,540 7,560 8.4 - 48.7 - 58 74 
1991 221,240 8,340 7.9 23.4 54.7 - - 52 
1992 264,480 9,040 7.9 - 63.1 44.8 - 51 
1993 336,620 10,920 8.0 - 94.9 - 60 60 
1994 400,720 12,640 8.4 18.5 71.7 45.0 - - 
1995 473,680 14,300 8.3 - 58.4 - 58 67 
1996 528,739 17,000 8.0 - 50.6 - - - 
1997 623,235 19,788 9.6 - 39.4 52.3 - - 
1998 690,910 21,267 9.3 25 37.4 - 60 74 
1999 742,135 22,208 8.2 17.7 44.3 - 54.7 71 
2000 795,972 22,943 8.7 22* 38.5 56 53* 70* 
2001* 895,278 25,094 8.7 21* 33.1 - 54* 68* 
 
Sources: 1994-2001 GDP (at market prices), share of public debt and 
government social expenditure % of GDP from Economic Surveys (various 
issues); MOH (1996: 1) and ROK (2001a: 61) for life expectancy and IMR; 
UNDP-Kenya (2002); Central Bureau of Statistics (2001); Ministry of Finance 
and Planning (2000).  
Notes: *Figures provisional. Social expenditure figures and the share of public 
debt (internal and external) % of GDP have been computed by author from 
original tables. The social expenditure data comprises the items listed under 
similar heading that includes health, education and social welfare. Although 
the data shows only central government expenditure, local government 
expenditures in health and education would add only between 0.2 and 0.3 
percentage points. “–” data not available.   
 
On the whole, the 1990s were a period of social development crisis (UNDP-Kenya, 
op. cit.: 44). In the 2000s, there is renewed hope: already in 2001, a modest (1.2%) 
growth rate was reported (ROK, 2002c: 1). The neo-liberalist anti-statist thinking 
stress on minimization of the state in public life, public sector reforms, privatisation 
and civil society initiatives for welfare generation with emphasis on partnerships has 
become a rallying call for the 1990s and the 2000s, e.g., in the medium-term National 
Development Plan 2002-2008 (ROK, op. cit.) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
 119
Paper (PRSP) (ROK, 2001a); from 1992 159 parastatals have been privatised (Kenya 
Social Watch Coalition, 2003; see also the PRSP, p. 50). As was noted in the 
presentation of the marketization, privatisation and participation discourse presented 
in Part II chapter 4, the introduction of a cost-sharing scheme in health care in 1989 
was a significant measure of marketization.  
 
By withdrawing from public life beginning in the 1980s, the government chose to 
“pull back from an equality oriented social policy that it had earlier chose to pursue, 
and that it has abandoned its former commitment to use the apparatus of the state in 
an effort to secure social and economic goals” (Mutiso, op. cit.: 216). With little 
donor support to government in the 1990s, charging of fees in health care services 
procurement, increased poverty incidence and overall declining economic 
performance, NGOs became major players in health care (e.g., Hearn, 1998, Berman 
et al, 1995, Wang’ombe et al, 1998). In fact, the overall NGO sector also became the 
number one foreign exchange earner (Fisher, 1998: 58). Within this setting, NGOs 
have become central to the country’s health and social policy development.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE, DISTRIBUTION, UTILIZATION, AND FINANCING  
 
2.1. Organizational Structure, Planning and Administration 
 
Like many developing countries Kenya has a hierarchical-pyramidal public health 
care structure (Figure 1). In practice, health care provision and implementation lies 
with the health infrastructure, which includes the provincial hospitals, district and 
sub-district hospitals, health centres and dispensaries. The mandate for supervision, 
formulation of policies, establishment and enforcement of standards and mobilization 
of resources for health care is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
under the Public Health Act Cap 242 of 1921 and subsidiary legislations (ROK, 
1999b: 5). At the second and third levels are the 8 provincial administrations and 68 
districts, respectively, that are responsible for implementing health programs and 
delivery of services. Primary health care is provided at the community level by the 
network of dispensaries, clinics and health centres under the MOH and some local 
authorities. Ordinarily, a health service seeker first visits the clinic, dispensary or 
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health centre, whichever is at the bottom, and if need be goes through the referral 
system to district and provincial hospitals. Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) is the 
flagship referral and university teaching health institution.1 Only hospitals provide 
inpatient services. With only one national and seven provincial hospitals, health care 
dispensation occurs mainly at the district level in the district and sub-district hospitals, 
dispensaries and health centres as indicated by the bulky system towards the bottom.  
 
Figure 1: A Simple Structure of the Hierarchical-Pyramidal Public Health Care 
System in Kenya (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: model adapted from Akin et al (1985: 8). Data: ROK (2001e: 63); 
district and sub-district hospital data from National Hospital Insurance Fund 
(NHIF), May 2003.  
Notes: Data for the district and sub district facilities is counted from the NHIF 
list of accredited health institutions. The NHIF accredits all government 
hospitals from the district level upwards but not all sub-district hospitals hence 
the number shown for the latter may not be actual.    
 
Each province, except Nairobi, has a provincial hospital. And since the provinces, 
except Nairobi, are subdivided into districts, each district has at least one district 
hospital. These vary in size measured by, e.g., the number of beds. Each level has its 
own administration organ. The comprehensive flow chart of the national health 
administration is reproduced in figure 2 below. This structure was agreed upon at a 
stakeholders’ consultative workshop on decentralization in 2000. The provincial level 
is under the administration of a Provincial Medical Office (PMO), which also has 
                                                 
1 Only one other public university trains doctors; a private hospital in Nairobi (Aga Khan Hospital) has 
recently been authorized to train doctors for the East African region in some special health fields. 
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 121
overall responsibility for overseeing the implementation of health policy, and 
supervising, regulating, coordinating and controlling all (public and NGO/private) 
health services in the province; because Nairobi province has no district-level 
subdivisions it differs somewhat from other PMOs.  
 
Figure 2. Administrative Organogram for the Decentralized Public Health Care 
System (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MOH Decentralization Workshop Report (March, 2000).  
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The PMO is comprised of a Provincial Medical Officer supported by a Provincial 
Health Management Team (PHMT). As shown in the decentralized organogram, the 
provincial hospital has a (facility) management board and a team. The district level is 
similarly comprised of, at the apex, a District Medical Officer of Health (DMOH) 
supported by a District Health Management Board (DHMB) and a District Health 
Management Team (DHMT). Likewise, the district hospital has its own management 
board (HMB) and team (HMT). At the lower levels of health centre and dispensary 
are corresponding committees and teams. The provincial medical officers receive 
copies of all minutes and reports of the DHMB meetings and their long-term plans for 
the district. In addition, they control the prices set by DHMBs as well as authorize 
their use of the funds collected from the cost-sharing programme. The DHMBs have 
responsibility to supervise all health activities in their area of jurisdiction. DHMBs 
have broad-based representation as discussed later.    
 
Although responsibility for health care provision in the country rests with the central 
government – the MOH – the local government plays an important, albeit 
supplementary, role under certain powers provided in the Local Government Act Cap 
265 of 1963, revised in 1998, and the Public Health Act Section 31 (1). There are 175 
local authorities in the country. These are divided into municipal (44), county (67) 
and town councils (63). A county council covers the whole district; municipal 
councils cover a smaller part of the district but are larger than town councils. Each 
authority is comprised of a government of councillors who elected directly by the area 
inhabitants. Every municipality is headed by a mayor elected by the council from 
among the councillors for a period of two years (Section 13: 1). Although the Act 
does not oblige the local authorities to provide health services, it gives the municipal 
councils miscellaneous powers to: “Establish and maintain either by itself or jointly 
with any other authority or any association, hospitals, maternity services, health 
centres and dispensaries within or without its area of jurisdiction” (Section 145i).  
 
Other local authorities may establish day clinics for the care of infants, children and 
juveniles (Section 145ab). In general, local authorities – municipal councils and town 
councils – carry out work of a public health nature as mentioned variously in the Act 
such as sanitation, i.e., maintaining lavatories, vermin control and water supplies. In 
addition, they have powers to “acquire and maintain one or more ambulances” 
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(Section 160c). Under Section 32 (1) of the Public Health Act, the municipal councils 
may at their discretion “provide for the use of the inhabitants of its area hospitals or 
temporary places for the reception of the sick” either directly or by contractual 
agreement with any other provider. In reality however only seven municipalities in 
larger urban areas – e.g., Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret – undertake 
health services (research interviews). All local authorities were doing so until 1970 
when responsibility was centralized (Berman et al, op. cit.: 29). These municipalities 
operate mainly primary health care such as health centres and clinics. Only the largest 
municipality, Nairobi City Council (NCC), provide specialized care in a (single) 
hospital in addition to 50 other facilities as of 1992 (Schwarz et al, 1992: 40). 
Administratively, the provision of health in Nairobi is peculiar because both the NCC 
and the PMO operate many health facilities and services, a subject dealt in length by 
Schwarz et al (op. cit.: 58-72). In general, administration is complex: each municipal 
council must have a medical officer of health and a public health officer appointed by 
the Public Service Commission, or the MOH (Section 107: 1). However, the officers 
are accountable to the municipal councils, which also pay their salaries (ibid.). In 
figure 2 above, the municipal health system has not been included because it does not 
have a centralized structure, is not part of the MOH and is otherwise small; it is in fact 
not included in any of the government pictograms on the public health care system. 
 
2.2. The National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF)2 
 
The NHIF was established by an Act of Parliament (Cap 255) shortly after the 
country’s independence in 1966. As the only statutory sickness insurance institution 
in the country, NHIF is a significant landmark in the country’s health system. It is a 
contributory scheme to which all employers are obliged to remit 2% of the salary of 
an employee if it exceeds Ksh1,000. Furthermore, any Kenyan resident over 18 years 
engaged in income-generating activities both in the formal and informal sectors and 
who could afford to can also voluntarily buy coverage. The monthly premium ranges 
from Ksh30 to a maximum of Ksh320 for a daily cover benefit of between Ksh400 
and Ksh2,000 for up to 180 days, amounting to a maximum total of Ksh360,000 
($4,832).3 Persons not in formal employment contribute Ksh60 and receive the same 
                                                 
2 Sources primarily: research interviews, and Daily Nation (August 26, 2002).  
3 At Central Bank of Kenya mean rate of Kenya shilling 74.4983 per one US$ as at May 1, 2003. 
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benefits. The premium determines the maximum amount of cover that can be claimed. 
At present however, the benefit is not graduated meaning that the minimum 
contributor will receive the same amount of rebate as the maximum contributor for 
the same health institution. In this arrangement, the rich pays for the poor in 
accordance with the NHIF policy. The insurance covers the contributor’s spouse and 
children under 18 without discrimination on the type of ailment suffered or number of 
children. Thus, if both couples are working, one is exempted from contributing. For 
all its importance, the scheme is however only for inpatient services.  
 
The scheme covers over 9 million people with 1,309,444 million individual 
contributors as at May 16, 2003; the overall coverage is estimated from assumption of 
an average family size of eight members. The system is otherwise flexible and clients 
are free to seek health services from any of the over 400 accredited hospitals operated 
by the government, the private sector, NGO missions and community health 
providers. Two forms of reimbursements are applied: hospital claims and general 
claims. In the first case, hospitals have the patients’ NHIF cards and make claims on 
submission of NHIF pre-designed clients statements. General claims are those made 
directly to the insurer by patients upon hospitalisation. Claims can be made as often as 
needed but must be made within 90 days of client discharge. Following 
corporatization in 1998 through an amendment to the 1966 Act, the NHIF is fully 
autonomized and does not receive any budget funds from the state. NHIF is run by a 
broad board of directors drawn from, among others, NGOs.  
 
2.3. Distribution and Utilization of the Health Care System 
 
The public health care delivery system in Kenya comprises a total of 2,252 health 
facilities as at 1999 (ROK, 2001e: 63). Table 3 shows the national distribution of the 
facilities by province while also reflecting the vast health impacting socio-economic 
disparities between them using national health account indicators. Because data on 
NGOs and private sector providers have been aggregated, the table shows the overall 
national totals. This notwithstanding, a question on the data should be raised. In 
general, reliable data on the facilities in the country is not easy to obtain nor is the 
classification clear at times. Private health institutions are supposed to register with 
the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board (MPDB), under the MOH.  
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Table 3. Distribution of the National Health System and Key Health and Socio-economic Characteristics in Kenya by Province*  
 
Province 
 
Nairobi Central Eastern Rift 
Valley 
North 
Eastern 
Nyanza Coast Western COUNTRY
Area sq. km.  696 13,220 153,473 182,539 128,124 12,547 82,816 8,264 581,667 
Population (000)   2,143 3,724 4,632 6,987 962 4,392 2,487 3,359 28,686 
No. Of Health Facilities   358 470 842 1,251 72 551 467 283 4,294 
Life Expectancy at Birth  61.6 63.7 62.3 58.5 52.4 45.7 51.5 52.4 54.7 
Pop growth rate (1989-1999)**   4.8 1.8 2.1 3.5 9.5 2.3 3.1 2.5 2.9 
Human Poverty Index (HPI) (2001)  32.4 30.7 39.9 36.8 44.8 44.3 37.5 41.8 34.5 
Literacy Rates (2000)  82.2 83.9 66.5 72.6 64.2 70.9 62.8 74.6 70.9 
Human Development Index (HDI) Value 0.783 0.604 0.452 0.528 0.426 0.457 0.459 0.445 0.539 
 Rank 1 2 6 3 8 5 4 7  
Per Capita Income (Ksh.) Amount 78,644 17,829 15,131 15,251 17,212 14,169 18,840 11,191 16,406 
 Rank 1 3 6 5 4 7 2 8  
HIV prevalence %  16 13 16 11 3 22 10 12 13.5 
No. Of Districts   7 13 18 3 12 7 8 68 
No. Of Municipalities (2003)  1 8 8 11 1 6 3 7 45 
No. Of health personnel (2000)  - - - - - - - - 55,732 
Pop/health personnel (2000)***  - - - - - - - - 550 
Pop/health facility  5,986 7,923 5,501 5,585 13,361 7,970 5,325 11,869 6,680 
 
Sources: ROK (1999c, 2001b, d and e); ROK, Economic Survey (various issues); MOH Central Province (2000); UNDP-Kenya (2002); 
Local Government Ministry (May 2003).  
Notes: * All data are for 1999 unless otherwise shown. ** The high increase in population growth in North Eastern province is explained 
by under-enumeration during previous years and the influx of refugees during period covered. Central province reduction is explained by 
rural-urban out-migration and declined fertility rates (ROK, 2001b: xxvii). *** The national average figure of population per medical 
doctor (and dentist) in 2000 is far much worse at 5,462.  
“-” data not available. 
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However, it is recognized that many facilities are operating without MPDB 
registration (research interviews). In fact, the MPDB 2002 register contained only 640 
private/NGO institutions (MPDB, 2002) as compared to the 2,042 reported by the 
MOH’s Health Management Information System (HMIS) for 1999 (ROK, op. cit.). 
The official data encompasses facilities defined as hospitals, health centres, 
dispensaries, nursing and maternity homes, health clinics and medical centres. Hence 
the list omits many non-conventional and private health facilities and may be 
therefore much smaller than the actual number.4 In spite of these discrepancies, care is 
taken not to over-interpret the data and where necessary explanatory notes are given.  
 
According to the overall country data on facilities distribution for 1999, Rift Valley 
province had by far the most number of health facilities (1,251 or 29.1% of national 
total of 4,294) with the least being in North Eastern province (72 or 1.7%). Central 
province ranks third with 470 (10.9%) ahead of Nairobi’s 358 (8.3%). North Eastern 
is worst off in both availability and population per facility as shown by 13,361 as 
compared to Coast with the lowest (5,325). The national average is 6,680. Distances 
to a facility are also longest in North Eastern and shortest in Nairobi. Figure 3 depicts 
a comparative analysis of the distribution by operator sector and province using more 
differentiated data. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Health Facilities by Province, 1999
 
Source: ROK (2001e: 63). 
                                                 
4 One of the studies referred here presents a broader list that includes, in addition to these, doctors 
clinics, clinical officers clinics, nurses clinics, institutional clinics and herbalists (Wang’ombe at al, op. 
cit.: 10; see also, Berman et al, op. cit.: 31-34). The tens of thousands of shops/kiosks, which dispense 
simple non-prescriptive drugs such as pain and fever relievers, antacids and anti-malaria tablets also 
form part of this diverse health system although they are not included in any of the counts.  
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Here, facilities operated by NGOs and the private for-profit sectors have been 
combined as ‘N-GOK’, which stands for not government of Kenya. With a national 
average of 48%, the share of N-GOK facilities in the provinces ranges between 30% 
in the largely arid, dry and rural North Eastern to 58% in the largely urban and 
densely populated capital area of Nairobi. The Rift Valley increases its lead in the 
share of the number of N-GOK facilities with about 28% and Central Province falls to 
number five with 8% with the least in North Eastern (1%). Looking more closely at 
the distribution of the health care system by provider sector in more detail using 
another data set of 4,214 health facilities as at 1998, we get a clearer picture of the 
health facilities operated by each of the three sectors (table 4). According to this table, 
the government operates 51%, NGOs 20% and private businesses 29% of the 
country’s health facilities. Clearly, the health care delivery system in the country is 
quite mixed. As can be seen, however, there are wide variations in sector penetration 
in the different facility types. The private sector has a commanding domination in 
nursing and maternity homes and health clinics and medical centres with 94.2% and 
83.7%, respectively. On the other hand, the government operates most health centres 
and dispensaries as well as hospitals with 80%, 60.9% and 50%, respectively. NGOs 
second government in these types of facilities with 17.4%, 23.6% and 30.7%, 
respectively. In another light, the primary health care system (health centres and 
dispensaries) takes the largest overall share of total health facilities (74%).  
 
Table 4: Distribution of Health Facilities by Type and Provider Sector, 1998 
 
Government
 
NGOs 
 
Private 
 Type of Facility 
No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
No. 
Hospital 109 50 67 30.7 42 19.3 218 
Health Centre 460 80 100 17.4 15 2.6 575 
Dispensary 1,537 60.9 595 23.6 391 15.5 2,523 
Nursing & Maternity Home 0 0 11 5.8 180 94.2 191 
Health Clinics/Medical Centres 43 0.1 72 10.2 592 83.7 707 
Total 2,149 51 845 20 1,220 29 4,214 
 
Source: ROK (1999b: 5) 
 
In terms of health personnel, the number is relatively large at 55,732 in 2000 as 
shown in table 7 below. Although the majority (69%) of personnel are supplied by the 
MOH (Wang’ombe et al, op. cit.: 3), it is probable that the larger number is in private 
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practice (ROK, 1999c: 8) since they have freedom to operate privately (Berman et al, 
op. cit.). In fact, of the over the 5,000 doctors in the country, only about 1,000 work in 
the public sector according to data released by the health Minister (Kimani, 2003). In 
terms of distribution, majority of health personnel are concentrated in urban areas, 
with over 50% working in a few major towns (Nairobi, Mombassa, Nyeri, Nakuru, 
Kisumu, Eldoret) representing only 16% of the country’s population (Wang’ombe et 
al: 4). While Nairobi alone accounts for 9.5% of clinical officers and 12.3% of nurses, 
50.8% of all doctors are located in the capital city (Berman et al, op. cit.: 49).   
 
Utilization of the Health Facility System  
 
Utilization of health services is determined by, among others, availability-
accessibility, and affordability and quality.5 Several studies can be cited on this 
subject. Data from the 1994 Welfare Monitoring Survey show a high variation of 72% 
private (includes NGOs) utilization in urban areas compared with only 25% in the 
public sector (Wang’ombe, et al 1998: 3). This trend is largely reflected in 
affordability rather than availability. In a 1996 study, 58% of households reported that 
health services were available in their communities although only 25% reported they 
could afford (ibid.). As we have seen above, availability of health facilities varies 
widely across provinces. Disparity in availability measured by the distance a patient 
has to travel to a health facility is large with an average range of between 4-8-25 
kilometres for urban, rural and arid areas, respectively (MOH, 1996: 6). 20% of 
urban, and 8% of rural poor people cannot afford to utilize public health care services 
while the figures are 81% and 76% for private health care, respectively (ibid. 14). 
This may be explained by the common belief that N-GOK facilities charge higher fees 
than government facilities.  
 
In another study of six districts from different provinces, the use of NGO mission 
hospitals for outpatient services was only 3% compared with 17% for private for-
profits and 40% for government (Berman et al, op. cit.: 53). Together with the use of 
traditional medicine (5%) and purchased self-administered drugs (13%), private 
utilization amounts to 38%. Another study of financial flows in 1994 showed that the 
                                                 
5 Accessibility may differ from availability. In real terms accessibility is a measure of availability of a 
doctor as per a defined number of persons (usually 100,000 in Kenya statistics) while in norminal terms 
it is equal to the distance of the health facility.  
 129
overwhelming out-of-pocket financing (92%) is in the utilization of private for-profit 
and non-profit providers (ROK, 1999c: 30). Berman et al’s study highlighted many 
socio-economic factors affecting the utilization of private providers, which include 
income, education, place of residence, age and gender and various forms of insurance 
cover such as the statutory NHIF, private or informal. For low-income earners, 
insurance cover, particularly the NHIF, may cause individuals or households to seek 
private health care if they perceive it to be better (see data presentation in Part IV 
Section II chapter 2).  
 
In fact, only about 20% of NHIF reimbursements go to public institutions with the 
rest going to private/NGO providers (ROK, 1999b: 52). Private insurance schemes 
have an overwhelming urban bias (80%) (Berman et al, op. cit.: 62). An exception is 
one NGO mission hospital that provides insurance policies to farmers in the 
surrounding rural area in Chogoria (Eastern Province); 8,000 persons were covered as 
of 1995 (ibid.).6 A third scheme determining private utilization of healthcare is the 
Harambee movement, a post-independence phenomena rooted in African traditional 
society. Many people use this informal community system of pooling resources to pay 
for their relatives’, friends’ or neighbours’ hospital cover. The NGO insurance and 
Harambee system are part of a growing community-based health insurance (CBHI) in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Wiesmann and Jutting, 2000). No studies exist on the scheme.  
 
In another more recent study by Wang’ombe et al (op. cit.) carried out to measure the 
capacity for N-GOK providers in services provision during a major strike by public 
health nurses between July 1997 and February 1998, the findings indicated an 
increase in the outpatient utilization of N-GOK facilities by 8-80% in 79% of the 
facilities studied. While the effects of the strike most directly reflect the upsurge in 
demand, utilization of the N-GOK facilities is quite brisk but highly under-utilized as 
some had only over 39% utilization in the non-strike period. The study also gives an 
analysis of the reasons for preferred use of the N-GOK and government facilities. 
Notably, the main reasons for using an N-GOK facility included reliable supply of 
                                                 
6 Under the scheme, the hospital paid 50% of members’ contributions towards hospital treatment. The 
scheme was however converted in 2000 into a “staff welfare fund” following community abuse and 
membership dropout (Kirema and Gitari, 2001: 18). Apart from Chogoria, two other mission hospitals 
(Maua Methodist and PCEA Tumutumu) also operate relatively similar kinds of insurance schemes. 
These schemes are however broader and members can draw loans for a variety of non-health needs.   
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drugs, shorter waiting times, availability of specialty care and friendly reception. On 
the other hand, most people (60-80%) preferred to use government facilities due to 
lower fees, proximity and availability of qualified personnel and care (p. 50-2). In a 
1990 survey by the government, a majority of patients regarded as higher the quality 
of services available in NGO-run facilities (MOH, cited in Berman et al, op. cit.: 64).  
 
Due to the economic hardships and rise of medical costs in the cost-sharing scheme, 
Kenyans are increasing resorting to cheaper means of obtaining healthcare. Of 
significance is the rise in the use of non-conventional medicine. Popularly known as 
‘healers’, traditional practitioners contribute significantly to the health of the 
population (Johnson, 2001). Although they have been associated with witchcraft, and, 
thus, stigmatisation in usage, this has been demystified as they receive increased 
recognition in the mainstream health care system – e.g., the WHO acknowledged their 
importance in its primary health care efforts from the 1970s (for background on WHO 
recognition and case studies in Kenya, see Johnson, op. cit.) – and as more and more 
people utilize them. Their reported use has been on the rise from 1% in illnesses 
treatment in 1993 (Berman et al, op. cit.). For example, use of traditional methods in 
family planning stands at 8% nationally compared to 32% use of modern methods 
(MOH, 2001). Typically, traditional practitioners operate from home or hired 
premises and may be mobile. Another indicator is the increase in the use of 
pharmacies in diagnoses and drugs prescriptions. The study by Berman et al (op. cit.: 
52) found out that 92% of the 52 pharmacies studied gave these kinds of services. A 
consultation fee is not charged as the patients are expected to buy the drugs they are 
prescribed for. However, 71% of the retail pharmacies/chemists are in only three 
provinces with a concentration of 47% in Nairobi (ibid. 48).  
 
2.4. Health Care Financing, and Recent Trends in 
 
There are numerous sources of financing health care in Kenya. Although financial 
data is not very developed due to lack of an advanced health information system – 
which is currently under development (research interviews) – the few reliable sources 
available show that the MOH is no longer the dominant spender. Two main groups of 
spenders can be identified: (1) the government (MOH and other Ministries such as 
Education, and local authorities); and (2) the private sector, including individuals and 
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households, NGOs and the for-profit sector. According to the most comprehensive 
available data in the only national health accounts (NHA), during 1994, total 
expenditure on health amounted to Ksh31,240 million (8% of GDP, or US$419 
million with the conversion rate on footnote 1). Of this, households contributed a total 
of 53% of which out-of-pocket spending was the single largest share (49%) while the 
combined government share stood at 29% (ROK, 1999c: 12). Household expenditures 
include also contributions through NHIF, about 4% of overall total, as well as private 
insurers. Spending by parastatals, which are quasi-governmental organizations, is a 
component of occupational health. Private sources (employers and insurers) play a 
minor role (10%) as does donors (8%)7. This data is summarized in table 5.  
 
Table 5. Health Care Expenditures by Source of Finance, 1994 (%)  
 
Government 
Central Local Parastatals
Donors Households Private Total 
19 1 9 8 53 10 100 
 
Source: ROK (1999c: 12) 
 
In general, spending on health care as percentage of Growth Domestic Product (GDP) 
has averaged 8% in the 1990s (figure 4). The government has been spending less on 
health as outlined in a 1986 Sessional Paper that set the target at 8% (Berman et al, 
op. cit.: 24). As a result of the policy change, expenditure levels as percentage of total 
government spending fell sharply from over 9% in 1985/86 to about 7.4% in 1988/89 
rising again from the mid 1990s to stabilise at 8.1% (Mwangi, 1996: 5).  
Figure 4. Trends in Health Care Expenditure as % of GDP (1995-
2000)
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Source: WHO (2000).  
                                                 
7 The main donors included the African Development Bank (ADB) (23%), the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) (14%), OXFAM (11%), Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) (8%), UNICEF (7%) and 20 other agencies (37%) (ibid. 28) (for a break down of donor figures 
during 1989-92, see, Watanabe and Takahashi, 1997: 119).  
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The MOH operates a recurrent and a development budget; recurrent budgets are used 
for a variety of purposes such as staff payments, purchasing drugs, maintenance and 
transportation whereas development expenses goes towards constructing facilities, 
buying new equipments, etcetera. The recurrent spending has averaged 70-80% of the 
combined recurrent and development budgets. It should be noted that 15% of the 
MOH recurrent budget is a grant given to the national hospital (KNH) while 67% of 
the remainder goes towards staff payments and the rest on medical supplies, repairs 
and maintenance (ROK, 1999b: 59). Of the total MOH expenditures, 67% have gone 
towards specialized curative care areas, 13% to rural primary health care, 6% to 
preventive and promotive health, and the rest to central administration and planning 
(UNDP-Kenya, op. cit.: 51).  
 
Figure 5. Trends in Government Expenditure in Health from Recurrent and 
Development Budgets and Local Government Spending (1990-2001)
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Source: ROK, Economic Survey (various issues).  
Notes: * Data for 1999/00-2001/02 financial years are provisional.  
 
Although overall government spending on health has remained stable as shown in 
figure 4 above, the allocation vote between the two budgets has changed radically. As 
shown in figure 5, the recurrent budget has grown tremendously over the last decade 
although it is declining lately due to rationalization of operations as decentralization 
entrenches further. On the other hand, the development budget has had more mixed 
results. This can be explained by the fact that 95% of these funds are from external 
donors with the rest coming from government (ROK, op. cit.: 58). The figure also 
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shows the contribution of local authorities to the health care financing. But while the 
central government expenditures on social services are dominated by education, the 
share of local government social services expenditure is dominated by health (ROK, 
2002c). 
 
Following the introduction of cost sharing in the public health service system in 1989, 
the role of households in financing the health service system has been increasing 
throughout the 1990s. When cost sharing was introduced, the government had set a 
common policy on pricing. This was abandoned in 1994 as part of the decentralization 
programme (research interviews). The responsibility of setting prices was relegated to 
the DHMBs and their advisory DMHTs. However, the charges have to be approved 
by the PMOs who are the intermediary links between the MOH and the districts. Price 
setting at the provincial hospital is the responsibility of the PMOs. Likewise, the KNH 
sets its own prices, as a corporate body (research interviews). Local authorities have 
legal powers to levy fees and charges for licenses or permits issued by them and for 
any services they provide (Local Government Act, Section 148: 1 & 2).  
 
On the whole, the MOH maintains a guiding policy according to which the referral 
system has to be taken into account. In practice this means that pricing is graduated so 
that the charges increase from the lowest level to the highest (research interviews). 
However, in the absence of a universal pricing system, user charges may therefore 
vary across districts depending on socio-economic circumstances. Nevertheless, as a 
safety net measure, the MOH has put in place guidelines on waivers and exemptions 
for those who cannot afford to pay, e.g., for under-five year olds, pregnant women 
and the poorest (ROK, 2002d: 38); for detailed lists of categories of exemption and 
criteria of waivers as well as procedures and complexities and problems surrounding 
the policy, see Bitrán and Giedion (2003: 30-33). In 2000/2001, the waivers and 
exemptions amounted to just 3.2% of total revenue collections (ROK, op. cit.).  
 
In spite of institutional weaknesses in its implementation (Owino, 1999: 267) revenue 
generation from the cost-sharing programme has increased exponentially from only 
Ksh60 million (US$805,390) in 1992/1993 to over Ksh700 million (US$9,396,000) in 
2000/2001 financial year, an increase of 1,000% (ROK, 2002d: 19, 27). Although 
about 20% of total inpatients are NHIF beneficiaries, the NHIF contribution to overall 
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expenditure in health and as a measure of overall cost-sharing revenues is however 
small: only about Ksh41 million compared to over Ksh700 million of cost-sharing 
revenues for financial year 2000/01 (ibid. vi, vii). In fact, NHIF share of revenues 
from total collections has decreased throughout the 1990s from a high of 35% in 
1992-93 to 7% in 2000-01 (ibid. 27). Table 6 below extrapolates the health care 
financing scenario for a period of four years as estimated for the period of 
implementing the National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP) 1999-2004 (see 
later). The estimations are quite conservative as changes of shares held by different 
sectors are only marginal even as the overall financing shows some gradual increases.  
 
Table 6. Projection of Financial Resources Available to the Entire Health Sector 
During NHSSP Implementation by Source (1999-2004) (Ksh. Millions) 
 
 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 
 Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
MOH           
        Development  4,900  4,900  4,900  4,900  4,900  
        Recurrent 9,300  9,560  10,100  10,600  11,060  
        Cost sharing 500  660  720  1,000  1,320  
Total 14,700 41.8 15,121 41.9 15,720 41.4 16,500 41.9 17,280 41.9
Other Government 2,080 5.9 2,160 6 2,280 6 2,380 6 2,500 6 
NHIF/Other Insurance 1,740 4.9 1,800 5 1,900 5 2,000 5 2,080 5 
Private/Individuals/NGOs 16,620 47.2 16,920 46.9 17,620 46.4 18,500 47 19,360 47 
Capitation (NSSF) 60 0.2 60 0.2 60 0.2 60 0.1 60 0.1
ALL TOTAL  35,200 100 36,060 100 37,940 100 39,400 100 41,280 100
 
Source: ROK (1999b: 56).  
Notes: NSSF is the National Social Security Fund, a statutory employees 
pension insurance scheme similar to the NHIF.  
 
To conclude, although health spending as a percentage of GDP had been very low at 
about 1.3% during the 1980s, it has been growing at about 5.2% annually (Berman et 
al, op. cit.: 23) to level at 8% in the 1990s (WHO, 2000). Notably, cost sharing out-of-
pocket funds have grown and remain the dominant mode of financing healthcare in 
Kenya. Still, Kenyans spend only 2.2% of their non-food expenditures on health 
according to the 1992 Welfare Monitoring Survey (ibid. 26). Taken singly, the MOH 
expenditure per capita from both the recurrent and cost sharing funds stood at US$3.4 
in 1997. This reflected a 64.2% drop from a high of US$9.5 in 1980/81 (ROK, 1999b: 
6). The World Bank places Kenya among countries with medium health expenditures 
(of US$16 per capita), which include Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi, Zambia and 
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Niger (Mwangi, op. cit.). This indicates that a larger part of the total per capita 
spending, projected at US$14.77 in 1998/99, comes from other sources, outstandingly 
out-of-pocket. According to these estimates, the country already spends more per 
capita than is needed for providing health services at the district level (ibid. 15). 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. HEALTH CARE DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
As was discussed in Part II, health development around the world has undergone 
through three generations of reforms (WHO, 2000: 13-16). In Kenya, this is explained 
by the development of the governmental system in the 1960s, centralization and 
emphasis on primary health care through the 1970s-1980s, and decentralization and 
restructuring in the 1990s amid economic and efficiency constraints. The present 
chapter will discuss the key development and reforms in the country’s health system 
over the last two decades in light of the international health policy context. Like in 
other parts of post-colonial Africa, most of the health infrastructure in Kenya was put 
into place by the independence government from 1963 as part of the popular nation-
building efforts. Prior, the organization and provision of health care (and other 
welfare services) during the colonial era in Africa had been dominated by voluntary 
organizations, typically, Church missions and societies, particularly in the rural areas 
(Bratton, 1989: 570-1; Mburu, 1989: 594; Vogel and Stephens, 1989: 480).  
 
As was pointed earlier, the country’s social development strategy was laid down in 
the 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and its Application to Kenya. 
Following this, the health system expanded tremendously in all components as the 
comprehensive data of the past decade portrays (table 7). This expansion and 
development has however been met by major reforms over the past two decades as 
efforts were made to improve the health status of the expanding population. These 
have followed global shifts in ideas towards health, in particular, the 1978 WHO 
Health for All (HFA) by the Year 2000 programme (Owino, 1999: 269). And as 
elsewhere in the developing world, the health development and reforms have been 
implemented under conditions of economic (Koivusalo and Ollila, 1996: 147), 
political, structural, cultural, as well as donor-dependence constraints (Vogel and 
Stephens, op. cit.; Oyaya and Rifkin, 2003). 
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Table 7. Development of the Health System in Kenya 1990-2001 
 
 
All Registered Medical 
Personnel, No. 
Registered Doctors 
and Dentists, No. 
Hospital Beds 
and Cots, No. 
Health 
Facilities, No.
1990 33,918 3,953 33,086 2,131 
1991 35,455 4,088 33,926 2,346 
1992 37,847 4,218 34,360 2,637 
1993 40,774 4,458 38,137 3,144 
1994 40,650 5,188 37,271 3,754 
1995 43,264 4,510 47,214 3,802 
1996 45,561 4,656 49,331 3,993 
1997 48,462 4,782 50,909 4,069 
1998 51,365 4,997 52,186 4,145 
1999 53,612 5,145 54,378 4,294 
2000* 55,732 5,252 57,416 4,355 
2001* 57,208 5,393 57,540 4,421 
 
Source: ROK, Economic Survey (various issues); ROK (2001e: 63).   
Notes: *Data provisional. The data encompasses all provider sectors. “All 
registered personnel” include: doctors, dentists, pharmacists, pharmaceutical 
technologists, registered nurses, enrolled nurses, clinical officers, public health 
officers public and health technicians.  
 
In line with the HFA general framework, the policy objectives of the MOH lay 
increasing emphasis on preventive/pomotive health and decentralization while 
encouraging the participation of the private and NGO sectors and communities to play 
a larger role in delivering and financing the services and cross-sectoral collaboration 
(Owino, op. cit.; ROK, 1999b). Key developments of Kenya’s health policy in the 
HFA environment are summarized in table 8. I will hence briefly discuss this outline 
here and in the next chapter in particular regard to showing the context of health 
NGOs development and implications (see also Part V Section II).  
 
Table 8. Development of Health Policy in Kenya Relevant for NGOs Following the 
1978 WHO Health for All by Year 2000 
 
Year Major Developments 
1983  District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) 
1986  Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion 
1987  Financing Health Services in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform 
(World Bank)  
 The Bamako Initiative (BI) (September) (UNICEF)  
 Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) autonomized 
1989  Cost-sharing programme introduced  
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1992  District Health Management Boards created  
1994-
1995 
 (1994) Kenya Health Policy Framework (KHPF 2010) 
 HFA Programme incorporation and formation of Planning Committee to 
coordinate, oversee and fund NGO activities  
1996  KHPF Implementation and Action Plans (February) 
 Health Sector Reform Secretariat (HSRS) established at MOH 
1997  Establishment of Donor and NGO Coordination Division (DNCD) and an 
advisory Technical Working Group (TWG) comprising 10 representatives  
 Ministerial Reform Committee (MRC) established to oversee implementation of 
the reforms 
1998  Split of the MOH into two Ministerial portfolios: Public Health and Curative 
Services  
 National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) corporatized and restructured 
1999  National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP) 1999-2004, drawn in partnership 
with NGOs 
2000  Decentralization Organogram and action plan drawn up by all health 
stakeholders including NGOs  
 District Health Stakeholder Forum (DHSF) initiated  
2002  A 13-member Ministerial Task Force (MTF) comprising of NGO and 
government representatives set up by MOH to look into ways of transforming 
the NHIF into a comprehensive national health insurance scheme 
2003  National Social Health Insurance Strategy (NSHS) (June)  
 
Sources: World Health Organisation, 1978, 1986, 1988; Vogel and Stephens, 
1989: 483; Koivusalo and Ollila, 1996: 43; K’Amollo, 2001; ROK, 1994a, 
1996, 1999b, 2002b and d; Mwaniki, 2002a; Otieno and Mwaniki (2003); 
Dror, Preker and Jakab, 2002: 42; Collins, Njeru and Meme (1996); research 
interviews.  
 
3.1. National and International Impetus to Reforming the Health System and 
Transformations in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s 
 
Kenya began its long-term reforms with the commencement of the sweeping cross-
government decentralization programme, the District Focus for Rural Development 
(DFRD) in 1983, and later in the 1990s the Civil Service Reform Programme.8 A 
framework laid out in the World Bank’s model detailed in Financing Health Services 
in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform (1987) gave a particular impetus as 
the decade came to a close. The neo-liberalist model proposed four main areas of 
reform: (1) introduction of user charges; (2) development of an insurance system; (3) 
increased use and development of the NGO sector; and (4) decentralization of health 
services (cited in, Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.: 149). This model emphasized and 
rationalized the core (services system) aspects of the WHO HFA initiative. The model 
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argued that user charges on drugs and curative services would increase resources to 
the government health system and thus help improve quality and efficiency as well as 
access to the poor from the expanded system (ibid.). Accordingly, several steps were 
undertaken by Kenya in the direction of this model. Autonomization of Kenyatta 
National Hospital (KNH) into a quasi-governmental profit-making parastatal marked 
the first restructuring from the top. This paved the way for the proposed automization 
of all Provincial Hospitals and a number of District Hospitals as part of the policy of 
gradually shifting resources from curative to promotive/preventive health care (ROK, 
1999b: 16-17).     
 
The introduction of cost sharing in 1989 was the most significant step in health care 
reforms, as it signalled a complete break with the past, that had impact on the whole 
population. In the World Bank model, planning, budgeting and purchasing of public 
services was to be decentralized so that revenues collected would be retained close to 
the delivery facility point. With the introduction of cost-sharing, the Exchequer and 
Audit Act (Cap. 412) was amended to provide a Health Care Services Fund in which 
75% of the income generated by health facilities would be used by the collecting 
facility with the remaining 25% going towards the promotion of PHC activities in the 
source districts (ibid. 12-13). The programme was however abandoned soon after 
introduction in 1990 as it was revealed that the number of people seeking health had 
decreased (ibid. 4) and due to administrative and management problems (ROK, 
1999d: 74). It was reintroduced in 1992 following the establishment of the district-
level administrative structures – District Health Management Boards (DHMBs) – 
made possible by an amendment to the Public Health Act (ROK, 1999b: 12). The 
DFRD framework facilitated the creation of these structures.  
 
Because they are ploughed back into the collecting institution, the cost sharing funds 
are called Facility Improvement Funds (FIFs). In spite of this however, the facilities 
need to procure Authority to Incur Expenditures (AIEs) from the provincial health 
administration. Further decentralization gave the DHMBs mandate to manage the 
FIFs as well as those procured from the exchequer. New plans are under way to 
finally decentralize the entire financing system so that the DHMBs will handle the 
                                                                                                                                            
8 See Nzioka (1998) for objectives and implementation of the civil service reform programme.  
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AIEs on the cost sharing funds and receive Block Grants from the treasury into their 
own District Account (MOH, 2000). Although the decentralization policy has laid 
particular focus on delivering health care at the district level, management teams have 
been introduced at all levels from the province down to the dispensary in the new 
decentralized vision (see figure 2). The DHMBs are meant to “represent community 
interests in health planning and to co-ordinate and monitor the implementation of 
projects at the district level” (ibid. 12) and thus have broad-based membership.  
 
The constitution and operation modalities of DHMBs are governed by a legislation 
enshrined in the Public Health Act. While the DHMB is a decision-making body and 
oversees the activities of the district hospital including use of funds, investments and 
user fees initiatives, the DHMT is a consultative expert body of all the top health 
professionals at the district responsible for liasing and coordinating all health and 
which plays an advisory role to the DHMB. In spite of their long-running period, 
guidelines for the DHMBs have only now been drafted (ROK, 2002f). On the whole, 
the implementation of decentralization at the district level has faced persistent 
organizational, resource and coordination constraints as discussed at length by Oyaya 
and Rifkin (op. cit.).  
 
The introduction of cost sharing coincided with a decision by the government to 
increase spending on rural primary health care and preventive/promotive health care 
(R/PHC) in the attempt to increase accessibility within the auspices of the WHO 
HFA. R/PHC aims at increasing primary level services such as drugs, vaccinations 
and health education in rural and marginal communities while curative care are those 
services delivered in hospitals (Mwangi, op. cit.: 2). As a result of the policy, 
combined recurrent and development expenditures on curative services and R/PHC 
almost equalled during 1994/95-1995/96. However, by the end of the 1990s, this had 
fallen to around 17% with that of curative rising back to around the 1980s highs of 
70% in 1998/99. On the other hand, spending on the R/PHC from the development 
budget has been high at almost 68% in 1998/99 while the comparable level for 
curative services was about 13% during the same period (figure 6). It should be noted 
that during the 1970s and until the mid 1980s, spending of these funds was higher on 
curative services but a persistent shift has occurred in favour of developing R/PHC 
system. Increased R/PHC was most notably reflected in the sharp increase in PHC 
 140
facilities (dispensaries and health centres). Between 1990 and 1994, these facilities 
increased by 82% from 1,527 to 3,390 as compared to hospital increases of 20% from 
268 to 324. The increase was gradual after 1994 and stood at 3,874 in 2000 and 481, 
respectively (ROK, Economic Surveys, various issues).   
 
Figure 6. MOH Spending from the Development Budget, 1986/87-1998/99
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Adapted from Mwangi (1996: 11). 
 
One of the other major instruments of health development and reform was the 
promulgation of the Bamako Initiative (BI) in Bamako, Mali, in 1987 by UNICEF as 
a developing-countries’ approach towards the HFA targets in line with the 1986 
Ottawa Charter. The initiative emphasizes the mobilization and commitment of 
communities’ own resources in developing PHC services through selling drugs 
(Vogel and Stephens, op. cit.: 483; Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.: 43) and are designed 
in line with the WHO and MOH guidelines. Their realization uses an integrated 
approach as a targeted social safety net aimed at poverty reduction. As a signatory 
member to the initiative, Kenya committed to these principles (research interviews). 
The BI gave impetus to accelerated decentralization at the community level in the 
1990s while, at the same time, decentralization made the Initiative possible. Many 
communities today have community health systems comprised of pharmacies, health 
centres, Village Health Committees (VHCs) and Community Health Workers 
(CHWs). Traditional practitioners and village leaders are identified for training in 
strengthening participation of the households in their well being (ROK, 1999b: 15). 
The integrated multi-sectoral Nyeri Dry Area Smallholder and Community Services 
Development Project (NDAP) pioneered community mobilization and ownership of 
health centres in Kenya. By its close in 2002, the nine-year donor-funded project had 
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helped establish 7 community pharmacies, 23 health groups, and 1,084 groups in 
other components, in the semi-arid administrative divisions having 140,000 people in 
central province (ROK, 2002g).  
 
The adoption of the Kenya Health Policy Framework (KHPF 2010) by Parliament in 
1994 renewed government long-term commitment to health reforms. Further steps 
towards decentralization were detailed two years later in the KHPF Implementation 
and Action Plans. The plan outlined the implementation of the 15 key strategic issues 
identified by the KHPF including the setting up of the Health Sector Reform 
Secretariat (HSRS, also abbreviated as HEROS), interministerial collaboration 
through the Ministerial Reform Committee (MRC), and the corporatization of NHIF 
in an effort to allow competition in health insurance. In effect, to discuss one of these 
examples, the 1966 NHIF Act was amended in 1998. This accorded the institution a 
new status as a social health insurance scheme and made it a state corporation. 
Corporatization allowed for claims to be made at the more than 20 branch offices 
around the country; previously, this was only done at headquarters in Nairobi 
(research interviews). The transformation of the Fund was meant to underscore the 
government’s commitment to health priorities. The Fund was mandated to ensure 
wide access to affordable and quality healthcare in an era of changing health care 
needs, rising medical costs and restructuring in the health sector. One of its current 
goals is to expand coverage to include outpatient services such as laboratory tests, 
dental, physiotherapy, drugs, doctor’s fees, and boarding costs and to provide 
financial support for improving health delivery (Daily Nation, 2002a). 
 
In spite of the detailed document, the Implementation and Action Plans were 
abandoned due to a variety of reasons and replaced with the NHSSP in 1999. Most 
notably, acknowledging that designing of the Plan did not involve all stakeholders – 
the working group had no representation from NGOs and comprised predominantly 
MOH personnel – the NHSSP argued that it “did not reflect the shared views and 
priorities by all concerned and, therefore, lacked the commitment required for 
effective implementation” (ROK, 1999b: 1). On-going decentralization under the 
NHSSP is viewed as a mechanism for linking service provision to needs (ROK, 
2002b: 42). The vision laid out in the NHSSP is to “create an enabling environment 
for the provision of sustainable quality health care that is acceptable, affordable and 
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accessible to all Kenyans” (ROK, 1999b: 7). Thus, it emphasizes the rights approach 
under the welfare citizenship model. Among its objectives are to increase spending in 
primary and preventive health services, increase revenue generation through the cost-
sharing scheme, promote the BI for community resources mobilization, and “engage 
dialogue with private/NGO health providers for them to take up more discretionary 
health package (mainly curative)” (ibid. 63). The NHSSP also undertakes to cause 
reviews and amendments of numerous health care related legislations (ibid. 16).  
 
In line with the strategic plan, the government views decentralization as a key 
management strategy for facilitating “efficient decision making and delivery of 
services” (MOH, 2002: 3). This represents a radical shift: earlier centralization of the 
system hitherto operated by local authorities in the early 1970s was aimed at giving 
the central government better control of the public health system and also as an effort 
towards the provision of free health care along the vision laid out in the 1965 
Sessional Paper (research interviews). Current reforms are being implemented in a 
phased out manner starting with 14 districts from across all the provinces (ibid.) with 
core funding from the World Bank and the Swedish development agency SIDA 
(research interviews). This is expected to create models and best practices that would 
then be replicated all over the country. One of the components of the health 
developments is the creation of a Health Management Information System (HMIS) to 
help link planning, monitoring and evaluation (research interviews). The latest efforts 
in the 2000s towards reforms have been on transforming the NHIF into a free 
universal and comprehensive national health insurance scheme as an alternative 
financing mechanism. The broad team of experts (MTF) sent to Europe and South-
East Asia to look into ways of developing such a scheme gave its report in early 2003.  
 
Called the National Social Health Insurance Strategy (NSHIS)9, the bill proposes that 
all fees for basic hospital care regardless of the disease or socio-economic status be 
fully covered by the government. These include doctor’s fees, bed admission and 
drugs. In order to finance the scheme to cost Ksh40 billion (US$536,927,000) 
annually, the Strategy requires that all Kenyans and permanent residents contribute 
between Ksh400 and Ksh600 per year. Those in formal employment will contribute 
                                                 
9 The following is based on a report by Otieno and Mwaniki (2003).  
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through their work place while those in the informal sector will put in Ksh400 through 
their trade associations and groups. This would bring in Ksh12 billion and Ksh10 
billion, respectively, annually while taxation on tobacco and alcohol will add Ksh11 
billion. The taxation and other revenue will help the government cover those unable to 
pay the premiums. Because of its universal and comprehensive coverage and that 
every adult rather than households contributes, the compulsory scheme will differ 
sharply from the NHIF. Announcing the social health insurance scheme, the Minister 
of Health said it would be operational by July 2004 with the NHIF Ksh6 billion assets 
forming the initial capitalization. It can be highly expected that the system will be 
implemented as the new Narc government has pledged its commitment to the reforms 
and health system renewal as detailed in its Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth 
and Employment Creation 2003-2007 (ROK, 2003: 40-41). The key challenge to its 
successful and effective implementation will be management in particular regard to 
the registration of all salaried persons and deduction of their premiums, and the 
identification of those unable to pay who would be covered by the government.  
 
  
CHAPTER 4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1990S AND 2000S HEALTH 
REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENTS ON HEALTH NGOS 
 
“In this era of reforms, Church-run health facilities do not want to be caught 
napping. The prevailing economic situation has made survival a worrying 
phenomenon for them. Dwindling funds from donors both locally and abroad 
have aggravated the situation” (K’Amolo, 2001: 5).   
 
Admittedly, the worsened economic conditions in the country are seen as the most 
impacting on health NGOs in the 1990s (research interviews). However, the policy 
changes in health during the decade have had wide ranging implications on their 
operations. In this chapter, I will briefly discuss the implications of the key 
developments outlined in table 8. The neo-liberalist reforms discussed above have 
fundamentally been shaped by the need to create an environment (and) for providing 
sustainable, quality, accessible and affordable health care to the population under 
domestic socio-economic challenges and international circumstances. With this 
vision, set out in the NHSSP (ROK, 1999b: 7), the reform policies have laid particular 
emphasis on the role of NGOs, the need for collaboration and creating an environment 
conducive to the expansion of the sector. The KHPF Implementation and Action 
Plans (1996) laid out the main policy framework for the operations of NGOs. As a 
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key strategic objective, the Plan envisioned an expanded NGO sector in the provision 
of health services, thus that:   
 
“All non-government providers deliver at least the basic package10 of services 
at an acceptable level of quality and price. This will entail improvements to 
and decentralization of the licensure and certification process as well as 
enforcement of rules and regulations by the provinces” (ROK, 1996: viii).  
 
Although the Implementation Plans were abandoned, these intentions became even 
more entrenched in its successor, NHSSP. As the projections of financial resources 
available to health care during NHSSP’s implementation show (table 6 above), 
NGOs, together with individuals and the private sector, comprise the central part for 
the success of the KHPF whose life ends in 2010. Thus, the government has taken a 
functionalist approach to integrate them into the public health system. One of the 
strategic imperatives for NHSSP is creating an enabling environment for NGOs 
towards which the government is  “promising/offering material (e.g., land) and 
financial (e.g., tax exemptions) incentives to encourage the provision of essential and 
discretionary health services by the private sector and NGOs in underserved areas” 
(ROK, 1999b: 11). As in its predecessor, the NHSSP aims to also effect “amendment 
to relevant legislation to facilitate and streamline the registration and licensing of 
private and NGO health providers and institutions” (ibid.). Although this policy is yet 
to be realized on a large scale, it paints a good picture of the future field of health 
NGOs in the country. Already, specific institutional dynamics have been taking shape 
with varied extents, notably, the Donor and NGO Coordination Division (DNCD), the 
DHMBs and the District Health Stakeholder Forum (DHSF).  
 
At the same time, decentralization and privatisation has been facilitating the 
mobilization of interests and participation by NGOs (Munishi, 2002: 78) and 
especially as the field has come to be dominated more by non-governmental 
alternatives to health care and organization. Under the reform programmes, the 
government allowed clinical officers and nurses to run private practice already from 
the late 1980s (Berman et al, 1995: 30). This partly explains the proliferation of 
private and NGO health operators relative to those of government. For example, while 
                                                 
10 Priority health packages include malaria control, immunization, reproductive health, and control of 
communicable diseases such as typhoid and cholera, and HIV/AIDS (ROK, 1999b: 23). 
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the share of N-GOK facilities as percent of total stood at 44 in 1994 (Berman et al, op. 
cit.: 51), it increased to 48 in 1999 (ROK, 2001e: 63). And while government 
facilities increased by only 227 (12%) those operated by the private sector grew by 
544, a 36% increase over the same period. In fact, the huge increase in the number of 
PHC institutions between 1990 and 1994 is the result of N-GOK expansion (ROK, 
1994b: 41). The same is also the case for the increase in the number of hospitals 
during 2000 (ROK, 2001c: 41). Indeed, because of the existence of a large NGO 
sector, current reforms have focused not only on promoting their share of the market 
but also avenues for greater collaboration with the public system. Hence the rhetoric 
of the NHSSP is centrally in line with the international discourse on health 
development (e.g., Koivusalo and Ollila, op. cit.; Oyaya and Rifkin, op. cit.).  
 
The formation of the DNCD in 1997 is a milestone in the reform process and vision to 
incorporate the NGO sector fully in the new social policy. Towards its realization, a 
Technical Working Group (TWG), operating under the mandate of the HSRS, was 
formed since then and comprises of ten representatives from mainly large NGOs and 
some government agencies. The TWG is expected to formulate a policy for the 
collaboration of MOH and NGOs, and the DNCD finally staffed and in place by the 
end of the plan period (2004). The TWG works through meetings and workshops, 
although the latter have been few and far between (research interviews). Its best 
accomplishment has been the NGO consensus-building workshop held in June 2001. 
Plans to hold two provincial workshops and a national one by the end of 2002 were 
dashed by the December General Elections. New targets were to hold the national 
workshop during 2003 (research interviews). Although the Division has not taken off, 
its eventual formation will have far reaching consequences for NGO health providers.  
 
The DHMBs comprises two NGO representatives as per the policy goals. These 
institutions have a substantial implication for NGO operations in the districts given 
the central role they play in health care organization and development at this level.11 
In addition, the DHMTs and NGOs are coming up with new formal approaches 
towards collaborative relationships in the working environment. An example is the 
                                                 
11 Districts may have substantial numbers of health facilities. For example, Nyeri district, with the most 
number in Central Province, had 280 as at end 2002, most of them private for-profit and 20 NGO-
operated (research interviews, 2002).  
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Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care 
(HAPAC) Project of a consortium of international and local NGOs and the Thika 
district (Central province) medical office (DHMB and DHMT) for providing 
voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) services (research interviews). Initiated in 
2000, the DHSF brings together, and is open to all, stakeholders working or interested 
in the health sector in the district to participate in the decision making process and 
share experiences (MOH, 2002). The DHSF was made possible in the 
Decentralization Action Plan of 2000 drawn up in a workshop comprising of NGOs 
representatives (MOH, 2000). In addition, NGOs hold regular meetings with the 
district health (and other) officials to discuss various agenda such as supporting each 
other and Bamako Initiative groups in training programs, health education, food and 
nutrition issues and networking (research interviews).  
 
Although within the current framework there is no funding set aside by government 
for NGOs, up to the 1980s, the mission/NGO hospitals received about 20% of their 
operations costs from government in the form of direct block grants (Hearn, 1998; 
Christian Health Association of Kenya (CHAK), 2001a: 9). During 1995-1998, the 
government had set up a committee to coordinate NGO activities operating in the 
health sector under the WHO HFA programme. The committee continued to disburse 
line budget funds to the NGOs (research interviews). The Kenya Catholic Secretariat 
(KCS), the largest health mission/NGO system, was receiving about Ksh5 million 
(US$67,115) annually while the second largest, CHAK, received Ksh3 million 
(US$40,269) during 1996-1997 (ibid. 9; research interviews). These agencies had the 
responsibility of distributing the funds to their member health facilities. The funding 
was however completely phased out in 1997 and the committee ceased to exist.  
 
While the funds were small relative to the operating budgets of these agencies, they 
were meaningful and the agencies have been pressuring the government for a 
resumption of the funding (research interviews). The committee had served as a 
platform of direct communication between the government and NGOs in developing 
the health care system. Although it no longer exists, its purpose could eventually be 
revived and taken over once the DNCD is fully operational. Another crucial issue in 
the collaboration is the availability of human resources: NGOs can request 
secondment of health personnel to their facilities (Hearn, op. cit.). But in the absence 
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of a policy, decisions on secondment are on an ad hoc case by case basis and can only 
be made by the Permanent Secretary or Director of Medical Services in the MOH 
with the NGO request going through the provincial health administrator first (research 
interviews) (see Part IV Section II for further discussions and statistics).  
 
In addition to the institutional dynamics discussed above, NGOs are now represented 
in key health boards, for example in the newly decentralized NHIF, since 1998. The 
plan to expand coverage to include various types of outpatient services and to provide 
financial support to programmes that improve the delivery and quality of services to 
its members will have an impact on NGOs. NGO providers stand to benefit from such 
development inputs. In general, the imminent plans to transform the NHIF into a 
comprehensive health insurance system will have major implications on the large 
NGO health system in Kenya and insurance schemes such as the health maintenance 
organizations. A positive implication would, for example, be the assurance of 
guaranteed payments by patients through reimbursements. On the whole, the health 
reforms of the 1990s and current developments in the 2000s have made it possible for 
NGOs to participate more not only in service delivery but also in decision making 
(see Part IV Section II for a detailed discussion).     
 
To conclude however, the mission NGOs complain that the reforms are happening too 
slowly, particularly with respect to the realization of the NHSSP stated goals of 
supporting the NGOs and the establishment of the DNCD (footnote 1; see also, ROK, 
2002d). In particular, they view the policy of emphasizing on preventive health while 
relegating curative care to the NGO/private sector as a neglect of duty by the 
government (e.g., Aluvaala, 2001: 1). The problem is that the government is seen to 
be “dumping” sick people at the doors of the NGO health institutions without giving 
any substantial support. For example, withdrawal of the 20% government subsidy in 
the 1980s had serious implications on the mission/NGO hospitals and many had to 
survive through alternative innovations although at the expense of increasing prices 
and possible comprise on quality (see various articles in CHAK Times, 2001 and 
2002). Liberalization of licensing also brought about increased competition as the 
private sector expanded tremendously in the 1990s. At the close of the 1990s decade 
many hospitals had undergone restructuring and there was even contemplation of 
handing over hospitals to government as a possible alternative (CHAK, 2001b: 8).  
 148
III-PART: SUMMARY CONCLUSION  
 
This Part has discussed the socio-economic and political context of health care, its 
organization, structure, distribution and financing, its developments and reforms over 
the last 20 years and their implications on NGOs in Finland and Kenya thus primarily 
addressing the research’s first question as regards the public health system, question 
three and also four. This has been done with the view to create a solid, and the 
necessary, background in understanding the organization and development of health 
NGOs and the environment for their collaborations with the public sector in line with 
the aims and questions of the study. Although this background is necessary in line 
with the Private Health Sector Assessment (PHSA) guidelines (Chakraborty and 
Harding, 2003), the discussions have gone much further to understand the broader 
picture in answering the research questions. The findings confirm the theses cited in 
the beginning of chapter 4 Part II that country socio-economic and political context as 
well as global developments have influenced the health organization, developments 
and policies in both Finland and Kenya in spite of the variations in the system 
organization, structure and level of financing or extent of influence.  
 
Key findings relevant to this study can be summarised. One is that health system 
organization including financing in both countries is changing due to pressures from 
domestic and international factors. The developments and reforms – decentralization 
of decision-making power and authority and marketization - have brought an 
increased role and visibility of NGOs in health services provision, promotion, and 
participation in policy making. In spite of the public sector dominance in ownership 
of health institutions, system development and financing (though to a lesser extent in 
Kenya), health NGOs already run over 20% of the hospitals in both countries; the 
detailed picture of the configuration of the NGO system is discussed in the following 
Part (IV). Both countries have adopted policy shifts that encourage the development 
of NGOs (and private) sectors as well as an improvement of collaborative relations 
with the public sector. Emphasis and definition of the roles and inclusion of NGOs in 
developing the health system has become more pronounced towards the end of the 
1990s. Because this development is ongoing, much of the lasting implications on the 
NGO, as well as the overall, health system remain, however, to be seen.  
PART IV: ORGANIZATION OF THE NGO  
 
HEALTH SYSTEM IN FINLAND AND KENYA 
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SECTION I – FINLAND: CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: OVERALL 
CONTEXT AND WORKING ENVIRONMENT OF HEALTH NGOS  
 
“An approach that emphasizes legislation and the state as the prime agent of 
public health cannot present a complete picture of the development of Finnish 
health policy” (Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 9).   
 
Finland has long been recognized as a country of associations (Heikkilä, 1963). 
Several theoretical accounts explicate this claim. According to Siisiäinen (1989: 27), 
voluntary organizations have been “central to Finnish nation-building” from the 
1880s. This reflects the social origin theory of explaining the existence of NGOs (e.g., 
Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 226-31). In pre-WWII 1900s, due to deficiencies in the 
state, they acquired a “semi-official status as planners, ideologues and also executors 
of public health policy” (Hélen and Jauho, op. cit.: 4). The voluntary movement 
increased again in the years after WWII working in areas not reached by the state 
(Sundberg, 1990: 97-98). Like many other countries, Finland experienced 
associational growth years in the 1980s that was fuelled by the development 
movement impetus, and again in the 1990s spurred by neo-liberalism, economic 
recession and consequent fall out of trust in the welfare system and social changes 
(Julkunen, 2000: 65; Kinnunen, 2000: 101; Newton, 2000: 210). In line with the 
welfare state theory discussed by Myrdal (1960: 48), Marshall (1965a: 72-73), 
Karlson (1993) and Spicker (2000: 171), during the welfare state expansion years 
(1960-1980) (Ohtonen, 2000: 171), much of the NGO activities were nationalized or 
consolidated by the corporatist state as part of the welfare state social policy ideology 
(Modeen, 1989: 12; Matthies, 2000: 8).  
 
As such, many of them “could only survive by becoming part of the cultural plan of 
the state” (Siisiäinen, op. cit.: 40). To be sure, NGOs continued to exist in the bulky 
welfare state system (Matthies, op. cit.: 211) reflecting the welfare state theory 
(Modeen, 1990: 360) and interdependency theory of NGO development (e.g., Kramer, 
1981: 236; Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.: 224-6). But the 1990s have brought a new 
re-awakening for both the welfare state and NGOs. Over 2,000 different kinds of 
NGOs were established annually in Finland in the 1990s (Newton, op. cit.: 210). At 
this new juncture in the political economy, terminology also matters and ‘voluntary 
organization’ is being replaced with the ‘Third Sector’ concept (e.g., Matthies, op. 
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cit.: 210). Now regarded from the more entrepreneurialist economic theories (see 
government/market failure, supply-side and trust theories discussed in chapter 3 Part 
II), NGOs are seen as suitable systems and co-operators in generating jobs, services 
and social policy innovations towards a sustainable society (e.g., Ministry of Labour, 
1998; Helander, et al, 1999: 80; MSAH, 2001a:). In this context, the sector has once 
again regained its pre-war years’ status in the public health area and is gaining new 
dimensions. The state is no longer the only arena for change and the social policy 
discourse and action. As Helén and Jauho (op. cit.: 10) assert:  
 
“An approach that directs its gaze to practices and rationalities in the domain 
of public health can bring forth astonishing parallels between the voluntary 
organizations of the early 20th Century and the emphasis given today to 
‘privatisation’, the ‘active role of civil society’ and the ‘third sector’”.  
 
The recession, and reform of the state subsidy in 1993 while giving them more 
discretionary decision-making power, weakened the capabilities of the municipalities 
and created an agenda for cooperation so that now they are “becoming dependent on 
co-operation” with the NGOs (Matthies, op. cit.: 213). Indeed, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health (MSAH) go on to acknowledge the changing role of NGOs:  
 
“The traditional role of non-governmental organizations has been to develop 
new forms of activity and to point out defects. In the past few years, however, 
they have increasingly started to complement health services. This trend has 
been supported by financing policy” (MSAH, 1993: 51; emphasis added).  
 
The present context of the operation of health NGOs is compounded by numerous 
factors that include the prevailing socio-economic conditions, political context, the 
scope of state ideology, legislation, funding environment, the organizational culture, 
structure and history of NGOs, and population dialectics in health-seeking behaviour 
and choice. A good understanding of the health care context was established in Part 
III. Here I illustrate more directly the NGO context among these factors with a 
number of data sets and charts and brief analyses. First I present the NGO view of the 
basic context of the funding and organizational interplay between the public and the 
private/NGO health system in relation to the population they both serve in producing 
services (figure 1). In this picture, the provincial administration has been left out 
because of its marginal role, which is limited to mainly licensing; in other words, as it 
does not produce, organize or buy services, it is regarded as less important to the 
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actual activities of health NGOs (research interviews). The health system in Finland 
presents a duality in both operations and funding. However, there is heavy dominance 
by the public sector that is funded at two levels, directly by taxes from the state and 
municipalities. The second is the private system funded mainly by both the public 
system (municipal and state taxes) and by an independent state corporate buyer and 
reimburser1 – the National Health Insurance (NHI), part of the Social Insurance 
Institution (SII).  
 
Figure 1: Health NGOs View of the Organization of the Finnish Health Care 
System 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Kalske and Ekström (2003), and research interviews. 
 
Looked at from the bottom, the population has possibility to choose which system to 
patronize, while the municipality or the NHI pays some or all the costs. This means 
that both systems are competing and becomes potentially expensive to the privately 
paying patients who wish to beat the public queue by using the private system 
                                                 
1 The NHI buys rehabilitation services through contracting and/but reimburses patient user charges.  
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(research interviews). Meanwhile, the private/NGO sector grows largely without 
much control from society, which raises a fundamental challenge to both the 
population and the public providers: if money is available, they buy services from the 
private/NGO sectors otherwise they queue in the public system. Having laid out the 
basic theoretical and organizational context, I present some characteristics of the 
overall Finnish NGO sector from a number of sources followed by a short description 
of three large umbrella NGOs and a discussion of the funding environment before 
moving to the main body of the research findings in the next three chapters as per the 
research questions. As shown in table 1, the overall size and scope of Finnish NGOs 
is large, although small by European standards, arguably due to the country’s “social 
and political structure”, i.e., cultural homogeneity, a strong local government, a strong 
universalist welfare state, and long institutionalisation of social movements (Helander 
et al, op. cit.: 69-70; Siisiäinen, op. cit.).  
 
Table 1. Key Features and Scale of Finnish Health and Social Welfare NGOs 
(2001)*  
 
Total No. Of all NGOs (2003)** 117,624 
Members (000s) 2,000 
Employees 25,355 
Expenditure on personnel costs, €  728 
Volunteers (000s) 180-200 
Est. value of volunteer labour/ personnel costs, €  700 
Total expenditure, € 1,500 
Slot Machine Association (RAY) funding, €  280 
Other public funding, €  190 
Service production (Health), € 240 
Service production (Social), € 800 
Earnings from taxable business activities, € 136 
Own fundraising collections, € 82 
Investment earnings, € 42 
Value of investments, € 345 
Savings in Reserve, € 316 
 
Sources: MSAH (2003a: 22); National Board of Patents and Registration 
(NBPR) (Patenti ja Rekisterihallitus, in Finnish) (April 2003), for data of all 
registered NGOs; Dufva (2003), for employees data.   
Notes: * Data is for year 2001 unless otherwise indicated; the financial data is 
in million Euros; the number of employees has been computed to mean “full-
time equivalent paid workers”. ** The number of NGOs is for all sectors and 
means those juridically existing in the Association Register kept by the 
national registering body, NBPR.  
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The above-cited organizational renewal in the 1980s and 1990s has helped bring 
NGOs into more public spotlight as well as growth. As the table shows, with 117,624 
registered NGOs and over 2 million members, the overall NGO sector is very large. 
The number of social welfare and health NGOs based on RAY’s data on those 
receiving funding from it in 2001 was 15,511 (Dufva, 2003: 21). Hence this sub-
sector is surprisingly large as measured by all the other indicators shown such as 
number of employees and a total expenditure exceeding 1.5 billion Euros. Although 
the estimated share of their own collections is negligible in this comparison, 
volunteers play a significant role even only quantified financially. As a significant 
investor, the sector also contributes to the country’s tax purse. However, it should be 
noted that the sector is dominated by a handful of very large NGOs, which control 
most of the financial resources. A view of the ten largest NGOs in the health and 
social fields indicate that they operate a huge budget amounting to €452 million in 
2001 and personnel numbering 7,452 for the same year – almost a third of the totals 
shown – (Kauppinen and Niskanen, 2003: 30). Among these, the largest by financial 
expenditure is the Finnish Red Cross with €113 while the largest by number of 
employees is the Invalid Foundation with 1,395 (ibid.). Some of these NGOs operate 
hospitals and rehabilitation units and all of them run numerous health activities.     
 
With regard to legislation, this is not clear and many NGO leaders and scholars 
consider it necessary that it be systematized (e.g., Modeen, 1989: 3; research 
interviews). The basic legal reference is the 1919 Constitution Act that gave right to 
freedom of association. However, what would be considered to have more immediate 
relevancy and an approximate NGO legislation is the Associations Act (503/1989) if 
particularly because bodies registered under it are non-profit distributing (Section 1, 
Article 2 and 5). Other than the National Board of Patents and Registration (NBPR), 
which is the only registering body, located in Helsinki, there is no special body for 
dealing with NGO issues as the case is in Kenya. In general, there is no legal 
requirement to register in order to operate an NGO or even to engage in a limited way 
with the local authorities although it is necessary for receiving state subsidies or in 
competitive bidding. However, according to the Act on Private Health Care 
(152/1990), a health NGO is required to procure a license from the provincial health 
administration within the geographical area it intends to operate.  
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Finnish NGOs are structured along three organizational levels characterized like a 
pyramid. At the top are national umbrella or federation organizations while national, 
regional or district organizations occupy the middle ground, and local associations 
operate at the grassroots (Helander and Sundback, 1998: 9-10). One estimate puts the 
number of national social and health umbrella organizations to 155 (Poteri, 1998, in 
Nylund, 2000: 69). The bulk of the NGOs exist on the third level close to the 
grassroots and many are usually unregistered. The Association Register (at NBPR) 
classifies NGOs in eight major categories as follows: party-political associations, 
professions or trades, social and health, culture, leisure, sport and physical exercise, 
religious and other associations relating to outlook of life, national defence and 
international relationships, and other associations. However, as the classification has 
been put to use only recently, the only data available accordingly is of 408 NGOs 
from one region around Jyväskylä in central Finland (research interviews). According 
to these data, the dominant fields are culture (31.6%), sports and physical exercises 
(23.5%) and professions/trades (16.9%); social and health scores only 8.8%. Although 
the data is perhaps indicatory of trends, because of the size of the data, it is not 
possible to make an accurate judgment on national characteristics as to which field is 
more dominant; besides, the sectorization structure has been changing in the 1990s 
(Helander and Sundback, op. cit.: 10). However, if we put available data from the 
much larger Johns Hopkins University global Comparative Nonprofit Project (CNP) 
study, that agrees with an internationally comparable classification (see chapter 5 Part 
I), into perspective, we see that the core social policy fields of education, health and 
social services dominate in the share of employees (table 2).  
 
Table 2. Composition of the Finnish NGO Sector by Share of Employment (1996) 
 
Activity Field % 
Advocacy 8.7 
Development 2.4 
Professional 7.2 
Culture 14.2 
Social Services 17.8 
Health 23 
Education 25 
Other 1.6 
 
Source: Helander et al (1999: 73).  
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Still, the most recently published data appears to contradict some of these figures. A 
relevant example can be given to distinguish between NGOs in the social and health 
fields. Data produced by the National Research and Development Centre for Welfare 
and Health (STAKES), (table 3), shows that the share of NGO employment in social 
services far outnumber that in health. This table presents a good general summary of 
the context of health NGO operations in the country. The private for-profit data is 
shown in order to comprehend the NGOs relations to the overall context of health and 
social services delivery. As shown, this context is heavily dominated by the bulky 
state system in terms of expenditures and personnel in line with the welfare state-
dominance model (Karjalainen, 2000: 153; see chapter 2 Part II). Secondly, the health 
NGO sub-sector is overshadowed by the social NGO sub-sector in both variables.  
 
Table 3. Finnish NGOs in Comparative Sector Perspective by Expenditure and 
Personnel Indicators (2000) 
 
% Expenditures % Personnel   
Sector 
 Social Health (%) Total Social Health (%) Total 
Public 78.2 80.1 79.3 79.3 83.2 81.3 
Private 4.9 16.5 11.9 4.5 11.5 8.1 
NGOs 17.0 3.4 8.8 16.2 5.2 10.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Kauppinen and Niskanen (2003, table 1).  
Notes: The number of NGOs from which the health data is composed is not 
known, as it has not been separated from the number of private providers, 
which totalled 2,883 in 2001. However, the number of social services 
providers was 2,885 in 2001 out of which 1,601 (55.5%) are NGOs 
(Kauppinen and Niskanen, op. cit.).    
 
Indeed, table 1 and 3 serves to show that the NGO context is dominated by the social 
services field with a relatively smaller role in health. However, given some 
inconsistency and lack of comprehensive data, it is not easy to gauge an even accurate 
number of health NGOs operating in the country. The closest we can get is to outline 
some of the existing organizational infrastructures in the form of a few key individual 
NGOs as well as key apex organizations for health NGOs. Some of the individual key 
NGOs will be presented in the next chapters. Presently, I illustrate the main 
characteristics of the three main umbrella organizations in the NGO health sector, 
which inevitably overlap with also social welfare (table 4).  
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Table 4. Characteristics of the Three Key Umbrella NGOs in the Health (and 
Social) Sector in Finland  
 
 YTY FCHP STKL 
Year established  1978 1962 1917 
No. Of employees 3 24 25 
Member NGOs 121 121 105 
Executive Board members 9 11 11 
% Income from RAY 80 26.9   43 
Expenditure € (2002)  253,725 2,569,611 1,680,993 
 
Sources: Association of Voluntary Health, Social and Welfare Organizations 
(YTY, abbreviation in Finnish), Finnish Centre for Health Promotion (FCHP, 
abbreviated in Finnish as TEK), Finnish Federation for Social Welfare and 
Health (STKL, abbreviation in Finnish) (research interviews, 2003).   
 
These organizations resemble the first type discussed in the pyramidal structure above 
(Helander and Sundback, op. cit.). Despite the similarity their names exhibit, the 
organizations are different and play different roles. In terms of membership, YTY has 
only NGOs but FCHP has only those involved in health promotion while STKL has 
also municipalities. While also the oldest, STKL is perhaps the largest of the three as 
seen by the number of employees, and organizations: in fact, STKL has more member 
organizations than shown. This is because it has a mixed membership comprising the 
indicated NGOs, 16 additional regional associations – that have member groups as 
well – five trade union-type of organizations, and 140 municipalities; all together 271 
member organizations (research interviews). However, FCHP commands more 
financial resources. In all the three umbrella bodies, the member organizations pay a 
fee. Joining is vetted by their administrative and governance structures according to 
some clearly defined procedures.  
 
The organizations commonly share many NGOs: 42 individual NGOs belong to all 
the three organizations simultaneously; YTY and FCHP also share 51 NGOs; YTY 
and STKL share 79 NGOs; and FCHP and STKL share 45 NGOs (Dufva, op. cit.: 
23). These umbrella bodies are major players in mediating expertise to and from their 
members and transforming them into policy discourses towards the state. They 
represent a well-networked NGO sector with connections to the grassroots all over the 
country. Their main lines of working are consulting and lobbying the public, training 
and information production and dissemination. The organizations rely on various 
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sources of funding, but as shown, RAY is the main supporter for their general 
operations and for projects; FCHP’s smaller reliance on RAY’s funding is because of 
its special ‘favoured child’ relationship (Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 5) with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health whose funding constituted 52.7% for the 2002 
budget. For purposes of this research, FCHP is the most important organization 
because of its exclusivity in health promotion and will be featured in chapter 3 below.  
 
Resources Context for Health NGOs in Finland   
 
In order to develop a more comprehensive picture on the context of NGO operations it 
is important to look at the funding environment. Although Finnish NGOs can obtain 
public funding from numerous sources (Kauppinen and Niskanen, op. cit.: 59), the 
largest single source is the Slot Machine Association (RAY). RAY is a quasi-
government NGO that was founded in the early 1930s on the philosophy that private 
businesses should not benefit from exploiting people’s urge to gamble. Formed by a 
group of eight NGOs, it has now 97 member NGOs and a governance system shared 
with the state under the general direction of the MSAH (research interviews). RAY is 
essentially a joint income-generating venture operated by the state and NGOs. The 
purpose of the agency is to raise money in order to support primarily the work of 
health and social welfare NGOs. It does so by producing its own slot machines and 
operating them in its own casinos or in other businesses locations throughout the 
country on an exclusive monopoly basis (research interviews). Its activities are 
governed by the Act on Slot Machine Funding (1056/2001). According to the 
legislation (Article 1) RAY’s funding can only be used by legally recognized social 
and health NGOs with the exception of a few non-profit companies (NPCs), which 
must be registered and recognized as public benefit organizations. Thus any NGO 
wishing to receive this form of state funding must be legally registered.  
 
All projects funded by RAY ought to have significance for social policy as well as be 
innovative. The distribution of all funding is discretionary and no organization has a 
special right of assistance (unlike the SII, see later). All applications must be done on 
special documents prepared and publicly provided by RAY. In 2003, €302 million 
were distributed to over 1,100 organizations carrying out 2,495 projects (research 
interviews). In terms of distribution among the NGOs, the picture is highly skewed. 
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Ten large NGOs take up a third of all the funds and 50 shares half of the entire sum 
(Dufva, op. cit.: 22). The RAY-funded organizations have over 23,000 paid 
employees and about 126,000 volunteers. Although RAY provides only about 15% of 
the sector’s total operating expenditures, it is regarded as the most important single 
source of NGO funding (RAY, 2002: 4), hence it warrants a closer attention. Most of 
the NGOs receiving RAY funding are in Southern Finland and in major towns such as 
Helsinki, Oulu and Jyväskylä although the whole country is covered. The funding 
goes to three main areas as shown in table 5 below.  
 
Table 5. RAY Funding in Million € According to Major Areas (2003) 
 
A B C Total 
AY AK      
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %  
47.2 15.6 90.2 29.8 83.8 27.7 81.6 26.9   302.8 
 
Source: Slot Machine Association (2003).  
 
The letters are Finnish abbreviations. A stands for general funding and is subdivided 
into AK for funding targeted to certain defined areas such as continuation of an 
activity, and AY for the NGOs’ general activities. On the other hand, B funding is for 
their investment activities such as construction of a service house; up to 70% can be 
given for such projects while the rest 30% or whatever percentage is not funded must 
be raised by the NGO; the percentage of support given varies between projects rather 
than between NGOs. Finally, C goes for funding different kinds of projects. Figure 2 
depicts the trends in RAY’s overall funding appropriations while also showing health 
funding in perspective. Quick caution in interpreting the health funding should be 
however made. The plotted data is derived from RAY’s older classification, which 
contained nine major sectors and 21 sub-fields. In the old model, activities in health 
were classified as “public health promotion” and contained six sub-fields (care for the 
elderly and the disabled were the main sectors). Further discussion into the matter 
revealed that there was after all no clarity of distinction between social and health 
activities. Thus, some of the activities coded ‘public health promotion’ contained 
social services and rehabilitation components (research interviews). The figure has 
however been maintained in order to show the official budgetary development of 
RAY’s NGO funding with special regard to the wide field of public health.  
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Figure 2. Trends in RAY's Overall and Health Funding (1990-2003)
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Source: Slot Machine Association (2003).  
 
In this trend, public health funding has constituted about a third of overall funding. A 
summary statement with this figure is that appropriation to NGOs health activities has 
always dominated a large share. The new model RAY uses in appropriating funding 
differs remarkably from the older model. It has seven major sectors further subdivided 
into 18 sub-fields (table 6). According to RAY source interview, each of these seven 
sectors has public health promotion components but especially rehabilitation and 
treatment sub-fields including also the general operations of NGOs. As the table 
shows, although the number of projects as well as funding has increased, funding has 
increased at a higher rate. A careful look shows however variations in the funding and 
project by sectors. For example, funding for NGOs general operations has increased 
the most while the largest project increase is recorded in home living and assistance to 
care givers. The more apparent health area of rehabilitation and treatment services 
with four sub-fields remains third overall for the years and has grown in project 
numbers though funding has decreased in 2003. These variations reflect both the 
NGO application trends as well as RAY’s and MSAH’s policy direction.  
 
Although RAY’s funding has increased tremendously as the figure shows, more than 
doubling in the last decade from €120 million in 1990 to €302 million in 2003, there 
are reasons to be concerned with this ‘buffer system’ for NGO funding (research 
interviews). Firstly, the rapid increase throughout the 1990s may reach a saturation 
point in the near future, according to some views. Secondly, since 1993, the 
government began channeling part of RAY’s funds for rehabilitation of war invalids 
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and veterans, and others involved in war. In 2002, 25% of the €377.3 million 
available for funding – after deductions for RAY administration, investment and other 
expenses – NGO activities in 2002, was subvented to the state. This share has grown 
constantly and with the largest margin (RAY, op. cit.: 18). Since funds collected by 
the state would otherwise be available for use by NGOs, it represents a huge loss to 
the sector in spite of the fact that general funding has increased as cited above. 
Thirdly, the funds available for use are also constrained through taxation, which has 
increased from 3% before 2000 to 5% in 2001, 7% in 2002 and to 8.25% in 2003. In 
spite of the growth however, the taxation rate for RAY’s otherwise profit-making 
activities is generally lower than the market rate.  
 
Table 6. RAY Funding by Major Sector and No. Of Projects (2001-2003)  
 
2001 2002 2003 
Major Sectors (and no. Of sub-Fields) 
% Projects % Projects % Projects
Service and living support (4) 23 434 23 419 21.3 420 
Rehabilitation and treatment services (4) 18 334 18.1 359 17.5 403 
NGOs general operations (4) 30 559 30.3 573 31.1 612 
Courses, travel and holiday operations (2) 7.4 75 6.9 75 6.5 73 
Home living and assistance to care givers (2) 8.2 405 8.2 451 8.7 475 
Day-care centres and work support (1) 7.1 299 7 309 7.8 361 
Crisis services (1) 6.3 132 6.5 140 7.1 151 
Total 100 2,238 100 2,326 100 2,495 
 
Source: Slot Machine Association (2003).  
 
It is important to mention another issue with regard to RAY’s funding challenges. As 
shown in table 5, funding for capital investment projects is the second largest among 
the 3 major areas. Owing to the emerging pressure from competition politics, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union, the social welfare field is 
being forced to observe the rules of the market (MSAH, 2003a: 21; Lehto, 2002 254-
5). NGOs have dominated the field of service homes for the elderly. Since they can 
receive grants of up to 70% of the investment capital needed to put up such a unit, 
they are well ahead of the competition and some private companies are pushing for 
this market distortion to end (research interviews). In fact, funding of new 
constructions of such homes has dramatically fallen over the last five years from 31 in 
1999, 25 in 2000, 8 in 2001 and 12 in 2002 to just one totally new investment in 2003. 
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The changes have been brought by a major policy shift in the MSAH with regard to 
RAY funding so that now NGOs are being steered away from services production 
field towards the other three major sectoral areas – lobbying, voluntary work and 
development or new innovations. The alternative to that is the push for NGOs to 
establish non-profit companies (NPCs) in order to compete in the open market. 
However, B funding will continue to support rehabilitation and repairs of the service 
houses (research interviews).  
 
To conclude, as already pointed out, Finnish NGOs have numerous funding sources 
(Ohtonen, op. cit.: 174-78; Kauppinen and Niskanen, op. cit.). According to the Johns 
Hopkins CNP study, although fees for services constitute the largest share (57.9%), 
public grants (such as RAY’s) are an important second at 36.2% whereas donations 
comprise a paltry 5.9%; these figures are calculated without volunteer and religious 
institutions contribution, which if added still leaves fees as the main revenue source 
(Helander et al, op. cit.: 74). In particular, health NGOs rely more heavily on public 
sector financing – up to 66% – than any of the other social welfare sectors (education 
and social services), according to the same study (ibid. 78). Municipalities and the 
NHI are also important sources for health NGO financing in terms of grants, contracts 
and reimbursements (see below). Because of the stringently high income taxes on 
individuals and corporate earnings, private philanthropy is limited in Finland 
(Modeen, 1990: 359). However, NGOs working in fields related to Finnish cultural 
heritage, and the promotion of art and science can acquire from the National Board of 
Taxation, for a defined time period, a status that allows them to receive tax deductible 
donations from corporations amounting to upwards of €850 for the former and 
between €850 and €25,000 for the latter. For example, under the Tax Administration 
Board decision number 1210/347/2003 listing over 230 NGOs, beneficiaries include 
research on rheumatic children and cancer research (research interviews).   
 
 
CHAPTER 2. NGO SYSTEM IN HEALTH SERVICES PROVISION 
 
According to the Employers Union of Private Health Services Providers,2 private 
health care system is understood to stand for a wide range of activities and facilities 
                                                 
2 Terveyspalvelualan Työnantajaliitto, https://www.palvelutyonantajat.fi/tet.nsf/suomi/etusivu.html.  
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that include: private hospitals, doctor’s clinics or surgeries, rehabilitation centres, 
physical health therapy departments, medical laboratories and research institutions, 
imaging centres, dental clinics, hospital transportation, and pharmacies. As was 
defined elsewhere, health services provision is considered to include all those actions 
leading to treatment, curing or management of an illness. NGOs operations in health 
services delivery fall under a much broader classification due to a thin line of 
distinction in the often-close connections between social and health services, as can 
be seen in table 8 below. As there is no special legislation concerning health NGOs, 
their operations are governed under the Private Health Care Act (152/1990) and the 
Act (603/1996) and Decree (1208/1996) on the Supervision of Private Social 
Services. This legislation also applies to the services that municipalities purchase 
from private/NGO service providers. In this chapter, I attempt to examine the extent 
of the health NGO system in services provision (P1 of the 3Ps) in Finland using 
various kinds of available primary and secondary data and information from the field 
research and example of cases in specialized health care and rehabilitation.    
 
To start with, I present the most recent data available for the first time on the 
organization of health services by NGOs countrywide (table 7). The data is drawn 
from RAY’s database – RAY collects statement of account reports from all the NGOs 
it supports – and published in a recent study, Private Production in Social and Health 
Care Services, by STAKES (Kauppinen and Niskanen, op. cit.). Hence, NGOs that do 
not receive RAY’s funding are not included although it would be untypical for a 
major producer not to receive even a small amount of RAY financing. It should be 
observed that this table shows different information on the expenditures and personnel 
of NGO operations than was given in table 3 of chapter 1 above and the health 
personnel data in table 4 of Part III Section 1. Data shown in those 2 tables are only 
on the type of services marked as ‘health care services’ in the table below. Hence 
table 7 gives an expanded picture of the NGO health care system. It was not possible 
to obtain accurate information of the number of NGOs from which this data is 
obtained, but again it is expected that the field be dominated by a few large NGOs. 
Although the production of health services by NGOs is large given the nearly 300 
million Euros in expenditure and almost 10,000 employees, it represents only 17% of 
the total private health care expenditures and 31.1% of total personnel.  
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Table 7. Size of the NGO Health System by Expenditure and Personnel (2000)  
 
Type of Service  Expenditure € Personnel 
Health care services* 232,678,413 7,998 
Hospital services 181,333,176 5,044 
Doctor services 29,463,933 1,147 
Other doctor services 29,463,933 - 
Dental care - 24 
Other health care services 21,881,303 1,783 
Physical therapy 2,166,466 118 
Lab and imaging services 5,416,164 854 
Hospital transportation 3,249,698 80 
Other health services  11,048,975 731 
Total  284,023,649 9,781 
 
Source: Kauppinen and Niskanen (2003, tables 13 and 15) 
Notes: * These include the hospital services, the doctor services, dental care 
and other health services. Hence the expenditure and personnel shown are 
totals of all these; other health services include, for example, visits of private 
nurses and practical rehabilitation nurses, etc. “–” data not available.  
 
The second piece of data on the health NGO service provision system is from another 
study on purchasing of services by municipalities conducted by the Association of 
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (AFLRA) in 2003. The data was obtained 
from 211 municipalities out of the national total of 448 (research interviews). As 
already described in Part III Section I on Finland, municipalities are obliged to 
organize health services for their inhabitants. In so doing, they can choose from a 
variety of delivery systems. Table 8 here shows the level of services purchased by 
municipalities in the 17 different activity fields by percent of total organization in the 
public, NGO and private systems; the activity list is by no means comprehensive, it 
does not include mental health services, for example. Again, the private sector data is 
shown to give perspective to the NGO provision. As the table shows municipal 
purchases from NGOs varies remarkably according to the service field; the remaining 
percentages are produced by municipalities in a variety of combinations such as lone 
municipalities, municipal federations, municipal business subsidiaries and companies.  
 
To put some analysis of this table, it has already been mentioned above that the social 
and health fields are often overlapping. If we attempted to split this table into social 
and health sectors, we would with some confidence put a line under child family care 
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for social services and over doctor services for health services. Those services falling 
between these lines should be regarded as overlapping. According to some health 
literature, care for the elderly as well as that of disabled people is regarded as part of 
health services as is rehabilitation (e.g., Aromaa, Koskinen and Huttunen, 1999). And 
although STAKES data collection coding system classifies drug abuse rehabilitation 
as a social service (Kauppinen and Niskanen, op. cit.: 32), substance abuse care has 
been institutionalised by one NGO hospital (Järvenpää Social Hospital), the only 
hospital of its kind in Finland. Perhaps a better understanding would be possible 
through investigating how the budgeting for these services are institutionalised as 
either social or health services. Notwithstanding, with this conceptualisation, we see 
that Finnish NGOs are most active in the overlapping fields with the highest 
penetration in delivering housing services for the elderly (44%). 
 
Table 8. Purchasing of Social and Health Services in Finnish Municipalities from 
NGOs and the Private Sector, % (2003) (N=211)  
 
Type of Services NGOs Private
Child day care 9 11 
Child family care 2 10 
Child and youth institutional care 23 38 
Elderly housing services 44 25 
Elderly home services 19 18 
Elderly institutional care 16 12 
Disabled housing services 28 20 
Disabled home services 13 12 
Disabled institutional care 15 8 
Disabled special services 16 16 
Substance abuse care 32 16 
Doctor services 3 18 
Lab and imaging services 2 12 
Occupational health 3 12 
Dental care 0 15 
Specialised hospital care 1 11 
Environmental health 0 2 
 
Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (2003). 
 
The share of services bought by the municipalities from the health NGOs system is 
however small as shown in the core health fields although this has been steadily 
increasing (research interviews). Data from the STAKES study shows that in 2000, 
municipalities spent a total of €536.5 million on services bought from private/NGO 
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providers of social and health care, which amounted to about 10% of total municipal 
spending on these services (Kauppinen and Niskanen, op. cit.: 49). This represents an 
increase from about 5% in 1993 (ibid.). It was not possible to get data for overall 
national municipal grants and reimbursements to health NGOs. However, data on 
grants from the Helsinki City Health Department is presented in chapter 3 below since 
it mainly applies to health promotion activities rather than medical services.  
 
2.1. NGO Specialized Health Care – Case Illuminations  
 
According to data procured from STAKES, there are 22 NGO hospitals providing 
varying kinds of specialized health care services (research interviews). In addition to 
these services, some of the hospitals are also training centres for intern health 
students; an example is the Päivärinne Rehabilitation Hospital in Oulu that has an 
average of 30 local and foreign (including Kenyan) trainees (research interviews). The 
NGO hospitals are distributed around the country but with a concentration in the 
Southern Province: 12 are in this region, 4 in Eastern, 3 in Western and 3 in Oulu. The 
hospitals have the following basic characteristics: ten of them are focused on 
rehabilitation services; four are cancer hospices (the only ones in the country); two are 
specialized on children, one on rehabilitating children with hearing disabilities and the 
other on general rehabilitation; two are for rehabilitation and treatment of war invalids 
and veterans; one specializes in brain research; one is a general hospital; one is a 
specialist center on stroke rehabilitation; one is the Järvenpää Social Hospital for 
drugs and substance abuse; and two are highly specialized hospitals, one in research 
and treatment of rheumatoid diseases and the other on orthopedics. Among the 
hospitals the latter two, in addition to the operations of one special case NGO, will be 
presented as outstanding examples and also because they are situated in the Southern 
Province. Presently, a short description of each of the two hospitals is made followed 
by a summary of the major features of each in a combined table (9).  
 
The Rheumatism Foundation Hospital (RFH)3 
 
A leading hospital in Finland and renown all over the world for its expertise in 
rheumatology, the Rheumatism Foundation Hospital (RFH) specializes in the 
                                                 
3 Source: www.reuma.fi/eng (April, 2003), and research interviews (2003).  
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treatment and rehabilitation of patients with musculoskeletal diseases and research 
and training. Treatment areas include rheumatism, juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, 
orthopaedics and physical medicine. The hospital treats almost 75% of Finnish 
children with collagen disease. As the flagship centre for rheumatology and 
rheumatoid orthopaedic training and research, the hospital has trained the majority of 
rheumatologists and rheumatoid orthopaedists specialists in the country in addition to 
more than 1,000 foreign physicians. With Finland having the highest number of 
publications in this medical area in the world, the hospital research activities produce 
a third of all the publications on rheumatoid diseases in the country. As shown in the 
table, the hospital sells services to 360 municipalities in the country. The National 
Health Insurance (NHI) is also a major buyer. In most of the municipalities both the 
NHI and the municipalities use RFH services while in a few cases only either the NHI 
or the municipalities pay; the fewest cases are where only the municipalities pay. The 
RFH is owned by the Finnish Rheumatism Foundation and is situated in Heinola, 
about 140 kilometres from Helsinki.   
 
Table 9. Characteristics of two Major Specialized Care Hospitals  
 
 RFH (2002) OOH (2003) 
Year of NGO establishment  1946 1940 
Hospital functions started 1951 1943 
Turnover (million €) 21.2 17.5 
Permanent staff  362 173 
Beds 222 60 
Inpatient days  57, 326 12,600 
Average treatment period, days  6,3 <5 
Outpatient visits 7,259 9,500*  
Surgical operations 2,389 2,500 
Municipalities Buying Services  360 300** 
 
Sources: Rheumatism Foundation Hospital (RFH) (2003) and Orton 
Orthopaedic Hospital (OOH) (2003).  
Notes: * 4,500 visits are from the private polyclinic operating within OOH 
where the hospital doctors can see patients privately outside working hours. 
This is part of an old tradition from before 1984 when the hospital received 
100% direct grants from the state. The clinic is beneficial to the doctors but 
not the foundation. ** This is an approximate number for 2002.  
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Orton Orthopaedic Hospital (OOH)4 
 
Orton hospital is one of the leading centres for expertise on orthopaedics in the 
country and has pioneered in the first endoprosthetic and arthroscopy operations. The 
hospital specializes in six main areas of treatment care: spinal surgery, endoprosthetic 
surgery, paediatric orthopaedic surgery, hand and shoulder surgery and microsurgery, 
knee surgery and sports medicine, and rheumatic surgery and general orthopaedics. 
Utilization by patients is mainly through referral from the public health system or 
insurance companies. The hospital receives patients from all over Finland, nearly 70% 
of who are referred by hospitals and hospital districts from about 300 municipalities 
but mainly from the Uusimaa region in the Southern Province. The share of patients 
sent by municipalities is about 40%. As in the case of RFH, this number describes 
very well the national coverage of the hospital services. OOH is part of a complex of 
four major institutions owned by the Invalid Foundation: the hospital, rehabilitation 
unit, vocational institute and a research unit. It is located in Helsinki city.   
 
Table 10. Turnover by Sources of Income for RFH and OOH (1998-2002), Million 
€*  
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 RFH OOH RFH OOH RFH OOH RFH OOH RFH OOH
Municipal Reimbursements 8.7 9.8 9.2 9.1 10.2 8.8 10.2 10.5 11.0 10.6
State and Insurance companies 0.3 1.1 0.4 1.0 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.3 0.4 1.3 
Self-paying patients 1.3 2.4 1.5 2.5 1.3 3.1 1.4 3.6 1.4 3.6 
Patient fees  0.7 0.4 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.4 0.3 
Others  4.9 0.4 5.6 0.4 5.7 0.5 6.3 0.4 6.9 0.3 
Total  15.9 14.1 17.4 13.3 18.4 13.9 19.1 16.2 21.2 16.1
 
Source: RFH (2003) and OOH (2003).  
Notes: * RFH data for 1998-2001 originally converted from FIM to Euros at 
the rate of 5.94573. “Self-paying patients” are those who pay all the fees while 
“patients fees” refer to the €22 levied for visiting a health institution – the 
referring public institution pays the excess balance.  
 
Looking more closely at the financial characteristics of these two leading health NGO 
institutions, table 10 reveals that municipalities are the most important users of their 
services as indicated by the amount of reimbursements. However, with 65.8% OOH is 
more reliant on this source than RFH with 51.9%. A second observation is that while 
                                                 
4 Source: Orton Orthopaedic Hospital undated newsletter, and research interviews (2003).  
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their incomes have grown, the latter’s has grown by a larger margin. It would appear 
also that since most income is from the municipal purchases, the costs of services are 
high seen from the point of view that the share paid by patients (patients fees) is very 
small. From the data in table 9 and 10, RFH is the larger of the two. Both of these 
institutions are old and have continued to operate even as the welfare state expanded. 
The theoretical explanation for this may lie in the government/market failure theory in 
the sense that both these forms of producers were not able to enter the specialized 
health field dominantly (e.g., Weisbrod, 1977: 8-9). But once the welfare state took 
hold, their persistence may also be explained by the continued state support as argued 
by the welfare state theory (e.g., James and Rose-Ackerman, 1986: 31; Modeen, op. 
cit.: 360); in particular this is the case for OOH since it received 100% financial 
grants from the state until 1984 (research interviews). In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
explanations lie in the interdependence theory and the paradigm of collaboration 
(Salamon, 1995: 203).  
 
The Health Association of Folkhälsan Health System5  
 
Folkhälsan, literally ‘people’s health’, is among the largest public health NGOs in 
Finland. It was founded by the Swedish-speaking community in Finland in 1921. The 
NGO operates in three main areas: production of health and social services, 
biomedical research with nearly 100 employees; and health promotion done together 
with the 100 local member associations located in the Swedish-speaking parts of 
Finland and which have about 15,000 members. The organization is best depicted by 
figure 3 below; its health service system is highlighted. This NGO is described here 
because of its unique position in the country having won a competition in the late 
1990s to run the entire health system of a small rural municipality (Karjaa) of about 
9,000 inhabitants in the mainly Swedish-speaking region of Länsi-Uusimaa in the 
Southern Province. The entry of the NGO represents a major shift in the political 
thinking about how best to (re)organize primary and secondary health care in the 
overburdened public system in rural and/or poor municipalities. A short background is 
justified in order to understand this development; the core health components – the 
hospital and health centre – are presently discussed. 
 
                                                 
5 Source: research interviews (2003).  
 169
Figure 3. Organigram of Folkhälsan’s Health System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Folkhälsan research interviews (March, 2003).  
 
Prior to the entry of the NGO in Karjaa in 1998, primary health care (PHC) was run 
by a federation of three adjunct municipalities. The existing (Meltola) hospital was 
operated by the Uusimaa Hospital District (UHD), the administrative organ of 
specialty care in the region formed in 1991; UHD was later amalgamated to become 
part of the large Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa (HUS) in 2000 (HUS, 
2000). As part of the restructuring of the hospital system in line with the national 
policy to reduce institutional care (and hospital beds) (see, Part III Section I) in an 
effort to cut costs, the UHD decided to close Meltola hospital. In particular, the 
hospital was closed for two main reasons: there were too many specialized hospital 
beds in the UHD area, and health care expenditure in the municipality was among the 
highest in Finland and in the district (Laamanen, Häppölä and Brommels, 1997). The 
closure would have meant the loss of vital jobs (and taxes) and hence the municipality 
decided to buy the hospital. However, the municipality could not continue running it 
for similar reasons and hence agreed to a 20 year old term contract with Folkhälsan to 
supply all its PHC and part of specialised care needs. In general, the municipality 
buys a specified amount of specialty care on a yearly contract basis.  
 
Several reasons may have contributed to the NGO model rather than a market model 
(research interviews). For one, the competition wanted to run only a part of the 
system, whereas Folkhälsan had a broad integrated programme, which included the 
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PHC, rehabilitation, care for the elderly and health promotion with an activation of 
voluntary activities. Secondly, the NGO could guarantee retaining the employees. 
Thirdly, its non-profit status, long history and good image combined with a visionary 
and ambitious leadership contributed to its political advantage. Now operating as the 
Meltola Health Promotion District, the NGO system is divided into five districts and 
employs 300 persons of who seven are doctors, three dentists while most of the rest 
are nurses. The health centre offers only outpatient services while specialized long-
term care is given at the hospital, which has 210 beds. About 120 (64%) are utilized 
by Karjaa while the rest are sold to other municipalities. In 2001 there were a number 
of 12,236 visits in the health centre. The Karjaa model has been a subject of mixed 
public and political discussions and it remains to be seen how it works in the long run. 
However, preliminary results of an on-going comparative three-part study show that 
the inhabitants were quite satisfied with the PHC services – they had more “trust” in 
the system, to suggest the relevance of trust theory discussed in Part II (e.g., James, 
1990: 22). In addition, the welfare of the staff was more favourable than in the other 
three municipalities running municipal systems (Laamanen et al, 2002). 
 
To conclude this sub-chapter, I present in table 11 a comparative view of prices in the 
public, private and NGO hospital systems for a number of specialized surgeries. This 
kind of data is generated for practical purposes in an effort to encourage municipal 
authorities to assess the different options in the market and to exercise competitive 
purchasing of quality services (research interviews). Although competition law was 
introduced in 1992, not only was there inadequate supply and demand but also 
municipalities did not follow it widely. Presently though, the situation is changing 
rapidly. At the same time, NGOs are competing vigorously. For example, in 2002, the 
City of Helsinki purchased over €800,000 worth of specialized services directly from 
OOH in a competitive tender with, among others, the HUS (research interviews). And 
during the doctor’s strike of spring 2001 the city was forced to buy services from, 
e.g., OOH that is reflected in its 16.5% increase in income from the previous year 
(table 10). But as these sample prices show, there is tight competition among the 
players and it is not always a question of the cheapest provider but also of quality and 
even political considerations. The new situation represents an opportunity whereby 
NGOs, having been at it for much longer, are starting ahead of the municipal system 
in the increasingly competitive health services market (research interviews). 
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Table 11. Comparative Health Care Costs of Selected Services in Selected Hospital 
Institutions  
 
Hospitals Type of Hospital 
Knee-Joint 
Replacement 
Hip 
Replacement
Arthroscopy* 
 
Hallux 
Valcus** 
South-Savo HD Public 7,218 7,218 - - 
OOH NGO 7,150 6,550 1,050 760 
Mehiläinen  Private 9,261 7,340 1,029 882 
Coxa Mix 8,261 8,261 - - 
Eira Hospital Private  6,614 5,979 788 577 
  
 Source: The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (2003).  
Notes: *Arthroscopy (knee examination, and operation); ** removal of tissue 
(bone) from foot. The mixed hospital is owned by the private, public and NGO 
sectors; “–” data not available.  
 
2.2. Medical Rehabilitation Services 
 
As in other health services, primary responsibility for medical rehabilitation in 
Finland lies with the municipal system as contained in the Public Health Act, and 
Rehabilitation Act (1015/1991). Historically, NGOs have had a strong presence in the 
care of invalids and it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that rehabilitation institutions 
started to increase (Aromaa, Koskinen and Huttunen, op. cit.: 206). During these early 
years, the Social Insurance Institution (SII) and RAY were the main funders. This 
meant that there was already a large presence of an NGO system since RAY can only 
fund NGOs while the SII funds mainly the private/NGO system. The reformed 
legislation (1015/1991) distinguished between medical, vocational and social 
rehabilitation, targeted at different groups: young persons aged 16 or 17 – later 
legislation in 2002 has raised the upper limit to 19 years; middle-aged persons (16-64) 
and people with disabilities (ibid.; SII, 2002a). Following declining economic 
situation of the municipal health services in the early 1990s (Nylund, 2000: 68), the 
SII started to play an increased role in rehabilitation services (Aromaa, Koskinen and 
Huttunen, op. cit.; see also table 12). The legislative reforms relegated some special 
functions of rehabilitation under the responsibility of the SII. Today, the SII is 
responsible for vocational rehabilitation of persons with disabilities and with medical 
rehabilitation of those severely disabled (ibid.).  
 
Information on the organization, production and expenditures on rehabilitation 
services in the country is published in the Rehabilitation Account submitted by the 
 172
MSAH to the Parliament; three such reports have been published since the 1990s 
(1994, 1998 and 2002). The discussion given in the following is based on these 
reports unless otherwise indicated. Although all the three sectors are involved in the 
delivery of the rehabilitation services, as pointed above, the accounts show that the 
pubic sector is the largest producer; public-sector services are provided in specialized 
units or are integrated in other service systems such as in PHC, hospitals and 
schooling institutions. In 2000, the public sector produced about 90% of its share of 
medical rehabilitation in its own facilities (MSAH, 2002c). Table 12 shows the 
comparative trends in the rehabilitation funds over the past decade. As the table 
indicates, the recession year (1993) saw a huge six-fold increase from the pervious 
year. This has gradually been reduced although during 1997-2000, a growth of 9% in 
real expenditure growth was registered.  
 
Table 12. Trends in Rehabilitation Financing at Current Prices (1992-2003), 
Million € 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total rehab. 833 4,838 5,426 5,342 5,739 1,061 1,103 1,153 1,213  - -  - 
SII 141.8 161.8 185.3 173.1 176.3 185.5 191.7 207.5 225.4 232.5 - - 
RAY   22.6 20.9 16.3 18.7 21.9 22.7 21.7 24.4 31.6 41.5 47.1 49.2
 
Source: MSAH, 1998a and 2002c; RAY (2003). 
 
The provision of health NGOs in medical rehabilitation and rehabilitation in general is 
very large (table 13). Furthermore, NGOs are regarded as pioneers in especially the 
field of mental health. Their expertise is also increasing. The main buyers of NGOs 
rehabilitation services are the SII and the state. In 2000, the state spent €67 million on 
buying services from the war veterans and homes of the sick, largely operated by 
NGOs. The SII’s funding is executed through competitive bidding with strict rigor in 
selection, standards of care and pricing system as governed by legislation (research 
interviews). In 2002 the agency bought open care services of severely disabled 
persons from about 2,565 providers, mainly individuals therapists or companies, and 
from about 80 producers of institutionalized rehabilitation the majority of which are 
NGO providers (research interviews).  
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Table 13. Size of the NGO System in Rehabilitation (2000) 
 
Institutional rehabilitation facilities*  >100 
Accommodation places 6,100 
Institutional care employees 5,000 
Other rehabilitation units**  >100 
Share of all sheltered-work personnel (%) 26 
Students in 4 professional education institutes  6,430 
Personnel in the educational institutes 916 
Share of total Social and Health rehabilitation (%) 15 
 
Source: MSAH, 1998a and 2002c.  
Notes: * Encompasses institutionalised and open care facilities. These include 
war veterans’ hospitals and sick and brotherhood homes, bathing 
establishments, service centres and holiday and educational centres. ** 
Includes open rehabilitation such as polyclinic examinations, therapy and 
psychological services.   
 
These numbers vary but have generally increased. For example, in 2003, the number 
of providers of institutionalized rehabilitation with which the SII contract is 131 of 
which over 80% are NGOs (research interviews). Those serving severely disabled 
persons have grown from 1,962 in 1995 representing a 30% increase to 2002. Some 
NGOs actually do not themselves provide the services but execute the contract by 
purchasing them from a providing center, which could be operated by any 
organizational form. As shown in table 12, in 2000, RAY’s contribution amounted to 
about 3% while the SII paid nearly 19%. RAY’s funding has grown five-fold from 
10.6 million in 1990 to 49.2 million in 2003, while the SII’s nearly doubled during 
1992-2000. RAY is the main source of funding for especially the innovative projects 
of NGOs. Like in the SII, the number of NGOs receiving RAY rehabilitation funding 
has grown tremendously in all the funding sectors (research interviews).  
 
 
CHAPTER 3. NGO SYSTEM IN HEALTH PROMOTION  
 
As defined in Part I, health promotion (HP) refers to “the process of enabling people 
to increase control over and improve their health” (Last, 1987: 10). Health promotion 
is the main component in the field of public health, which is “organized by society to 
protect, promote, and restore the people’s health through collective or social actions” 
(ibid. 6). It includes, among others, environmental health, sanitation, immunizations, 
nutrition, and general protection of society from ill health (ibid.). Control of 
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intoxicants, healthy living and screenings are a major part of public health campaigns. 
Health promotion and education in Finland has developed as an integral part of 
primary health care following its legislation in the Primary Health Care Act of 1972 
(Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 8). Clearer objectives and conditions for health promotion 
work were subsequently enshrined in the amended Constitution Act (969/1995) 
(MSAH, 1996: 16) and 731/1999 (WHO, 2002: 23). Other specific Acts include the 
amended Alcohol Act (1477/1994), the Act on Measures to Reduce Tobacco Smoking 
(910/1984) and Decree (225/1977), the Temperance Work Act (828/1982), the Health 
Protection Act (763/1994), and the Finnish Local Government Act (March 17, 1995) 
(see, WHO, op. cit.: 23-27, for details).   
 
The thrust of the health promotion movement emanates from the international policy 
framework set out by WHO, the Health for All by Year 2000 (HFA 2000). At the 
national level, this was re-emphasised by the Target Action Plan for Social Welfare 
and Health Care 2000-2003 (TATO) (MSAH, 1999b). Currently, health promotion is 
the central theme in the public health policy framework, the Health 2015 (MSAH, 
2001b). It has also received additional stress in the ongoing policy framework on 
health care services systems development, the National Project 2007 (MSAH, 2002a: 
17). In addition to these there exists a sizeable inter-sectoral policy environment and 
process (WHO, op. cit.: 29-30). Health promotion is carried out largely as a 
partnership exercise between mainly the public health system and NGOs.  
 
The main issues in health education are smoking, alcohol and drugs, nutrition, 
physical exercise and reproductive health (Järvelin, 2002: 53). Due to the fact that 
funding for health promotion comes from diverse number of sources (Vertio and 
Catford, 1995), it would be practically impossible to calculate total national 
allocations. Vertio and Catford’s attempt to capture the variety of sources is so far the 
best available. In Resourcing Health Promotion, they identified 18 different sources 
ranging from governmental sources at the state, regional and local levels, RAY, 
private corporations and NGOs. Various ministries such as of Social and Health, 
Education, Labour, Environment, Transport and Communication are particularly 
involved (WHO, op. cit.: 35-36). In this chapter focusing on P2 I will discuss three 
sources: the primary government source (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health), RAY 
and funding by municipalities taking the case of the City of Helsinki.  
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The most important source of health promotion financing is the national annual 
budgetary appropriations disbursed by the MSAH as grants to different providers. In 
2003, this amounted to €7,6 million, which is about €1.5 per capita. The budget kit is 
sourced mainly from tobacco and alcohol taxes as determined by the corresponding 
legislation: the Tobacco Control Act (910/1984), and the Temperance Work Act 
(828/1982). A third source within this framework is the budgetary appropriations by 
Parliament under the drug policy development, which were first given in 2001. Article 
27 of the Tobacco Control Act requires the government to allocate an amount 
equalling 0.45% of the revenue collected from excise duty on tobacco. Article 10 of 
the Temperance Work Act requires the government to appropriate a minimum of 40 
pennies for every registered citizen. Appropriation based on this Act has been 
however higher and was 50 pennies in 2000 (MSAH, 2000). In addition, the 1999 
budget raised the level of appropriations from the tobacco tax to 0.75% (ibid.). 
Furthermore, there is an outstanding Parliamentary Resolution of 1994 and 1999 
requiring the level of appropriations from the tobacco tax to be 1%. Although this has 
not been effected, it is also the level that has been recommended by the WHO and 
Finnish public health NGOs (research interviews).  
 
Recent appropriations are presented comprehensibly in table 14. Data presented in the 
table show that NGOs are the largest single block of organizations in health 
promotion activities measured by their share of the MSAH budgetary appropriations 
in comparison to the national bodies! Indeed, as early as 1992, the NGOs were 
implementing 35% of the funds (research interviews). In addition, some of the funds 
going through the other agencies are also utilized by NGOs mostly in partnerships 
with the agencies. For example, of the funds implemented through STAKES under the 
tobacco legislation in 1997 2.6% went to six NGOs. The overall trends in 
appropriations are depicted in figure 4 and more aptly in table 14. As these charts 
show, overall funding and funding to NGOs has increased significantly. The large role 
played by NGOs in health promotion strengthened from the early 1990s due to 
reduced capacity of municipal primary health care in promotive health work (WHO, 
op. cit.: 30-31). As their strength and visibility increased in the decade, a major shift 
in the organization of health promotion was set to occur in which the government and 
NGOs would enter into a unique collaborative marriage.   
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Table 14. Implementation of Health Promotion Funds by Agency (1997-2003), 000 Euros* 
 
Implementing Agency 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 2003 Total
 Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % % 
Stakes 1,055 19 1,253 24 1,456 23 1,477 24 1,453 19.8 1,626 22.8 2,366.3 31.3 23.7 
FCHP 2,299 42 2,483 48 2,607 42 2,454 39 2,452 33.5 2,926 41 3,257 43.1 41 
KTL** 230 4 286 6 404 7 395 6 404 5.5 477 6.7 587 7.8 6 
FIOH**     277 4 235 4 235 3 220 3 220 3 2.6 
Others 1,941 35 1,162 22 1,471 24 1,653 27 1,796 24.4 1,896 26.5 1,117.9 14.8 24 
State Drugs Policy***         1,009 13.8     2.3 
TOTAL 5,525 100 5,184 100 6,215 100 6,214 100 7,349 100 7,145 100 7,550 100 100 
 
Source: MSAH (Allocation Scheme for Health Promotion, various issues) 
 
Notes:  * Figures for 1997-2001 originally in FIM have been converted into Euros: 1 Euro = 5.94573 FIM. 
** KTL stands for the National Public Health Institute and FIOH for Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, both of which are some of 
the specialized research and development agencies of the MSAH.   
*** Projects connected to drugs policy principle of the decision of Council of State. In 2001, the grant for dug prevention was handled 
separately, but from 2002 onwards, it is included under other headings.  
 
“Others” include projects undertaken by the provincial administrations, research institutions and universities, specialized government 
departments, MSAH operations as well as other projects of significant national public health interest that may also be operated by NGOs.  
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In 1997 the MSAH delegated preparation of the yearly budgetary appropriation plan 
for health promotion programmes implemented by NGOs to the health NGOs 
umbrella organization, the Finnish Centre for Health Promotion (FCHP). According 
to this arrangement, FCHP acts as an agent of government, a form of indirect public 
administration (for discussions, see, e.g., Rosas and Suksi, 1994; Salamon, op. cit.: 
17-43). NGOs send their applications to the agency, which then evaluates them, 
prepares the budget plan and forwards it to the MSAH. MSAH then makes the 
decision on which NGO applications are accepted and sends the funds directly to the 
granted NGOs. On the other hand, the FCHP administers, monitors, and evaluates the 
implementation of the projects included in the plan. In addition, it provides support to 
the implementing agencies with expertise as well as promotes co-operation between 
the implementers (research interviews).   
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Figure 4. Trends in NGOs Implementation of Health Promotion Funds 
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Source: MSAH, Allocation Schemes for Health Promotion years 1997-2003. 
 
Each of the agencies noted in table 14 above is responsible for different groups of 
applicants. Although the FCHP is meant to process NGO applications, there are a few 
exceptional cases where firms may also apply. This is based on procedural 
understanding with the MSAH that the agency can handle the applications not 
emanating from the public sector. The number of individual NGOs receiving funding 
through the FCHP system is not very large as indicated in table 15. Furthermore, the 
number of funded projects has been reducing as has the number of applications, which 
were about 350 in 1997 but now stand at about 200 yearly; the overall number of 
applications received by the MSAH is about 300 annually out of which about 150 
receive funding (WHO, op. cit.: 34). The reduction in projects funding is explained by 
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the MSAH’s policy to support larger or partnership projects that have a national 
impact rather than small ones. On the other hand, NGO leaders argue that small 
projects are also meaningful in areas, which may be overlooked by large 
organizations, and in innovative projects among small target groups (research 
interviews). Project applications have reduced due to the enhanced quality developed 
by FCHP, which is seen as one measure of an improvement in the quality of health 
and health promotion. The projects address a range of problems mainly tobacco, 
alcohol and drugs abuse as well as mental and physical health through educative 
campaigns in schools, homes, work or other public places.   
 
Table 15.  Implementation of MSAH Funded HP Projects Through FCHP (1997-
2003) 
 
 1997* 1998* 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
NO. Of Organizations 55 48 49 37 41 43 35 
Of which NGOs 41 42 46 34 39 41 34 
No. Of Projects  70 78 67 53 51 56 48 
 
Source: Allocation Schemes for Health Promotion years 1997-2003 (MSAH). 
Notes: * Data not very clear; the number may have been more or less as at one 
activity sub-category the FCHP is mentioned together with other organisations 
not named. In both years, a number of the NGOs implemented more than one 
project and FCHP implemented more projects than any other NGO.  
 
The second major source of health promotion funding is RAY. Table 16 captures the 
size of a larger NGO system in public health activities than table 15 above. The data 
is more comprehensive compared to figure 2 in the previous chapter. In this picture, 
public health activities dominate the field by a wide margin as compared to the other 
two fields. According to the source (Dufva, op. cit.: 21), the field of public health 
refers to the various organizations working in this area, patients’ organizations, 
rehabilitation and treatment services, mental health, and organizations of the 
unemployed and other health welfare work. Many of the NGOs operating in this field 
are small one-employee agencies and rely heavily on volunteer labour as reflected in 
table 16 (this is quite different in the specialized health NGOs discussed in the 
previous chapter). Temperance work and care for intoxicant abusers is a major area of 
health promotion corresponding to the framework of funding by the MSAH as 
discussed above. Table 17 depicts the trends in the development of substance abuse 
institutions. These are categorized as detoxification units and intoxicant care 
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rehabilitation institutions. The varying number of NGOs compared to the institutions 
reflects the nature of health education and promotion work; these institutions thus 
have a rehabilitative role, e.g., the Järvenpää Social Hospital and the myriad centres 
operated by the A-Clinic Foundation, the largest intoxicant abuse rehabilitation NGO 
(Kauppinen and Niskanen (op. cit.: 40).     
 
Table 16. RAY Funding in two Public Health Fields (2001), Million € 
 
 
Expenditure
 
No. Of 
Personnel
No. Of 
Volunteers
No. Of 
Members 
No. Of
NGOs
Public Health  495 8,026 92,304 928,957 6,994
Temperance and intoxicant care 55 1,166 4,912 29,067 371 
 
Source: Dufva (2003: 21). 
 
Table 17. Trends in Substance Abuse Care Facilities  
 
 NGOs Private
Total 
2001 
Total 
2000 
Total 
1999 
Intoxicants care institutions 34 9 43 39 35 
 
Source: Kauppinen and Niskanen (2003, table 7)   
 
Other sources of importance to supporting health promotion work of NGOs are 
municipal authorities. As was pointed above, the position of NGOs in health 
promotion in the municipalities has strengthened in the 1990s. For example, in a study 
conducted by Simonsen-Rehn (2003) in four small municipalities (Karjaa, Lovisa, 
Parainen and Toijala) in Southern Finland to assess the role of NGOs in health 
promotion and well being, 70-75% of the 183 responding organizations perceived 
themselves as playing a positive role in this regard. The NGOs operated in diverse 
sectors and not just in health, which showed that NGOs have high consciousness with 
regard to health promotion and well-being. Municipalities have continued to offer 
support for the health promotion activities of NGOs in spite of the recession. The 
national size of this support would be however very difficult to estimate. One would 
expect the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities to be a natural 
source for such information. However, such information and data is not collected. 
Here I present data from the City of Helsinki’s Health Department. Municipal 
decisions on grants to NGOs and other associations are made by the Department’s 
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Health Committee on an annual basis; it should be remembered that the departments 
of health are not the only sources for health promotion funding (grants or contracts) – 
others include sports, education and social services. Table 18 show the grants 
disbursed for the last 10 years in Helsinki and the number of beneficiary NGOs 
(particular data for purchased health promotion services were unavailable).   
 
Table 18. Grant Appropriations of the Helsinki City Health Committee to Public 
Health NGOs (1993-2003)  
 
Year No. Of NGOs Total funding 000 €* 
1993 20 226 
1994 20 184 
1995 23 166 
1996 23 177 
1997 21 177 
1998 20 184 
1999 20 189 
2000 26 226 
2001 25 232 
2002 24 238 
2003 23 238 
Total  2,237 
 
Source: Helsinki City Health Department (2003).  
Notes: * Financial data for 1993-2000 converted from old FIM to Euros at the 
rate of 5.94573.   
 
As the data show, it is clear that the funding is substantial at least when considering 
that only a few NGOs receive the grants. Also, there was a rather sharp decline from 
1993 at the height of the economic recession gradually rising again from 1998 (this is 
in contrast with the MSAH and RAY funding, which had generally upward trends). 
Although all the projects are considered of importance to health, and hence not funded 
under the social services budget according to a 1997 agreement between the health 
and social committees (research interviews), it is not easy to determine whether they 
fall into health service or promotion and may be thus mixed. However, the better 
judgement would be to treat them as health promotion activities because of their 
nature: the funds are specifically allocated for public health education and to support 
activities of these NGOs whose focus is to better the health of their members or 
others’ health and welfare for a broad variety of target groups such as prostitutes, 
HIV-positive persons, drug users, and sexual minorities (research interviews).  
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Thus, funding can be procured for activities such as sexual health and family health 
clinical services, payments for rental costs of the NGOs, salaries of project 
employees, and family and patient clubs, under certain conditions.6 Firstly, the 
treatment or support should require special professional skills and must be given in 
trust. Secondly, the equivalent activity should not be already organised by the 
municipal system, meaning NGOs are the primary producers in this case. Thirdly, the 
service should not be produced for sale. In addition, applicants must use specified 
forms. One important infrastructure of the health promotion movement that has grown 
from the late 1980s is the Healthy City Network (HCN) (see, Part III Section I for 
background). The City of Helsinki is one of the early members of the Finnish HCN. 
All these cities have close networking relationships with NGOs in health promotion 
activities. In 1995 Helsinki established the Advisory Committee of Healthy and 
Safety City to coordinate multi-sectoral cooperation. The Committee meets five times 
a year and its work is carried out by a secretariat with one employee. The office has 
disbursed funding particularly to a large group of neighbourhood houses associations 
(HATY) for health promotion work. This amount has increased seventeenth fold since 
the 1990s from about €50,000 annually to €885,000 in 2003 (research interviews).  
 
To conclude, this chapter has shown that health NGOs play, as expected, a major role 
in health promotion in Finland given their long history in this field (Helén and Jauho, 
op. cit.). It is worth noting that because NGOs mainly have a central focus on their 
members, they are likely to generate additional resources for health promotion from 
their own efforts. An example is Folkhälsan, which generates 80% of its €2.5 million 
budget for health promotion activities from its own sources such as donations and 
investments; the rest comes from RAY and the MSAH. As depicted in figure 3 above, 
Folkhälsan’s health promotion work is done through its 100 member associations 
spread around the country in mainly Swedish-speaking areas. Its Health Promotion 
Unit has 30 full-time employees spread out in all areas of its operations mainly in the 
west and southern parts of the country. In addition, the local branches and 
associations have budgets of their own. The health promotion projects are mainly in 
youth work, nutrition, physical activities, training, and information with a newsletter 
published 6 times a year.  
                                                 
6 Source: Agenda of the City Health Committee meeting (December 12, 2002).  
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CHAPTER 4. NGOS PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH POLICY MAKING 
 
The role of NGOs in health policy making in Finland is of significant importance. 
They variously contribute to the design, reviews, monitoring and implementation of 
public health programmes. Moreover, their participation in the policy-making 
processes has particularly grown in the 1990s. Theoretically, citizen participation in 
policy making is a political process whose context is shaped by “governmentalisation 
of the state” in which the state disperses certain functions and processes (Hélen and 
Jauho, 2002: 2-3). This context is however broader than just the “fragmentation 
tendency in the modern state power and politics” (ibid.) In addition to the political 
economy of state, referred by these authors, it pertains to the legal, historical and 
cultural environment and tradition of citizen involvement in policy issues. In this 
broader sense, it is also possible to draw understanding from the social origins theory 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 226-319). It is not the interest of this research to discuss 
all the specific contextual themes. The basic question this chapter sought to answer 
was what, in light of the growing presence of NGOs in society, institutional and 
organizational dynamics may have been created or emerged that allow their 
participation in health at the national level and through what mechanisms? In 
answering the question (on P3) I shall refer to the legal and policy framework in the 
prevailing social political context regarding specific policy processes in health 
development as identified in table 8 of chapter 3 in Part III section 1.  
 
The discourse of participation by NGOs in designing and implementing health policy 
is not new in Finland (e.g., Hélen and Jauho, op. cit.). As discussed in previous 
sections of this dissertation, the participation discourse has been rallied by the WHO 
HFA 2000 in the last two decades. Participation has also received overall 
governmental boost more recently in the Kuule Kansalaista (“Listen to Citizens”) 
project realized in 2000 (Ministry of Finance, 2001). Participation of NGOs will be 
taken here to include not only policy advocacy, which attempts to create awareness in 
order to influence policy process, but also the provision of expert services, advise and 
decision-making in the policy process (e.g., Chattergee, 1988: 106; Mpamila, 2000: 
2). This may be achieved through different mechanisms such as public hearings, 
through written presentations and representation in relevant committees. To start with, 
we can refer to some statistics. Within the MSAH, there are about 50 advisory boards 
 183
among which 30% have NGOs representation (MSAH, 2003a: 16). In addition, of the 
about 90 working groups about 40% have NGOs representation (ibid.). The 
collaborations take various forms (e.g., Heikkilä and Karjalainen, 1999: 18). 
Typically, leaders of major NGOs participate in meetings with government and 
receive preparatory material for their comment very regularly. For example, a director 
of one of the NGOs discussed earlier attends 10-14 meetings with the MSAH and 
STAKES in a month (research interviews). The frequency varies depending on season 
or period of government and the general political processes: in election periods, the 
meetings and lobbying intensifies. NGOs also submit reports that the government uses 
for drawing action plans. Examples are reports of the Finnish Cancer Society, the only 
agency producing cancer epidemiological data in the country and those of YTY.  
 
The main difference between “advisory boards” and “working groups” is that the 
former are constituted through legislation or statute or their establishment is based on 
existing legislation that formalizes their existence, composition, programme of work, 
meeting times and budget while the latter may be more ad hoc and less structured. 
However, both organizational forms have a clearly defined objective. Advisory boards 
assess or explore a defined issue and produce a policy document and plan. Working 
groups typically discuss a matter and come up with a report and may recommend 
actions to be undertaken towards the objective. Working groups can be established by 
a Ministerial or departmental decision and expire once the task is completed. Another 
kind of organizational form is a “follow-up group” or monitoring group, which is 
similar to a working group in constitution but performs a different action. A follow-up 
group is constituted mainly to monitor, and make recommendations about, the 
implementation of a particular on-going programme or process (research interviews). 
I will illustrate this with some recent examples and trends at the national level in 
current health developments with the MSAH as the referent governmental organ.  
 
Although some of these boards and groups have existed for a longer time, the 1999 
TATO was the first government social policy programme that involved NGOs as “full 
partners” in its design through working groups in the MSAH. This was hailed as a 
“new type of role played by NGOs” (MSAH, 2001d: 18). TATO is the overarching 
government policy on social welfare and health. Every new government makes 
similar policy programme following electoral victory. It could be therefore referred to 
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as some kind of development and action plan. The fact that TATO was the first 
government policy with full NGO participation reflects a new political reality 
emerging as the 1990s came to a close. NGOs were not merely mentioned as 
implementing partners but were partners in policy design. As one outcome or product 
of the NGOs participatory processes, the TATO recognized the challenges facing 
health care development and therefore the need for the partnerships (MSAH, 1999b). 
Clearly, the government was accepting an interdependency collaborative pragmatism.  
 
After TATO, the “Listen to Citizens” project has legitimised the discourse on 
participation of citizens through NGOs. The MSAH released its Strategies for Social 
Protection 2010 in March 2001 aimed at making the country a “socially and 
economically sustainable, efficient and dynamic society” (MSAH, 2001a: 6), and 
emphasizing a strong role of NGOs in health promotion and tackling social exclusion. 
And in June of the same year, it released the National Action Plan Against Poverty 
and Social Exclusion. The Plan was prepared by a “working party” comprising 
several NGO representatives (2001d). In addition, two public hearings were held for 
NGOs. The Plan highlights key problems facing health care in the country and lays 
measures for tackling them through cross-sector cooperation. Based on this 
background, an informal discussion group comprised of 10 representatives mostly 
from NGOs was set up in 2002 to come up with a strategy on NGOs. The strategy, 
NGOs as Actors in Social Welfare and Health Policy: Strategy for NGOs Activities, 
was published in 2003. This strategy reiterates the importance of NGOs in social 
policy development as watchdogs of societal interests and in development and 
production of services.  
 
The strategy calls for five areas of action between the MSAH and NGOs: (1) assuring 
possibilities for NGOs participation; (2) cooperation with NGOs and engagement in 
the “Listen to Citizens” project suggestions; (3) continued basic resources for public 
benefit activities; (4) earmarking of the RAY funding; and (5) securing the share of 
activities for special groups beneficial to the general public (p. 14-15). However, 
implementation of the strategy has no clear or autonomous structure although its 
intentions are raised in discussions with RAY and consultations with NGOs on how to 
follow these strategies. As was pointed earlier in chapter 3 Part III Section I, the aim 
is to steer NGOs towards development activities and interests observation in light of 
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new realities of competition in services provision. In order to get a clearer picture of 
participation of NGOs in health policy making, I discuss the current two health 
policies being undertaken for the medium and long term. These examples will show 
the organizational dynamics that clarifies the role of NGOs in health policy 
development in the country.    
 
4.1. The Advisory Board for Public Health – The Health 20157  
 
 
The Advisory Board for Public Health (ABPH) is the organizational dynamic 
responsible for shaping and implementing the government’s long-term, and inter-
sectoral, public health policy, the Health 2015 Public Health Programme. Hence it is 
the most appropriate example from the point of view of the question addressed here. 
The Board was launched in 1997 and is based on the Public Health Act (1972/66) 
Article 4 and 2 amended in 1997 (50). Its tasks and composition are described in the 
Decree on Advisory Board for Public Health (1997/67) Article 2 as follows:   
 
1. To monitor the development of public health and execution of the health 
policy; 
2. To develop national health policy and work for health promotion cooperation 
between diverse administrative agencies, organizations and other actors; 
3. To prepare together (in network) with professional authorities disease group- 
and -problem cases concerning health programs and follow their 
implementation; and  
4. To perform other duties determined by the Ministry in question. 
 
The Board is comprised of 17 members and an equal number of vice members. 
Although the Decree does not dictate the number of members, Article 3 states that the 
members should be various public health promoting governmental bodies and public 
health professionals. In reality, the members are from almost all the ministries and 
different departments of the MSAH, the provincial administration, STAKES, the 
Public Health Institute (KTL), Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH), the 
SII, the AFLRA, professional organizations and hospitals, and three NGOs – 
currently, Folkhälsan, the FCHP and the Finnish Union of Health Care Professionals 
(abbreviated in Finnish as TEHY). These NGOs have two vice members from the 
Finnish Association for Mental Health and the A-Clinic Foundation.  
                                                 
7 Source: research interviews (2002, 2003).  
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The process of choosing the NGOs representatives involves several stages. At first the 
MSAH may request national health NGOs to propose a representative. In the present 
set-up, it requested two umbrella NGOs discussed earlier to propose would be 
representatives. Since the legislation (Article 3) lays some basic requirements on the 
composition – geographical and (official) languages representation – the MSAH may 
accept, reject or change the proposals, as to some extent happened in this case. 
Representation by gender in governmental organs is also a matter of legislation, and 
requires at least 40% be women. After accepting the proposals and compiling all 
members, the MSAH submits the proposal for the final decision to the Council of 
State (Cabinet). The decision on the new members was made on March 20, 2003.  
 
The Board operates on a three-year period as provided in Article 3 of the legislation. 
Since its creation in 1997, it has worked in two 3-year periods so far and is now in its 
third term. The first three years went to the preparation of the Health 2015. The 
programme preparation was completed in 2000 and launched in 2001 as a government 
resolution. As pointed earlier, the Health 2015 is a long-term programme and “is a 
continuation of the Finnish national HFA 2000 programme” (MSAH, 2001b: 3). As 
discussed in chapter 3 Part III Section I, the programme lays particular emphasis on 
the role of NGOs and civil society action in promoting public health in cooperation 
with systems of government. Having successfully launched the programme, the tasks 
of the ABPH are now to coordinate its implementation, make proposals and take 
initiatives on its execution. To carry out its work effectively, the ABPH has three sub-
committees also with NGO representation: one prepares meetings of the Board and 
implements decisions; another supports horizontal implementation across other 
ministries; and the third is for coordinating at the local level with municipalities and 
STAKES. The whole Board meets about 5 times a year while the sub-committees 
have more regular meetings.  
 
The workings of the ABPH, emphasizes the need for, and development of, broad 
cooperation. Although some officials and Board members note that there has been 
some progress in the Health 2015, it has also faced some challenges as was pointed 
out in chapter 3 Part III Section I. A particular challenge regards the extent to which 
the policy can actually be implemented through the independent municipal health 
system at the local level and through the horizontal structure. These challenges 
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emphasize the importance of the sub-committees. Other challenges include allocation 
of resources; health impact assessment (HIA), information sharing, dissemination and 
application A recent review of the Finnish health promotion policies in the 1990s by 
the WHO, Review of National Finnish Health Promotion Policies of 1990s, also 
raised some of these challenges (see, WHO, op. cit.: 38-48). The challenges have 
raised some scepticism as to whether the programme goals can be achieved in 2015. 
Representation of NGOs is on the other hand hailed since they can air their views to 
the government and be part and parcel of the health policy initiative, design, 
implementation, discourse and review; the local expert review team of the WHO 
report also had an NGO representative (ibid. 72).  
 
4.2. Participation of NGOs in the National Project 20078  
 
The ABPH is unique because NGOs are equal participants in a body formed by 
government Decree that has tenure of office. Typically, government bodies are only 
assisted through consultative processes through working groups with a broad-based 
representation comprising also NGOs (Modeen, 1989: 4). The National Project (NP) 
on Securing the Future of Health Care is a case in point. As a medium-term Project 
with a term to year 2007, it aims “to develop health services as cooperation between 
municipalities and the state so that the activities of NGOs and the private sector are 
also taken into consideration” (MSAH, 2002b: 11). Designing of the Project involved 
four pairs of working groups – referred to as “administrators” in the Project literature 
– each chaired by two persons under the overall direction of a management group 
appointed by the Council of State. One of these four pairs was represented by the 
director of the health NGO Rheumatism Foundation Hospital while the team member 
represented a hospital district. The team was charged in developing the “division of 
labour and cooperation in the public health care, private and third sector” (ibid.).  
 
While views from NGOs health providing community were channeled directly 
through the working group, the main procedure for the policy development involved 
(public) hearings and consultations of almost 400 experts across the board. In 
addition, the groups were assisted by expert task forces appointed by the MSAH 
(MSAH, 2002a: 10). After completion of its work, the Council of State adopted the 
                                                 
8 Source: research interviews (March, April, July 2003).  
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Project as a Decision in Principle in 2002. The Project has 40 different projects whose 
practical implementation depends on project coordinators working mainly from the 
MSAH. On the other hand, it has an organizational structure with several official 
levels. At the top is the Steering Group, which has members from the MSAH, the 
AFLRA and other Ministries. This is a political steering agency. At the second level is 
the Monitoring Group set up on 1st August 2002 with 24 members from various 
ministries, hospital districts, municipalities, research and education institutes and six 
NGOs. The Monitoring Group has five roles outlined as follow:  
 
1. Promote the dialogue of health care and connected groups for developing 
health services; 
2. Mediate information about the aims and implementations of the principle 
decisions between social and healthcare, its connected groups and the Project 
leadership; 
3. Follow and evaluate the progress of the Decision in Principle and if needed 
make the necessary change and revise proposals; 
4. Evaluate the changes of the operation environment for securing the 
implementation of the Decision in Principle; and  
5. If necessary make the initiatives and proposals for the implementation of the 
Decision in Principle. 
 
The monitoring group has produced its first progress report in 2003 on the Project 
implementation during 2002, Seurantaryhmän Arvio: Kansallisen Terveyshankkeen 
Toiminnasta Vuonna 2002 (MSAH, 2003b) (see, Part V Section 1 for discussions and 
analysis of this process). While the steering group met seven times in year 2002, the 
monitoring group met twice in whole-day seminar type of deliberations. In addition to 
the mentioned working groups, four others have been formed. Out of these, three have 
NGO representation. One is the working group for developing guidelines on 
continuing education running through 1st April 2003 to October 30, 2003. The second 
is a working group developing implementation guidelines for access to treatment care 
and queue management running through 1st August 2002 to December 31, 2003. The 
working group on transferring patient’s records into an electronic form runs through 
1st February 2003 to December 31, 2004.9 In light of these forums, the participation of 
NGOs in policy making and current health developments seems to be assured. 
However, as the NP, like the Health 2015, is still in its infancy, it remains to be seen 
to what extent the partnership paradigm in this area can actually be achieved (Part V).    
                                                 
9 Source: Internet: http://www.terveyshanke.fi/fi/index.asp (June 22, 2003).  
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SECTION II – KENYA: CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: OVERALL 
CONTEXT AND WORKING ENVIRONMENT OF HEALTH NGOS 
 
“In response to needs in the health sector, the government is in the process of 
implementing reforms which have far reaching consequences on the health 
sector. One of the objectives of these reforms is to reduce the government’s 
role in provision of curative services and increase emphasis on promotive and 
preventive services. Implicitly, the NGOs sector will play a greater role in the 
provision of curative services” (Speech read by Professor Sam Ongeri, 
Kenyan Minister for Public Health, at the NGO Consensus Building 
Workshop, Nairobi, June 21, 2001).  
 
NGOs health operations in Kenya, as in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, have their 
roots in the period of colonialism during when many religious missions, ethnic 
groups, and professional associations sprang up to promote the welfare of their 
populations (MacPherson, 1982: 103; Bratton, 1989: 571). In most remote rural areas, 
NGOs were the first providers of the health services and pharmaceuticals and have 
remained in some cases the main or sole providers (MacPherson, op. cit.; Mburu, 
1989: 594; Vogel and Stephens, 1989). NGOs are however post-independence 
phenomena when the number increased from barely 15 in 1950 to 132 in 1978 and 
267 in 1988 (Fowler, 1993: 156; INTRAC, 1998: 139). The 1980s were called the 
‘NGO decade’ in which NGOs were regarded as Africa’s “hidden resource” (Bratton, 
1988: 415) following state failure in providing basic social services (Fine and 
Stoneman, 1996: 6; Word Bank, 1997: 2). During the decade, Kenya had the largest 
number of NGOs in the continent (Bratton, 1989: 571). The 1990s has seen an 
explosion in the overall size of the sector in the country as the number increased by 
about 100 annually from 1,718 in 1995 to 2,469 in 2002 (research interviews) about 
40% of which are international or foreign owned as per 1996 data (INTRAC, op. cit.).      
 
As in other sub-Saharan African countries, the tremendous growth in the number of 
NGOs in Kenya in the 1990s is explained by a number of factors. These include the 
prolonged economic deterioration, the changing international political economy of aid 
with the new development paradigm emphasizing on the need for good governance 
and transparency, and the new post-Cold War world order that triggered the “‘third 
wave’” of democratization in the continent and in former communist countries (e.g., 
Tarrow, 1991; Ndegwa, 1996: 3; World Bank, 1998: 9-13).  Liberalization under the 
structural adjustment framework yielded a new context for the growth of NGOism 
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from the mid 1980s in the East African region (Hyden, 1995: 42-46). The theoretical 
explanation suitably fitting to this context is the supply-side theory: the “expanding 
structure of political opportunities” (Tarrow, op. cit.: 13) in which a “bourgeois 
revolution” (Salamon et al, 1999: 4) combined with “civil unrest, nascent opposition 
parties, and international donors demanding political pluralism allowed NGOs to 
organize effectively and coordinate their resources” (Ndegwa, op. cit.: 50). With 
heavy reliance on donor funding during the 1990s, NGOs seemed to have taken a 
leading role in socio-economic development, as government became a less favourable 
channel for appropriating foreign aid. In the early to mid 1990s, the shift in donor 
focus was so subtle that only 25% of total aid went to government with most going 
through NGOs and private actors (INTRAC, op. cit: 157). This certainly helped fuel 
the supply of NGO enterpreneurialism to meet the demand (Salamon and Anheier, 
1998: 221), of foreign aid.  
 
Historically, the development pattern of NGOs in the country closely follows and is 
shaped by the political regimes of the day (Kanyinga, 1995). During the Kenyatta era 
(1963-1978), the significance of Harambee spirit (pooling resources together) – a 
traditional ad hoc form of organizing that can be explained most aptly by the social 
origins theory (Bratton, op. cit.: 573; Salamon and Anheier, op. cit.: 226-31) – was 
formally recognized and voluntary initiatives were given special policy 
considerations. Voluntary groups such as Churches and NGOs actively provided basic 
services at the grassroots. NGOs had operated rather freely complementing 
government in development projects under the District Development Committees 
(DDCs) (ibid). However, they were required, as now, to report their presence and 
work operations to the DDCs (Ndegwa, op. cit.: 33). In spite of the liberal stance on 
the civil society organizations (CSOs), their space for manoeuvre was restricted to the 
socio-economic sphere as the single party state system shunned their engagement in 
political activities.  
 
The present face of NGOs has largely developed during the Moi regime (1978-2002). 
The period is characterized by an “effective demobilisation” of CSOs in the 1980s 
and proliferation in the 1990s when “for the first time [they] could be distinguished 
from the state” (Kanyinga and Owiti, 2003: 8). Thus the 1990s saw the opening of 
developmental and political space and expanded opportunities for NGO activities vis 
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the government in the delivery of basic social services (Ng’ethe and Kanyinga, 1992). 
At the same time, the state began attempts to control and coordinate what was a 
rapidly increasing uncoordinated NGO sector. Of particular importance is the 
introduction early in the decade of a special legislation – the Non-Governmental 
Organizations Coordination Act (1990) – pertaining to the establishment and 
operations of NGOs. The Act is today the basis for understanding NGOs in Kenya 
and as shaper of relations with the state. It created two bodies: (1) the Non-
Governmental Organization Co-ordination Bureau (henceforth, NGO Bureau); and (2) 
the National Council of Voluntary Agencies (henceforth, NGO Council). As the 
government decision-making and surveillance proxy, the Bureau is the disciplinarian 
regulator and coordinating body as well as the government advisory body on the role 
NGOs play in development. All NGOs, foreign and domestic, must register with the 
Bureau. On the other hand, as a self-regulatory body with its own structure 
representing all registered NGOs, the NGO Council is the facilitator. Due to its legal 
status, the Council is a legitimate interface between the sector and the government.  
 
In addition to the Act, the legal terrain of the NGO sector is laid out in three other 
legislations and guidelines: (1) the 1992 NGO Coordination Regulations; (2) the 1993 
Rules and Regulations of the NGO Council; and (3) the 1995 Code of Conduct, which 
“stipulates the cardinal rules and values that must be observed by all NGOs” (NGO 
Council, 2001). Prior to the 1990 Act, NGOs registered and operated under different 
legal statutes and their administration was under the Kenya National Council of Social 
Services (KNCSS), their umbrella body established in 1963 in the Ministry of Culture 
and Social Services. In spite of the otherwise rich legislative context, many problems 
exist such as conflicts in the parallel governance structure (Bureau and Council) (e.g., 
Ndegwa, op. cit.; Opala, 1999; Yaansah, 1995: 24). The Act did not merely provide a 
legal recognition of the sector but, more than that, it was a state control tool through 
the wide ranging powers of the Bureau, which could reject an application or deregister 
NGOs it deemed out of line with their stated purposes (INTRAC, op. cit.: 142). A 
recent example is in early 2003 when 340 NGOs were deregistered. Of these, 28 
successfully appealed against the decision within the required time period; it is 
suspected that the others may be non-existent or non-operational (research 
interviews). Although the Bureau and the Council have representation in each others 
governing boards as laid out in the legislation, they differ in some fundamental ways. 
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For example, the Bureau is staffed by government civil servants and operates as a unit 
of government under the Office of the President while the Council receives no 
government budget and its employees and operations are run independently by the 
member NGOs; all registered NGOs are automatic members of the Council although 
they pay a graduated fee according to their level of income.  
 
Kenyan NGOs can be classified into three main typologies (INTRAC, op. cit.: 137-8). 
The first are of two types. One are “service or intermediary NGOs set up for”, but 
without control of, the “targeted beneficiaries”. Included here are international NGOs 
such as OXFAM and Action-Aid. Second are horizontal or infrastructural NGOs. 
These provides support (financial, advisory or other services) to other NGOs, e.g., the 
NGO Council, the Kenya AIDS NGO Consortium (KANCO) and Family Planning 
Association of Kenya (FPAK). These types of NGOs serve other NGOs as well as 
community-based organizations (CBOs). Although CBOs are technically not NGOs – 
because they are registered at the local level with the district social services offices – 
they comprise the largest number of development organizations estimated to be 
between 30,000 and 40,000 (ibid. 137). The third type is the numerous religious 
missions or Church/faith-based organizations. Discussions and data presented in this 
dissertation are on the first and third types.  
 
As of May 2003, there were 2,633 national and international NGOs registered in the 
country although it is expected that many may be operationally active. The NGOs 
operate in no less than 25 fields according to a classification developed by the NGO 
Council. This composition is presented in table 1 below. The table uses 2002 data of 
2,469 NGOs. The larger total number of 3,164 indicates that some NGOs are involved 
in more than one sub-sector. According to the table, the social services and welfare 
sub-sector has the highest concentration of NGO activity (15.8%) followed by 
education and training with 14.4% and health and medical services (13.7%). Using a 
narrower classification system containing 13 categories developed for registration 
purposes, the official government classification system characterizes a similar trend 
but with a particular exception in health. A compilation of all the NGOs registered to 
date (2,633) brings out the following picture (figure 1). Here, the overall count of 
cross-sectoral activities undertaken by all the NGOs is 5,008. In this context, general 
welfare remains at the top with 15% while the health sub-sector falls to the bottom 
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with just about 3% concentration. Education also remains a popular field of activity 
with a share of 10% although relief is higher at 11%. The variation between the 
Council and Bureau data may be explained by simple pragmatic preferences.  
 
Table 1. Composition of the NGO Sub-Sectors in Kenya (2002) (N=2,469) 
 
Sub-Sectors No. Of NGOs
African culture, African religion 19 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Forest, Livestock and marine resources  
(includes food security) 80 
AIDS support services 21 
Animal rights 1 
Arid lands, pastoralism and wildlife 82 
Children, youth and family life 118 
Communication, journalism and information 25 
Conflict resolution and peacemaking 13 
Education and training 455 
Environmental conservation and energy 307 
Finance and management 16 
Health and medical services (excludes AIDS support) 432 
Human rights 49 
Informal sector, commerce and industry 187 
People with disabilities 13 
Population issues (includes family planning) 85 
Relief and emergency operations 145 
Religion 66 
Rural development 121 
Social services and welfare 500 
Sports and leisure 8 
Urban development 34 
Water supply, sanitation and waste management 189 
Women and gender issues 74 
Multi sector 124 
Total  3,164 
 
Source: NGO Council (May, 2002).   
 
These data helps us to contexualize the field of NGOs generally, the classification 
system, and health NGOs more specifically. In the face of the wide variation between 
the Council and Bureau data with regard to health, in particular, it would be unwise to 
use these data as measures of the size of the health NGOs sub-sector. The data can 
however be used as indicatory while paying caution to the differing interests of the 
classifier. For example, these data contradicts an earlier study that estimated the 
health sub-sector to comprise 50% of NGO activities (Riddell, 1997: 5). In terms of 
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coverage, this study estimated that Kenyan secular (excluding the Church) NGOs 
touch the lives of 15% of the country’s population, about 40% of the more than 10 
million people living below the poverty line (ibid. 6). In spite of the broad activity 
fields and the large number of registered NGOs, only about 300-400 are active (at 
most about 15%), according to sources at the NGO Bureau (research interviews). And 
as the more specific data will show in subsequent presentations below, a handful of 
organizations control most of the resources, particularly in the health sub-sector. 
 
Figure 1. Composition of NGOs by Sub-Sector (2003) 
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Source: NGO Coordination Bureau (May, 2003).  
 
Resources Context for Health NGOs in Kenya  
 
There are three main sources of resources for health NGOs in Kenya: (1) the 
government; (2) international donors; and (3) fees for services from direct cash 
payments by users and reimbursements from health insurance, in particular the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). Presently, the former two are briefly 
outlined while the third is analysed in detail in the next chapter. In general, the 
government does not provide financial assistance to NGOs at the present time even if 
this is one of the stated objectives of the Ministry of Health (MOH): to “encourage 
and financially support community and non-government initiatives in health related 
activities especially in provision of curative care” (ROK, 1998b: 51). Local 
authorities may also make grants to or contract NGOs or any operator under a 
provision in the legislation (Section 146 (e) of the Local Government Act); details of 
any such funding were however not obtainable in this research. Much of the 
supportive government policy environment is laid out in the National Health Sector 
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Strategic Plan (NHSSP) 1999-2004 (ROK, 1999b: 11, 21). In contrast to the 
significant subsidies of the 1970s, the government today gives some minor support. 
For example, in the estimated 1994 National Health Accounts, the government gave 
NGOs Ksh1 million (about US$13,423 – Central Bank of Kenya mean rate of 
Ksh74.4983 per one US$ as at May 1, 2003) (ROK, 1999c: 12).  
 
This sum was however insignificant as Ksh476 million (US$6,389,000) of the 
Ksh477 million (US$6,402,000) classified as NGO finances came from donors, which 
represented 18% of all donor funding to the health sector with most of the rest going 
to MOH and other government agencies (ibid. 29). Although support to NGOs is 
largely in personnel costs through secondment by the MOH (ROK, 1999b: 53), other 
financial support is also available. The best attempt to construct such government 
transfers to the NGO/private sector available is in Berman et al (1995: 88-89). The 
authors identified two main types of transfers categorized as direct cash and capital 
grants with direct cash payments accounting for a larger share. Overall, all transfers 
for financial years 1982/83-1991/92 constituted a very small percentage of total 
government health expenditures with fluctuations through the decade. In 1982/83 the 
sum was only 0.4% while at its lowest in 1989/90 it stood at 0.1%. It was highest in 
1991/92 at 4.8%. In addition to these, NGO/private providers can also on a case-by-
case basis request a 50% reduction in import duty on imported medical supplies (ibid. 
87). They otherwise are not exempt from paying taxes.   
 
Overall, the NGO sector reliance on donor funding has been, in fact, extremely high 
in the early to mid 1990s. One study estimated that NGOs receive 95% of their 
funding from foreign sources (Fowler, 1995: 61). During these years, the sector 
became the number one foreign exchange earner (Fisher, 1998: 58). The earnings 
represent an estimated US$125-250 million annually (or 12-25% of all external 
earnings) (INTRAC, op. cit.: 140). About US$150 million of this sum went through 
religious institutions (ibid.). And about 90% of the estimated US$90 million up to 
June 2000 of external funds (excluding World Bank support) for HIV/AIDS activities 
were channelled through NGOs (Office of the President, 2000a: 13). In 1994, 
international religious organizations were channelling funds to over 40 major NGOs 
(ROK, 1999c: 29). In recent times, in spite of a general decline in donor finances, the 
sector received, by all accounts, huge sums of money.  
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According to the NGO Bureau statistics, NGOs have received over Ksh286 billion 
over the last 10 years (table 2). As the source reiterates, an estimated 90% of these 
funds have come from foreign donors. This figure may actually be a gross 
understatement because, as shown, only a small percentage of the registered NGOs 
submit their annual returns; all NGOs are otherwise required by law to do so. (In fact, 
this requirement has been a major source of the mistrust and conflict between the 
Bureau on the one side and the Council and NGOs on the other.) The high return rate 
in the early years of the Act (1992/93) may be explained by the small number of 
NGOs at that time. On the other hand, the high levels after 1997 may probably have 
been the result of continuous threats by the Bureau and the Moi regime to NGOs 
failing to do so although this is highly speculative since similar threats in 1999, 2000 
and 2001 (see, e.g., Wamai, 2001: 3-4) did not yield a high compliance.  
 
Table 2. Summary of Income and Number of NGOs (1992/93-2001/02 Financial 
Years) 
 
NGOs Submitting Returns 
Year Amount (Ksh.) 
No. 
% Of Total 
Registered NGOs 
1993/94 690,314,333.45 30 10 
1994/95 2,246,861,305.54 46 11.1 
1995/96 2,393,198,948.49 56 11 
1996/97 2,993,910,106.25 67 11.1 
1997/98 52,195,118,619.00 257 44.3 
1998/99 74,299,340,978.78 331 39.6 
1999/00 73,487,702,771.40 410 32.7 
2000/01 58,889,978,358.46 305 18.7 
2001/02* 14,562,325,836.25 246 13.5 
Total 286,927,115,799.62     
 
 Source: NGO Coordination Bureau (May, 2003).  
Notes: *Data is incomplete because the Bureau is still receiving 2002/03 
financial year’s annual reports: as contained in the 1992 NGO Regulations 
(Section 24) the NGOs have until May 31st to submit the returns.  
  
The Bureau’s data system is not developed to be able to show the share of these funds 
per sub-sector. However, data presented by the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs 
during a Parliamentary debate and published in the (print) mass media reveal some 
trends in the key sub-sectors (table 3). According to this data, during 2000-2001, 281 
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NGOs received Ksh109.9 billion (or US$1.3 billion as at that days Central Bank of 
Kenya mean rate of Ksh78 to the dollar) from external sources (Daily Nation, 2002b). 
In contradistinction with the organizational data above, the health sub-sector was the 
third largest with a percent share of 13.5. With an expenditure of Ksh12.6 billion the 
281 NGOs spent nearly a half of the combined MOH recurrent and development 
budgets for the same period in health activities! A word of caution should be added 
with regard to interpreting this data. It is highly probable that these data are either 
inaccurate or incomplete. This is because many NGO health operators receive only 
supplemental grants from donors and collect most of their funds through user fees 
according to a recent study conducted as part of the Johns Hopkins CNP (Institute for 
Development Studies, 2002). This picture will emerge clearly in chapter 2 below 
while discussing mission/NGO hospitals in health service provision.  
 
Table 3. Composition of the NGO Sector by Amount of Funds Received from 
Donors During 2000-2002 (Billions Ksh.) (N=281) 
 
Sector Amount % 
Relief 21.9 23.4 
Administrative costs 19.7 21.1 
Health activities 12.6 13.5 
Population related issues 11.4 12.2 
Small and medium enterprise 9.3 9.9 
Welfare 9.2 9.8 
Education 9.5 10.1 
Total* 93.6 100 
 
Source: Daily Nation (June 26, 2002).   
Notes: *An item may have been omitted in the media report as this total 
differs from the overall total mentioned by the Minister. 
 
In light of the overall context highlighted in chapter 1 Part III Section II, health NGOs 
in Kenya operate under circumstances of extremely high levels of poverty and 
HIV/AIDS prevalence, population pressure, dependency on diminishing donor funds, 
a thin and fluid financial base, inarticulate and conflicting regulations and high taxes 
(see, e.g., chapter 2 below on licensing of medical operators; Owino, 1999: 280; 
CHAK Times, 2001 and 2002, various articles). The double impact of HIV/AIDS and 
poverty is of particular concern since many patients attending treatment at NGO 
hospitals are unable to pay for the services. These factors have created a situation in 
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which large sums of debt remain uncollected and uncollectable. Such financial 
constraints affect the smooth operations of the health system.1       
 
 
CHAPTER 2. NGO SYSTEM IN HEALTH SERVICES PROVISION 
 
Most of the NGO health operators are Church based non-profit institutions. As other 
private for-profit operators (FPOs), specialized care health NGOs are required to 
obtain a certificate of registration and licence from the Medical Practitioners and 
Dentists Board (MPDB), which operates as a specialized agency of the MOH. The 
MPDB is the government’s watchdog on all NGO/private operators. It was 
established in 1978 following commencement of the Medical Practitioners and 
Dentists Act, amended in 1983. However, the requirement for NGOs to register with 
the Board has existed only since April 2000 as per Kenya Gazzette Notice No. 13 
(Article 26). Prior to this, they were merely gazetted by the MOH and thus had no 
licences. This made it harder to trace their existence. The new requirements are listed 
in the Board’s (2002: 10) newsletter as follows:   
 
 Application on Board pre-designed forms on payment of Ksh1,000; the forms 
must be signed by the area medical officer of health, a government official,  
 Provision of company, business or organization’s registration certificate, 
 Hospitals must provide mortuary or storage facilities for cadavers,  
 Facilities to have clear drainage system and to be accessible, and 
 Payment in full of application, registration and annual licence fees. 
 
Except for the application, the other fees differ according to different categories (table 
4). Although the licences must be renewed annually at a fee, mission/NGO 
dispensaries, clinics, health centres and medical centres are exempted from renewing 
the licences, and thus paying the fee, on the understanding that they are providing 
basic health services. Though the registration and licensing fees paid by 
Church/Mosque/NGOs are modest relative to those of FPOs, licensing is complicated 
by the dualistic system since municipalities also issue licences for operators in their 
jurisdiction as detailed in the Local Government Act; Section 148 (1 and 2) entitles 
the local authorities to not only issue licences but also levy fees in so doing. In 
                                                 
1 Statement of the Kenya Episcopal Conference, Catholic Secretariat, Commission for Health and 
Family Life to the Parliamentary Committee on Health, Housing, Labour and Social Welfare (August 
2002). 
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addition to this dualism, corruption has also been cited as a major constraint 
(Wang’ombe et al, 1998: 38). More specific legislation pertaining to the licensing of 
NGOs health units by local authorities is contained in bylaw 3 (1) of the trade and 
premises bylaws of 1991. By issuing and vetting licences and registration certificates, 
and carrying out regular inspections, the MPDB acts as a centralized regulator. 
However, this work is duplicated by the local government and can, possibly raise a 
serious conflict if, for example, the local authority denies or cancels the licence of an 
operator (under Section 164 of the Local Government Act) holding an MPDB licence. 
Both the MPDB and NGOs see this as unnecessarily problematic (research 
interviews). In fact, there are strong arguments against this double licensing. For 
example, it both duplicates the work of the MPDB and increases costs to the 
NGO/private operators. Ideally, it is argued, municipal licensing should be 
eliminated; these pressures led to the creation of a committee to look into the matter. 
The issue is also raised as one of the policy objectives under the NHSSP (ROK, 
1999b: 11).  
 
Table 4. Fees Structure for Registration and Licensing of Mission/NGO Health 
Facilities by Categories (2002) (Ksh.)    
 
 
Application 
Fee 
Registration 
Fee 
Annual Licence 
Fee 
Maternity and Nursing Homes and  
Medium Hospitals  1,000 20,000 20,000 
Church/Muslim Hospitals 1,000 5,000 10,000 
Church/Muslim Dispensaries, Clinics, 
Health centres, Medical centres  1,000 5,000 Exempted 
 
Source: Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board (MPDB) (2002: 5-6).   
 
In general, all health activities are governed by the Public Health Act (see, Section 
153 on regulation) and certain provisions in the Local Government Act. Operations of 
organizations registered as NGOs must also comply with the NGO legislation. Other 
standards regulating agencies apart from the MPDB include the Nursing Council of 
Kenya (NCK), the Pharmacy and Poisons Board and the Medical Laboratory 
Technicians and Technologists Board. As in Finland, Kenyan NGO health operators 
are not exempt from certain municipal taxes such as property tax, land rates and other 
charges. For example, municipal, town and urban councils have powers to levy 
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charges for the use of its drains or sewers as a sanitary service charge (Local 
Government Act, Section 174). In addition to the fees and other charges, 
mission/NGO operators also have to bear other costs such as licences for foreign 
doctors invited to provide services. In this case the fee is Ksh5,000 (MPDB, 2002: 4).  
 
On the whole, the role of NGOs in the provision of health services in Kenya is very 
large as the following discussion shows. One estimate suggested that they provide two 
thirds of all curative services (Deolalikar, 1997, in ROK, 1999c: 8). Already in the 
1980s, NGOs were delivering up to 35% of health services in the country (Bratton, 
1989: 571).  In 1989, the MOH estimated that the share of NGO facilities was 40% 
(INTRAC, op. cit.: 140). NGOs also produce a sizeable number of health personnel, 
mainly nurses and clinical officers, in their training programmes. Of the 24 
NGO/private training institutions producing about 835 health personnel yearly, 70% 
are operated by mission/NGOs (ROK, 1999b: appendix II). As major actors in health 
care services, NGOs play a crucial complementary role to government provided 
services (Berman et al, 1995; Wang’ombe et al, op. cit.). Figure 2 amplifies the 
government-NGO-private sector mix in all the above five main types of health 
institutions. The overall data indicates that NGOs operated 20% of the health facilities 
in the country in 1998.  
 
51 %
20 %
29 %
Government 
NGOs
Private for-profit
Figure 2:  Composition of Health Institutions in Comparative Sector Perspective 
(1998)
 
 
Source: ROK (1999b: 5) 
 
To have a clearer picture of the NGO health service system, we disaggregate figure 2 
into the major types of the facilities in table 5 below. Although the MPDB’s register 
contained only 640 individual NGO/private institutions by November 2002, the 
overall number is larger as the table indicates. It should also be observed that the 
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MOH data presented in the table is only on the number of health facilities and does 
not reflect the number of NGOs. The data shows that NGOs operate over 30% of all 
secondary care in hospitals in the country as measured by 30.7% of hospitals and 36% 
of beds. Thus, NGO operators have a greater specialization in the secondary care 
component taken singly. However, they are also key players in the primary health 
care network comprising of health centres, dispensaries and health clinics; the Health 
Management Information System (HMIS) indicates that the majority of outpatient 
services (64%) were rendered in these kinds of facilities (ROK, 2001e: 65). 
 
Table 5: Size of the NGO Health Service System 
 
Measure  No. % Share
Hospitals 67 30.7 
Health centres 100 17.4 
Dispensaries 595 23.6 
Nursing & Maternity homes 11 5.8 
Health clinics and medical centres 72 10.2 
Total* 845 20 
Hospital beds - 36 
Outpatient treatment - 51 
 
Sources: Republic of Kenya (1999b: 5); Owino (1999: 270), for hospital beds 
and outpatient treatments data.  
Notes: *Facilities data are for 1998; “–” data not available.  
 
With primary data obtained from the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), it is 
possible to evaluate the full size of the specialized health care system operated by 
NGOs in the country. As was noted in chapter 2 Part III section II, NHIF subscribers 
can use any of the hospitals accredited by the insurance agency. Accreditation is a 
rigorous exercise that entails inspection, inventory and evaluation of the health 
facility, its owners, its employees, its standards and system of care (research 
interviews). Aspects such as general cleanliness and hygiene, water and food quality, 
suitability of premises and types of services provided are also looked at. A primary 
condition for accreditation is that the facility has a resident doctor. Once a facility is 
accredited it is given a score, which determines its rebate rate. If an institution puts up 
an additional service, NHIF can review its rebate rate accordingly. Accreditation is 
based on the general policy of adequate quality care for in-patients. Unlike the 
NGO/private institutions, accreditation of government hospitals from the district 
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hospital up is automatic. All accredited hospitals are gazetted (publicly announced). 
Table 6 below shows the composition and size of the overall NHIF in-patient system 
in current times.  
 
The NHIF-accredited institutions are spread out in the country although unevenly. 
With regard to the mission/NGO institutions, Nairobi and North Eastern provinces 
have the least with a range of between 9 and 15 in the other provinces. As shown in 
this table, the mission/NGOs operate 63 institutions with 6,755 beds representing an 
overall share of 15.2% and 18.5%, respectively. These numbers are evidently less 
than in the private or government system but higher than in the community one. 
Community health institutions comprise a broad variety of ownership and type (the 
best-known hospitals in Nairobi are put under this category.) However, the majority 
are operated by for-profit organizations. Another important point to note from this 
table is the variation from figure 2 above in the percentage shares of the three main 
actors (government, NGOs and private). In that figure the share of NGOs was slightly 
higher at 20% in overall institutional ownership. 
 
Table 6. Composition of the NHIF Accredited Hospital System by Provider Sector 
(2003)  
 
Sector No. Of Institutions 
%  
Share 
No. Of 
Beds 
%  
Share 
Private 210 50.7 9,670 26.5 
Government  120 29 18,191 49.9 
Mission/NGOs  63 15.2 6,755 18.5 
Community  21 5.1 1,847 5.1 
Total  414 100 36,463 100 
 
Source: National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) (May, 2003)  
 
Table 7 disaggregates the (NHIF) mission/NGO system by type of institution. As 
depicted, the overwhelming majority (87.3%) are hospitals. If the number reported in 
table 5 above were accurate, it would appear that either four hospitals are not 
accredited or that they have closed. If the former explanation, then about 94% of all 
the mission/NGO hospitals existing today are currently accredited by NHIF. The 
percentage for maternity homes is higher than for health clinics and medical centres 
although both are much smaller and thus more or less reflect the picture of overall 
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sector composition. This profile is similarly reflected in the government sector with 
nearly all its hospitals accredited and less so in the private sector. In 2002, the overall 
number of NHIF-accredited institutions has increased by 38 from 376 in 2001 
(CHAK/KCS/NHIF, 2002: 6). Of the increase, only three are mission/NGO 
institutions with the government and private sector having 17 each.  
 
Table 7. Composition of the NHIF-supported Mission/NGO Health System by Type 
of Institution (2003)  
 
 Total No. % 
Hospitals 55 87.3 
Health centres - - 
Dispensaries - - 
Maternity home* 4 6.3 
Health clinics and medical centres 4 6.3 
Total  63 99.9 
 
Source: National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) (May, 2003)  
Notes: *One maternity home doubles up as a dispensary and another as a 
cottage hospital; “–” no accreditation.   
 
With regard to the financial dimension of the NGO health system, the broadest 
primary data available countrywide is reimbursements from NHIF. It would have 
been a monumental task to profile data from earlier years since computerization only 
began in 1998 following restructuring of the NHIF. Hence, the oldest data presented 
is from 1998/99 financial years (table 8). Still the table reveals telling trends. 
Evidently, the share of the mission/NGO hospitals is large in percentage terms in 
comparison to the other three provider sub-categories despite the decrease. In the 
share of claims as well as reimbursements, the sector dominates in 1998/99 and 
1999/00. After that the sector is overtaken by government except for year 2000/01 
when it has a slightly larger number of claims although a lower reimbursement share. 
In 2002/03, the percentage share of reimbursements was 26%, 29%, 22% and 23% for 
mission/NGO, government, private and community hospitals, respectively. For all the 
years for which the data is available, as shown, mission/NGOs have received the 
highest reimbursements (29%). The significance of this data is that it can also be used 
to gauge both the quality of care and utilization of the hospitals since NHIF has 
differing reimbursement scales for different hospitals as pointed above. Thus, despite 
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leading in the share of facilities, the private sector is largely underutilized by NHIF 
beneficiaries, as is government despite overwhelming lead in hospital beds. The 
overall large share of mission/NGO sector in the NHIF system is amplified when we 
consider that the sector has only a third of the hospital beds in government facilities.    
 
Table 8. Summary of NHIF Claims and Payouts to Mission/NGO Hospitals 
(1998/99-2002/03 Financial Years) (Ksh) 
 
 No. Of Claims % Of Total Amount Reimbursed % Of Total  
1998/99 17,986 34 79,988,379 37 
1999/00 28,616 30 127,920,074 33 
2000/01 24,742 26 104,606,740 29 
2001/02 27,085 25 153,298,752 26 
2002/03 24,711 24 171,609,599 26 
Total  123,140 27 637,423,544 29 
 
Source: NHIF (2003).  
 
The size of the mission/NGO hospital system in the NHIF scheme can be amplified 
with more comprehensive data from the Central Province region (table 9); each 
province has a regional NHIF office. For purposes of illustration, the table is analysed 
in a comparative perspective, thus the government and private sectors are reflected. 
Analysis of the regional financial data is made possible by the fact that after 
restructuring in 1998, the regional offices took the responsibility to process claims in 
their area of operations. The data reveals even more remarkable trends. With only 4 
hospitals (17% of the total), 32% of all beds and 22% of all doctors, mission/NGOs 
attracted 62% of all NHIF claimant beneficiaries netting a whopping 85% of all 
reimbursements in the year 2002! While the general trend in the total reimbursements 
has grown by 195% over the four-year period, that of mission/NGOs has shot by 
236%. On the other hand, the government’s percentage share has deteriorated 
although recording a growth in actual amounts of about 50%. The private sector has 
had more widely varying fluctuations with an overall growth of 154% in 
reimbursements. Notably, the increase in both government and private sector 
reimbursements can be most readily explained by the increase in the number of 
accredited facilities run by these two sectors. In comparison, the four mission/NGO 
hospitals have been in existence long before the oldest data year (1999).  
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Table 9. Composition of the NHIF-Supported Specialized Care System in the 
Central Province Region by Provider Sector (1999-2002) 
 
 Year 
Mission/ 
NGO 
% Of 
Total Government
% Of 
Total Private 
% Of 
Total
1999 15,704,994 74 3,995,678 19 1,414,050 7 
2000 14,111,960 81 2,476,125 14 775,600 5 
2001 19,590,405 78 2,782,440 11 2,590,570 11 
Reimburse-
ments (Ksh.) 
2002 52,810,342 85 5,980,445 10 3,560,700 5 
Hospitals  4 17 7 31 12 52 
Beds  614 32 1,005 52 308 16 
Doctors  12 22 29 53 14 25 
Nurses  239 21 739 66 150 13 
Claimants 4,038 62 1,251 19 1,257 19 
 
Source: NHIF Regional Office, Central Province, Nyeri (May, 2003). 
Notes: Data on hospitals, beds, doctors, nurses and claimants are for 2002.    
 
There are two plausible explanations for the dominance of the mission/NGO 
institutions. One is the users’ perception that they have better quality care. An 
associated link to this view is the experience that government facilities do not have 
adequate drugs (Wang’ombe et al, op. cit.: 53).2 Second is the fact that all the 
mission/NGO institutions receive, in general, a persistently higher rebate rate relative 
to the government and private systems. Another reason is that prices of services in 
mission/NGO facilities are 3-4 times lower than in the private sector although they are 
relatively higher than in government facilities (ibid. 31). It should be noted that 82% 
of all the 2002 total reimbursements have gone to only one of the hospitals (Consolata 
Catholic Hospital). Its dominance has been more or less consistent over all the years. 
The hospital (see below) has a far much higher rebate than any of all the other 
hospitals. At current (2002) rates, NHIF will pay the highest rate of Ksh1,400 
(US$18) per admission at the hospital and Ksh800 for all the other mission hospitals 
while the closest central government hospital draws Ksh1,000 and the closest private 
hospital Ksh800. The lowest rebate in the region is Ksh300 (US$4) for a facility in 
private ownership. Consolata hospital has high rebates because it has the most 
sophisticated and diverse services such as an ICU, a diagnostic/imaging centre with a 
Computer Tomography (CT) scanner and x-ray, and an ENT (ear and nose and throat) 
centre. According to the stated policy of NHIF, clients should get the best possible 
                                                 
2 This view is very familiar to this researcher as it is his birth and place of growing up.  
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medical attention. Although some views are that price should not be a concern, it 
becomes an issue because the longer a client stays in hospital the more NHIF pays. 
Hence the Fund holds consultative meetings with hospital administrators and doctors 
to discuss how to handle such concerns (research interviews).   
 
2.1. NGO Specialized Health Care – Case Illuminations  
 
The largest activities in the NGO specialized health care services sector in the country 
are operated by Church missions.3 As presentation of the overall data has been done 
above, in this sub-chapter I will present detailed data on the two largest and main 
health NGO systems in the country. The two are the Kenya Catholic Secretariat 
(KCS) and the Christian Health Association of Kenya (CHAK), a grouping of 44 
Protestant Churches. It is estimated that these two systems operate about 40% of all 
health care services in the country (Mwenda, 2002: 21). The Health Management 
Information Systems Report for the 1996-1999 Period estimates that KCS health 
facilities alone own 12% of all hospital beds in the country and accounted for 8.4% of 
all in-patient hospitalisation in 1999 (ROK, 2001e: 66, 67). The HMIS did not report 
data on CHAK health operations although its size is slightly smaller. Overall 
characteristic indicators of the KCS and CHAK health systems are portrayed in table 
10 below. All data and information are based on the field researches unless otherwise 
indicated.  
 
KCS was established by the Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC) of Bishops in 1960. 
Prior to the Secretariat, the Catholic Bishop’s run a medical department established in 
1957. The Commission for Health and Family Life is one of the eight commissions of 
the KEC. On the other hand, CHAK has been in existence since the 1930s. After 1946 
it operated as the Protestant Churches Medical Association and in 1982 acquired its 
current name. It is a membership organization of Protestant health institutions. 
Affiliate Churches include, e.g., the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), the 
Seventh Day Adventist (SDA), Africa Inland Church (AIC) and the Church of the 
                                                 
3 There is however a Muslim health care organization called Crescent Medical Aid (CMA). According 
to the available data, in 1994 CMA was directly operating 12 facilities owned by individual Mosques 
(Berman et al, 1995: 37). This system is not included in the current research because it was not 
recorded in the Health Management Information System (HMIS) and thus not much was known of its 
existence. For the most thorough explication of the development of the religious institutions in political 
and socio-economic development in Kenya see Ngunyi (1995).     
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Province of Kenya (CPK). Both KCS and CHAK act as secretariats for their member 
Church institutions. The member units are fully autonomous in the day-to-day 
decision-making and operations. Their main role is advisory towards the member 
units and policy advocacy and lobbying towards government on issues of concern 
regarding their member operations in particular and the health sector in general.  
 
Both bodies also co-ordinate and disburse funds, such as government grants, to the 
member units in the field and collect and collate information on the units. CHAK 
operates an emergency support fund to its member units in case of an outbreak or 
other emergency such as floods. The fund is however small, equivalent to 
Ksh150,000, 75,000 and 50,000 for hospitals, health centres and dispensaries, 
respectively (Mutiga, 2002: 20). Of the two systems, KCS is significantly larger. Its 
facilities are also arguably of higher quality and more attractive to NHIF patients 
(Berman et al, op. cit.: 37). The rebates rates, claimants and total reimbursements as 
shown in table 13 below provides an example. In effect, CHAK institutions are less 
reliant on NHIF reimbursements and more on user charges than KCS institutions 
(ibid. 36-37; see also table 13).  
 
Table 10. Characteristic Features of the Two Main NGO Health Systems  
 
Type of Facilities 
Christian Health 
Association of 
Kenya (CHAK) 
Kenya Episcopal 
Conference Catholic 
Secretariat (KCS) 
 2001 2003 2001 2003* 
Hospitals  16 20 39 41 
Health centres & cottage hospitals 13 40 93 94 
Dispensaries  250 253 272 276 
Total Facilities 279 313 404 411 
Secretariat employees  - 16 - -  
Districts operated  - 60 - 71 
 
Sources: Christian Health Association, and Kenya Episcopal Conference, 
Catholic Secretariat, Commission for Health and Family Life (2002, 2003). 
Notes: *KCS data are being updated from 2002; current numbers are 
expectedly higher; the number of KCS secretariat employees was not 
established; all country districts are covered. “-” data not available.  
 
As table 10 shows, in current year KCS has 41 hospitals, 94 health centres and cottage 
hospitals, and 276 dispensaries while CHAK has 20, 40, and 253, respectively. The 
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health operations of these two systems are by all means large and vital to the society. 
Further evidence on this is provided in tables 11 and 12. The presentation is made in 
separate tables since matching data components on both systems was not forthcoming. 
Data on table 11 was obtained from a statement of KCS presented to the 
Parliamentary Committee on Health, Housing, Labour and Social Welfare in August 
2002. The data captures the key indicator components of the KCS system except 
financial aspects, which were not reported. With a personnel total of 3,288, the system 
is fairly well staffed. Using the provisional data of 4,421 for the same year (see table 7 
of Part III Section II), the KCS facilities actually account for slightly over 9% of all 
health facilities in the country.  
 
Table 11. Key Data on the Overall KCS Health System (2001)  
 
Characteristics No. 
Health facilities*  404 
Hospital administrators  38 
Doctors  178 
Nurses** 1,097 
Support staff 2,013 
Beds  5,585 
Inpatients  148,941 
Outpatients  2,389,343 
Children immunized (<1 year) 447,976 
Training schools***  16 
 
Source: KCS Commission for Health and Family Life (August, 2002).  
Notes: *Comprises 39 hospitals, 93 cottage hospitals and health centres and 
272 health sub-centres, dispensaries and mobile clinics. **Comprises 346 
registered nurses and 751 enrolled nurses. ***Includes 13 schools of nursing, 
one school of clinical medicine, one school of pharmacy, and one school of 
laboratory technicians.    
 
Table 12, on the other hand, portrays some lesser elements (personnel and financing) 
of the CHAK system. The organization collects these data on specially designed 
forms, which the hospitals are encouraged to fill out and submit to the secretariat. At 
the time of the field research only 11 hospitals had submitted the forms. These 
represent 55% of the 20 hospitals shown in table 10. The 11 hospitals are the largest 
ones thus making the data significantly reasonable for deducing some conclusions. 
Several features of this system are notable. For one, these hospitals have fairly large 
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personnel. Notably, the hospitals have a significant but small number of staff 
seconded by government. Looking at the financial data, we see that the hospitals 
operate a huge budget of nearly Ksh1 billion (US$13,424,000). The overwhelming 
majority of these funds come from clients’ user fees – the range is between 50% at the 
lower end to almost 85% in one of the hospitals! Donations either domestic or foreign 
are minimal. In addition to these characteristics, it can be added that four of these 
hospitals have currently 13 medical-doctor interns under a special agreement with the 
MOH (see chapter 3 Part V Section II on interning procedures).  
 
Table 12. Key Data on the 11 Major CHAK Hospitals (2002)   
 
Characteristics No. 
Seconded medical staff* 37 
Doctors  67 
Nurses 810 
Total Staff 2,884 
Income (Ksh.)** 970,658,925
     
 Source: CHAK (2003).  
Notes: *Includes at least eight doctors and 11 nurses. Others are laboratory 
technicians, dentist, radiographer, and clinical officers. **2001/02 financial 
years.    
 
In order to get a deeper understanding of these mission/NGO operations, the research 
sought more expanded data on two hospitals, each operated by either of these bodies, 
within Central Province. The hospitals were chosen because they are the largest 
mission/NGO institutions in the region. Key data is summarized in table 13. The 
Consolata Mission Hospital (popularly known as Mathari Hospital owing to the name 
of the area) is a Catholic facility located about five kilometres from Nyeri town, the 
provincial capital. Tumutumu Hospital is run by PCEA located about 20 kilometres 
from Mathari Hospital. Both hospitals are in the same district (Nyeri) and are well 
known by the area inhabitants. The largest government hospital in the area is the 
Provincial General Hospital (PGH), the main public referral hospital in the province. 
In terms of NHIF reimbursements, Consolata is the leading hospital in the province 
followed by Tumutumu, and then PGH. Although the overall aim of the table is to 
portray various characteristics of the two hospitals, a comparative analysis can be 
made and various conclusions drawn.  
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Table 13. Characteristics of two Major Specialized Health Care Hospitals (2002) 
 
 
Consolata Mathari 
Hospital  
PCEA Tumutumu 
Hospital  
Year of Mission establishment  1902 1909 
Hospital functions started 1937 1909 
Turnover (Ksh) 42,560,381*  71,133,845 
NHIF reimbursements/net (Ksh) 43,215,578 8,361,760 
NHIF rebate rates (Ksh.) 1,400 800 
% Of user fees to total turnover  ~50** 84.5 
Total staff  230 262 
Resident doctors (2003) 6 5 
Nurses 92  110 
Other health personnel***  18 15 
Beds 245 203  
Inpatients  4,577 4,124 
NHIF claimants  2,265 1,396 
Inpatient days/bed occupied days  50,817 46,303 
Average treatment period days  12  9.6 
Outpatient visits 18,039 30,525 
Surgical operations 
- Major 
- Minor  
1,015 
760 
635 
1,235 
HIV screens 833 926 
Main source of medical supplies**** MEDS (~80%) MEDS (>90%) 
Government agencies buying services*****   
No. Of other facilities managed by hospital 
in its region****** 5 11 
No. Of students in Nursing School 192  100 
 
Sources: Archdiocese of Nyeri Consolata Hospital, Annual Report and 
Accounts (various issues); CHAK Times (2001, 2002); MOH Central Province 
Annual Report (2002); Tumutumu Hospital (2003); CHAK (2003).   
Notes: *Figures for July-December; figures for January-June were unavailable 
but could be assumed to be about the same, making a sum of over Ksh80 
million. **The percentage is approximated at 50 from account of estimated 
total year turnover. ***Includes, paramedics, e.g., radiographers and lab-
technicians, clinical officers, and pharmacists. **** MEDS is the Mission for 
Essential Drugs and Supplies operated jointly by KCS and CHAK. *****It 
was not possible to get a precise number. However, it is acknowledged that 
nearly every district hospital in the Mt. Kenya region and province refers 
patients to the hospital. Tumutumu has special arrangements with various 
government parastatals such as Kenya Power and Lighting Company, Telkom 
and Posta whose patients can be released with commitments to pay later. 
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******For Consolata, includes 1 mobile clinic, ENT, eye clinic, maternal 
child health/family planning MCH/FP), and a diagnostic centre all within the 
compound, except for the mobile clinic; for Tumutumu all are dispensaries.    
 
To start with, Consolata hospital is larger than Tumutumu in many ways such as 
NHIF reimbursements, number of doctors, and in-patient days. Secondly, it is much 
younger. Thirdly, Consolata is also well equipped and draws Ksh600 more in NHIF 
rebates. For this reason, it attracts more than five times the amount of NHIF 
reimbursements although it accounts for 62% of the claimants. This however serves to 
show that Consolata is also more reliant on the insurance scheme than Tumutumu, 
which nets 84.5% of its turnover from user fees. It should be mentioned that 
Tumutumu hospital has undergone a major transformation in the 1990s. The hospital 
almost closed down in 1991, following a decision by its donors due to various reasons 
such as low patient patronage, indebtedness, management and accounting problems, 
and dilapidation of the physical facilities (CHAK, 2002: 8). Following a series of 
concerted interventions with crucial support from the community through Harambees 
and Church leaders from the region, the hospital was renovated and new facilities 
added. Today the hospital is a success story as it is self-sustaining with local resources 
in terms of direct user fees.     
 
KCS and CHAK have key strategic relations. The best example for our purposes is 
their joint venture operation, the Mission for Essential Drugs and Supplies (MEDS). 
MEDS was established in 1986 to ensure reliability of quality essential drugs and 
supplies to the KCS- and CHAK-sponsored health institutions (Masiga, 2002: 15). Its 
stated mission as spelled out in a poster is “serving non-profit making health care 
providers”. In line with the WHO definition, essential drugs are those that satisfy a 
majority of the population and thus ought to be available always. MEDS provides 
drugs at subsidized prices and on a non-profit basis to a large clientele of institutions 
including more than 900 Church health units, NGOs as well as government health 
systems; 90% of the buyers are CHAK and KCS member units. With a stock of more 
than 580 types, the agency is probably the best source for essential drugs in the 
country. Yet more than 70% of these drugs are purchased from the local market 
(ibid.).  
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2.2. Reproductive Health Services    
 
As defined in the country’s National Reproductive Health Strategy 1997-2010, 
reproductive health is a concept referring broadly to “physical, mental, emotional and 
social well-being” of individuals and couples in matters relating to sexual and 
reproductive health (MOH, 1996). Used particularly to refer to family planning (FP), 
key services encompass a wide field such, safe motherhood, infant care, child health 
and adolescent health, and prevention and treatment of cancers of reproductive organs 
and sexually transmitted diseases. In spite of the possible duplication, the 
reproductive health strategy recognizes NGOs as playing a leading or primary role in 
the provision of counselling and clinical services, and information, education and 
communication services (ibid. 9). Indeed NGOs contribute an estimated 40-50% of 
family planning services in the country (INTRAC, 1998: 140). The best notable NGO 
in this field is Family Planning Association of Kenya (FPAK). FPAK is the oldest and 
largest organization providing family planning services in the country. Established in 
1962, it pioneered family planning services in Kenya and run the only clinics – some 
of which were situated in MOH facilities (research interviews).  
 
Throughout the 1960s, FPAK was a lead producer of these services. As the state 
health system expanded some of its clinics were incorporated in the early 1970s 
(MOH, op. cit.: 5). In 2002, the NGO had 12 clinic outlets and received 70% of the 
contraceptive needs from the MOH. In addition to reproductive health, e.g., family 
planning and maternal and perinatal services, FPAK also offers curative services at 
most outlets. This development has partly been customer driven as well as the need 
for the organization to adapt with the times. For example, some areas are already 
experiencing alarmingly low population growth rates such as Nyeri with 0.8% (MOH, 
2001). Here, the FPAK clinic is now called Family Health Centre since 2000 and 
carries out screening for breast and cervix cancer, antenatal and postnatal care as well 
as minor surgeries (research interviews). Since the government began undertaking FP 
services in the 1970s, the role of NGOs varies from complementary to primary 
provision mostly depending on the location of service delivery points (which include 
static centres, mobile units and community-based distribution programmes). Their 
role in FP and rural health (RH) is increasingly becoming even more important in the 
framework set by the NHSSP where the burden is being shifted to the NGO/private 
 213
sector as results of a study of one recent FP programme shows. In the project, Kenya 
Family Health Programme (KFHP), on improving access and availability of quality 
FP services delivery and ensuring continuously sufficient supply of contraceptives 
implemented by the German technical cooperation (GTZ) during 1997-2002, 14 
NGOs were involved with a total of 15 contracts; one of the international NGOs had 
two contracts.4 Table 14 summarizes the types of intervention and regions covered. 
 
Table 14. Intervention of NGOs in FP/RH in the Implementation of KFHP 
  
Type of Intervention Geographic Area of Intervention (Province) 
- 240 CBDs for FP and HIV/AIDS prevention; 1 CBD per 29 
households 
2 districts in Nyanza  
120 CBDs 2 districts in Nyanza  
- 184 CBDs (CBD, TBA and voluntary FP mobilizers – Folk 
media) and mobile clinic; 1 CBD per 57 households 
1 district in Eastern  
- FP/RH: reduction of CYP costs, filling the gaps (under-served 
groups and areas), sustainability plan, ARH component 
3 districts in Eastern  
421 Natural Family Planning (NFP) teachers (KCS) 10 Dioceses in Western, Rift 
Valley, Nyanza, Eastern, 
Coast and Central 
- 1 Clinic, and 176 CBD Slum area, Nairobi 
- Introduction of PAC in 12 (CHAK member) health facilities 12 districts in Coast, Rift 
Valley, Eastern, Central, 
Western and Nyanza  
- 800 CBDs, and up-grading of 4 public health facilities; ARH 
component 
4 districts in Coast  
- 246 CBDs (TBAs and male traditional herbalists); 1 CBD per 
63 households 
4 districts in Western, and 
Rift Valley 
100 CBDs, and 2 clinics; informal sector approach 3 districts in Nairobi and 
Central  
- 162 CBDs + 8 clinics 7 districts in Eastern, Central, 
Western, Eastern and Nyanza 
- 200 CBDs 1 district in Nyanza  
- 4 clinics 2 districts in Nyanza and Rift 
Valley  
- 1 clinic, ARH component, sustainability plan 1 district in Coast 
- 240 CBDs, ARH component: 200 youth educators; 6 
community pharmacies, 6 low cost mobile clinics (bicycle) 
2 districts in Western 
 
 Source: KFHP (http://www.gtz.de/kenia/projects/kfhp/index.html). 
Notes: *4 of these were actually public health facilities that were rehabilitated 
by one of the NGOs. Six of them were community pharmacies and seven were 
mobile clinics.    
                                                 
4 Source: the KFHP project plan at http://www.gtz.de/kenia/projects/kfhp/index.html.   
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Originally, only eight NGOs were involved but six more were added following 
publication of the NHSSP by the MOH. The intervention areas of the six new 
“‘innovative’” NGOs were carefully selected to complement public sector services 
and to operate in areas of high demand. This enabled the KFHP to extend its range of 
services to underserved areas. The additional interventions included adolescent 
reproductive health (ARH), post-abortion care (PAC, which included an FP 
component), and informal sector volunteers. It also explored ways of social marketing 
and reducing couple-year protection (CYP), defined as the amount of contraceptive 
good and/or service necessary to protect a couple from pregnancy for one year. Aimed 
at increasing utilization of FP services, the project was funded to the tune of €28.72 
million by the Department for International Development (DFID) and the European 
Commission (EC). All the major NGOs working in the country with a focus on FP 
and RH were contracted. Although it was not established how much of the funds was 
appropriated to the NGOs, this was done through competitive bidding. The strategies 
supported to increase family planning services through NGOs included community-
based distribution by community volunteers and clinic-based services.  
 
In order to co-ordinate their activities with existing services, all the NGOs were 
reporting to MOH District health officers and the National Council for Population and 
Development (NCPD), which is under the Ministry of Planning and Finance. 
Altogether, 45 clinics and 2,468 community-based distributors (CBDs) were involved. 
In this project, FPAK accounted for 162 of the CBDs and eight of its clinics were 
involved in Eastern, Central and Western provinces. KCS and CHAK were also 
involved in varying degrees. The table is comprehensive in that it captures the whole 
NGO-provided FP package from method of contraception to method of delivery and 
distribution system covering the whole country. The media, health facilities, mobile 
clinics, community distributors, traditional health workers and Bamako Initiative (BI) 
community pharmacies are all used to target and reach the population in an approach 
that integrates the FP services also with other existing health care system.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3. NGO SYSTEM IN HEALTH PROMOTION  
 
Harding (2003: 46-7) argues that in the developing world the role of the private sector 
in preventive and promotive health is not typically large. The reason, it is felt, is that 
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the sector is normally “excluded from public health programs, exacerbating this 
tendency to under-emphasize critical promotive and preventive care” (ibid. 47). On 
the other hand, going by one report, the role of the private/NGO sector in this sphere 
of health actions is significantly large in Kenya (Watanabe and Takahashi, 1997: 
116). To substantiate this assertion, this chapter will present a number of indicators 
using the available data on NGOs. The first is on financing of preventive/promotive 
health services as part of the national expenditure on health. The second will be on 
two health promotion (HP) activities: immunization and HIV/AIDS. But first I outline 
the main strategies laid out in the current health framework of the National Health 
Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP) regarding NGOs participation in HP.  
 
As a broad health care development programme, the NHSSP lays especial emphasis 
on health prevention and education in a number of components. One is the control and 
prevention of major environmental health related communicable diseases. This 
component has six objectives: (1) water and sanitation; (2) developing links between 
water and sanitation sectors; (3) improving control of food administration; (4) 
strengthening interventions in pollution; (5) strengthen vector-borne disease control; 
and (6) promotion of teaching on basic health intervention to enhance personal 
hygiene in schools (ROK, 1999b: 28-32). In these objectives, NGOs are regarded as 
key stakeholders responsible in the activity of implementing and expanding domestic 
water supply and sanitation programme in the first objective area. They also share 
responsibility with the MOH for health promotion efforts in communities geared 
towards increasing pit latrines in rural areas. In the second objective, encouraging the 
involvement of NGOs and the private sector in the provision of water and sanitation is 
an activity by itself. This is supposed to be done by the MOH, local authorities and 
the Ministry of Water Resources. Another activity pertaining to objective five is to 
encourage the participation of NGOs and other stakeholders in the sustainability of 
Bamako Initiative (BI) centres, as measured by the number of stakeholders involved.  
 
There are two strategic objectives in health education. One is to “increase public 
knowledge and understanding on mode of spread and preventive measures of all 
diseases up to the community level” (ibid. 35). The aim is to produce and disseminate 
health education material through mass media and targeted groups with one output 
being the establishment of a health education system with broad participation by 
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community based organizations that would see the creation of health promotion 
centres at district or divisional levels. The second objective of health education is to 
“enhance the capacity of the division of health education to coordinate planning and 
implementation of health communication” in the country (ibid. 37). This objective 
largely deals with the establishment of a networking dynamic with NGOs and the 
private sector, training health promotion personnel and research. Altogether, 12 
activities are to be undertaken. Most of this work falls under the responsibility of 
Division of Health Education (DHE). DHE works through personnel at the MOH, 
provincial level and district levels. Although the strategic plan is in its fifth year, only 
a few HP centres or collaborative dynamics may have been established as 
acknowledged by the head of the DHE (research interviews). However, as every 
district has a Public Health Care Committee, preventive and primary health care is 
generally expected to be more coordinated.  
 
To put some perspective into health promotion work by health NGOs, some key 
indicators of the size of the sector can be analysed. According to the country’s first 
National Health Accounts (1994), preventive/promotive health services constituted 
only 4% of the overall health expenditure (ROK, 1999c: 14). The distribution of these 
funds by provider institution is depicted in table 15. Of the total Ksh477 million spent 
by NGOs towards health, Ksh348 million (US$4,671,830) or 72% went towards 
promotive/preventive health. Clearly, NGOs provided a sizeable (30.4%) share of 
health promotion financing that rivals MOH’s 38.5%. But it should be remembered 
that Ksh476 million or 99.8% of the NGO expenditures was donor financing and the 
rest from government (ibid. 12).  
 
Table 15. Promotive/Preventive Health Financing by Sector (1994) (Millions Ksh.) 
 
 Total % 
MOH 441 38.5 
Other Ministries 84 7.3 
Local Government 101 8.8 
Out-of-pocket 172 15 
NGOs 348 30.4 
Total 1,146 100 
 
Source: ROK (1999c: 14) 
 217
A second indicatory measure is the participation of NGOs in certain 
preventive/promotive health services. A notable component where NGOs have a 
strong role is in immunization of children under one year old. Although the 
government takes the lead under the Kenya Expanded Programme on Immunization 
(KEPI) at the MOH, health NGOs play a significant complementary role. As was 
noted in table 11, the KCS health system immunized 447,976 children in 2001. With 
559,952 immunizations in 1999 KCS alone accounted for about 50% of all 
immunizations in the country (ROK, 2001e: 35, 67). Immunization coverage in Kenya 
has generally decreased in the 1990s from 76.7% in 1992 to 65.4% in 1998 (ibid. 36). 
The rate of immunizations serves as a good indicator of the strength of the health 
NGO system in securing a healthy future for the population. Looking at another 
measure of NGO participation, we refer to table 1 and figure 1 in chapter 1 above. 
The sub-sector water supply, sanitation and waste management as a public 
(environmental) health issue is a health promotion activity. This sub-sector accounts 
for 6% of the NGOs activities fields. In the official classification, the water sub-sector 
has a larger participation at 8%. While the data presented above does show that health 
NGOs are important actors in health promotion, the most visible activity area is in the 
HIV/AIDS sub-sector. Because of the availability of comprehensive data, the results 
are presented in greater detail as a separate sub-chapter below.  
  
3.1. The Role of NGOs in HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care  
 
HIV/AIDS has brought tremendous transformations in the health service system in 
Kenya as in many other sub-Saharan African countries. Whereas in 1992 hospital 
beds occupied by AIDS patients equalled 15%, in 2000 it had risen to 51% (Office of 
the President, 2000b: 7). It could be argued that the epidemic has somewhat 
superimposed another health system onto the previously existing one. This could be 
seen in the new organizational structures, health facilities and financing specifically 
dealing with the disease. According to the latest surveillance data, the national 
prevalence rate averages at 13.5% with wide variations across provinces (see table 3 
of Part III Section II). With an estimated population of over 2 million infections, 
HIV/AIDS is the greatest challenge to the country’s socio-economic and life security 
(ibid. 2). Long before Kenya’s President declared HIV/AIDS a national disaster on 
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November 25 1999, NGOs were already undertaking a leading role in HIV/AIDS 
education, sensitization and policy advocacy work (research interviews).  
 
In this sub-sector I discuss the first two components while policy advocacy work is 
discussed in the next chapter. I use national data on financing HIV/AIDS work. 
According to data presented in figure 1 above, there are nearly 400 NGOs working on 
HIV/AIDS. The largest and main HIV/AIDS NGO is the multi-agency Kenya AIDS 
NGO Consortium (KANCO). The NGO was formed in 1990 by an informal network 
of six major local and international NGOs – FPAK, KCS, CHAK, African Medical 
Research Foundation (AMREF), the Norwegian Church Aid and Action-Aid. The 
Consortium formally set up a secretariat in 1994 with about 100 member 
organizations. The most pressing need at that time was information, and working with 
government in coordinating HIV/AIDS activities. Hence a resource centre was 
established and a policy process, discussed in the next chapter, commenced. Today, 
the Consortium has about 750 members from all sectors of society including NGOs, 
CBOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs), learning institutions, for-profit sector and 
various government ministries and departments. Any organization can join upon 
payment of an annual subscription fee of Ksh1,000. KANCO’s main functions today 
are information production and dissemination and capacity building the actors.5  
 
Table 16. Estimated Expenditures and Priority Areas in the Implementation of 
KNASP (Millions Ksh.) 
 
Priority Area  Amount 
Prevention and Advocacy  
- Promotion of behaviour change  5,388 
     - Prevention of blood-borne infection  1,310 
     - Treatment and control of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) 597 
     - Prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) 866 
Treatment and support of continuum of care of the infected and 
affected persons  2,791 
Mitigation of the social economic impact 785 
Monitoring, evaluation and research  411 
Management and Co-ordination  1,911 
Total  14,059 
  
 Source: Office of the President (2000a: 49).  
 
                                                 
5 Source: KANCO brochure and research interviews (May 2003). 
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With the declaration of AIDS as a national disaster, the government drew the Kenya 
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan (KNASP) 2000-2005 and set up by a Presidential 
Order (1999), the National AIDS Control Council (NACC) under the Office of the 
President in 2000. Earlier in 1997, the Parliament had approved the policy framework, 
Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1997 on AIDS in Kenya. The KNASP detailed five priority 
areas and a total of Ksh14,059 million (US$188,762,000) was budgeted and targeted 
to each area as detailed in table 16 above. According to the table, ‘prevention and 
advocacy’ sub-fields take the largest share (Ksh8,161 million or 58% of total) relative 
to the other areas. US$50 million, was sourced from the World Bank; the other crucial 
donor is UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Most of the first 
two years (2000-2002) of the strategic plan went to putting up the national structure 
depicted in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: A Simple Institutional Structure of the National HIV/AIDS 
Administration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National AIDS Control Council (NACC) (May, 2003).  
 
According to the structure, the NACC is the overall national body working through 
three pillars: the public, civil society and an administrative structure of coordinating 
actors. The public pillar comprises all government ministries each of which is 
required to establish an AIDS Control Unit (ACU). Private for-profit organizations 
(FPOs) have been categorized as part of the civil society for expediency purposes. 
However, in order to receive funding, they are encouraged to establish CBO-type 
associations with the Home Affairs Ministry. There are three levels of coordinators: 
the Provincial AIDS Control Committee (PACC), District AIDS Control Committee 
National AIDS Control Council (NACC) 
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(DACC), and the Constituency Control Committee (CACC). The NACC structures do 
not implement projects but carry out proposal reviews, project monitoring and 
evaluation and are responsible for coordinating all HIV/AIDS activities in their area 
of operation.  
 
Each of these sectors is receiving a share of the World Bank funding of US$50 
million managed by NACC. According to the implementation arrangement, 19%, 
60% and 21% of this fund will go to the public sector, the civil society and the NACC 
structures (coordinators), respectively. Disbursements commenced in June 2002 and 
should end in December 31st 2004 as per the strategic plan. As noted, most of the 
funds are given to civil society organizations (CSOs), and in particular the NGOs, 
CBOs and FBOs. Rigorous criteria have been developed for obtaining the funds. To 
start with, all recipient CSOs must be formally registered and have a domicile of 
operation. Applicants should submit proposals, at any time of the year, to any of the 
NACC structures depending on two conditions (research interviews): the amount of 
funds applied, and the determined geographical area(s) of operation. If the project is 
at the CACC level, the maximum an organization can apply for is Ksh400,000 
(US$5,376), Ksh1.2 million (US$16,129) at the DACC level and 2 million 
(US$26,880) at PACC level, meaning the project covers more than one district. 
Projects seeking more than Ksh2 million must be national, covering more than one 
province and are therefore approved by NACC. If a project is seeking more than Ksh8 
million, it has to be approved by World Bank headquarters. These criteria also 
determine where the CSOs ought to submit their applications. A summary of the 
programme progress in terms of project funding is shown in table 17.  
 
As the table indicates, district-level interventions receive most of the funds followed 
by those at the provincial level. Constituency level projects fall in third place although 
they constitute the largest share of the overall number of projects funded. The number 
of projects does not reflect the number of organizations as some have more than one 
project. Although the data did not distinguish between the sub-provider sectors, i.e., 
whether NGO, CBO or FBO, it could be assumed that CBOs are the majority 
providers given the larger of CACC-level projects; operations at DACC and PACC 
levels are most likely carried out by NGOs or FBOs. A deeper examination of Central 
province data confirms this to be true. Out of the over 100 CSOs funded, only 22 were 
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NGOs two of which had constituency level projects (research interviews). According 
to national distribution per province, Nairobi – with a prevalence rate of 16%, second 
highest – has the largest share of both approved and disbursed funds at 28.8% and 
26.8%, respectively. Nyanza – with the highest prevalence rate of 22% – follows it 
with 14.9% and 14.9%, respectively. 
 
Table 17. Summary Analysis of Total Funds Approved and Disbursed, and Funded 
Projects in the CSO Sector Since Programme Inception as at 30th April 2003 (Ksh.) 
 
 Approved 
% Of 
Total Disbursed 
% Of 
Total 
No. Of Funded 
Projects 
% Of 
Total 
CACC 155,127,085 21.6 102,297,871 25.4 459 52.5 
DACC 297,227,551 41.4 163,477,412 40.4 285 32.5 
PACC 212,508,050 29.6 102,505,134 25.3 123 14 
NACC 52,926,800 7.4 36,130,300 8.9 9 1 
Total 717,789,486 100 404,410,716 100 876 100 
 
Source: NACC (2003).  
 
On the same measures, Central – third highest prevalence rate of 13% – comes in 
fourth place with 7.5% and seventh place with 6.9%, respectively. Eastern province 
with a similar prevalence rate as Nairobi stands at third place in both measures with 
9.1% and 9.5%, respectively. On the other hand, Nyanza has the most number of 
funded projects (185 or 21.1%), out of which 148 are at the CACC level, followed by 
Nairobi with 148 (16.9%) of which 97 are at the provincial level. The funds are 
released in quarterly instalments based on proper reporting and accounting because 
some of the organizations (CBOs) are small and have not previously administered 
such huge amounts of budgets. The projects are very diverse and include advocacy 
and awareness campaigns, home-based care, peer education, behaviour change 
communication, prevention, orphan care, and food and nutrition provision. In fact, 
projects are varied depending mainly on target group and geographic area and are not 
necessarily restricted to health promotion because AIDS is a multi-sectoral issue 
(research interviews). 
 
In addition to the World Bank funding, all the major sectors have other resources 
directed towards HIV/AIDS activities as a study conducted by NACC in 2002 
revealed. The six organizational actors covered would, by the Strategic Plan period 
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end, have injected over Ksh54 million (US$725,806) in expenditures. Table 18 
summarizes this analysis. Nearly half (49.5%) of the total funds come from the public 
sector while NGOs contribute 15.9%. 
 
Table 18. Summary of Expenditures by Provider Organization During the 
Programme Period (2000/2001-2004/2005 Financial Years) (Ksh.)* 
 
Organisation Type 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 All Yrs. 
Development Partners 1,366,938 2,263,158 3,160,262 4,777,713 4,011,983 15,580,054
Private Sector 187,790 213,924 307,085 267,341 226,341 1,202,481
Public Sector 4,352,764 5,295,954 5,616,710 5,871,395 6,031,339 27,168,162
NGOs 1,527,079 898,293 1,902,799 2,102,445 2,276,456 8,707,072
CBOs 232,096 318,407 664,285 512,486 309,845 2,037,119
FBOs 13,253 20,793 50,496 58,141 30,897 173,579 
Total  7,679,919 9,010,529 11,701,637 13,589,521 12,886,860 54,868,467
 
Source: NACC (2003). 
Notes: *Data for the financial year 2000/01 and 2001/02 are actual 
expenditures.  
 
The source of these funds or number of NGOs was not established. While these are 
the most comprehensive data available, on-going developments significantly changes 
the picture. For example, in 2002 the Catholic Church, categorized here as an FBO, 
began a Ksh320 million (US$4,301,000) HIV/AIDS control programme for PMTCT 
providing Nevirapine in all its hospitals (Mwaniki, 2002b). The NACC study data is 
comprehensive and shows the expenditures of each of the organizational actors for the 
five priority and sub-priority areas. Table 19 summarizes this result on NGOs for the 
five-year Plan period. It is clear again that prevention and advocacy activities take a 
large share (Ksh3,158,706 (US$42,410) or 40%) of the total funds available to the 
sector especially in the latter years.  
 
To a large extent, interventions in the promotion of behaviour change are carried out 
through education and counselling provided mostly at the voluntary counselling and 
testing centres (VCTCs). VCT services are administered by the National AIDS and 
STDs Control Programme (NASCOP) established in 1994 under the MOH. The VCT 
services began in 2000 and as at May 2003 there were 140 VCTCs around the country 
(research interviews). It is planned that by the end of the programme there should be 
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five VCTCs in each of the current 71 districts – making a total of 355 (Family Health 
International (FHI), 2003: 1). These centres are operated by a variety of agencies 
including donors, the government, NGOs, Churches and CBOs. Although it was not 
possible to get the actual data, it was acknowledged that the majority of these centres 
are operated by NGOs and donors (research interviews). In addition, NGOs and CBOs 
offer most of the counselling and home-based care services (Office of the President, 
2000a: 32).   
 
Table 19. NGOs Priority Expenditure Areas During the Programme Period 
(2000/2001-2004/2005 Financial Years) (Ksh.) 
 
NGOs Priority Areas 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 Total 
Behaviour change 227,456 412,314 520,731 600,828 592,204 2,353,533
Blood safety 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Treatment and control STIs  8,413 24,640 49,280 24,640 0 106,973
PMTC 0 26,400 280,280 337,920 413,600 1,058,200
Treatment/care affected and infected 147,568 112,819 390,137 389,794 402,510 1,442,828
Mitigation of socio-economic impact  
(includes income-generating activities) 112,103 38,773 329,305 451,986 590,146 1,522,312
Research, monitoring and evaluation 1,989 21,120 108,786 140,466 163,786 436,146
Policy development and management 1,029,550 262,227 224,281 156,811 114,211 1,787,080
Total  1,527,079898,2931,902,7992,102,445 2,276,456 8,707,072
 
Source: NACC (2003). 
Notes: * Data for the financial year 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 are actual 
expenditures. 
 
Some of the major supporters of the VCTC system apart from NASCOP are the 
international NGO, FHI (supporting over 50 of them) (ibid.), and USAID (over 40 
supported). PMTCT services have come later than VCT, prompted by increased 
infections and vulnerability among young women (ROK, 1997: 2). These primarily 
provide prevention education, VCT and drug therapy for pregnant mothers and their 
babies. They are also run by a variety of operators. The umbrella NGO KANCO 
supports 10 PMTCT centres operating in already existing hospitals run by 
government and mission/NGOs. As well as providing and developing guidelines for 
these services, NASCOP issues free testing kits and other technical support to all 
providers; all VCT counsellors must acquire certification from NASCOP in a three-
week training programme (research interviews). On-going efforts in the development 
of the VCT and PMTCT services are to integrate them into the existing health care 
 224
system such as hospitals and primary health care outlets although there are many 
stand-alone VCTCs. The VCTs are rapidly expanding the overall health care system.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4. NGOS PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH POLICY MAKING 
 
The Kenya government used the term “NGO” for the first time in its 1989-1993 
(Sixth) National Development Plan whose theme was “Participation for Progress”. 
Consequently, the government started to recognize NGOs as partners in development. 
Since then the participation of NGOs in health policy-making has increased 
throughout the 1990s. This has generally reflected developments in the political 
economy and the expansion of the NGO sector. As discussed in chapter 1 above, the 
developments emanate partly from international pressures bearing on political 
governance as well as changes in the social and economic spheres. These have led to 
increased democratisation and civil society participation in national development and 
planning. Kenya’s overall development policy framework is contained in three key 
documents: (1) the 1999 long-term National Poverty Eradication Plan 1999-2015; (2) 
the 2002 medium-term National Development Plan 2002-2008; and (3) the 2000 
short-term interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2000-2003. NGOs have 
to different extents participated in the design of each of these policy documents and 
are partners in their implementation.  
 
Of these policy designs, the PRSP has brought an unprecedented high level of 
participation. In fact, civil society participation has been the central element in the 
World Bank sponsored country policy responses to combating poverty. Over 300 
CSO stakeholders, including 20 NGOs, took part in the preparation of the PRSP (see 
Wamai, 2002a). As a comprehensive cross-sectoral poverty eradication and 
development policy program, the PRSP health component, which aims at radically 
shifting resources from curative to rural preventive/promotive primary health care, 
was linked to the Kenya Health Policy Framework (KHPF) and the NHSSP (ROK, 
2001a: 18-19). With the PRSP, the role of NGOs entered mainstream discourses on 
social policy formulation. Government officials admit that the role of NGOs in 
combating disease is indispensable in light of current economic constraints (research 
interviews). NGOs and experts also believe that affecting long lasting change in the 
society requires policy advocacy and participation in decision-making (ibid). With 
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regard to current developments in health, the 1994 KHPF with a life to year 2010 and 
the 1997 Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1997 on AIDS in Kenya are the most notable policy 
frameworks. In line with these and other health sector developments and reforms in 
the 1990s, the participation of NGOs in the policy formulation processes and in health 
management is evident in several institutional dynamics. These will be discussed 
while referring to the health developments outlined in table 8 of chapter 3 Part III 
Section II.  
 
The earliest institutional, and legal, mechanism that opened the door for NGO 
participation in the 1990s was the District Health Management Board (DHMB). 
DHMBs were established through Legal Notice 162 of the Public Health Act in 1992. 
The legislation stipulated that they should have a broad-based membership including 
NGO and community representatives. Each DHMB has between seven and nine 
members of whom two are from NGOs active in the area. With 71 districts in the 
country, each with a DHMB, NGOs have 142 representatives in the district health 
care system. Members are however appointed by the health Minister for a period of 
three years with possible reappointment. Within the Boards are three committees each 
for dealing with finance and general purposes, quality of curative services, and public 
health care services (Section 7). The roles of the DHMBs articulated in the legislation 
are spelled out more generally in the draft Guidelines as follows (ROK, 2002f):   
 
1. Representing community interests in the health planning process; 
2. Reviewing, approving and forwarding Facility Improvement Funds (FIF) 
Authority to Incur Expenditures (AIE) requests to the health Minister; 
3. Working with all the health management teams (HMTs) at the district and 
health centre level to coordinate and monitor implementation of the public and 
NGO/private health programmes; 
4. Identifying, and seeking solutions to, implementation problems;  
5. Advocating costs sharing and promotive health education in the public; and  
6. Making policy recommendations on health matters to the health Minister 
through the provincial health officer (PMO).  
 
The DHMBs have long been operational and are the most crucial agencies in health 
management at the district level. Although they are subject to national health policies, 
their role in user-fees pricing policy and other health management and development 
issues at the district level makes them central elements in the health system 
organization (Oyaya and Rifkin, 2003). Again, in line with the decentralization 
reforms they are supposed to set priority areas in health care, develop District Health 
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Plans (DHPs) and “implement district specific health sector reforms” (MOH, 2002: 
2). One of the recent developments in participatory health planning and operation is 
the formation of the District Health Stakeholder Forum (DHSF). The DHSF is an 
institutional dynamic bringing together on a quarterly basis all health actors in the 
district to discuss any issue of concern pertaining to health in the area. Establishment 
of the DHSFs is being undertaken under the decentralization work plan, implemented 
in the proposed phased manner (see table 1 Part V Section II). A robust attendance 
and participation by NGO health providers in one DHSF in Nyeri district was 
indicatory of the popularity of the forums. The DHMBs and HMTs showed openness 
and eagerness to pursuing recommendations and suggestions for interventions 
(research interviews). In the following sub-chapters I present in detail the 
participation of health NGOs in the KHPF/NHSSP and KNASP.  
 
4.1. Participation of NGOs in the Kenya Health Policy Framework (KHPF) 
 
At the national level, the participation of NGOs in the current health reforms and 
management under the KHPF can be discerned from an array of policy processes and 
institutional dynamics. To begin with, we note the efforts to reform the main 
institutional body – the Central Board of Health (CBH) – established in 1921 under 
the Public Health Act (Section 3/1) Cap 242 in order to accommodate a broader 
representation of actors to reflect the current situation in health care. According to the 
new proposals, the legislation should be reviewed to expand CBH membership to 
include representatives of government, NGOs, donors and health insurance funds as 
well as professional organizations; the changes are proposed in the KHPF 
Implementation and Action Plans (IAPs) (ROK, 1996: 83-84) and the NHSSP (ROK, 
1999b: 15). As per the original legislation, CBH comprised eight members. However, 
the IAPs suggested a CBH Steering Committee membership of nine and articulated 
the need for NGO representation. On the other hand, the NHSSP revised the 
membership upwards to 10 but nevertheless failed to detail composition unlike the 
IAPs. All CBH members are to be appointed by the health Minister. In sum, although 
not much information was obtained on the present status of the CBH, it could be 
deduced that NGOs are desirable and likely members of the flagship body given the 
favourable view of the KHPF and NHSSP.  
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The Central Board of Health is touted as the apex organ for steering6 the reforms and 
has three main functions: (1) to advise the health Minister and local authorities on 
public health issues; (2) to promote health research; and (3) to collect views from 
stakeholders on health care delivery matters and give appropriate advise (ibid. 15). 
The NHSSP was made possible following the establishment of the Health Sector 
Reform Secretariat (HSRS, also HEROS) in 1997, another reform institution proposed 
in the KHPF and defined further in the IAPs, and the MRC. HSRS functions as a 
professional and technical organ of the revived CBH responsible for executing the 
(NHSSP) reforms. As a medium-term plan for the operationalization of the KHPF, the 
NHSSP is the key document defining the reforms processes up to 2004. As was 
pointed out in chapter 4 of Part III Section II, the NHSSP was developed through a 
consultative process involving all stakeholders engaged in health care delivery to 
replace the non-consultative IAPs.  
 
To operationalize the intentions of the government to “engage dialogue with 
NGO/private health providers for them to take up more discretionary health package 
(mainly curative)” (ibid. 63), the new organization of the MOH facilitated the creation 
of a Donor and NGO Coordination Division (DNCD) in 1997. The DNCD will 
operate under the HSRS within the Department of Policy Planning and Development. 
Its main role is to foster linkages between MOH and the NGO/private sector. As 
specified in a working document procured from an official of the Division, its roles, 
responsibilities and functions are numerous and include to:  
 
 Establish a N-GOK health care service providers planning and coordinating 
function at MOH; 
 Create structures for developing sound working relationships with N-GOK 
health services providers; 
 Review existing laws and regulations governing the activities of N-GOK 
providers and recommend appropriate amendments in line with the present 
day context of operations of the N-GOK providers;  
 Carry out research and publish, foster dialogue with the MOH and facilitate 
MOH’s formulation of appropriate policies and guidelines in its relations with 
N-GOK providers; 
 Establish and maintain a database for N-GOK providers in the country and 
develop appropriate categorization criteria for developing a management 
                                                 
6 While the CBH is a steering organ within MOH, the Ministerial Reform Committee (MRC) performs 
the overseer function across ministries.   
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information system (MSI) that would facilitate coordination of their work with 
the MOH’s reform agenda; 
 Facilitate the increase in scope and quality of curative and preventive health 
care by N-GOK providers; 
 Promote the maintenance and improvement of health care standards of N-
GOK providers in accordance with the law; 
 Support organizational capacity building of N-GOK providers for financial 
self-sustainability; 
 Stimulate formation of sectoral networks with appropriate links to professional 
associations with codes of conduct and self-regulatory and monitoring systems 
for the members; 
 Facilitate the formation of N-GOK coordination committees at the district 
level with participation from the DHMBs and HMTs and seek stronger 
participation of N-GOK providers in the DHMBs; and  
 Develop a strategy for providing needed support to N-GOK providers for 
effective health care delivery.     
 
The organizational structure of the DNCD comprises of a Technical Working Group 
(TWG). The TWG is the central steering organ of the DNCD and has two key 
functions: (1) to guide the implementation and actualisation of the functions and 
responsibilities of the DNCD and the recommendations of the HSRS and MRC on the 
roles of N-GOK providers in health service provision and development; and (2) to 
guide and advice on the establishment of the DNCD and its working committees. To 
clarify its membership constitution and operations, it was suggested that the MOH 
issue a legal notice in the Kenya Gazzette. Members of the TWG would be appointed 
by the health Minister through the Permanent Secretary for a period of three years and 
their names published in the Gazzette. Although this has however not yet been 
forthcoming, a working TWG is in existence. It is composed of 10 representatives 
from large national NGOs such as KCS, CHAK and AMREF, and some government 
departments such as the National Council of Population and Development (NCPD) in 
the Ministry of Planning and National Development and NACC. The formation of the 
current TWG and its operations are facilitated by the HSRS, hence there is close 
liaison between the two. However, take-off has been slow and little has been achieved 
to date (see Part V on Kenya).  
 
In addition to these institutional dynamics, participation of NGOs in the broader 
health reforms and development processes has been significant. The NHSSP stands as 
a major example in which they are involved in the health policy making. Again, 
through participation in the HSRS, they have contributed to the development of the 
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new organizational structure of the decentralized MOH, which seeks to incorporate 
them as part of the national health care system (see Part V Section II). The 
restructured MOH has now only six departments out of 36 divisions (ibid. 13-14). 
One of these is the Department of Standards and Regulatory Services (DSRS). 
Established in January 2001, the DSRS has a working group composed of 23 
members from various government, and para-governmental organizations such the 
Nursing Council of Kenya (NCK), the MPDB, and NGOs (including CHAK and the 
National Council of NGOs). The Group meets quarterly to discuss proposals, reviews 
of policy documents and bills (research interviews).  
 
Another key area of participation is in the envisioned future of the National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF). The reform of the NHIF follows the government’s intention 
to develop an alternative health care financing system to replace cost sharing and set 
up a universal scheme covering all Kenyans. If this will be realized as anticipated in 
2004, it would become the next major development in the country’s health care since 
the introduction of cost sharing in 1989. NGOs were represented in the Ministerial 
Task Force (MTF) that has been responsible for steering this process. To close with 
some examples, both KCS and CHAK are represented in HSRS meetings and the 
TWG. In addition, CHAK has a representative in the MTF and in eight other policy-
making bodies at the MOH. These are: the NHIF board; Inter-agency Coordinating 
Committee (ICC); Decentralized HIV/AIDS Reproductive Health Project (DARE); 
Integrated Rural Health Committee (DISC); Reproductive Health Advisory Board; 
Joint Inter-agency Coordinating Committee (Country Coordinating Mechanism for 
the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria); NCK; and the National 
Medical Research, Ethics and Traditional Medicine Committee (CHAK, 2001c: 5). 
CHAK publicly acknowledges that this representation provides the agency “with 
opportunity to participate and contribute to policy formulation” (ibid.).   
 
4.2. The NACC Structures – Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1997 on AIDS in Kenya 
 
The high level of efforts in pulling together all actors in the society has increased the 
participation of NGOs in combating HIV/AIDS from both the preventive and care 
interventions and the policy advocacy point of view. As the national response to the 
epidemic has already been discussed above, in this sub-chapter I will briefly examine 
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how NGOs have been embedded in the official organizational structure of NACC and 
their role in the design of the Sessional Paper and other policy documents. The 
HIV/AIDS framework set out in the Sessional Paper provides a vivid picture of the 
role of NGOs in health policy-making participation. Through this framework, NGOs 
have acquired a central role in the health system development in the HIV/AIDs era. 
Notably, the national AIDS policy came late in the decade. However, efforts by the 
government have existed since the mid 1980s. Furthermore, the government had 
already in the early 1990s recognized NGOs as part of the institutional framework in 
the implementation of national AIDS interventions (ROK, 1993: 272). With the 
Sessional Paper, their role became even more central.  
 
But, in fact, the policy framework detailed in the Sessional Paper was the result of 
consultative workshops and processes across the country whose driving force was the 
work of the consortium of HIV/AIDS NGOs already discussed above – KANCO.7 As 
pointed out earlier, KANCO’s main engagement in HIV/AIDS was information 
generation and dissemination and policy making. From the mid 1990s, the 
Consortium organized a series of regional policy meetings at the district and 
provincial levels to help actors and politicians identify critical issues in dealing with 
HIV/AIDS. This policy discussion process culminated into a national consensus 
forum in 1996. KANCO was given a mandate to write a policy paper by the 
government to contribute to the Sessional Paper. However, since the Paper did not 
contain any implementation strategies, the NGO began sensitising NGOs, private and 
religious organizations. It held two regional meetings to disseminate the Paper in 
1998 as well as a series of meetings with stakeholders. The NGO also started 
sensitising Member of Parliaments (MPs) in four provinces with the last drive in 1999 
in Central. Through this process, the NGO arrived at 14 resolution points and drew 
terms of references and guidelines for constituency AIDS committees. These 
documents were consequently placed into MPs’ pigeonholes to make sure they would 
take note of them in a well orchestrated process that led to the national AIDS 
conference attended by the Parliamentarians in Mombassa in November 1999. It was 
at the conference that the President declared AIDS a national disaster. The result of all 
                                                 
7 The following is based on research interviews at KANCO (2001 and 2003).  
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these processes was the development of the National AIDS Strategic Plan (KNASP) 
in 2000 and the consequent establishment of the NACC in the same year.  
 
Interestingly, NACC was established as a corporate body under the State Corporations 
Act through a Presidential Order in Legal Notice No. 170 of 1999 (ROK, 1999e). Its 
composition, governance and roles were further defined in the AIDS Sessional Paper. 
In accordance with the Notice, NACC has 23 members from diverse government 
ministries and departments, six representatives from NGOs, FBOs and the private 
sector. Furthermore, according to the policy document, every level of its lower 
structures – PACC, DACC and CACC – have two NGO representatives. Statistically, 
their representation is obviously large: 16, 142 and 420, respectively, given eight 
provinces, 71 districts and 210 constituencies. As can be expected, many of these 
positions are filled by only a few of the largest NGOs. The main roles, as stated in the 
KNASP, are to reduce prevalence by 20-30% by year 2005, provide care, strategic 
direction, and institutional coordination (Office of the President, 2000a: 49). The 
rationale for establishing NACC is the need to coordinate diverse players – 
government, NGOs, donors, CBOs and the private sector – in order to focus available 
resources in the areas of most need and avoid duplication (ibid. 48). Crucially, the 
NACC sets out to mainstream the Strategic Plan and direct all HIV/AIDS activities 
towards its achievement. In doing so, the agency is expected to build partnerships 
with NGOs and consult them actively in policy development (ibid. 50). Admittedly, 
the extent to which this is done in practice is a subject for further investigations.  
 
IV-PART: SUMMARY CONCLUSION  
 
This Part has presented the broad findings of the main elements of the study in the 
two countries, namely, the NGO health system organization and development with 
regard to 3Ps: services provision, health promotion and participation in policy-
making. It has also partially addressed questions three and four. Presentation and 
discussion has followed a similar pattern to elicit as much systematic empirical detail 
as possible and sufficient within the space to show the extent of the NGO health 
system. Evidently, the system is large in both countries while varying in many ways. 
Firstly, the NGO system organization, development and functioning, just as the public 
sector system, is influenced by the countries’ historical, cultural political and socio-
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economic contexts as well as by international processes. Secondly, although there is 
obvious need for improvement, the overall legal, regulatory and funding environment 
of their operations while varying in both countries is favourable to varying degrees. 
Thirdly, as shown, in both countries, NGOs have a provider role in health care. This is 
not to say however that all NGOs have or aim to play such a role (e.g., Nylund, 2000). 
In fact there are many kinds of NGOs in the field. As was pointed out in Part II 
chapter 3, NGOs play varying roles encompassing services provision, vanguarding 
state welfare programmes, advocacy, and value guarding by participating and 
volunteering in the civil society (Kramer, 1981: 236). Furthermore, the roles can be 
intertwined. For example, although health promotion can be regarded as a service as 
well, its educative components are the central features to the activity in this area. 
Health promotion involves efforts and campaigns through citizen participation in 
neighbourhoods, communities, schools, and so on. And while many NGOs operating 
hospitals and health service systems follow a market/entrepreneurial approach and 
involve citizens and communities in their health promotion programmes, the larger 
sub-sector working in health promotion activities has expansive network organization; 
a good example being Folkhälsan in Finland.  
 
More specific results show that NGOs are more widely predominant, visible and 
acknowledged in the health promotion area than in services provision in Finland. In 
Kenya on the other hand, the services provision structure is more visible and therefore 
predominant although their organization in the HIV/AIDS area makes the health 
promotion aspects of the spectrum more clearly visible and measurable as well. 
Fourthly, findings also show that participation of NGOs in health policy has become a 
central and broadly accepted feature of recent policy-making processes in both 
countries so much so that the rhetoric is being normalized into law in some cases. 
While the process of inclusion represents a change towards participatory health 
policy-making across the countries, an investigation into its impact with regard to, 
e.g., effects on NGOs and the visibility of their inputs in the end-policy outcome, can 
present a clearer picture of the influences of the political economy and culture of the 
different countries. Although this will remain a topic for further research, in the next 
Part I will expand the analysis of the system organization and development to show 
the extent of its collaborative interrelationships with the public sector system.  
 
PART V: GOVERNMENT-NGO  
 
COLLABORATIONS IN HEALTH CARE  
 
PROVISION, PROMOTION AND  
 
PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING IN  
 
FINLAND AND KENYA  
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SECTION I – FINLAND: CHAPTER 1. OVERALL CONTEXT OF 
COLLABORATION  
 
 
“Until the 1960s and 1970s, a division of labour prevailed where certain 
functions of public health care came within the domain of the state (via 
federations of municipalities) and certain functions were transferred to 
voluntary organizations operating with a mandate derived from the state” 
(Hélen and Jauho, 2002: 9).    
 
Voluntary organizations working in the health area in Finland have longstanding close 
relationships with the state. These are rooted in the late 19th Century as a state system 
was gradually emerging, and strengthened during the war and interwar years of the 
20th (ibid). In fact, as these authors note, for a long time “there was no clear-cut 
division between public and voluntary – or private – actors” (ibid. 4). An early 
example in this kind of working relationship is the formation of the Family Federation 
of Finland (FFF) (known as Väestöliitto in Finnish) in 1941. Although the 
organization was created by a group of 21 NGOs, two of its board members were 
from then Ministry of Social Affairs. One of its main objectives then as now is the 
integration of NGOs and government in population matters (research interviews). 
Other examples in the 1970s are the Finnish Centre for Health Promotion (FCHP), 
which worked from the office of the National Board of Health during 1975-1978, and 
the North Karelia Project (see later), which also started operations from the provincial 
state office in Eastern Province in 1972.  
 
The development of an expanded welfare state system after World War II readily 
incorporated much of the NGO operated hospital system as well as other activities in 
education and social welfare (Modeen, 1989: 12). For example, in the 1950s, the 
Finnish Cancer Society (FCS) operated seven cancer hospitals in Finland. At that time 
there were no state or other sector hospitals in this specialty area. However, during the 
1960s and 1970s all the hospitals were sold to the government, the last one in 1972 
(research interviews). Presently, the FCS operates four hospices established later. 
Today, the relationship between health NGOs and the state in Finland can principally 
be understood in the context of the changing welfare state system. As Marshall (1996: 
46) assert, “within the welfare state model the role of the voluntary sector is seen as 
dealing with what might be termed ‘statutory failure’”. This is however but just one 
plausible explanation for the role or rise of NGOs, as was discussed in Part II.  
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Part III and IV detailed the organization and extent of each of these two systems. It 
was demonstrated that both systems are large in the country in terms of coverage, 
expenditure and system operations (facilities and human resources) although that of 
NGOs is clearly and as expected much smaller. Each of the systems serves a common 
public as shown in figure 1 Part IV Section I although there are some specializations 
on the part of the NGO health system towards specific populations as shown by the 
cases. In addition to specialization and a common population, other factors affect the 
character of the relationships. These include: dependencies with regard to resources 
and needs; the institutional practice and expectations of the relations; the easiness or 
investment in time and energy in negotiating the relationships (Milner, 1980: 9); and 
the flexibility of the political and social space (Leat, Smolka and Unnell, 1981: 98). 
Notably, transformations in the welfare state and society are influencing these 
determinants of collaboration. As Kramer (1992: 50) put it, “the fate of the Third 
Sector will continue to be inextricably linked to the future of the welfare state”.  
 
With major health reforms in the 1990s, responsibility for health care financing has 
been shifting more and more towards individuals/citizens. Other socio-economic, 
demographic and political challenges in the welfare state future as discussed in Part 
III have also cast a shadow over the infallibility of a comprehensive and free and cost-
effective public health care system. Increased decentralization, state administrative 
reforms in the form of deregulation and state subsidy reforms in the 1990s were 
inevitable. At the same time, many municipalities and whole regions are facing 
declining populations and low work opportunities (e.g., MSAH, 2002a: 27); thus the 
tax base, which is the main source of financing services is under challenge. These 
pressures have provided the rationale for the development of present rhetoric and 
policy programmes on health – the Health 2015 and the National Project 2007 – in 
which increasing emphasis has been laid on NGOs and greater collaboration in the 
health care systems. As already pointed out in earlier discussions, trends towards 
increased collaboration in the systems have also been shaped by international health 
discourses, primarily the World Health Organization’s Health for All (HFA) by Year 
2000. And at the end of the Century in 1999 the social-democratic government fully 
brought NGOs on board in designing and implementing its social policy programme, 
the Target Action Plan for Social Welfare and Health Care 2000-2003 (TATO). 
Furthermore, at the same time a cross-government project on listening to citizens 
 235
(Kuule Kansalaista) accelerated the impetus for the development of strategies by all 
Ministries. As part of this work, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH) 
released its NGOs as Actors in Social Welfare and Health Policy: Strategy for NGOs 
Activities policy paper in 2003. These are the key developments that compound the 
overall context of government-NGOs collaborations in health care today in Finland. 
Partnership within this collaborative environment is an effort at wider social processes 
aimed at curbing growing exclusion and poverty in Finland as in other European 
Union (EU) countries (European Anti-Poverty Network, 1999; STKL, 2001; Atkinson 
et al, 2002).  
 
This section synthesizes the collaborative relationship between the public and NGO 
health systems with particular reference to the above two health development 
frameworks: the Health 2015 and the National Project to Secure the Future of Health 
Care (National Project 2007). Here the dynamics and interconnections are analysed 
in an expanded way using a schematic analysis of the inter-organizational linkages 
and the three dimensions of NGOs actions around which the study has been focused 
(provision, promotion and participation). Presently a brief outline of each programme 
regarding specific areas of NGO action is given. As discussed elsewhere in Parts III 
and IV on Finland, the Health 2015 differs from the National Project 2007 (NP) in 
that it focuses more on health promotion and prevention education while the latter 
focuses on services provision and the service system development. Both emphasize 
the need for collaboration with NGOs, and other societal actors, in their successful 
implementation. The Health 2015 reckons the need for involving civil society and 
NGOs (the Third Sector) in all aspects of the programme from planning to 
implementation and evaluation due to its manifest importance. Here, NGOs are seen 
as crucial contact infrastructural organizations with a reach at the grassroots. Hence, it 
uses a ‘bottom-up’ approach as the rationale for intensified involvement of NGOs and 
CSOs and takes as a line of action that:  
 
“In implementing this programme, evaluating its achievements and reshaping 
it in response to changing circumstances, care must be taken to involve and 
listen to individuals, NGOs and public health organisations both nationally, 
locally and in all administrative sectors involved in the programme. Central 
and local government also carries some responsibility for ensuring and 
furthering ways in which NGOs can exert influence and operate” (ibid. 30; 
emphasis added). 
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Key text in this policy statement has been highlighted to show the clarity and 
comprehensiveness with which the government has taken the involvement of NGOs 
in shaping future health of the population. The statement not only asserts their 
involvement in all the programme cycles and in the different administrative levels but 
also indicates where responsibility for realizing this lies: both the government and 
NGOs carry some responsibility for ensuring the synergies of collaboration. In its six 
targets, the programme characterizes this need for inter-organizational collaboration 
in most of the 36 action lines. With regard to the challenges individuals face at 
different stages in life, this need is greatly emphasized. The life-long focus on health 
articulated in the Health 2015 is heavily drawn from the integrated 2001 social policy 
framework, Strategies for Social Protection (SSP) 2010. The SSP expresses the spirit 
of the government’s collaborative framework by noting that:  
 
“NGOs in the social welfare and health care sector will play an important role 
both in terms of direct influence and in promoting cooperation” (MSAH, 
2001a: 18; emphasis added). 
 
And in reference to combating substance abuse, the Strategy determines that:   
 
“Cooperation between the public authorities and NGOs will be intensified and 
their expertise pooled in order to ensure handling of alcohol and drug abuse 
problems” (ibid. 17; emphasis added).  
 
On the other hand, looking at the National Project (NP) in some detail reveals 
processes that deeply embedde NGOs. The NP starts its recognition of NGOs by 
acknowledging that they “play an important role in promoting health and providing 
information on human welfare” (MSAH, 2002a: 16; emphasis added). However, as 
pointed above, the Project is primarily for services development. In this aspect, it 
acknowledges that:   
 
“The private sector, occupational health care and [NGOs] provide a great deal 
of health care service, particularly for the residents of [growing urban] centres 
and their environs” (ibid. 26; emphasis added).     
 
In discussing responsibility for the delivery of health care services, it further 
recognizes that “statutory access to services may also be arranged from other 
providers such as NGOs and the private sector” (ibid. 15). With this rationale, it 
recognizes the need for healthy competition between the provider systems as a way of 
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improving access to health services. It is with this intention that a working group for 
developing the division of labour and collaboration between the public and the 
NGO/private health care systems had been created. In particular, it is argued that:  
 
“Clarification of the division of duties will improve healthy competition 
between the public and private sectors” (ibid.).   
 
Overall, the National Project 2007 expert paper produced as a Memorandum made 18 
recommendations for its realization many of which mention the involvement of NGOs 
especially with regard to the planned structural reform of the service system, ensuring 
access to treatment and quality control, staff development and – due to the role of the 
Slot Machine Association (RAY) – health care financing, insurance and rehabilitation. 
In spite of the similarities in their emphasis on the importance of NGOs and the need 
for collaborating with them, the NP differs in both extent and mechanisms of NGO 
involvement. While the implementation of the Health 2015 is being overseen by a 
large core agency – the Advisory Board for Public Health (ABPH) – comprising three 
NGO representatives, the NP is overseen by a small Steering Group of ministerial and 
municipal sector representatives with a Monitoring Group and four working groups 
carrying out most of the policy and guidelines development work. However, both 
programmes are being implemented by a wide range of actors including government 
agencies, municipal authorities, hospitals, learning institutions, and NGOs. In spite of 
the detailed reference to NGOs and other stakeholders in these two programmes, the 
set indicatory outcomes to be achieved with regard to collaboration are not as clear as 
is in the case of Kenya (see Section II of this Part). The NP Project Plan published in 
September 2002 focuses on six key areas as follows:  
 
1. Health promotion and preventive health care 
2. Ensuring access to treatment  
3. Ensuring availability and expertise of health personnel  
4. Reform of functions and structures 
5. Health care practices development  
6. Health care financing augmentation  
 
Of these, three involve NGOs to a larger extent. The following table (1) summarizes 
some of the key aspects of these three project components. A brief description of each 
is given followed by a discussion of the progress made to date.    
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Table 1. Implementation of the (National Project 2007) Project Plan Components 
with Collaborative Responsibilities Involving NGOs  
 
 Responsibility Amount and Source of funds* 
Outcome and 
Time frame 
Health 
promotion/prevention 
NGOs, ABPH, Ministries, 
Provinces, SII, Municipalities 
AFLRA, RAY, Professionals, 
Inhabitants, Schools and 
students  
-  2007 
Guidelines and 
Criteria: HCs  Reform of functions 
and structures 
NGOs, STAKES, AFLRA, 
HCs, Hospitals, 
Municipalities, Provinces  
€8 million: 2003, 
€30 million 
annually: 2004-
2007; State  
May 31 2003: 
HDs submit Plan 
Health care practices 
development 
NGOs, HCs, HDs,  €1.4 million 
annually: 2003-
2007; State, RAY
 2007 
 
Source: NP Project Plan (MSAH, 2002d).  
Notes: *The funds shown are for the entire project component with the 
exception of Käypä Hoito sub-component under the third component in which 
the funding is specific. SII is the Social Insurance Institution; AFLRA stands 
for Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities; HCs are health 
centres and HDs stand for hospital districts. “-” Data not available: no funding 
was appropriated to health promotion/prevention activities although the 
integrated Health 2015 has budget for 2002 amounting to €135,000 and 
€270,000 in 2003. 
 
The health promotion/preventive component has two sub-fields on preventive health 
and substance abuse. Their implementation has been integrated with the Health 2015. 
As the table shows, this component has a broader collaborative frame than the other 
components, as would be naturally expected owing to the large role NGOs play in 
health promotion and as to the nature of the work. On the other hand, the reform of 
functions and structures is to be carried out at both the health centre and hospital 
levels. Hence, the component is divided into these two sub-fields with further 
subdivisions within each. Both levels include NGO-run health facilities. The 
collaborative dimensions in implementing the first sub-field are captured by 
recommendation 6 contained in the NP Memorandum as follows:  
 
“Mental health outpatient services, psychosocial services, services for 
intoxicant abusers and associated emergency services should be organized as a 
functional regional unit in association with the private and Third Sectors” 
(MSAH, 2002a: 29).     
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With regard to the implementation of the second sub-field in specialized care, the 
hospital districts are expected to “prepare a plan of cooperation and division of 
duties”, while taking into account services provided by the NGO/private sectors, to be 
given to the MSAH by 31st May 2003 (ibid. 30). This was expected to be a “mutually 
agreed operating strategy” (ibid. 29). The third project component has five sub-fields 
one of which is the development of National Evidence-Based Current Care Guidelines 
(Käypä Hoito in Finnish), which is under the overall responsibility of the Finnish 
Medical Society Duodecim, an NGO trade union of medical professionals founded in 
1881. As these projects are under implementation, planning, or have only been 
recently completed, the only available evaluation is the Seurantaryhmän Arvio: 
Kansallisen Terveyshankkeen Toiminnasta Vuonna 2002. The document reports the 
progress of the NP in its first implementation year while raising concerns on its 
working and makes recommendations for the current year and the future. In general, it 
notes the briskness with which the Project has started while emphasizing on 
cooperation within wider policy frameworks, in particular regard to the Health 2015 
(MSAH, 2003b: 14). Although the Review of National Finnish Health Promotion 
Policies of 1990s conducted by the WHO in 2001 was planned as one action line of 
the Health 2015, it primarily looks at the structures, resources and activities in health 
promotion that have been put into place in the 1990s rather than evaluates the 
program implementation. Both these evaluations emphasize the need for greater 
visibility of health promotion activities, funding, structures and collaboration across 
actors.  
 
In the reform of functions and structures health centre component sub-field, two 
national seminars were held during September-October to exchange ideas on moving 
forward. In addition, 18 regional coordinators were named whose role can be 
summarized as that of strengthening collaboration between health centres, district 
hospitals and the regional central hospitals. Furthermore, municipalities and joint 
municipal authorities had made 163 project-funding applications that were to be 
processed in February 2003. Work on collaboration between NGO/private and public 
systems in specialized care was on-going with municipalities and joint municipal 
authorities submitting 13 project applications for 2003 and one for 2004 to the 
MSAH. Eight of the 2003 applications were funded with a total of €2,661,959 in 
March 2003 (MSAH, 2003c). Broad collaborative partnerships and integration of 
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public health promotion activities have been taken as key criteria in awarding the 
funding. With regard to the formulation of national evidence-based guidelines for 
health care practices, 40 Käypä Hoito recommendations were ready, 24 were to be 
updated and 33 were under preparation. During 2003 focus is going towards their 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation.1          
 
 
CHAPTER 2. THE SCOPE OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
“Private and public sector services are neither coordinated with each other nor 
are they real competitors with each other” (Järvelin, 2002: 25).  
 
Although the public-NGO/private partnership institutional model under development 
in Kenya in health care has not been planned in Finland, there are numerous inter-
linkage mechanisms the two project/programmes discussed above are creating. On the 
other hand, Finnish health NGOs are well embedded in the state system in direct and 
mediating relationships in the sense explicated by Lune and Oberstein (2001: 18-20) 
(see Part II chapter 3 and chapter 3 below). Partnership models established through 
the creation of the institutional dynamics such as the DNCD and the DHSF in Kenya 
(see below) require legislative and policy changes in the highly structured and 
formalized health care system in Finland. In light of lack of national policy or 
legislation to the effect, inter-organizational relations between Finnish health NGOs 
and the public health system are loosely developed and thus faintly visible. As much 
of the decision for implementing health care actions occur at the municipal level, 
which are free from state interference, the partnerships that emerge depend on local 
and nationally uncoordinated decisions. This is regarded as one of the challenges 
facing the sector system development (Järvelin, op. cit.). And as we have seen in the 
discussion of the NP above, the clarification and coordination of the sector systems as 
one of the main goals is expected to improve competition. This could also remove 
duplication of services and thus wastage of resources while at the same time improve 
access through information sharing and client-service targeting. This chapter will give 
                                                 
1 These discussions are taken from the NP first progress report (MSAH, 2003b). In an update of past 
years development, Duodecim reports that 43 guidelines were actually already under use as of end 
2002. Among these are guidelines developed by the NGO Finnish Lung Health (FILHA) (Kaila and 
Nuutinen, 2003: 867, 869).   
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an interpretive analysis of the inter-linkages between the two systems using these two 
health development frameworks and the wider scene as captured through the research. 
 
2.1. The Institutional Framework in the Implementation of the Health 2015  
 
In achieving the programme goals, the Health 2015 identified several sectors, which 
include municipalities, businesses and industry, NGOs and civil society organizations 
(CSOs), research institutions, international actors and the central government. The 
interactive framework is reflected by figure 1 below in which each actor has specific 
roles and responsibility areas. In interpreting the figure, it should be noted that the 
sphere of civil society has been summarized to include diverse actors including 
individual citizens, households, schools and local communities. As a country at the 
forefront of health status among its population, Finland is active in promoting 
international health through collaboration with the WHO, the EU and the Nordic and 
neighbouring countries, depicted here as international agencies.  
 
Figure 1. Interactive Stakeholder Organizational Structure in the Health 2015 
System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MSAH (2001b: 27-33), developed by author.  
 
Using the theoretical framework developed by Evan (1976), and discussed in chapter 
2 Part II, in a broadened manner, we could see the Health 2015, as an organized 
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process, representing the input-organization set around which NGOs (as indeed the 
other actors) are the focal organization for action. In this sense, the policy framework, 
rather than an institution, operates as the core. Although figure 1 depicts the inter-
relationships between the diverse agencies in implementing the Health 2015, it could 
be suitably converted to represent the NP interactive structure. In this case however 
the actors become more institutionalised, meaning, for example, that the civil society 
will only be represented by the organized sphere outside the family. The business and 
industry sector also becomes more restricted to the health products for-profit hospital 
and medical systems. International agencies also would not be featured so that the 
docket is occupied by the public hospital and health centre system. The research 
institutions here mean more the health personnel-producing teaching institutions as 
well as health professionals. As pointed above, each sector plays a unique role 
towards achieving the Health 2015 targets. According to the programme document, 
“the role of [central] government is to provide the preconditions and to support local 
action” (MSAH, 2001b: 27). Most of the action will take place at the municipality and 
community levels. Highlighting the role of municipalities, the program emphasizes 
their influence due to the working relationships they forge with NGOs. On the other 
hand, the role of NGOs, individuals, households are emphasized thus:   
 
“Individuals, families, action groups and NGOs all have an important part to 
play in setting goals for health promotion, in making then concrete, in action 
towards them, in evaluation and in any necessary reorientation” (MSAH, 
2001b: 29; emphasis added).  
 
The programme further emphasizes that:  
 
“Many public health [NGOs] are opinion-formers, mediators of information, 
and service providers or developers. [As such] they have a key role in forming 
cooperation networks between public actors, researchers, the media, active 
citizens and service users” (ibid. 30). 
 
The identified roles played by NGOs can be summed up as follows:  
 
1. Setting and concretising goals  
2. Implementing actions   
3. Evaluating the programme  
4. Formulating and influencing opinion  
5. Mediating information  
6. Providing and developing services   
7. Forming and promoting networks with other diverse actors   
 243
The general recognition NGOs have received in the last decade and more so towards 
its end has fuelled these policy statements in a clear shift from the old statist social 
policy thinking. In the new thinking, NGOs are seen as purveyors of both influence 
and promoters of cooperation as well as key providers in special, niche markets and 
marginal areas of the social and health of the population (research interviews). To put 
perspective to the overall inter-organizational linkages between health NGOs and the 
public health system, the following picture emerges (figure 2). Both the Health 2015 
and the NP health care development programmes have been incorporated in arriving 
at this complex picture.          
 
Figure 2. Complex Organogram for the Inter-organizational Finnish Health Care 
System 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Järvelin (2002: 18).   
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The figure differs slightly from figure 1 presented in Part IV on Finland with 
particular regard to the reinstatement of the provincial administrations as in figure 1 
of Part III on Finland. This is due to two main reasons discussed in the next chapter. 
The location of the ABPH in the interactive system has also been shown to provide a 
clearer and comparative picture. Fundamentally, it also represents a more permanent 
than transitory organ as compared to working groups. Other Ministries and agencies 
though not shown here are discussed below. Hospitals and health centres are also 
more interactive in light of the NP. Before going to the descriptive details, I introduce 
a deeper analytical framework of the collaborations at the municipal level owing to 
the fact that responsibility for the delivery of health services in the public health 
system lies at this level (figure 3). The importance of this figure is in its helpfulness in 
seeing a clearer picture of a typical disaggregated municipal system.  
 
Figure 3. Typical Model of Organizational Relations at the Municipal Level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Field discussions (December, 2002).  
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NGOs. It should be pointed out here that though figure 3 is a real model of a 
municipal organization it may vary slightly among the numerous municipalities 
mainly with regard to the number of subdivisions across the different levels both 
vertically and horizontally than the examples shown. However, all municipal 
decisions regarding financing, delivery and development of services are made by the 
democratically elected political council representatives from whom NGOs and other 
implementing agencies seek financing. As with figure 2, this figure is discussed in 
chapter 3 below.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3. DIVERSE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT-NGO 
COLLABORATIONS IN HEALTH PROVISION, PROMOTION AND 
PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING 
 
“Not only are [NGOs] identifying themselves in national debates as permanent 
and indispensable part of the welfare scene … they are increasingly claiming 
the right to help determine the future of welfare provision by participating in 
its planning” (Leat, Smolka and Unnell, 1981: 1).  
 
The depth or scope of the collaborative relationships between the public and NGO 
health sector systems in the welfare state can be understood in light of the penetration 
and activities of NGOs as well as the pragmatism evident in the political sphere where 
decisions about delivery and development mechanisms are made. This is particularly 
the case in Finland where the system is decentralized to 448 municipalities, each with 
a structure as in figure 3, making politics such an inevitable reality. As Leat, Smolka 
and Unnell (op. cit.: 98) argue in their study of collaborations in the UK, it is about 
how much space the NGOs can curve out for themselves or/and how much the 
political system can allow them. But in the absence of policy guidelines or specific 
institutional mechanisms, the authors argue that the discerned relationship is that 
between the government as a sector and NGOs as individual agencies rather than as a 
sector. This itself is an explanation to the diversity and complexity of relationships as 
well as opinions from both sides. It is also fundamentally an indicator of much 
misapprehension and lack of documentation on the same. The complexity of how 
unsystematized interactions occur, despite the seeming embeddedness, was captured 
while discussing interorganizational relations theory as depicted by, e.g., Zeit (1975: 
40-46), Milner (op. cit.: 67-70) and Scott (1991: 173-4).  
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In this chapter, an attempt is made at illuminating complex interactions as captured in 
the research with the help of the foregoing discussions and figures 2 and 3 above. The 
figures represent an open ‘systems approach’ to health care organization and delivery 
in which the organizations “engage in various modes of exchange” (Evan, op. cit.: 
149) and have “non-local as well as local connections, vertical as well as horizontal 
ties, and cultural and political influences” Scott (op. cit.). The exchanges in the 
Finnish model are more embedded, as pointed above, and collaborative in the state-
dominate scenario (Karjalainen, 2000: 153). For ease of comprehension, I 
disaggregate the figures in a summary analysis represented by table 2. And as figure 2 
shows, the collaborations occur at national, regional and local levels. These inter-
linkages can further be identified along three major types: (1) human resources; (2) 
financial and other resources; and (3) policy-making. The analysis is organized along 
these major types for each of the levels. However, it is not always easy to identify 
clear boundaries between a national, provincial or municipal level activity especially 
if the activity depends on a given national policy. The basic idea here is to make a 
description on the basis that the activity is understood to occur at that level in 
organization. The national level encompasses Ministries (principally the MSAH) 
RAY, SII as well as other agencies such as STAKES and the National Public Health 
Institute while the municipal or local level encompasses municipalities, hospital 
districts, hospitals and health centres.  
 
Table 2. Matrix of the Levels and Types of Government-NGO Collaborations in 
Health Care  
 
 Human Resource 
Financial and Other 
Resources Policy-Making 
National 
  
- Training health personnel 
- Consultancy and expertise 
- Funding 
- Data and information 
- Standards and guidelines 
- MSAH  
 
Regional 
(Provincial)  
- Capacity building 
(working together)  
- Joint projects 
- Use of work space 
- Funding 
- Health NGOs 
licensing, 
governance 
Local  
(Municipality) 
- Internships 
- Capacity building 
(working together) 
- Consultation 
- Funding  
- Referrals 
- Joint activities  
- Information dissemination 
- NGOs 
governance 
 
Source: Developed by author based on the research.   
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3.1. Collaborations in Human Resource Development   
 
National Level 
 
Although most health personnel are educated and trained in the public schooling 
system, some of the NGOs are involved in various forms of human resource 
development as teaching and training health care organizations. The most vivid 
example in terms of specialized training is the Rheumatism Foundation Hospital 
(RFH) based in Heinola. As the flagship centre for rheumatology and rheumatoid 
orthopaedic training and research, RFH has trained most of the rheumatologists and 
rheumatoid orthopaedists specialists in the country. The hospital also has 
collaborative relations with various universities for doctoral training. In 1999, a 
change in the legislation made it possible for the state to compensate university-level 
medical training and research given outside the university hospitals. Such payments to 
RFH amounted to €336,000 in 2000. In addition to the primary role the hospital plays 
in rheumatology training, it also organises specialty care medical training 
programmes that complement or supplement other teaching offered in the university 
hospitals. The training programmes offered in the specialist fields thus makes the 
hospital a significant national collaborator in human resource development.  
 
In the field of medical genetics, the Family Federation of Finland (FFF) has been a 
leading provider of training since 1979. It pioneered the first national Department of 
Medical Genetics (DMG) in 1971, and also initiated the professorship of demography 
at the University of Helsinki in 1974. FFF’s DMG and Sexual Health Clinic offer 
courses for medical and other health care students in universities and other 
educational institutions. In addition, its Family Clinic offers a two-year course in 
family therapy for professionals in family matters. The Diaconia Polytechnic in 
Finland, formed by non-profit and Christian organizations and the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, is an “important and prominent educator of social and health care 
personnel” both for the public and private sectors (Niskanen and Seppo, 1999: 12). 
Comprising of nine training institutes, it was training about 2,000 students in these 
fields in 1996 (ibid. 13).      
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NGOs are also involved in other forms of human resource development at the national 
level. For example, the umbrella bodies (STKL, FCHP and YTY) are major players in 
channelling expertise from their special areas towards the state. These NGOs are 
experts in many fields such as mental health, health promotion, physical rehabilitation 
and substance abuse problems. They also represent a well-networked sector with 
grassroots presence all over the country and, as umbrella NGOs, their main activities 
constitute consulting and lobbying the public. Other nationally significant expert 
NGOs are: the FFF, which now provides the largest research and treatment services 
for infertility in the country distributed in four of the largest cities (Helsinki, Turku, 
Tampere and Oulu); the Finnish Cancer Society (FCS); the Finnish Federation for the 
Visually Impaired (FFVI); the Finnish Lung Health (FILHA), a WHO collaborating 
centre on tuberculosis prevention; and the Finnish Association for Mental Health 
(FAMH), which is the oldest mental health association of its kind in the world.2 These 
NGOs are the leading agencies in their respective areas of operations.  
 
Top leaders and knowledgeable members of these NGOs sit in government working 
groups as representatives of the sector. Regularly, government ministries or agencies 
send invitations requesting NGOs meetings, hearings or events. For example, on 
average, the YTY General Secretary attends about 10 meetings or seminars every 
month at the MSAH or its affiliate expert agencies. Other examples include the 
consultative process that developed TATO, the Health 2015, the NP, the National 
Action Plan Against Poverty and Social Exclusion (2001), and NGOs as Actors in 
Social Welfare and Health Policy: Strategy for NGOs Activities (2003). NGOs also 
consult governmental bodies and staff and often organize conferences in partnership 
with government. A notable example of this is the 12th World Conference on Tobacco 
or Health (August 3-8, 2003) organized as a broad partnership of, among others, 
NGOs, ministries and universities and chaired by the FCS and FCHP.  
 
Recognizing the expertise among NGOs the government also sends some leaders as 
its representatives to key international events. For example, the Secretary General of 
the FCS is a member of the Finnish Ministerial delegation to the WHO Convention on 
Tobacco Control. In her capacity as an expert in this area, she attends also some EU 
                                                 
2 For a list of other major health NGOs see, e.g., FCHP (www.health.fi), YTY (www.sosteryty.fi), and 
STKL’s (www.stkl.fi) members.    
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meetings on related matters. In light of these examples, it could be said that 
government and NGOs constantly engage each other in active consultations in sharing 
and building expertise. How influential or significant this consultative process is 
reflected in the policy outcomes is open to debate. This research did not seek out this 
question, as pointed out in the model discussion in chapter 2 Part II. Overall, 
interaction processes in human resource development are currently more ad hoc than 
nationally coordinated. It is in this light that the NP has taken such coordination as a 
priority in the key area of ensuring availability of expertise of health personnel 
(MSAH, 2002a: 44-45). However, the interaction will be more in policy development 
at the regional level and is therefore discussed in sub-chapter 3.3 below.   
 
Provincial Level 
 
Provincial-level interrelationships in human resource development for health care are 
not strong. This is because the provincial administrations neither run schools nor 
provide services. One case in health promotion activities is notable. The establishment 
and development of the North Karelia Project Support Association, later named the 
North Karelia Project Association and nowadays the North Karelia Public Health 
Association (NKPHA) (also the North Karelia Public Health Centre) was a 
collaborative effort between individuals who shared a common concern for reduction 
of cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) and other non-communicable diseases (NCDs). 
Started in the early 1970s, the long collaborative process strengthened both the 
provincial health promotion unit as well as the NGO NKPHA that later emerged. 
Elsewhere, provincial health officials from Southern and Eastern provinces as well as 
NGOs expressed their satisfaction with the close cooperation enjoyed. However, most 
of the consultations at this level are more informal and personal. But as indicated in 
table 1 above, the provincial administrations are working together with NGOs and 
other stakeholders not only in preventive/promotive health but also in the reform of 
health functions and structures, an area involving sharing of expertise and knowledge.     
 
Local Level 
 
Some NGO hospital institutions are also involved in supervised practice of health 
personnel. As all the polytechnics running nursing schools have to send their students 
to practical training according to curricula requirement, recognized NGO health care 
 250
units provides a supplementary alternative. Päivärinne Rehabilitation Hospital (PRH) 
in Oulu is a notable case with its collaborative relations with the Oulu Polytechnic 
School of Health and Social Care whose students intern at the hospital. A single 
school, the Polytechnic of Rovaniemi has practice contracts with about 170 social 
welfare and health care organizations from all the three sectors in the province 
(Ylipulli-Kairala and Lohiniva (Eds.), 2002: 18). Placement and payments of such 
internships are supervised and organized on a contract system negotiated between 
individual polytechnics and teaching hospitals (ibid. 17). However, the contracts are 
based on national models developed by the National Board of Education in 1994 and 
the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (AFLRA). The sum of 
payment is calculated per student and for each study credit while the length of 
practice may be fixed or open (ibid. 18).  
 
As a leading expert in family health, FFF’s different departments provide a broad 
range of training courses to municipalities, hospitals and health centres. For example, 
the Family Clinic has provided consultation for municipal health care personnel on 
family therapy through lectures for which the municipalities pay. The Sexual Health 
Clinic gives courses for health centres medical professionals working with the youth 
on sexual health matters. The Clinic also cooperates with some municipal health 
centres in the Helsinki capital area to develop training of families with newborn 
babies for nurses/midwives working with families. These courses are paid for by the 
municipalities.  
 
Naturally, NGOs do a great deal of capacity-building work, consultancy and lobbying 
at the municipal level where most health action occurs. They are also consulted a 
great deal by senior civil servants and health personnel. For example, if the concerned 
department wants to develop a new project or activity in a field with a strong NGO 
presence it only makes good sense to consult the NGO; especially also because NGOs 
represent certain groups of clients. For example, FFF’s DMG provides free 
consultation by telephone, e-mail, or visits to doctors in hospitals and health centres 
who ask for information concerning rare hereditary diseases. NGOs also make 
proposals to department heads to undertake particular projects. Such proposals could 
be submitted in writing or in a discussion and could be further developed by the two 
parties and then forwarded to the political council for a decision. In such cases, the 
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NGO party acts as the key consultant. As one municipal official pointed out, 
municipalities have several incentives for consulting NGOs; they: have good ideas, 
are cheaper than municipal or private consultants, have better contacts with people at 
the grassroots, are also more flexible, and have a leaner management. This clearly 
reflects the comparative-advantages thesis dominant in the inter-dependence theory 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 225; Rooff, 1957: 277-83; Biggs and Neame, 1995: 40).  
 
A significant aspect of health personnel collaboration is the easiness with which 
individuals can not only exchange ideas but also cross over from one sector to the 
other. For example, Kerava municipality in the Southern Province has a rather strong 
relationship with some health activity producing NGOs. Notably, the clerk is also an 
auditor for one of the local NGOs. This is on purely voluntary basis. The strong sense 
of voluntarism among personnel in the municipality and NGOs allows them to 
exchange workers in certain social and health promotion fields although in an 
unsystematic way. In Jyväskylä, the health promotion unit head previously worked for 
seven years as the executive director for the Finnish Heart Association in the Central 
Finland region. Change of working environment and many years of experience in the 
NGO world were cited as key motivations for moving with the expectation that this 
would be an opportunity to transfer the ‘good practices’ experience to the new 
engagement in the government sector.  
 
3.2. Collaborations in Financial and Other Resources  
 
National Level 
 
Collaborations at the national level with regard to financial and other resources are 
mainly reflected by the transfer of funds from various Ministries and agencies to 
NGOs. A number of numerous cases can be cited from data presented in Part IV on 
Finland. In that presentation, we saw that the major sources of government funds to 
health NGOs are RAY, the Social Insurance Institution (SII), and the MSAH. Funding 
from these agencies is based on different kinds of legislative or policy frameworks. 
As was discussed, RAY provides funding in accordance with the Act on Slot Machine 
Funding (1056/2001) for all kinds of activities, including the organizations’ 
operations – or what could also be called more appropriately ‘capacity building’ – as 
well as project implementation and staff salaries. As an expert buying agency, SII 
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funds are more targeted and given on strict contractual basis through competitive 
tendering. In one example, the contract lays down an agreed price per number of days 
as well as a ceiling on the number of persons to be seen in a year. As was pointed out 
most of the health care organizations with which the SII has contracts are NGOs. In 
fact, a number of NGO health institutions, such as the Orton Orthopaedic Hospital 
(OOH), the RFH, and its subsidiary Avo-Reuma in Helsinki, enjoy uniquely 
embedded relationships with the SII’s rehabilitation unit that obliges the SII to buy 
services from them and, in turn, for it to be represented in their boards. The ground 
for collaborative relationships in the rehabilitation field was laid out in the Act on 
Customer Service Partnerships in Rehabilitation (604/1991) and Decree (878/1991).  
 
RFH receives patients referred by SII from 346 municipalities around the country. 
OOH is currently running a contract with SII for 3 years whose prices are largely 
dictated by SII. As the most specialized orthopaedic institution in Finland, OOH 
receives most of its funds for rehabilitation, averaging 70% over the last five years, 
from the SII. FCS has 50 contracts with the SII for psychosocial rehabilitation. Such 
contracts were worth 10% of NGO’s total income for 2001. The SII also provides 
capital grants for renovation of rehabilitation facilities; OOH is a recent recipient. In 
addition to RAY and the SII, the MSAH, as was illustrated, provides key state 
budgetary appropriations to NGOs in health promotion activities through a special 
arrangement with the FCHP. The MSAH also provides other funding on contractual 
basis; the Ministry is managing only about 20 health promotion projects in 2003 of 
which the majority are contracted also to NGOs; e.g., the NKPHA has one contract to 
advance health promotion in North Karelia. Other Ministries such as Education, 
Foreign Affairs, Environment, Communication and Transport, and Labour also 
provide funding to NGO health promotion activities (WHO, 2002: 35-36).       
 
The development of data and information, and standards and guidelines can be 
considered as an additional outcome resource for the collaborations. With this regard, 
some examples can be cited. The participation of the NKPHA in the Health Behaviour 
Survey and Risk Factor Survey (Finrisk Study) is a major example of these efforts. 
Partnership in the surveys also resulted in some financial benefits to the NGO in the 
form of payments for the work from the National Public Health Institute (abbreviated 
as KTL in Finnish). In fact some NGOs are primary producers of data and 
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information on key health and social issues. As an example, the FCS produces the 
only cancer epidemiological data in the country published as the Finnish Cancer 
Registry, which is the second oldest in the world following Denmark. A second 
example is the Yearbook of Population Research in Finland published by the FFF in 
association with the Finnish Demographic Society. A third example is the annual 
Sociobarometer survey of the Finnish Federation for Social Welfare and Health 
(STKL). A more recent example is the collaborative work under way in 2003 to 
prepare national guidelines on continuing education in health care (see below). Such 
documents provide powerful tools for influencing government decision-making.  
 
Provincial Level  
 
Provincial-level collaborations can take the form of undertaking joint projects, use or 
provision of working space and funding. Although the provincial state administrations 
do not undertake services delivery, they are important actors in health systems 
development and in health promotion. The administrations comprise one of the 
implementers of health promotion programmes as we saw in our analysis of the health 
promotion funding from the MSAH. Often the state offices partner with NGOs in 
carrying out such projects. The best and most significant example is the collaborative 
partnership in the implementation of the North Karelia Project (NKP) from 1972 to 
1997. The public health care project that has become a unique model renowned 
around the world, and whose petition to Parliament was designed by the chief 
provincial state administrator, had many players including local health institutions, 
NGOs, grassroots organizations, shops and the media (Puska et al (Eds.), 1995). Even 
as the NKP was registered as an NGO in 1979 (now the NKPHA) and the NKP 
Research Foundation a couple of years later, its partnership with the state office has 
remained its key strength.  
 
Reflecting on this close partnership, an NKPHA official remarked that the 
organization had a dual role, the role of official actor (both as part of the provincial 
government and in the capacity of the official North Karelia Project of the National 
Public Health Institute) and the role of NGOs. In corresponding agreement, the 
director of the provincial Unit for Social and Health Affairs remarked that the NGO 
“wears two hats”, both official and NGO. Presently, the NGO has an agreement with 
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the provincial administration to plan a joint project for promoting physical activities 
among special groups. Another example of joint projects is in the Southern Province 
where the provincial administration was expecting to jointly plan a project with the 
NGO Action of Smoking and Health (ASH) for work to reduce smoking among 
young people in the province in line with the Health 2015 objective; the two have also 
had such joint activities before. The use of working space refers particularly to the 
office premises granted to NGOs at this level. For example, as was pointed out at the 
beginning of the section, the North Karelia Project was located at the provincial state 
offices and continued to work from there even as it evolved into an NGO until the end 
of the 1980s. This was exceptional at this level but perfectly understandable given the 
national significance of the project.  
 
Although only the municipalities can legally procure the development appropriations 
from the provincial state administrations, NGOs also can indirectly by working jointly 
with municipalities (see below). On the other hand, the NKPHA does receive small 
appropriations from the Regional Council of North Karelia and the Provincial State 
administration for developing disease prevention and health promotion in the 
province. For example, presently the NGO has two contracts with the Regional 
Council for Northern Karelia. The NGO is also seeking funds for rehabilitation 
project, to assist at-home living for the elderly. Funding for this project is to be jointly 
provided by the provincial administration and the EU structural funds for 
development, from which the marginal geographical region benefits.  
 
Local Level  
 
The level of financial collaboration between health care providing NGOs and 
municipal authorities in Finland is very large. This is not surprising because 
municipalities are the main producers and deliverers of health care services. However, 
they are at liberty to purchase services from NGO/private providers as granted in the 
Act on Planning and Government Grants for Social Welfare and Health Care and the 
Finnish Local Government Act (1995). However, as the system of healthcare is 
financed for the most part by taxes levied at the municipal level, and as the costs of 
providing any health care services are dominated by the costs of labour, it is more 
profitable for municipalities to produce the health services for its population than to 
 255
purchase them from NGO/private or even other municipalities. Hence, referring 
patients to NGO hospitals is primarily a matter of cost vs. effectiveness, not 
necessarily one of quality alone as argued by some experts (compare, for example, the 
prices in table 11 in Part IV Section 1). On the other hand, municipalities would 
prefer to buy services from an NGO producer domiciled in their local jurisdiction 
since they collect tax money than would be the case if the producer were non-
domiciled. However, municipalities do not always manage to satisfy their health 
demands. Again, they may be simply not available in the municipal system. For 
example, Kerava municipality finds it cheaper to buy all occupational health needs for 
its 1,700 civil servants from the private sector (even if it does organize this service as 
required by law), and provides only about 30% of all local primary health care 
services needed by the inhabitants. This is largely because of the long waiting queues 
but also patients’ perceptions of the municipal system, as reckoned by the local clerk. 
Thus, the municipalities’ need for services and, on the other hand, NGOs need for 
finances, makes them interdependent (Milner, op. cit.: 9).   
 
The case of the health NGO Folkhälsan-operated system that provides all primary 
health care services in Karjaa is obviously very unique in this context. Although the 
Folhälsan Karjaa system also provides some specialized care, RFH and OOH are the 
most significant NGO providers in the country with this regard. In Part IV we saw 
that municipalities are both buyers of specialized hospital care as well as givers of 
grants for health promotion activities provided by NGOs. 360 municipalities buy 
services from the RFH and 300 from the OOH through a referral system agreed by the 
parties. Referrals could be made directly by an individual hospital, a hospital district 
or a municipality. In the Kymenlaakso hospital district (HD) in Southern Province, the 
rheumatologist refers patients sent to the district hospital from local health centres to 
the RFH. The HD then pays the costs directly to the RFH. Starting 2003, RFH has a 
contract agreement of three (plus two possible additional) years with Paijät Häme HD 
in the Southern Province to provide all the specialized care services in rheumatic 
orthopaedics in the HD area while all other orthopaedics care are negotiated and 
bought on a case-by-case basis. This contract alone amount to about 10% of the RFH 
expected income. In this arrangement, the HD determined the financial value of the 
contract and reimbursements are paid on the submitted bills.   
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Municipalities also buy a wide range of other health services from NGOs as shown in 
table 8 of Part IV Section I. For example, costs for genetical-DNA testing for severe 
hereditary disease carried out by FFF are paid for municipalities or reimbursed by the 
NHI. In the preventive/promotive health area, the Finnish Cancer Society, for 
example, provides cancer-screening services to more than 300 municipalities, which 
accounted to 45% of the NGO’s total income in 2001. However, the proportion of 
municipal reimbursements to NGOs incomes varies. For example, they accounted for 
more than 50% of RFH’s income during 1998-2002 and over 63% of OOH’s income 
during the same period. Arguably, the differences may be due to the different 
structures in public provision of orthopaedic and rheumatic diseases between the 
urban Helsinki Uusimaa region and the more sub-urban Heinola Päijät-Häme. In 
general, buying of services by municipalities from the NGO/private sector has been 
growing in recent years as municipal officials acknowledge. For example, OOH’s 
income has grown between 2000 and 2002 primarily as a result of increased buying of 
its services by Helsinki municipality. Although the municipalities buy the cancer-
screening services mostly on contractual bases containing agreement on targets or 
outputs such as number of clients or an amount of money, contracting in the 
municipal system is not an advanced practice and often reimbursements merely 
depend on an open system whereby the NGO hospital sends invoices to the referring 
hospital or municipal department after the treatment of individual patients. This is the 
case, for example, in Kymelaakso HD and Etela Karjala HD relations with the RFH. 
Apart from contracts, rigidly or loosely defined, municipalities also make grants to 
NGOs for health promotion work. In Helsinki City although small such grants have 
been consistently available throughout the 1990s.   
 
The above examples reflect collaboration in terms of payment transfers from 
municipalities for services rendered or grants to deliver services otherwise not offered 
by the municipalities. This could reflect a level of sharing or distribution of 
responsibilities in a complementary or supplementary manner. On the other hand, 
numerous cases where municipalities are collaborating with NGOs in project 
implementation can be cited. In the NP, for example, out of the eight projects funded 
in 2003 one is a collaborative effort between the joint municipality of Kolpeneen in 
the Province of Lapland and four NGOs. The project is aiming to develop a pilot 
communications centre and has received €96,793 from the MSAH (MSAH, 2003c). In 
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fact, collaboration between NGOs and municipalities is quite extensive in spite of 
evident shortcomings according to a recent study of 15 municipalities and over 40 
NGOs (Laamanen, Ala-Kauhaluoma, Nouko-Juvonen, 2002). The study, Project 
Cooperation Between Local Authorities and the Third Sector Regarding Social 
Affairs and Health Care, found out that 37% of the municipalities and 22% of the 
NGOs were satisfied with the amount of collaboration while 61% and 78% desired its 
increase, respectively (p. 57). Only 2% of the municipalities thought the 
collaborations were excessive (ibid.).  
 
Box 1.  
 
Case Illumination: Broad NGO-Public Collaborations in Health Promotion 
 
In Jyväskyla, one of the Healthy Cities, the HD head nurse galvanized the creation of an informal 
hospital health promotion team (HHPT) in 1992. Today the group comprises a broad team of senior 
nursing departments personnel, a physiotherapist, a psychiatrist and medical doctor head of 
rehabilitation. With a small annual budget (€25,800 in 2002) raised from the HD’s Central Hospital, 
the HHPT buys health promotion materials from NGOs working in the HD area and distributes them to 
the health centres, whose financial situation may not permit them to purchase directly. (In Turku, HCN 
project site is in a local health centre, which also buys extensive health education material from NGOs 
for distribution). The epitome of this collaboration between the hospital and NGOs is realized in the 
form of an annual “Light Weeks” festival. Lasting a full three weeks, the event is primarily organized 
to give health NGOs working in the area an opportunity to inform, disseminate and sell their health 
promotion material to hospitals, health centres, patients and the general public. The event is hosted at 
the Central Hospital in collaboration with the municipal’s health promotion unit and NGOs. Each year 
it brings together nearly 40 NGOs, mainly patients’ organizations, from around the region. In 2002, 38 
NGOs participated in the event whose theme, suggested by a participant NGO, was Hyvä Kotiutuminen 
(translated literally as “going home well”). A successful idea, it serves three dimensions in that it 
connects NGOs and patients and the hospitals’ medical and health staff. As articulated by the concept 
initiator: “light comes from the light which the patient’s organizations gives to the patients and their 
relatives, light which has hopes and brightness and support”. The idea was then to organise them 
during the darkest time of the year usually October-November before snow falls. Eight events have 
been held annually since 1994. In addition to the annual Light Weeks, a small permanent table has been 
set where the NGOs can exhibit/sell their materials all year round. 
 
Joint collaborations are crucial to municipalities facing difficulties in service 
provision. Notably, as only NGOs can get funding from RAY, a joint project can 
bring additional financial resources to the municipality as well as create or develop a 
service. Unique examples of collaboration between hospital districts, hospitals, 
municipalities and NGOs in health promotion work are many. The municipal-NGO 
collaboration model in implementing the WHO HFA 2000 is also a notable example 
(MSAH, 1996) as well as the continuing work in the Healthy City Network (HCN) in 
Helsinki, Turku and Jyväskylä, for example. NGOs produce vast amounts of health 
education material that is bought for distribution and use by government agencies, 
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health care facilities and schools. Box 1 describes a case of broad partnerships 
between hospitals, health centres and NGOs in health promotion and education. 
 
Finally, municipalities and NGOs have also arranged special kinds of partnerships by 
establishing mutual working premises. The only notable examples are in the House of 
Partnerships in Jyväskylä and the Community Resource Centre (Kansalaistalo) in 
Joensuu. Although the centres are for general activities of all kinds of NGOs, groups 
and individuals, they are worth mentioning, as they are completely new phenomena. 
Part of NGOs development activities to establish five such partnership and know-how 
centres around the country, they are supported primarily by STKL and the local and 
regional authorities municipalities (MSAH, 2001d: 38:39). In particular, the House of 
Partnerships is unique because its establishment resulted from a joint survey of STKL 
and the City of Jyväskylä, Survey on the Contribution of the Social Services and 
Health Organizations in Well-being – the ‘Hyve’ Project in 1999 that found a need 
among NGOs to have working premises. The House has 24 different kinds of health 
and social actors mostly NGOs but also the City Department’s actors, e.g., the Centre 
for Voluntary Work. It is managed is by two persons one representing STKL and the 
other the municipality. Both regarded their relationships as good and collaborative.      
 
3.3. Collaborations in Policy Making   
 
National Level  
 
Collaboration in policy-making at the national level is one of the key discourses in 
current health development in Finland. This research has identified a number of 
processes, policy documents and mechanisms through which such interactions occur.  
There are numerous bodies established at the MSAH for developing policy and expert 
documents. In Part IV Section I, we noted that NGOs had 30% representation in 50 
advisory groups and 40% in 90 working groups (MSAH, 2003a: 16). By all measures, 
that is a huge representation. As already mentioned, the most notable policy-making 
organ in this respect is the Advisory Board for Public Health (ABPH) to which is 
accredited the Health 2015. Another more recent example with regard to the National 
Project 2007 is the Working Group on Continuing Health Care Education that is 
expected to come up with national guidelines for health care units regarding 
development of continuing education programmes.  
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Other working groups within the National Project have been mentioned and the 
Monitoring Group discussed in some detail in chapter 4 Part IV Section I. In addition, 
NGOs are represented also in other key government working groups and agencies. 
For example, with regard to the SII, there is an advisory body for rehabilitation 
(abbreviated as KUNK in Finnish) in which seven persons out of 20 are from the 
NGO sector. Another important example is RAY’s governance body, the Board of 
Administration, which has 14 members, seven of whom are nominated by the Council 
of State and seven by the General Assembly of RAY’s nearly 100 member NGOs. In 
effect, NGOs are centrally involved in designing RAY’s funding policies. Policy-
making often takes the form of dialogue surrounding diverse issues but may not be 
necessarily institutionalised. According to one study, indications are that “systematic 
dialogue” between NGOs and state authorities are very common. The study found out 
that 82% of the over 35 representatives from NGOs interviewed had such dialogue, 
although only 38% felt it was adequate (Heikkilä and Karjalainen, 1999: 17).     
 
Provincial Level  
 
Although policy-making work is generally at the Ministerial level, some mention 
could be made with regard to the implementation of policies, decision-making as well 
as formulation of recommendations. One of the reasons why the provincial 
administration is an important governmental level is the fact that there are indeed 
institutional linkages between the NGOs and the provincial administrations in terms 
of licensing and inspections. These roles and inter-linkages are mentioned here 
because they could not be appropriately fitted with the previously discussed types. Of 
importance, however is the fact that these administrations have a great deal of 
decision-making power with regard to the use of the development budgets. This 
reflects a degree of delegated decentralization in the development of the health care 
service system and can be comparable to the issuance of Authority to Incur 
Expenditure responsibility of the provincial-level health administrations in Kenya (see 
following Section II). Although these development funds are given only to 
municipalities, national-level policy requires that they have a partnership with NGOs.  
At a closer level to policy making, the National Project 2007 Memorandum, referred 
to earlier, proposed the creation of regional advisory boards for assessing and 
developing recommendations on the “need for training in the social welfare and health 
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care sector and to attend to regional development of basic, further and supplementary 
training” (MSAH, 2002a: 45). These bodies are to comprise a broad representation 
including the provincial administrations, universities and NGOs. In terms of 
participation in NGO governance by regional level administrations this research has 
established one case in Eastern Province. Here, the Provincial Medical Officer has 
been a key person in the operations of the NKP Association and Foundation as is the 
Chief of Medical Department in the North Karelia region Central Hospital. The 
Director of the provincial Unit for Social and Health Affairs is also a Board member 
of the North Karelia Public Health Centre (or NKPHA).  
 
Local Level 
 
Finnish municipal authorities are key decision-making bodies in health services 
development and delivery derived from the legislation and cemented through 
democratic voting. Because of the political economy broadened by the Local 
Government Act, the municipal authorities can elect “representatives of service users 
to [their] organs” (Section 28). The legislation makes it possible for NGOs to be 
involved in decision-making through representation in consultative bodies at the 
municipalities. An example is the Helsinki Municipality Healthy Cities Council in 
which the A-Clinic foundation is represented. Another is the board on services for the 
elderly in the same municipality, which has a number of NGO representatives. 
Conversely, some municipalities are represented in the governance bodies of key 
NGOs. The best example is the STKL, which has a broad membership that includes 
140 municipalities. The municipalities pay membership dues like other members but 
on a different criterion. They participate in the general governance meetings and can 
vote like any other member. However, they are restricted to one vote each as 
compared to member NGOs with five each. Such reciprocal representations reveal 
institutionalised dynamics of collaborations that may potentially be reflected in 
decision-making at the municipal level and in the governance of the health NGOs. 
Overall, systematic dialogue between NGOs and the municipal authorities in the 
broad social welfare area is actually more intense as the study by Heikkilä and 
Karjalainen (op. cit.) indicated. However, although 94% of the interviewees felt such 
dialogue existed, a much lesser percentage (17) felt it was adequate.  
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SECTION II – KENYA: CHAPTER 1. OVERALL CONTEXT OF 
COLLABORATION  
 
 
“NGOs act as conduits of development assistance. Their strengths are 
considerable and compliment the official government agencies to reach poor 
segments of the population in inaccessible areas. They have existing close 
links with poor communities and they have skills to ensure wide 
participation” (Office of the President, 2000a: 44; emphasis added).  
 
An understanding of the relationship between NGOs and government in Kenya is best 
informed by the historical development of the health services in the country. As 
already pointed out in the sections on the country in Parts III and IV, the NGO system 
developed largely in the form of religious missions and Church organizations. During 
that time, the relationship to the colonial administration “ranged from laissez-faire to 
antagonism” over connections to the nationalist movement (Bratton, 1989: 571; 
original emphasis; see also, Wallerstein, 1966: 321). By and large, relationships in the 
post-colonial period have been characterized by two faces: collaboration and conflict 
(Bratton, op. cit.; Mburu, 1989; Ndegwa, 1996; Wamai, 2002a;). Early collaborative 
relationships in the post-independent era can be traced back to the early 1960s in the 
field of family planning and reproductive health (FP/RH). The Family Planning 
Association of Kenya (FPAK),1 established in 1962, spearheaded work in this field 
and operated a number of model clinics within government health facilities. It was not 
until 1967 that the Ministry of Health (MOH) began the National Family Planning 
Programme following the adoption of National Planning Strategies in the 1965 multi-
policy development policy framework, Sessional Paper No. 10 (MOH, 1996: 5). In 
the early 1970s, the MOH took over two of the clinics operated by FPAK as part of 
then government’s policy to centralize health care services. Today, FPAK as other 
NGOs operate its own separate health facilities in collaboration with the MOH, albeit 
un-systematized.  
 
In the last ten years, the Kenya government has increasingly recognized the role of 
NGO health providers. Because of this, there has been growing embeddedness in the 
public and NGO systems. As has been already pointed in previous sections on the 
country, the institutional relationships are actively being developed under the current 
                                                 
1 FPAK is the Kenyan equivalent of the Family Federation of Finland (FFF) in terms of the general 
area of work operations. FPAK is the largest NGO of its kind in Kenya as FFF is in Finland. 
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decentralization and health reforms framework: the Kenya Health Policy Framework 
(KHPF) 1994-2010 and its medium-term implementation framework, the National 
Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP) 1999-2004. The overall context of this 
collaboration is shaped by international discourses on health and socio-economic 
development. The first discourse most crucially emanates from the World Health 
Organization’s Health for all by Year 2000 framework on expanding primary health 
care and the Bamako Initiative on the delivery of essential drugs through community 
pharmacies. The second discourse on socio-economic development is most notably 
shaped by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s participatory strategies 
towards poverty eradication as epitomized in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP). In fact, efforts towards the integration of, and closer collaboration between, 
the public and NGO/private systems in health care delivery are occurring all over the 
developing world (e.g., Harding, 2003). These discourses have already been discussed 
to some extent in Part II, and IV on Kenya.   
 
Further rationale for the collaborative and participatory policy environment in Kenya 
can be found in the statement below reiterated by the former Vice President and 
Minister for Home Affairs (presently Minister for Education) during the Second 
Conference on NGO Partnerships for Reproductive Health in Africa organized by the 
NGO Centre for African Family Studies (CAFS) (16-18 April, 2002).  
 
“The importance of good governance and leadership of NGOs cannot be 
overemphasized. NGOs must strive to collaborate with relevant departments of 
government by playing roles both complementary and supplementary. 
Mechanisms of collaboration between NGOs, the ministries of health and other 
partners need to be inbuilt in all reproductive health programs. In countries where 
the NGO/government collaboration is strong, the impact of the activities is greater 
and more sustainable” (April 30, 2002) (Daily Nation, 2002c). 
 
The current and future government-NGO relations should be understood in the overall 
context of the on-going process aimed at developing a policy on NGOs and new post-
Moi government. After five years of the NGO legislation, in 1996 the NGO 
Coordination Board recognized a need for a policy on NGOs. And a consultative 
survey carried out in 2000 revealed that NGOs favoured the need for the policy 
(research interviews). However, it was not until 2001 when the government restarted 
its interest for a policy and a structure was put into place to steer the process. 
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Although there have been delays in this work, including a parallel draft policy work 
by the self-governing NGO Council in which this researcher was involved, in spite of 
NGOs representation, in the government Technical Committee, a draft policy – 
Proposed Kenya NGO Policy Paper – has recently (June 2003) emerged. Charting 
government-NGO partnerships, the draft policy begins with the recognition given by 
government to NGOs. Among other things, it proposes that the government will 
contract NGOs, involve them in policy making, designate at the local and national 
level that every Ministry employ an officer responsible for NGO matters, that local 
governments attend and join NGO forums and networks in their jurisdictions, and that 
the government exempt NGOs from taxes and share its resources such as vehicles and 
facilities. In this context, it issues the policy statement that:    
 
“The Government recognizes the significant role and contributions of NGOs 
in the society and considers them very important partners in the development 
process. It will, therefore, be in the interest of the government to create a 
conducive and enabling environment to ensure that NGOs potentials and 
capacities are fully utilized” (Lewa, 2003: 22-23).  
 
While being an unprecedented development in the relations between NGOs and 
government in the country, the policy creates an environment that can further directly 
embedde the systems (Lune and Oberstein, 2001: 18-19). However, the policy would 
still lack adequacy in that it does not capture or cater for cross-sectoral interests and 
differences in the diverse NGO sector; it clearly does not capture any of the interests 
expressed by health NGOs (see below, Mwenda, 2002: 21). That is why a health 
field-specific policy would still be required and is necessary. Nevertheless, it is likely 
there will be changes in the proposed draft since discussions on the freshly produced 
draft have only began. In any case, the draft makes it clear that “a new legislative 
framework could only be reached after agreement is reached by all stakeholders, 
through consultative forums” (p. 2).  
 
With regard to the new political climate, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
government has demonstrated a clear break with the past by tapping three key 
personalities from the NGO sector (one as a Minister and the other two as Permanent 
Secretaries). Politically, the ground for effective collaboration has been shifting since 
the late 1990s and the current environment presents the best opportunity yet. The 
NARC lays as one of its objectives for improving health care services the case to: 
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“Build partnerships between government, the private and the civil society 
sectors in the management and rehabilitation of the [health] sector” (NARC 
Manifesto, 2002: 40).    
 
This intention is being pursued under the existing KHPF and NSSP frameworks. To 
have a clearer picture of this context, it is necessary to pinpoint the key issues under 
development in creating an environment most enabling for effective collaborative 
relationships. As spelled out in the NHSSP, the strengthening of collaboration and 
coordination of NGOs under the Ministry of Health (MOH) will seek eight key issues:    
 
1. Facilitate regular consultative meetings with NGO/private providers; 
2. Second critical personnel to NGO/private providers; 
3. Facilitate acquisition of government land by NGO/private providers to 
develop health facilities in under-served areas as a step to improve equity;  
4. Rent out facilities which are under-utilized to NGO/private providers on 
condition that they cushion the vulnerable groups from high health care costs; 
5. Facilitate waiver of taxes and duties on drugs and medical supplies;  
6. Facilitate speedy registration and acquisition of work permits where necessary, 
provided preference is given to Kenyans;  
7. Give essential drugs and medical supplies to providers in disadvantaged areas 
provided they are able to account for them;  
8. Enable public and NGO/private providers be accountable to the Central Board 
of Health (CBH).2  
 
An assessment of the achievements of this framework can reveal how the 
development of this collaborative paradigm set out in 1999 has progressed. The only 
systematic attempt available is a May 2002 study conducted for the Health Sector 
Reform Secretariat (HSRS) (ROK, 2002b). The study – Documentation of Health 
Sector Reforms up to January 2002 – was an evaluation of the Decentralization 
Action Plan (DAP) agreed at a cross sector-wide consultative workshop at the coastal 
city of Mombassa in March 2000 for taking the NHSSP forward from April 2000 to 
March 2002 (MOH, 2000). Since the DAP identified only four of the activities 
pertaining to the integration of NGOs into the system (table 1), the other issues have 
not been evaluated. In what follows and in the next chapters, analyses will be made to 
those about which the research gathered sufficient information.    
 
In drawing the DAP, it was assumed that NGOs were willing to collaborate and that 
funds would be available. According to the framework laid out in the NHSSP, the 
                                                 
2 Abridged from ROK (1999b: 21).  
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Donor/NGO Cordination Division (DNCD) is the flagship collaborative institutional 
agency slated to be operational by year 2004. In the anticipated schedule of activities, 
Ksh15 million was to be spent in the first two years (1999, 2000). An office facility 
was to be created during 1999-2000. As specified in the monitoring indicators, in 
these two years the established posts were to be filled, all officers appropriately 
accommodated and coordination guidelines established. These guidelines would be 
implemented during 2001-2004 and an evaluation of their effectiveness and impact 
undertaken during the same time and a report submitted (ROK, 1999b: 4, Part II).  
 
Table 1. Planned Activities for the Creation of Institutional Mechanisms for 
Government-NGO Collaborations in Health Care (2000-2003)  
 
Activities  Responsibility Source of funds Implementation Schedule 
   2000 2001 2002 
DNCD MOH, N-GOK Donor, N-GOK, MOH 
July: Regular 
meetings    
DHSF 
DHMB,  
N-GOK 
GOK, N-GOK,  
Donor 
October: 
Operational in 6 
Districts 
June: 14 
Districts  
March: 30 
Districts  
New 
Partnerships 
DHSF GOK, N-GOK,  
Donor ” ” ” 
Private Sector  
Initiatives  
N-GOK,  
Community 
N-GOK, donor October: adoption 
of QM standards in 
6 Districts  
June: 14 
Districts  
 
 
Source: MOH (2000: 41).  
Notes: GOK stands for the Government of Kenya; N-GOK is for ‘not GOK’; 
DHSF stands for District Health Stakeholder Forum; QM is abbreviation for 
Quality Management.  
 
While the DNCD is the apex institutional mechanism and expert body for 
spearheading the systems collaborative relations at the national level, the DHSFs form 
the consultative forums at the district level. Thus the establishment of the DNCD is of 
key importance as regards overall direction of collaborations. A concerted plan of 
action to realize a fully functional DNCD was originally laid down in the NHSSP 
(ROK, op. cit.). Although the process was started well, it has suffered repeated 
setbacks due to personnel and resource constraints in the HSRS (research interviews). 
No personnel had been identified for undertaking the full responsibility of moving the 
process forward. After the first NGO Consensus Building Workshop was held at 
Nairobi in June 2001 and addressed by the Minister for Public Health and World 
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Health Organization (WHO) country representative, among others, another plan of 
action for operationalizing the DNCD through the Technical Working Group (TWG) 
was drawn for the period 2001-2003 to guide the TWG was drawn with a budget of 
Ksh24.6 million (research interviews). At the beginning, the only person handling the 
process was already an employee of the MOH and thus could not fully commit time to 
its responsibilities. Thus, the process went dormant. In 2000 as proposed in the DAP 
the Division was reconstituted and held a series of meetings to come up with terms of 
reference for collaboration. An MOH employee took charge but in 2002 responsibility 
was again taken up by a third person who has also recently in early 2003 been 
transferred while in the process of revitalizing the Division. Presently, an MOH 
employee is working to revive plans for a national conference that was to be held at 
year-end 2002 to be realized before August 2003.  
 
With regard to the development of the DHSF in the system, the evaluation study 
found out that steps were under way to establish the forums in the 14 districts 
implementing phase one of the decentralization programme. In addition, three other 
districts receiving systems development support for resource management and work 
plans implementation by the WHO had also begun forming DHSFs (ROK, 2002b: 
40). Overall, the development of DHSFs seem to have been moving ahead although 
there are no later evaluations; the September 2002 Reform Brief (MOH, 2002) only 
mentioned that some of them have started in some of districts. Evidence from Nyeri 
district in Central Province indicates that the forums are popular and are going on as 
expected with quarterly meetings (research interviews). As noted in the activity plan, 
the DHSFs are the key mechanisms for inter-sectoral consultations and for increasing 
collaborative partnerships between the government and NGOs. The research could not 
establish details about the adoption of quality management standards by NGOs and 
neither were they documented in the evaluation or the Reform Brief.   
 
One of the key concerns with regard to the DNCD is that since it is located at the 
MOH headquarters, it may become just another government department whose 
operations would be controlled and thus jeopardize both results as well as willingness 
of NGOs to take part. The evaluation did however suggest a solution in which active 
and full participation of NGOs at the district-level planning through the DHSFs 
becomes of key importance (ROK, op. cit.: 32-33). Another challenge is clarifying the 
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system of reporting and action taking. In particular, there is no established system for 
linking the DHSF to the DNCD. Again, the DAP assumes that NGOs (and other 
stakeholders) have good will to share their budgetary, health delivery and financial 
management plans in the DHSF (ibid. 12). The purpose of such sharing is obviously 
good as it helps the districts harmonize their planning process and in designing 
District Work Plans. With the absence of terms of reference for the DHSFs, it is not 
clear how this can be exacted or even that views presented by NGOs at the forums are 
followed up and relations regularized.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2. THE SCOPE OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
2.1. The Institutional Framework in the Decentralized Health Care System   
 
Of key to the realization of the collaborative paradigm is the actualisation of an 
interactive organizational structure that strengthens linkages between the varieties of 
institutions (figure 1). The health care development framework sets out an overall 
contextual matrix in which all stakeholders in the society are involved in collaborative 
interrelationships around the decentralized sector.  
 
Figure 1. Interactive Stakeholder Organizational Structure in the Decentralized 
Health Care System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: ROK (2002b: Annex 5; the vital central government was omitted in 
the original chart but it is more fitting to represent it as depicted here).  
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The framework provides for a more participatory approach primarily through the 
DHSF. This framework is best depicted in the pictogram above. Since 
decentralization aims at improving efficiency and effectiveness of the health services 
delivery system, each of these sectors would be expected to play differentiated roles 
while contributing to the whole system. Thus, ideally, NGOs as well as the other 
sectors act as focal organizations around the decentralization strategy and process. 
Understood in this sense, the framework would reflect Evan’s (1976: 151) open 
systems approach inter-organizational relations model (see, figure 2 of Part II).  
 
In restructuring the organization of the national health care system, collaborative 
efforts among stakeholders produced an organogram that incorporates some of this 
interactive framework (figure 2). The picture is an expansion of the public sector 
system administrative organization presented in figure 2 of Part III Section II. NGOs 
are adapted here to illustrate the complex interorganizational relations model of the 
Kenya health care system. Interrelationships in the overall interorganizational system 
have been maintained to preserve the complex perspective of the various managerial 
and operational levels. The dotted arrows reflect non-administrative or non-official 
relations. As the organizational structure was developed to articulate the desirable 
system in the decentralized framework, its implementation was urgently important.  
 
Of critical importance was the reorganization of the MOH at the apex level that would 
see the collapsing of its previously existing 36 departments into just six during phase 
one of the decentralization programme (ROK, 1999b: 14). By March 2002, the new 
structure was partially in place and operational (ROK, 2002b: 13). The new structure 
has created numerous institutional opportunities for health NGOs participation. A key 
output of the referred decentralization workshop was the identification of the roles 
and responsibilities each of the levels and actors would play. The roles of the 
Provincial and District levels have been highlighted in chapter 2 of Part III Section II. 
As the main focus of the research is the NGO sector, it is necessary to point out here 
more clearly the envisaged roles and responsibilities for NGOs that helps to clarify 
their relationship with the government, and the overall health sector.  
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Figure 2. Complex Organogram for the Interactive Decentralized Health Service System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: MOH Decentralization Workshop Report (March 13-16, 2000).  
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Six key roles and responsibilities of NGOs were defined by the workshop (MOH, 
2000: 27).   
 
1. Providing services to communities, 
2. Liasing with government providers, 
3. Participating in relevant health boards and committees, 
4. Participating in the DHSFs,  
5. Mobilising resources, and 
6. Providing appropriate technical advice.  
 
Most of these issues have already been discussed and key data presented in Parts III 
and IV on Kenya and in the foregoing. Discussion on two aspects, namely, liasing 
with government agencies and the provision of appropriate technical advise, will 
however be expanded in the next chapter. An interesting feature in the interactive 
framework organization is the community. Here the community is not only a 
consumer group but also a key player in policy making and planning through 
participation and in financing the system. Crucially, the community plays important 
roles key among them being to: (1) provide user feedback on the quality and 
accessibility of the health facility; (2) promote public health issues; (3) mobilize 
resources through Harambee; (3) develop community-based insurance health schemes 
(see, e.g., Wiesmann and Jutting, 2000); and (4) participate in electing health boards 
and committees (MOH, op. cit.: 27). Previously, the community was a receptive 
receiver of the top-down designed policies and services. The WHO HFA and Bamako 
Initiative primary health care approach have changed that.  
 
The decentralized system allows for a wider inter-government, cross-sectoral and 
community participation in overall social development. A notable inter-governmental 
collaboration is the District Development Committee (DDC). DDCs were formed in 
the early 1980s as part of a long-term government administration development and 
decentralization programme. These agencies operate under the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning and have NGO and community representation. The DDCs act like 
clearinghouses for socio-economic development projects at the district level as they 
are expected to know what is happening on the ground as regards, e.g., health and 
food security (research interviews). They are also the key implementing agencies for 
the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP), National Development Plans (NDPs) 
and the PRSP. A key responsibility in these activities is in financial management, 
 271
monitoring and accounting. Hence, they have been integrated into the decentralized 
health system in developing the financial systems directly with the DHMBs. Another 
responsibility is monitoring the procurement, storage and distribution of drugs and 
medical supplies under the MOH’s Kenya Medical Supplies Agency (KEMSA).     
 
One of the most crucial tasks in operationalizing the new structure and the NHSSP 
was the review and amendment of relevant legal frameworks. The NHSSP identified 
at least nine legislations to be targeted. Although a review team was put in place, this 
research was not able to gather information about its work or progress. However, 
much of the review of legislation relevant to the NGO sector is to be carried out by 
the DNCDs Technical Working Group, which has not been very active, as noted 
above. Hence it can be expected that not much progress have been made in this area. 
Regarding the waiver of taxes and fees, a recent statement by the late NARC vice-
President promising to exempt all Churches from value added tax and customs duty 
(Siringi and Njagi, 2003) may be the first significant move in that direction. The 
mission/NGO health system has however asked for a much wider tax regime waiver 
to encompass importation of medical supplies, vehicles and ambulances (Mwenda, 
op. cit.). On the procurement of work permits for foreign medical personnel, requests 
to the authorizing Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board (MPDB) for a waiver 
have been rejected on legal grounds that every practitioner must obtain a license 
(MPDB, 2002: 4). However, the MPDB has committed to process such applications 
speedily in a month’s period (ibid.). Milestones in adapting the legal framework to the 
present environment of health NGOs operations, one of the key tasks for the DNCD, 
will have to be achieved in realizing a legitimatized and thus supportive collaborative 
paradigm. A bill of the new organizational structure requires preparation and Cabinet 
approval while there is yet to be MOH policy guidelines on the DHSF. Ultimately, 
these legal and policy processes can be expected to be realized only with continued 
political and financial support and will since they were recognized in the 
Decentralization Action Plan (DAP).  
 
2.2. The Institutional Framework in Managing the HIV/AIDS Epidemic   
 
“Collaboration can increase awareness and advocacy for human rights, sharing 
of ‘best practice strategies’ for preventing further HIV/AIDS transmission, 
including support of the already infected and affected population. In 
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recognition of this, NACC will propel the participation of NGOs and other 
voluntary groups in the fight against AIDS” (OP, 2000a: 44).  
 
As pointed out in chapter 3 Part IV on Kenya, HIV/AIDS has engendered the creation 
of a new institutional response mechanism. The scope of this mechanism in terms of 
national coverage, financial flows, and institutional organization were discussed. It 
was pointed out that much of the HIV/AIDS delivery system and programs, namely, 
Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) and Prevention of Mother-To-Child 
Transmission (PMTCT) services, were, where possible, being integrated into existing 
health structures such as hospitals and health centres in line with the AIDS policy and 
strategic plan. Here I elaborate on the roles of NGOs and their interconnections in the 
HIV/AIDS national institutional framework (figure 3); the figure is an expansion of 
figure 3 on the above referred chapter 3.  
 
Figure 3. Interactive Institutional Framework for the Implementation of the Kenya 
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan (KNASP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Office of the President (2000b: 15) 
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The HIV/AIDS relational fields are illuminated in the same way as the decentralized 
health care system in figure 1. The HIV/AIDS framework also dissects the NGO 
sector identifying the special roles religious organizations play in fighting the 
epidemic (ibid. 45-46); in the overall health system the Church health institutions are 
included in the NGO sector. The difference between KNASP and the NHSSP then is 
that the former has a more focused target issue as well as population group while the 
latter covers the health for all the population. Operationally, administratively and 
financially they are different too and NACC is more autonomous and dynamic than 
the MOH in spite of being under the Office of the President. Like the Provincial and 
District levels in the MOH structure, the NACC structures are also decentralized.    
 
One of the most important achievements of the KNASP is its recognition, from the 
very beginning, of HIV/AIDS as a challenge that requires cross-sectoral and inter-
institutional collaborative actions. Hence, the inclusion of all sectors, ministries and 
state administrative levels in the national framework is an excellent example of a 
comprehensive systems approach (Evan, op. cit.). As was pointed out in Part IV on 
Kenya, the KNASP implementation framework organization adopted the existing 
state administrative and political structure. Because HIV/AIDS was viewed as a 
critical health and poverty concern, the response was tied to the socio-economic 
development policy frameworks, namely, the NPEP, NDPs and the PRSP. Hence, the 
new institutions had to largely resemble the state structures in which these policy 
programmes are implemented. Establishment of these relationships was meant to 
“harmonize government operations at [the] grassroots level” (OP, op. cit.: 56). As a 
result, the PACC, DACC and CACC were integrated as sub-committees in their 
respective levels – Provincial Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, District 
Development Committees and Divisional Development Committees, respectively – to 
which they report (ibid.). As a result, the HIV/AIDS institutional structure effectively 
expanded the participation of NGOs in the socio-economic development sphere.        
 
As a result, in the HIV/AIDS system, NGOs are also much more integrated in the 
government administrative structures. Key rationale for this is well articulated in 
KNASP as captured by the quote above and the first quote of chapter 1 above. The 
Strategic Plan reiterates: “the strategies and activities ... must be implemented by a 
partnership of all stakeholders” (OP, 2000b: 21). Thus, in its implementation, NACC 
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is “expected to consult NGOs … discuss policy development, ensure regular 
interaction and build partnerships with other stakeholders” (OP, 2000a: 50). NGOs 
already operate a majority of the VCTCs in the country and this is expanding 
increasingly (research interviews). The most important NGO partner for NACC is the 
Kenya AIDS NGO Consortium (KANCO). And in particular reference to the NGO, 
KNASP acknowledges their close working relationship (ibid. 44). As a multi-sectoral 
membership organization, KANCO is well integrated into the HIV/AIDS system and 
recognizes the importance of governmental authorities in accepting members. For 
example, incumbent members are required to submit a certificate of registration from 
relevant government agencies and reference letters from the area district Medical 
Officer of Health (under MOH) or the District AIDS Coordinator (under NACC). 
Government agencies, mainly the ACUs can also join on presentation of an official 
letter introducing their operations from the relevant department or Ministry in 
concern. An example of the benefits and scope of government-NGO collaborations in 
HIV/AIDS is illustrated in box 1 below. Further syntheses of collaborations are made 
in the next chapter.   
 
Box 1.  
 
Case Illumination: NGO Action and Collaborations in the HIV/AIDS Area 
 
In Thika an NGO called WEM – Wende Munyitanire, a local dialect’s euphemism translatable as in 
unity and participation we can make it – Integrated Health Services (WEMIHS) established in 1998 
pioneered VCT services for the town located about 40 kilometres from Nairobi in Central Province. 
Thika had the highest concentration of HIV prevalence (34%) in the province. The NGO began as a 
community response to the epidemic in the early 1990s. In a short time, it trained and created a 
network of 7 community orphan care committees (COCCs) each made up of 8-12 persons and 256 
community health volunteers in 10 catchment areas in the largely poor urban slums and rural 
neighbourhoods. The NGO provides VCT services integrated with a continuum of care that makes it 
possible for its 320 registered PLWHAs to access comprehensive care and support that includes 
income-generating activities. Comprehensive care and support, such as schooling and feeding program, 
is also given to orphans and vulnerable children numbering 410. With an operating budget of about 
Ksh10 million and almost 20 members of staff, the NGO is coordinated by a leading expert in 
community mobilization and HIV/AIDS policy who has helped to interpret KNASP for the NACC. She 
has helped write the operational manual for its implementation through the World Bank-funded 
programme, and also participated in drafting Kenya’s policy on AIDS. The director also sits in the 
NACC committee that reviews programme and policy issues in monthly meetings with the World 
Bank. Although WEMIHS receives no government funding or subsidies, it receives its testing kits from 
the National AIDS and STD Control Programme (NASCOP) and treatment drugs for sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) from the MOH. It has however received Ksh1,160,000 from NACC for 
HIV/AIDS care in two districts. The NGO is a key referral centre for the local District Hospital. Since 
March 2002, 85 clients have been referred from the hospital for post-VCT care, support and 
prescription drugs for treating opportunistic illnesses. Due to this demand, the NGO has developed a 
standard form to be used by the hospital, as well as others in the area, for referrals. As the local health 
custodian, the District Medical Officer of Health (DMOH) sits in the NGO’s advisory board.  
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CHAPTER 3. DIVERSE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT-NGO 
COLLABORATIONS IN HEALTH PROVISION, PROMOTION AND 
PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING  
 
In a context dominated by a dualistic health system (Karjalainen, 2000: 154; see 
figure 3 in Part II chapter 3), it is inevitable that collaborative interactions will 
emerge. While this goes without much explanation, the diversity, extent, scope and 
type of collaborative interactions depends on many factors. As already noted earlier, 
the key to unravelling such collaborations lies in the analysis of the systems 
operations in the larger environmental context. In this wider context, NGOs in Kenya 
are embedded in an outsider form of relationship with the state in the sense that they 
receive minimal state support while they are actively engaged with it to influence 
policy towards themselves and the grassroots beneficiaries or citizenry at large (Lune 
and Oberstein, op. cit.: 18-20). In light of non-systematized collaborations, this has 
been conditioned by the manoeuvrability of the political and social space as the 
general view of Leat, Smolka and Unnell (1981: 98) suggests. However, health NGOs 
are directly embedded in government since they draw substantial support (Milner, 
1980: 9; Lune and Oberstein, op. cit.) through the NHIF statutory insurance system, 
HIV/AIDS funding, drugs and testing kits, and family planning contraceptives.  
 
Table 2. Matrix of the Levels and Types of Government-NGO Collaborations in the 
Health Care and HIV/AIDS Systems  
 
 Human Resource 
Financial and Other 
Resources Policy-Making
National 
  
- Secondment of personnel  
- Medical interns 
- Training health personnel 
- Consultancy and expertise 
- Funding 
- Medical supplies 
- Data and information 
- Standards and guidelines 
- MOH 
- NACC  
 
Regional 
(Provincial)  
- Capacity building (training 
health personnel)  
- Sharing health facilities 
- Referrals 
- PACC 
 
Local  
(District)  
- Capacity building (training 
health personnel)  
- Sharing health facilities 
- Joint activities 
- Referrals 
- NGOs 
governance 
 
Source: Developed by author based on the research.   
 
This chapter will analyse some of the identified collaborative mechanisms while 
articulating the perspectives of the systems operators as well as observers. In 
comparison with the case of Finland, three levels of government-NGO collaborations 
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can be identified: (1) national; (2) regional; and (3) local. In addition, these relations 
can be categorized into three major types: (1) human resources; (2) financial 
resources; and (3) policy-making. To depict these levels and types of collaborations, 
the above matrix is developed. The matrix expands the interactive models shown in 
figure 2 and 3 above and gives an analysis of the thickened lines linking the NGO 
system with the public system. To give a further perspective to these linkages and 
interactions, I shall discuss each with some illuminative examples.  
 
3.1. Collaborations in Human Resource Development   
 
“Church health facilities must be allocated a quota of new health staff 
employed by the government. Additionally Church health facilities must be 
assisted in human resource development by being allocated a quota of training 
positions for its staff in government training institutions” (Mwenda, op. cit.).3  
 
National Level  
 
There are numerous forms of collaboration in the use and development of human 
resources. The collaborations in human resources here will be restricted to a narrow 
interpretation to refer to exchange, secondment, training of health personnel, and 
consultations and expertise. One of the key interactions at the national level is 
secondment of health personnel from the government to the NGO providers; 
secondment could also be appropriately categorized as a resource transfer but will be 
maintained here since it is a human resource component. As was pointed out in Part 
IV on Kenya, secondment is one of the key indicators of government support to, and 
collaborations, with NGOs (Hearn, 1998). The government is the only resource pool 
for medical physicians since it has been the only agency training them in its two 
teaching university institutions. And because NGOs see it as a crucial mechanism for 
reducing costs of hiring health personnel, secondment one of their key demands as 
cited clearly in the above quotation. The alternative to secondment is either direct 
employment of personnel from the market pool or from abroad.  
 
The NHSSP also mentions secondment as one mechanism for creating a supportive 
environment to the NGO sector (see chapter 1 above). However, secondment has been 
                                                 
3 The text is taken from CHAK Position Paper on Health submitted to the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission in 2002.  
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going in the absence of a policy and decisions are based on an ad hoc case-by-case 
basis subject to availability. The process is also long, as requests must be made to the 
MOH through the provincial medical officer (PMO). After a review of the 
application, the PMO then forwards the request to the Permanent Secretary (PS) at the 
MOH. If the PS, or the Director of Medical Services (DMS), makes a favourable 
decision, they authorize the PMO to second the requested personnel. Although it 
would seem simple, it was not possible to obtain national data on the number of 
personnel seconded by the MOH to the NGO sector since the data is not tabulated in 
the Health Information Management System (HIMS) and would have required a 
lengthy bureaucratic process of procuring. However, data from one mission/NGO 
system already discussed in Part IV on Kenya indicated that the numbers might be 
substantial. The data showed that, in 2002, there were 37 secondments for the 11 key 
CHAK hospitals of whom at least eight were doctors and 11 nurses. As pointed 
above, the government does incur a cost on the seconded personnel although their 
salaries are generally paid by the receiving hospital. The only cost data available is 
the 1994 National Health Accounts (NHA) according to which a bulk of the Ksh1 
million contribution by government to the NGO sector was spent on secondment 
(ROK, 1999c: 53).  
 
Another national level collaboration in human resources is through the medical 
internship programme operated by the MOH. Medical students are required to 
undergo practical training as interns. The MOH is responsible for organizing the 
program, and until recently has been interning the students in its own (government) 
facilities. However, some NGO-operated hospitals have negotiated special 
arrangements with the MOH to allow them operate the programme. As an example, 
CHAK had 13 medical doctor interns in four of its hospital system in May 2003. As a 
precondition, hospitals must be well equipped and have specialist and trained 
personnel for giving a wide range of learning opportunities. An assessment and 
recommendation must also be given by the Commissioner for Higher Education in the 
Ministry of Education for hospitals wishing to join the Institute for Family Medicine 
(INFAMED) programme, which is a specialised training programme for doctors. 
CHAK plays a key role in facilitating the programme for its member hospitals. The 
agency communicates with the two public university medical schools and arranges 
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interviews with interested final year students. After identification of suitable 
candidates, negotiations for their deployment are held with the MOH.   
 
Under the arrangement, the government pays the receiving hospital for each interning 
medical student as well as pays the interns a salary. The hospitals also pay an 
additional token fee to the interns depending on whether they are government-salaried 
or not; some hospitals. Chogoria hospital, admits clinical officers as interns. The 
hospital also houses the interns in its compound in an effort to utilize their time 
maximally (Kirema and Gitari, 2001: 18). The normal length of the internship is one 
year after which the students are deployed back to MOH although they could be 
employed by the hospitals afterwards. A third form of collaboration in human 
resource development at the national level is through education institutions. Although 
the MOH trains far more health personnel, the N-GOK sector also contributes a 
notable number of staff, mainly nurses, considered to be 835 annually (ROK, 1999b: 
Appendix I and II). The Nursing Council of Kenya (NCK) determines all nursing 
credentials and categories. As such, all the 13 KCS nursing schools fall under this 
regulatory and standardization agency. For example, graduating students must sit a 
qualifier two-week exam given by the NCK.  
 
The fourth key component of human-resource collaboration is in the exchange and 
development of expertise, as differentiated from training. Key NGO personnel are 
often called to consult top-level government agencies on health and development 
issues. Tapping technical expertise from NGOs, and vice versa, through consultations 
is one of the most visible signs of positive collaborations. All the reforms and 
development strategy frameworks discussed throughout this dissertation are the result 
of such collaborations. Box 1 above gives just one more concrete example of this. 
Another is the outstandingly close collaboration between KANCO and NACC as 
mentioned by the KNASP and the NGO’s involvement in informing the policy 
process. Such collaborations are not only through the input of individual key NGOs or 
NGO experts but also through open public discourses in conferences, workshops and 
meetings such as those in the TWG. Expert collaborations occur in not only the 
design of strategies or policies but also sharing materials; for example, CHAK sends 
its quarterly publication – CHAK Times – to the MOH. Since NGOs provide most of 
the counselling and home-based care services for persons living with HIV/AIDS 
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(PLWHAs), as was pointed out in Part IV, they have valuable expertise to offer 
government in designing its own system and policy response.  
 
NGOs and government personnel often participate in each other’s seminars and 
workshops or arrange such events jointly. An example is the joint CHAK/KCS/NHIF 
workshop on The Role of Churches and Mission Hospitals in Mobilizing Local 
Resources for Health Care Financing Through NHIF (January 23-25, 2002). 
Collaborations can intensify in times of public health emergencies or disease 
outbreaks. The most notable example is the Ebola scare in 2000. Supposedly the first 
case in Kenya, the suspect was reported from Consolata Mission Hospital in Nyeri. 
The government’s response was immediate. It did its own tests in addition to those 
done by hospital personnel and kept constant surveillance. As the case became a 
matter of national importance, the MOH provided all the technical support needed. At 
one time, the most senior government health officer, the DMS, visited the hospital 
four times in a week. The hospital matron described the outcome of this response as a 
“very positive” collaboration.     
 
Provincial Level  
 
Collaborations at the provincial level with regard to human resources are less strong 
and systematic. These refer to NGO interactions with provincial-level health 
administrations. Figure 2 and 3 identify two such bodies, PMHT and PACC. As 
shown in figure 2 there are no direct relations between NGOs and PHMTs. This is 
mainly because PHMTs are not providers but intermediaries between the MOH and 
the districts.4 Some interactions do however occur, for example as regards NGOs’ 
requests for secondment of staff from the PMO. Although the PMOs do not make the 
decisions, their attitudes and personal contacts with the NGOs are obviously crucial in 
influencing a successful application. Most notably, interactions occur with the 
Provincial General Hospital (PGH), which is the highest referral hospital at the 
provincial level. These are in terms of technical support, placement of nurses on 
                                                 
4 Nairobi Province is one exception to this rule because it is not subdivided into districts. As such, the 
PMO does operate a number of health facilities, as does the Nairobi City Council – 38 and 51, 
respectively as of 1992 (Schwarz, et al, 1992: 40). It can be expected, and should be kept in mind, then 
that the interactions described here may vary in intensity, type and scope in Nairobi than in the other 
provinces. Again, a few local councils also undertake health services delivery and as such their 
organization and interactions may differ with the DHMB system. These exceptions are generally not 
considered in this discussion because of the complexities they pose.   
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practical training, and training of health staff. A few examples can be cited. The 
Consolata Hospital operates the most comprehensive diagnostic centre in the 
province. During the installation of its CT-scanner in 1999, the only one in the 
province, a radiologist from the Nyeri PGH was called to train the responsible 
personnel at the hospital on interpreting the computer printouts.  
 
Because Consolata Hospital runs a nursing school, it utilizes the PGH staff in 
providing its students with practical on-the-job education. The nursing students are 
sent to the PGH department of psychiatry or other departments and courses, which are 
not available at the hospital, e.g., on family planning (FP) services. The Consolata 
Hospital nursing school also interacts to a great extent with the Provincial Matron at 
the PMOs office, who is often called to preside over the graduation. On the other 
hand, the FPAK clinic located just across the road receives trainees attached to the 
PGH for on-the-job learning on how to administer FP services. For example, in June 
2002 the clinic trained 40 MOH nurses in Norplant insertion and removals at no fee. 
In the HIV/AIDS system, NGOs have a much stronger link with the provincial 
administration, PACC. The collaboration is however mainly administrative, since 
NGOs are represented in PACC, but also consultative. NGOs operating HIV/AIDS 
activities at the provincial level actively contact the Provincial AIDS Coordinator, 
who provide secretarial support to the PACC and receive funding proposals from 
NGOs, for technical help in drafting proposals.  
 
Local Level  
 
Local level interactions in human resources are less wide in scope but more intense. 
These refer to any interactions between NGO staff or experts and personnel at 
government district or sub-district hospitals, health centres or dispensaries. A number 
of examples can be cited. Consolata’s nursing school curriculum has a unit on District 
Hospital experience and students are posted for three months to area government 
hospitals at this level. As such, the nursing students interact a great deal with 
government bodies. After the training, the hospital heads are expected to submit a 
report back to the nursing school and the NCK, the national nursing body. These 
collaborations are more regularized. One of the main activities (and strengths) of 
NGOs like KANCO and WEMHIS is capacity building, advocacy and information 
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dissemination. They have been involved in capacity building of CACCs and hospitals 
and health centres health personnel. KANCO has been the key agency instrumental in 
sensitising parliamentarians at the constituency level of the need for a policy and 
strategy on HIV/AIDS as discussed in chapter 4 Part IV on Kenya. In general, NGOs 
are heavily engaged in developing human resources in health promotion work in the 
HIV/AIDS area. This strength is emphasized by the KNASP (OP, op. cit.). As was 
pointed out earlier, KANCO’s PMTCT project is being implemented through existing 
health structures at the district level operated mainly by government. The addition of 
these services is building vital capacities at these levels. 
 
A majority of health institutions countrywide do not yet have either VCT or PMTCT 
services owing to the recent development of these services. NGOs are at the forefront 
of establishing these systems. A major component of these projects, such as 
KANCO’s, is training hospital staff to set up and manage them. One international 
NGO called Network of AIDS Researchers in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(NARESA) has pioneered research and follow up of users of PMTCT services in 
Kenya. Two two-year pilot projects were set up at the Karatina District Hospital in 
(Central Province) and in Homa Bay District Hospital (Western Kenya). The projects 
operate within existing structures and have integrated PMTCT into maternal child 
health and family planning (MCH/FP) services. In doing this, the projects re-designed 
and provide the MCH antenatal record cards previously used in the government 
hospital. The PMTCT counsellors are hospital nurses who have been trained by the 
NGO. Others trained include paediatrics and maternity nurses. As the project comes 
to a close, all responsibility is to be transferred back to the hospital nurses.  
 
Exchange of human resource can also be observed as part of the capacity building 
process. For example, when NACC was training CACCs it called in KANCO to 
provide the training resources and organization because of its proximity to the 
grassroots. Again, while WEMHIS sponsors and conducts training workshops for 
nurses from the public health institutions in Thika and Maragua districts in Central 
Province, it on the other hand invites doctors from the health institutions to provide 
skills on the drugs administration since it does not have its own doctors. Finally, like 
in the PACCs, NGOs also have administrative relations with DACCs and CACCs. 
The DHSFs also provide a forum for human resource interactions through sharing 
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experiences and can thus enhance the development of the health system in the area 
through, e.g., the District Action Plans (DAPs).    
 
3.2. Collaborations in Financial and Other Resources  
 
National Level  
 
Financial collaboration refers to transfer of funds from government to NGOs. Other 
resources refer to medical supplies, information and data, and standards, guidelines or 
manuals. At the national level such collaborations occur most notably with the MOH 
and NACC. Based on the research experience, it is difficult to get a comprehensive 
view of all financial flows from the government to the NGO sector, a fact 
acknowledged by the 1994 NHA (ROK, 1999c: 35). Most government and NGO 
officials interviewed generally agree that government funding to NGOs is nonexistent 
or negligible. Although some budgetary transfers existed in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Berman et al, 1995: 88-89), no evidence of this was obtained in the research. 
However, secondment involves a considerable appropriation in employment costs by 
the government. Again the government pays hospitals running internship programs 
for medical doctors. The largest and most important form of government payments to 
NGOs is through the statutory National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF).  
 
In our analysis of table 8 in Part IV on Kenya, we saw that the NHIF has paid more to 
mission/NGO hospitals for years 1998-2003 than the other three systems. These are 
non-contractual payments. Because of their important contribution to the health 
sector, NGOs feel they should receive a “proportionate amount of the [government’s] 
budget on health” (Mwenda, op. cit.), subsidize their operations by paying, e.g., “staff 
wages up to 55% of the operating budget” or contract them to provide “specific health 
services in defined areas” (CHAK, 2001a: 9); the MOH does not have contractual 
relations with NGOs although contracting is referred to in the Public Health Act and 
Local Government Act with regard to municipal authorities (e.g., Berman et al, op. 
cit.: 98). In the HIV/AIDS system, it has also been seen that NGOs procure most of 
the budget operated by NACC.  
 
With regard to other resources, the MOH does provide certain medical supplies freely 
to NGOs although procurement may not be easy or the supply constant. These include 
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drugs for STIs and tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS supplies such as testing kits and 
Nevirapine. Others include contraceptives and most FP products and condoms. 
NASCOP is the main agency for Nevirapine drugs for PMTCT. The drugs are 
supplied to all government hospitals and NGOs and other providers can collect them 
in monthly kits; NGOs have to account for them. FBO providers can get them through 
the Mission of Essential Drugs and Supplies (MEDS). On the other hand, the 
government also procures some drugs from MEDS. In terms of health standards, 
guidelines or manuals, the MOH is the most important source. The main agency for 
health standards and quality management is the Department of Standards and 
Regulatory Services (DSRS). All health providers are required to comply with the 
formulated health standards, to which NGOs also make an input. For example, 
nursing schools run by mission NGOs use the NCK curriculum. Another remarkable 
feature with regard to standards is that KCS pegs its salaries on the government 
scales, an issue over which the Church body lobbied the government in 2002 to make 
public circulars on any changes made.   
 
The most important MOH source of HIV/AIDS material is NASCOP, which is also 
the Ministry’s ACU. One of its important publications is the National Guidelines for 
VCT (2001). The DSRS later developed standards for VCT centres. Earlier in 1999, 
NASCOP had produced guidelines on the implementation of home-based care 
services (OP, op. cit.: 32). These documents are produced through consultative 
processes involving NGOs and other agencies. NGOs have also developed training 
manuals and programmes, which benefit government agencies and health care 
deliverers. A notable one is the PMTC Training Curriculum (2002) produced by 
NARESA. With this manual, over 1,000 health workers in both government and NGO 
hospitals had undergone the 10-day training course countrywide as of October 2002. 
Both NARESA and WEMHIS view MOH as good in providing guidelines and 
information and data.     
 
Provincial Level  
 
Interactions at the provincial level regard more to the sharing of health facilities and 
referrals than to direct funding or guidelines. Sharing of facilities or medical and 
noon-medical equipments results from lack of self-sufficiency in either sector 
(Milner, 1980: 9). This can be in both service provision as well as promotive health. 
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Some NGOs run specialised programmes or are better providers of a particular 
service. As was discussed in the theoretical pages, agencies may be primary, 
complementary or supplementary providers of services (Kramer, 1979: 236). A good 
example is the FP service system provided and developed by FPAK in the country. As 
was cited at the beginning of this section, FPAK was delivering the services in some 
clinics located in MOH hospitals, some of which were taken over by government. In 
Nyeri, the PGH does not have a specialized FP facility and often utilizes the FPAK 
Clinic facilities for training such as the example cited earlier. In this case, the 
government provided the supplies needed for the training. Likewise, if FPAK needed 
to use the MOH facilities for its medical operations this goodwill is reciprocated.  
 
One way of embedding the collaborations is through the integration of the NGO 
providers into the public referral system (Harding, op. cit.: 7). A referral system is 
also a key approach to solving insufficiency in a specialized provider environment. 
Although there is no regularized or guided referral system between the NGOs and 
government facilities, they are common because some services may be unavailable at 
either sector. A good example of this is the CT-Scanner operated by Consolata 
Hospital. The scanner serves the entire Mt. Kenya region to which the PGH refers 
patients rather than to the national hospital in Nairobi. Other referrals are also made to 
Consolata’s intensive care unit. Some NGO hospitals, e.g., PCEA Tumutumu, have 
special arrangements with government corporations whose patients may be released 
on agreed commitment to pay later. Finally, in the matrix, the PACC was mentioned 
only in as far as its decisions concerning NGOs funding application proposals for 
cross-district projects are needed while forwarding the reviewed proposals to NACC.     
 
Local Level  
 
Collaborations in regard to financial and other resources at the local level are more or 
less similar as those at the provincial level. At this level, WEMHIS benefits from the 
use of the district hospital in terms of referrals particularly for curative and 
hospitalisation services for its PLWHAs. And as was pointed out in box 1 above, it 
too receives a significant number of referred patients from the same hospital who 
needs drugs for opportunistic infections but more so for a continuum of care. The 
referral system is perhaps more developed and larger between NGOs and municipal 
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health operators than the MOH district systems, as one study of Nairobi Province 
indicates (Schwarz, et al, 1992: 81-84). Again, KANCO’s PMTCT programme uses 
the district facilities, as does the NARESA in its PMTCT research and development 
project. In this regard, the projects are implemented jointly in partnership with the 
district and facility health teams. As in the PACC, the DACC and CACC are 
important resource collaborators as their decision are crucial in successful NGO 
applications. All applications at this level must be reviewed here together with the 
involvement of the DDC. There are also expert interactions and information 
exchanges at this level, for example, the referral cards developed by WEMHIS and 
NARESA’s MHC antenatal record cards. WEMHIS also meets regularly with the 
DMOH and other public health officials to inform them on what they are doing.  
 
3.3. Collaborations in Policy Making   
 
National Level  
 
The role of NGOs and extent of collaborations in policy making in Kenya has been 
discussed at a greater length in Part IV chapter 4. A list of the boards and agencies in 
which some NGOs have representation at the MOH has also been given. Here, it 
remains only to clarify the structures identified in figure 2 and table 2 above. As the 
figure shows, both the CBH and the DNCD are located within the MOH. These two 
are shown deliberately because they are the most important health policymaking 
organs; the CBH because of its primacy in the MOH organization and the DNCD for 
its centrality to NGO issues and coordination at the MOH. They are also identifiably 
permanent structures. Particularly because the DNCD is a body for NGOs with 
operations on the ground, the link is even more direct. The direct linkage is also 
emphasized by the representation of the NGOs in the various MOH boards. In the 
NACC structure, there are also direct links at the national level. NACC is made up of 
23 members of whom 6 are NGOs. The NGOs, as the other members, were originally 
named in the establishing legislation, Legal Notice No. 170 of November 17, 1999 
(ROK, 1999e). As a multi-agency NGO, KANCO has direct policy-making as well as 
administrative interactions with government agencies. Some of the Ministerial ACUs 
are members of the NGO and thus also participate in its governance through the 
board. The key products of these collaborations are the numerous policy documents, 
strategic plans and bills such as those discussed variously in this dissertation.   
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Provincial and Local Levels  
 
Provincial level administrations do not have policy-making powers but rather they 
oversee the implementation of macro policies by district-level authorities on behalf of 
the MOH and NACC. As such, although the PHMTs and PACCs do make decisions 
on, e.g., giving the DHMBs Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIE) on their cost 
sharing Facility Improvement Funds (FIFs) and passing judgement on proposals for 
HIV/AIDS projects, respectively, their overall role is supervisory and coordinatory. 
The DHMBs on the other hand while not involved in policy-making do carry out 
activities involving substantial decision-making and participation by NGOs, for 
example the District Action Plans (DAPs), setting prices for user charges, overseeing 
collaboration with NGOs and quality management standards. There are also likely 
issues developments from the DHSFs. The DHMBs, DACCs and CACCs are thus key 
implementing agencies of MOH and NACC policies. Presentation of NGOs at this 
level is seen from the point of view of NGOs as implementers of polices and thus as 
key collaborators of the policy implementation process. On the other hand, NGOs are 
represented in the PACCs, DHMBs, DACCs and CACCs and thus contribute to 
policy and program processes at these levels. Further decentralization can be expected 
to increase this role and interactions.     
 
A crucial aspect with regard to policy-making and decision-making is the fact that 
more often than not, government officials contribute directly in the running of NGOs. 
For example, through the involvement of the Thika DMOH in WEMHIS’s board of 
directors, the government official contributes to governance issues of the 
organization. Likewise, in Nyeri, the area DMOH is the chairman of the FPAK health 
centre. These kinds of collaborations at the NGO leadership are obviously overly 
beneficial to them due to the influence and favours that can be extracted. It is a very 
telling form of advocacy, lobbying and publicizing their services. Such NGOs would 
naturally be advantageously placed in procuring information and materials that helps 
them to take decisions for action. Because of this it is not unlikely that the many 
DMOH’s sit in the boards of numerous health NGOs at the district level. Obviously 
though there may also be dangers associated with such representation that may 
constrain the NGO action particularly if relationships sours for whatever reason.  
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V-PART SUMMARY CONCLUSION  
 
A major aim of the study, this Part has focused on examining the collaborations 
between the public and NGO health systems in Finland and Kenya. In doing so, it has 
attempted to describe and illustrate an overall understanding of the context of the 
collaborations in recent and ongoing policy processes in health development, their 
inter-institutional relationships in light of these developments, and the forms of 
collaborations with regard to services provision, promotion and participation in policy 
making. Hence, summary conclusions can be made on these three themes. Firstly, as 
the findings show, the context of collaborations in both countries is very favourable in 
terms of the policy environment although there lacks broad legislative measures for its 
institutionalisation and systematisation. The findings also show that the collaborations 
are reflected with a good amount of clarity capturing a variety of responsible 
institutional dynamics, activities and financing in current health development policies.  
 
Secondly, the findings show that the current health development policies in both 
countries have taken a significantly interactive approach that brings together diverse 
stakeholders playing different and integrative functions (figures 1). Furthermore, the 
development is reflected in the systems organization in which NGOs have inter-
linkages with numerous levels of the governmental health administration (figures 2). 
Thirdly, collaborations in this sphere of social policy are very complex in both 
Finland and Kenya. So are attempts at discerning them. The illustrated diversity of the 
forms, types and levels of government-NGO collaborations in the two countries has 
been made possible through the systems approach in health research illustrated in 
figure 2 Part I. As demonstrated in chapters 3 of this Part, collaborations occur both 
vertically and horizontally across different levels of the two systems and in a variety 
of ways. Despite the evident variations in system administration levels and inter-
linkages, depth or extent and forms between the countries these collaborations are 
significant in terms of human, financial and other resources, and policy-making and 
reveal a mixed-type health care systems. As figures 2 show, system administration 
level inter-linkages are most extensive in Finland reflecting the more decentralized 
and extensive system collaboration. Naturally, more systematisation and analysis of 
the kind of knowledge presented here would need to be done to make it more useful 
for managing more coherent and informed collaborations in health policy-making.   
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PART VI: CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF 
FINDINGS: A COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS 
 
 
This dissertation has given a comprehensive picture of the health systems operated by 
NGOs and the public sector in two country case studies – Finland and Kenya – as 
presented in Part IV and III. Part V has analytically described the growing 
collaborative paradigm in the two countries consequently tying Part III and IV. While 
Part I provided an introduction, the contextual rationale and method of the study, Part 
II enlarged its scientific lens and theoretical background. The research findings in Part 
IV and V have been presented in a ‘3P’ schema encompassing provision (P1), 
promotion (P2) and participation (P3) in policy-making activities of health NGOs in 
these countries. In the present and final Part of the dissertation, I will synthesize the 
findings (chapter 1) and point out to implications and future areas of research in this 
field of social policy studies (chapter 2). This research gives insight to the central 
paradigm of social policy and concludes that the welfare (health) state is really largely 
a ‘welfare partnership’.  On the other hand, the processes and trends of change in 
welfare arrangements signify perhaps a much deeper-seated dynamism in both the 
state and civil society.  
 
 
CHAPTER 1. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 
This study aimed to portray an analytical picture of the health system operated by 
NGOs in Finland and Kenya in current times with regard to the 3Ps (provision, 
promotion, and participation) and examine the collaboration between it and the public 
health system. I have attempted to analyse the NGO system through numerous kinds 
of organizational, financial and other operational data and to describe their operations 
within their different country contexts. The conclusions can best be summarized and 
will be presented in three themes in a comparative perspective as follows: (1) the 
changing health care systems; (2) nature and scope of the NGO health system; and (3) 
scope and types of collaboration.   
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1.1. The Changing Health Care Systems in Finland and Kenya  
 
Over the latter half of the 20th Century, health care systems around the world have 
undergone major transformations. These are reflected by the rapid expansion of the 
governmental hospital system in the 1960s, the development of primary health care 
(PHC) in the 1970s, and decentralization and restructuring of both the health system 
and government administration in the 1980s and 1990s (WHO, 2000). These trends 
are apparent in both Finland and Kenya. The transformations have followed global 
shifts in ideas towards good health; in particular, the WHO Health for All (HFA) by 
the Year 2000 framework provides a unifying theme through which these two 
countries have been studied. As was discussed in Part III chapters 3, reforms in health 
systems have become more perverse in the 1990s owing to the harsh economic 
conditions combined with unfavourable demographic and new political imperatives as 
well as internationalisation upon a neo-liberalist agenda. Obviously, the magnitude of 
these challenges is different in the two countries. While Finland has been facing a 
crisis of the welfare state through the early 1990s in the context of the Nordic welfare 
states (Alestalo, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Ploug and Kvist, 1996), Kenya has 
been facing a “crisis of development” in the context of neo-colonial African (Third 
World) countries (Leys, 1996; Gathaka and Wanjala, 2002).  
 
Challenges to the social or welfare contract within this environment have meant that 
changes became inevitable. In the next few years, health care organization in welfare 
state Finland may change even more rapidly with the planned European Union 
Constitution and as pressure from the World Trade Organization for further 
marketization mounts (e.g., Pekonen, 2003; Lehto, 2002 254-5). A matter of 
increasing political debate, some politicians fear the complex American-type health 
care system – with strong private and NGO delivery systems and insurance (e.g., 
Salamon, 1999b: 77-93) – favourable to those who can afford may come to Finland in 
the near future (Pekonen, op. cit.). In light of the present current of developments, 
increased mixture of provider types is inevitable in both countries.  
 
In both Finland and Kenya, the organization, planning and administration of health 
care has changed significantly over the past two decades as discussed in Part III 
chapters 3. Various forms of decentralization have given greater responsibility for 
 290
decision-making, organization, planning, administration and financing to the 
peripheral governments. Part of long-term government restructuring programmes 
started around the same time in the early 1980s in both countries, recent processes in 
health care reforms in the 1990s have made the role of the central governments more 
of a regulatory and steering nature. This has also meant that disparities between 
municipalities (in Finland) and districts (in Kenya) have become more and more 
unavoidable. In fact, there are glaring disparities between the provinces in both 
countries in the health service systems’ distribution (tables 3 in Part III). The 
disparities are obviously brought by complex factors, some of which are shown in 
these tables such as distances, population and health personnel distribution as well as 
migration. Though the system reforms have been moving towards the same direction, 
the extent of the decentralization achieved is not readily comparable.  
 
In Kenya, decision-making and organization is still in the hands of the public 
administration as the democratically elected local governments play a marginal role in 
health services provision. However, in a move to have the local governments play a 
stronger role, the new government is working on proposals that will require at least 
10% of the appropriations under the blanket 1998 (amended in 2003) Local 
Government Transfer Fund (LATF) Act be spent on health unlike currently when no 
such requirement exists (research interviews). (LATF obliges central government to 
transfer 5% of the national income tax collections to the local governments on 
population size and urbanization criteria.) Reforms of the system administration are 
still going on with the thinning of the provincial administration as hospitals get 
greater functional and financial autonomy and as the District Health Management 
Boards play an increasingly larger role in decision-making, planning and financing at 
this level. This has meant greater autonomization of system organization and 
management with less control from central government. Administrative reforms in 
both cases have been directed by the need for greater efficiency in the management of 
resources as well as the organization of the health services (Oyaya and Rifkin, 2003).   
 
With regard to financing, in both Finland and Kenya, the burden of health care costs 
has been shifting more towards users, mostly as private out-of-pocket financing with a 
parallel growing importance of health insurance as reflected by the increased share of 
the NHI and NHIF financing in the respective countries. It is interesting to note that 
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user fees were introduced almost simultaneously in the two countries at the beginning 
of the 1990s: in PHC in Finland in 1993, and generally in 1992 in Kenya although an 
earlier attempt had been made in 1989. In both countries, private (market) insurance is 
of a more marginal significance as the countries’ health accounts show (Järvelin, 
2002: 31, for Finland; ROK, 1999c: 12, for Kenya). It is clear however that statutory 
health insurance will remain or even become stronger, more remarkably in Kenya 
where plans are underway to convert the NHIF into a scheme, similar to the NHI of 
Finland, to which everyone contributes for health care cover. The conversion would 
however bring a tremendous change in that system because out-of-pocket payments in 
public health institutions would, as purported, become a thing of the past.  
 
In addition to the reform of structures, system organization and financing, another 
theme of the transformation has been the increased emphasis from curative health to 
promotive/preventive health. As a result, health has become a crosscutting issue 
demanding multi-sectoral and cross-governmental organization and action. The HFA 
has provided the guiding light in this development since the late 1970s. With the shift 
in focus, the role of individuals, community organization and action outside the state 
sphere has strengthened. The concern with individual and community responsibility 
for own health has called for increased participation of people in health planning and 
social policies at the grassroots. Part of wider processes in state and society where 
roles of different actors (state, market and NGOs) are contested and changing, the 
welfare state is transforming into a welfare society (Wiman, 1992; Barretta-Herman, 
1994; Julkunen, 2000). And with increased private participation (e.g., Harding and 
Preker (Eds.), 2003), the health service systems are becoming increasingly 
multifaceted. This process has helped frame the public-private partnership paradigm 
in health and social welfare services provision (ibid.; Salamon, 1995: 203) marking 
the new social policy paradigm of “moving beyond state-based welfare” (Alcock, 
1998: 12). In particular, the “new health paradigm” entails “moving from health as a 
‘public good’ to health as a ‘common good’” (Singh, 2002: 18). The partnership 
discourse is also accompanied by the division-of-roles discourse in which, through 
consultative processes, the different actors seek to agree to share responsibility areas 
(ROK, 1999b: 63; MSAH, 2002b), and that is, in the political dimension, moving states 
from “‘government’ to ‘governance’” (Taylor and Warburton, 2003: 336).  
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1.2. Nature and Scope of the NGO Health System in Finland and Kenya  
 
It is within the framework of the changing health care systems outlined above that the 
scope of NGO health systems in contemporary times must be understood. The context 
places NGOs at a crossroads. At the same time as the space for their operations is 
expanding, the market is also becoming more competitive (see below). In both 
Finland and Kenya, the context of NGO operations is actually favourable to a 
significant extent. The sphere of government regulation with regard to registration of 
NGOs is centralized but liberal to a more or less extent, although the Registrar of 
Associations at the National Board of Registration and Patents in Finland is much 
older than the NGO Coordination Board in Kenya. Thus, the legal environment may 
not be much different between the two countries. However, licensing and regulation 
of NGO specialized health operations takes place at different levels. In Finland it is 
more decentralized at the provincial level while in Kenya it is dualistic with a 
specialized Ministry of Health agency and local authorities both playing a role. The 
Finnish case is obviously more ideal as it is less complex. On the other hand, taxation 
issues are of key concern to the sector in both countries. Clearly, the legislation is not 
developed especially with regard to income generating activities and deductibility of 
donations. With regard to the political environment, NGOs enjoy a rather harmonious 
co-existence in Finland while in Kenya this has been more acrimonious, especially in 
the 1990s although this is changing increasingly for the better with the new 
government.       
 
Although in general there has been an expansion of the NGO sector globally in the 
1990s, many of the major NGO health care providers have been operating for much 
longer. As McPake (1997: 24) observes, the size of the NGO sector can be explained 
by “historical accident”. Although she refers to developing countries with regard to 
the influence of mission NGOs originating in colonial times (the cases of Consolata 
and Tumutumu hospitals in Kenya are notable), the historical perspective also 
explains the emergence of, e.g., the Rheumatism Foundation and Orton Orthopaedic 
hospitals in Finland. The heath care systems established by NGOs in specialized 
medical areas such as rheumatology and orthopaedics and in other institutionalised 
and non-institutionalised health care such as rehabilitation and cancer care have 
continued to exist in spite of the expansion of the welfare state in Finland as has the 
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above cited institutions in Kenya. The services these organizations provide are largely 
of a primary nature. Others have continued providing supplemental and/or 
complemental care. Because of the symbiotic relationships many of these health care 
organizations have enjoyed with the welfare state, they have largely been sheltered 
from competition in the market. Furthermore, in both Finland and Kenya, as we saw 
in Part IV, the organizations received hefty direct state grants in the 1970s, ending in 
the early 1980s. As explained by the welfare state theory, the flow of state support 
largely guaranteed the continued existence of the NGOs.  
 
However, as the welfare state started to open its service system to the market as well 
as introducing fees for health services, NGOs found themselves under growing 
pressure and have adopted entrepreneurial/managerial survival strategies. They now 
offer competitive services at competitive prices and compete with for-profit 
organizations in bidding for public contracting and grant financing. In Finland, the 
Finnish Slot Machine Association (RAY) funding on which the Finnish NGO sector 
has relied faithfully for their capital investments over the last 70 years is radically 
scaling down this kind of support in response to complaints from the market regarding 
unfair competition (research interviews). This policy shift towards encouraging 
competition and defining roles for the sector has presented a turning point for NGOs 
that now are being pressured to reorganize their units and establish for-profit 
functions alongside their non-profit structures. This should be understood in the larger 
context of managerialism within the transforming welfare state and service system in 
which management is seen as the “‘driving force of a competitively successful 
society’” (Clarke and Newman, in Malin, Wilmot and Manthorpe, 2002: 88). For 
example, the Helsinki Deaconess Institute Foundation, a Protestant Christian NGO, 
established a for-profit company to competitively organize its health activities way 
back in 1998. With 11 medical clinics, a hospital and an imaging centre, all in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area, the company (Diacor Ltd.) is the largest private health 
care company in Finland (Niskanen and Seppo, 1999).  
 
In Kenya, NGO hospitals have also had to adopt the new managerialism and 
entrepreneurism (e.g., Lewa, 2003: 5-6) in dealing with recovering costs and tapping 
clientele in a context of poverty and diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, among other 
management problems (e.g., CHAK, 2001, No. 11 and 2002, No. 7, various articles). 
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It is in this context that some hospitals have experimented with community initiatives 
such as community health insurance schemes (e.g., Wiesmann and Jutting, 2000) and 
Harambee fundraising schemes (e.g., Mwenda, 2002). Thus, as the discourse and 
mechanisms for contracting become more developed, the role of NGOs is becoming 
more marketised and the sector consequently becoming commercialised (Salamon, 
op. cit.: 227) in both countries.  
 
A number of conclusions can be made in connection with the scope of operations. 
First of all, as the data have shown in Part IV, the scope of the NGO health systems in 
the two case countries is remarkably large in all the 3Ps. Secondly, this scope differs 
between the two countries in scale and significance only as far as P1 and P2 are 
concerned. From the discussions we can conclude that the inclusion of NGOs in 
processes in P3 exhibits a more or less similar magnitude in scale, determination and 
political will. In terms of system size by share of national health facilities, in both 
countries, NGOs account for an equal amount of 20%. On the other hand, data 
presented on the share of personnel, expenditure and provision (lumped together as 
‘private’ sector) for Finland on table 3 in part IV and table 5 in Part III depicts a 
relatively small sector. Although overall comparative personnel data was not available 
for Kenya, overall health expenditure by the combined NGO and private sectors in 
table 6 of Part III and NHIF reimbursements nationally and in Central Province 
(tables 8 and 9 of Part IV) show that the sector is relatively larger than government’s.  
 
In health promotion work, the scope of Finnish NGOs is very large as shown most 
notably by the share of health promotion budget they operate and the responsibility 
for its management and expert organization. The same can be said with respect to 
Kenya’s NGOs in operating and managing the HIV/AIDS funding as well as other 
preventive work such as child immunization. There are however marked differences 
with regard to the organization of the NGO service provider system in both countries. 
While in Kenya basically two umbrella bodies exist for most (Christian-based) non-
profit health infrastructure, no such bodies exist in Finland. In Finland, the specialized 
NGO health providers exist either independently of each other or within a network of 
their own affiliate parent organization such as a foundation or an association. This is 
not to say that they may not be networked. In health promotion on the other hand, the 
organization through national bodies such as FCHP, STKL and YTY in Finland and 
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KANCO in Kenya are rather similar. There are however necessarily no clear 
distinctions in organization between fields among the 3Ps. In fact, NGO organization 
is both vertical, i.e., cross-sectoral and horizontal, i.e., inter- or -intra-sectoral and/or 
geographical. These features may be within a single NGO, such as Folkhälsan in 
Finland or within an umbrella body such as KANCO in Kenya.       
 
Also, as regards financing in services provision, the NGO systems in both countries 
are largely dependent on user fees either paid directly by the patients, the statutory 
health insurances or by municipalities with the latter being dominant in Finland and 
the former two in Kenya. It is clear then that in none of the countries are NGO health 
providers dependent on government grants any longer. In spite of the central role of 
RAY as key government source of funds for health and social service NGOs, its 
contribution was no more than 15% of their overall operating expenditures (RAY, 
2002: 4). On the other hand, no such source exists in Kenya. However, it is again 
clear that the sector, as a whole, has a dependency of its own: foreign funding.  
 
1.3. Scope and Types of Collaborations in Finland and Kenya 
 
“Strong people’s organizations and movements are fundamental to more 
democratic, transparent and accountable decision-making processes. It is 
essential that people’s civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights are 
ensured. While governments have the primary responsibility for promoting a 
more equitable approach to health and human rights, a wide range of civil 
society groups and movements, and the media have an important role to play 
in ensuring people’s power and control in policy development and the 
monitoring of its implementation” (People’s Charter for Health 2000).1  
 
The inter-organizational collaborative discourse being witnessed around the globe is 
aimed at placing people at the centre of health systems development in planning, 
implementation and monitoring with the view that they are empowered to take 
responsibility for their own health. This is very clear in current global health 
discourses.2 As the 20th century came to a close, the HFA primary health care (PHC) 
movement has been given a new lease of life by the People’s Charter for Health 
(PCH). The Charter was drawn by the People’s Health Assembly (PHA) in Savar, 
                                                 
1 The Charter is available at the People’s Health Movement website: www.phmovement.org/charter.   
2 See, also interview with the current WHO Director General Joon-Wook Lee on involving community-
based organizations in shaping the WHO agenda (www.who.int/features/2003/05/en/, June 27, 2003).  
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Bangladesh, in 2000 in which nearly 1,500 people from 92 countries, including 
Finland and Kenya, participated. The PHA’s starting point was the PHC goals set in 
the HFA. With its regrettable absence in the assembly, it challenges the WHO, and 
other United Nations agencies and governments to facilitate the realization of a 
“world in which a healthy life for all is a reality”. As with the HFA, the PCH 
reiterates a people-centred approach to health systems development that opposes the 
privatisation of public health services but endorses effective regulation of an active 
private sector and inclusion of NGO and traditional service systems and people’s 
participation in local, national and international health development and forums.            
 
Having laid out the old and current global discourse on participation and collaboration 
in the context of the PHC, a number of observations can be made with regard to 
processes in the case countries. The question of the depth or scope of the collaborative 
relationships between the public and NGO health sector systems can be looked at in 
terms of the diversity of the relationships, diversity of levels of interactions in both 
organizational structures, amount of resources (financial, human, and time) devoted to 
their operations, and the prevailing political will. As discussed in Part V, the 
collaboration can be seen in terms of the inter-organizational linkages, established 
organizational dynamics (institutions, financing, legislation and policy statements), as 
well as more or less organized synergies outside the ‘formal’ sphere, formal meaning 
that which is stated either as a policy, a legislation or which is organizationally 
structured. Representation of NGOs in the ABPH and National Project (NP) 2007 
processes in Finland and in the DNCD and the HIV/AIDS administration through the 
National AIDS Control Council (NACC) in Kenya as 1990s phenomena is 
unprecedented in the health system development in both countries.  
 
However, in spite of these institutional dynamics, their efficacy or relevance to 
collaboration notwithstanding, government-NGO/private sector coordination remains 
poor in both countries. A major reason for this lies in the very nature of the 
organizational spheres both set of systems operate. As Leat, Smolka and Unnell 
(1981: 98) argue, relationships are not defined “in abstraction but in terms of the 
inter-organisational space remaining after individual [NGO-government] relationships 
have been carved out”. While the governmental sector is characterised by legal 
administrative and formal structures, which are hierarchical and interdepartmental in 
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nature, the NGO sector is largely loosely organized and lacks an overall overbearing 
structure or (democratic) authority. Parliament and municipal council members are 
democratically elected officials while NGOs have no such governance legitimation, 
except, of course, among the members of the organization. The procurement of and 
dispensation of resources also differs. Furthermore, NGOs are formed on a voluntary 
basis and may have an uncertain life. These differences constitute a critical 
environment in which collaboration is meant to take place. As a result, and in light of 
lack of a coherent theoretical (Salamon, op. cit.: 35), policy or articulate legal 
framework, in practice the relationship is defined not between the sectors but between 
government, or individuals in government, individual NGOs or a small group of well-
connected NGOs (Leat, Smolka and Unnell, op. cit.; Taylor and Warburton, op. cit.).  
 
Given this general context, it should be recognized that diverse historical, political 
and cultural characteristics of the local scene are important in interpreting the 
relationships and do make a difference or even depart from the foregoing assertion. In 
general, we have seen in chapters 1 Part V that there is a more or less positive context 
prevailing in both countries. This is particularly the case with regard to the current 
health development frameworks and strategies, namely, the Health 2015 and NP in 
Finland and the NHSSP and KNASP in Kenya. In both countries, the government has 
accepted the role of NGOs as partners in the design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluating of the programmes. NGOs, on the other hand, while agreeing that 
collaboration on all levels is good, close and meaningful, admit that more could be 
done particularly in systematizing it. In Finland, health NGOs point to a need for 
reforming further the complex public health system to remove much ambivalence 
particularly about the dialoguing aspect of the collaborations. In Kenya, on the other 
hand, they seek more commitment from the government in terms of resources as well 
as improvement of the licensing and operational context.  
 
Overall, the relationship is evolving in light of the supplementary/complementary role 
of NGOs as recognized by the governments in both countries and articulated more or 
less in current health policies; the noted health development frameworks are the best 
examples of policy statements with regard to the collaborations. Other policy 
frameworks in the wider sphere are the Finnish NGOs as Actors in Social Welfare and 
Health Policy: Strategy for NGO Activities and the (Proposed) Kenya NGO Policy 
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Paper. Remarkably, both have been developed in the present year, 2003. Even more 
remarkable is that both policy documents have been produced through consultative 
processes involving representatives from both sectors. Both government officials and 
NGOs accept and see these policy processes as a way of further clarifying and 
cementing the collaborative relations. These NGO policy frameworks are the closest 
we can get to an overall policy on government-NGO collaboration in these countries.  
 
As far as the legal framework is concerned, the situation is again more or less the 
same with a mixed picture. We have seen that some of the institutional dynamics such 
as the ABPH and various working bodies in the NP in Finland and the DNCD and the 
NACC in Kenya have been created through decrees or legal notices. On the other 
hand, there is no clearly emerging autonomous legal administration to oversee or 
steward the operations of NGOs. The DNCD however has such a potential. The 
extensive government funding for NGOs activities through RAY in Finland is 
reflected most notably in the Act on Slot Machine Funding and the Lottery Act. In 
Finland municipalities have their own policy decisions or by-laws regarding grants to 
NGOs or the purchase of services. As we have seen no such thing exists in Kenya and 
there is no legislation obliging government to make grants to NGOs. While the legal 
policy framework can then be said to be more developed in Finland, with regard to 
particularly funding, than in Kenya, the extent of the policy framework in both 
countries would appear to be the same.   
 
In addition to the broad policy environment for collaborations, there exists an 
extensive inter-organizational relationship between the public and NGO health 
systems in both countries (figures 2 in Part V). The mapping portrayed by the 
thickened lines indicates the identified inter-linkages. Incidentally, a wider inter-
relationship has been witnessed in Finland than in Kenya. One explanation for this is 
in the nature of the Finnish health care system, which is more decentralized with few 
administrative bodies at the middle unlike in Kenya. As a result, NGOs interact with 
both the administrative, policy- and -funding-making, and delivery levels. Although 
health delivery and management in Kenya also occurs largely at the district level – 
except for the provincial hospitals controlled by the provincial administrations – and 
NGOs do interact with both levels, the many technical teams and management boards 
obscures the inter-linkages. Other explanations lie more in the nature of the research. 
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As a methodological consequence of the decentralization, more persons were 
consulted at the municipal level in Finland than were at the district level in Kenya. 
Thirdly, for the most part, the systemic inter-organizational collaborations in Finland 
has been largely originally traced by the research while in Kenya an elaboration was 
made along an already existing picture mapped by the collaborative Decentralization 
Workshop cited (MOH, 2000). In general, and especially in the context of the 
decentralized system in Kenya and the Health 2015 and NP in Finland, the inter-
relationships are actually envisaged to be quite extensive and active (figures 1 Part V). 
In general, the intensity is greater at the level of the municipality/district than at the 
provincial level in both countries. National level interactions are much wider in scope 
in both countries particularly with regard to policy planning and funding.  
 
In practice, the collaboration occurs on different levels and in different ways as 
summarized in tables 2, and discussed in chapters 3, of Part V. The intermediary role 
played by NGOs inevitably results in these collaborations in the present interactive 
stakeholder contexts of health care development. There is a great deal of interactions 
in human resource development and particularly at the national and municipal/district 
levels in both countries. NGO systems are experts in their areas of operations both in 
the hospitals they run, the education they organize and the information they produce, 
and the organizational infrastructures and reach they muster in distributing it. Their 
proximity and dedication to the causes they undertake gives them a comparative 
advantage in this regard. Collaborations in human resources are more balanced than in 
the other two types of collaborations in both countries. The interactions are also more 
frequent and more articulated. In fact, when officials on both sides in both countries 
say that they collaborate, it is mostly understood in these terms, mainly dialoguing.  
 
Unlike most collaboration in human resource development, the flow of funding is 
primarily one way, from government to the NGOs. As pointed earlier, the strong flow 
in Finland is incomparable in Kenya. This is strongest at both national and municipal 
levels. In Kenya though, government funding through the HIV/AIDS system is 
extensive, at least during the 5-year KNASP project period. In both countries, the 
NGOs use of the statutory health insurance reimbursement schemes is extensive. 
Relative to government systems, some NGOs provide highly specialized services 
using high technology systems, e.g., the Rheumatism Foundation Hospital in Finland 
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and the Consolata Mission Hospital in Kenya. As a result, public health institutions 
commonly refer patients to these NGO systems. Another notable understanding of 
collaboration is the undertaking of joint projects and activities. In both countries, this 
is more the case at the local levels (municipality/district). Although NGOs lobby both 
national, regional and local governments, the fact that policy-making occurs primarily 
at the national level makes it an intense area of action. No less than 10 working 
groups or boards were identified in each of the countries at this level in which NGOs 
are represented in the policy planning. At lower levels, NGOs are also involved in 
various decision-making organs, especially in municipalities/districts. Public officials 
are also active in the governance of NGOs, the best examples discussed being STKL 
in Finland and KANCO in Kenya.      
 
As the foregoing summary has shown, there is close collaboration between 
government and NGOs in health care provision, promotion and participation in 
policy-making. However, there are gaps between stated policies and rhetoric on 
collaboration and participation and practice. Examples in Finland are in the 
implementation of the municipal programme in HFA (MSAH, 1996: 22-25) and in the 
Health 2015 program (WHO, 2002: 47). Although these policy programmes stress on 
participation and role and collaboration of NGOs and government in health, it is often 
difficult to capture them on the ground, particularly due to the autonomy of 
municipalities. Since there are no statutory or legal requirements, municipalities can 
only implement the national policies on good will or political expediency, as is also 
arguably the case in the support of NGOs activities. In Kenya as we saw in chapter 4 
Part III and chapter 4 Part IV, except for the NACC system, the process of realizing 
the establishment of the DNCD and the overall decentralized system has been slow. In 
addition, realization of the DHSF process is yet to be achieved on a large scale or 
countrywide. Thus, it can be concluded that in both countries, there appears to be a 
gap between policy and implementation. Poor coordination is largely to blame in 
addition to other bearing factors peculiar to each country (for a broad analysis on 
Kenya, see, Oyaya and Rifkin, op. cit.).  
 
In light of lack of well-articulated legislative or policy environment and well-
resourced infrastructures in both countries, national policy goals for collaborations 
may be distorted or subverted. And although collaborations on the ground between 
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providers have been generally active in human, financial and other resources, these 
may depend more on personal relations and preferences as on need or resources. 
Again, the collaborative relationship may be limited to certain types of services or be 
selective. In participatory policy-making, often only large or well-connected NGOs 
are represented in the deliberations while others may take an ambivalent position 
(Taylor and Warburton, op. cit.: 329). It is not clear if the federated organizations 
really represent all the member interests or the authorities all the cross-government or 
political interests. As Leat, Smolka and Unnell (op. cit.: 89) found out in the UK, only 
a small number of the inner core makes an input into the policy-making. This may 
arguably jeopardize overall sector representation thus encouraging certain sectoral 
interests or views to proliferate. In addition, the fact that NGO representatives are not 
democratically elected, as are politicians decision-makers, may raise questions on 
how representative or legitimate their involvement in the policy process is (Taylor and 
Warburton, op. cit.: 329-30). There are other numerous concerns and implications 
with regard to government-NGO collaborations (see, e.g., reviews in Wamai, 2002b). 
Acknowledging that NGO relations with government in a democratic society take on 
a three dimensional model – opposition, partner and agent (DeHoog and Racanska, 
2003: 265-6) – in Finland and Kenya’s health service system, the latter two are more 
the norm. The extent to which health care providing NGOs play a ‘watchdog’ role – 
actively critiquing the state and seeking to provide alternative services and opinions – 
as opposition suggest, is debatable and, as this research finds, largely an 
overstatement to their advocacy role.   
 
 
CHAPTER 2. IMPLICATIONS AND SCOPE FOR FUTHER RESEARCH 
 
2.1. Overall Implications and Research Interpretations  
 
This research has shown that there is a burgeoning health system operated by NGOs 
in both Finland and Kenya. In addition, NGOs interact in a variety of ways and in 
different levels in the health sector indicating a vibrant mixed context of actors 
encompassing government and private sectors. With this regard, the research has 
supported existing studies showing a mixed-type of welfare service systems in 
Finland (Helander et al, 1999; Nylund, 2000; Siisiäinen, Kinnunen, and Hietanen, 
2000) and Kenya (Berman et al, 1995; Kanyinga, 1995; Wang’ombe et al, 1998; 
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Hearn, 1998). The trends have also shown an NGO-isation of health care in both 
countries with the increased debate about collaboration and, for example, the 
emergence of the Karjaa system in Finland and the increased take up of health 
functioning of the NGO-mission hospitals in Kenya. Within this context, there is a 
certain degree of mutual or even inevitable interdependence. However, the present 
study has shown that the NGO health sector is much larger than previously thought. 
In particular, the research reveals glaring gaps in knowledge, information and 
research on the operations of the NGO sector in health in both countries. In addition, 
the sub-sector is not well understood or appreciated, particularly in Finland, where 
studies of the welfare state have crowded the scope of social policy studies. Given the 
shortcomings of the public sector system, it is important for those responsible for 
organizing health care services (central government policy makers and 
municipal/district organizers) to gather knowledge on NGO health operators. This 
research has contributed to this knowledge gap by, for the first time, putting large 
amounts of data in an international cross-cultural perspective to show the important 
roles played by NGOs in this crucial area of social policy.  
 
In this regard, the research also suggests a methodological implication that it is 
possible, with the use of similar targets, to satisfactorily investigate phenomena in 
different contexts. This approach is helpful in that it also leads one to inevitably learn 
and understand the context in which that phenomena operates. In addition, the cross-
country study can help in examining each system from an external perspective that 
guides reflection on improving its organization, ways of collaborating and 
coordination. The role of NGOs in health provision, promotion and participation in 
policy-making has remarkably grown in the 1990s in both developed and developing 
countries. This growth suggests a convergence of changing processes in both 
hemispheres of the globe albeit in differing extents and the social-historical, cultural 
and political differences notwithstanding (e.g., Oyen, 1986; Salamon et al, (Eds.), 
1999). This strengthens the comparative approach taken in the study and thus 
reinforces the methodological implication.  
 
In light of the significant health NGO sector and changing health systems in both 
countries, the extensive and yet diverse collaboration needs to be nurtured and 
strengthened. Policy- and -decision-makers need to understand that a partnership and 
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participatory approach will make the system more responsive and adaptive to need 
and has other economic as well as political benefits. The partnership approach offers 
“the opportunity to combine the service-delivery advantages of voluntary 
organizations with the revenue-generating and democratic priority-setting advantages 
of government” (Salamon, 1995: 109-110). NGOs have many comparative 
advantages and governments ought to harness their operations as partners of a welfare 
society. At the same time, their weaknesses “corresponds well with government’s 
strengths, and vice versa” (ibid. 48). As DeHoog and Racanska (2003: 266; original 
emphasis) point out, “the role of a partner involves regular communication, dialogue, 
and engagement in issues, either as a sector, or, more likely, as a set of organizations 
within particular programs and in policy development and program implementation”. 
In the two countries, this would also entail not only the development of a national 
partner-NGOs information system that takes into stock the diversity of fields but also 
requires an advanced management and systematisation of this information and 
communication.  
 
That NGOs are sitting in various government decision-making and policy planning 
bodies also vindicates the involvement of government at similar levels in the running 
of NGOs. This would also imply the need for equal partnership especially when 
NGOs are being called to integrate national health priorities into their agencies 
development and action plans. Again, processes to integrate NGOs in current health 
development frameworks should be speeded up to allow timely uptake by NGOs of 
the benefits of collaborations. Having said so however, it should be emphasized that 
such a process of integration should be approached cautiously so that none of the 
sector crowds out the other but instead each can operate in areas of comparative 
advantage. Furthermore, NGOs need to assess whether such integration is too close 
for comfort. They have to strike a balance between the guarding of values and 
interests as citizens’ representatives and the provision of needed health services.    
 
The greatest challenge to the present collaboration practice is coordination or the 
management of the partnerships. In one sense this means the loose plurality of 
systems leaves far too much room for duplication of activities, lack of coherent 
targeting, wastage of resources, and, not least, the lack of information about the extent 
of NGO operations on the ground in the municipalities/districts. With no broad 
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coordination mechanisms presently available in both countries, the NGO system 
exists in an ambivalent position, that of competitor (n)or collaborator, a view that 
repeatedly came up in discussions in both countries. This implies that much of the 
inter-linkages identified in the research are not systematic. Hence the need to develop 
a coordinating structure jointly planned and run by both NGOs and government. Such 
a structure would be ideal not only for intermediating between the sectors but also be 
the infrastructural organization for information collating, processing and sharing. 
Furthermore, it would serve to invigilate the health system operations and harness 
resources to the most needy geographic regions and to the most efficient and cost-
effective players thus promoting equity in distribution and availability of facilities and 
services. The management of partnerships would most significantly entail the 
systematisation of the partnership as well as action for better health of the population 
and target groups. Finally, the government is the most appropriate player for 
spearheading the establishment of such an agency either within the ministries of 
health or as an independent body, such as agentisizing an NGO.      
 
2.2. Further Research Areas  
  
As an investigative study, the implications for further research in this area are clear. 
There is a strong case to call for a greater understanding of the NGO health system 
within the multi-disciplinary field of health research, civil society research and social 
policy. More than that is the importance of placing these research results in the 
context of societal changes to understand the deep-seated dynamic processes in state 
and civil society. Studies mapping NGOs in Finland and Kenya as part of the global 
Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project are the best available attempts 
at understanding the socio-economic importance of the sector. However, they are too 
broad encompassing the entire Third Sector and hence they do not go far enough both 
in terms of data and in placing the findings in the specific or broader social policy 
discourse. While the present study has tried to do this, more work needs to be done in 
expanding our knowledge of the forces of change in state and civil society. Several 
methodological implications for further research can be discerned with regard to the 
systems data and information. The research has faced challenges and surprises with 
regard to the availability of certain data in both countries. More surprising, data on 
NGOs in Finland is actually not as developed as in Kenya.  
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Notably, there is no single source of NGO health care providers, as these are not 
entered into a national health data system as in Kenya’s Health Management 
Information System (HMIS). In fact, no such comprehensive database exists although 
a recent attempt has tried to rectify that (Kauppinen and Niskanen, 2003). As a result, 
even the actual number of health facilities is difficult to establish. The national body 
charged with the responsibility for collecting health and social systems data 
(STAKES) uses a specific coding system under which reporting facilities are 
recorded. Because of lack of clarity in this classification system, many public health 
facilities (primarily hospitals) are not reported in the database. Furthermore, although 
all NGO/private systems are required to submit annual reports to the provincial 
administrations, which are further processed by STAKES, there does not seem to be a 
clear understanding of responsibility for the data; in any case, such data was largely 
unavailable from STAKES or some of the provinces.3  
 
Again, just as there is no single source of comprehensive health NGO data, there is no 
categorization of overall NGO data according to fields of operations in Finland. Thus 
the Finnish Registrar of Associations needs to develop such an information system. 
Because of the organization of most health service providers in the KCS and CHAK 
organizations, Kenya’s HMIS is rather resourceful. On the other hand, there are no 
obligations for the health providers to provide data to the HMIS and not all report to 
their umbrella bodies. Hence, the HMIS clearly does not contain information on all 
NGO health operators. And although the National NGO Coordination Board and the 
National Council of NGOs are relatively good sources, the information is quite 
inadequate. While the realization of a fully operational DNCD would, in line with the 
stated expectations, be a crucial organ for data and information on health NGOs in 
Kenya, collecting such data and information will require research. The foregoing 
suggests the need for further research in clarifying data and information gaps with a 
view to generating recommendations for the development of a systems information 
management. In addition, there is need to investigate and conceptualise the diversity 
of relations further within specific contexts. Strictly, individual NGO case relations 
                                                 
3 Information from the provincial register for NGO/private providers (YKSATU) should be developed 
and centralised at STAKES. A planned expansion of the financing and expenditure data system – the 
system of health accounts (SHA) – in line with a recent OECD framework (Haapanen, 2003) may 
provide a window of opportunity for a more comprehensive facilities data system and a classification 
that clearly separates the private providers into for-profit and non-profit functions. 
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best define the set of collaborating levels and forms. Hence, thorough understanding 
of collaborations across the sectors in a context of diverse organizational types, e.g., 
Church/mission systems, secular NGOs and foundations, would require the research 
narrowing the organizational-scope focus. Such research would help fill the 
shortcomings of the present work.  
 
In summary, although the present research has dealt primarily with systems data, 
context, organization and inter-relationships, further research is needed in these and 
other areas particularly on the following questions: (1) filling gaps in the data 
documentation, and systematizing and institutionalising research in both countries; (2) 
(how) to develop a practicable information resource and management system on 
health NGOs; (3) conducting individual NGO case studies to refine and detail 
complex relationships with the multi-level public sector, e.g., for assessing the 
applicability of the triple-relationship model (opposition, partner and agent); (4) 
examining the impact of the collaborations on NGOs as well as feedback effects; (5) 
clarifying the legal and tax policy issues regarding the NGOs operations and 
collaborations; (6); deepened analyses of the different roles various types of health 
NGOs play with regard to service provision, promotion and participation in policy 
work with a view to coordinating them well within the overall health system; and (7) 
establishing and evaluating ‘best practices’ on contracting and management of 
collaborative relations.  
 
Secondarily, further comparative research would also be needed to systematize what 
lessons can be learned from experimentation of the collaborative paradigm in 
different country contexts with a wider array of cases. The importance of this need is 
stressed with the view to following on the outcomes of the latest policy processes and 
programs in health developments given that they are currently undergoing 
implementation. Finally, a research that claims a comparative dimension with defined 
parameters helps in understanding certain trends in health system development, extent 
and methods of collaborations. However, perhaps ideological aspects in social policy 
development in the welfare state and developing countries could be a case for further 
research if they can help us deepen our understanding of why these trends seem so 
similar.       
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Appendix 1: Sample Lists of Open-Ended Questions1 
 
 
Guide Questionnaire for Government Officials 
 
1. In your Ministry (Office or Department) do you have direct or indirect 
working relationship(s) or engagements with NGOs?  
- In what regions of the country, areas/fields? 
- What are(is) the NGO(s) and what kind are they, i.e., local or 
international? 
- Describe the nature of the collaboration?  
- What has been the outcome of that collaboration?  
- How long have you had this collaboration, how long will it last?  
- How was this collaboration started?  
2. In what health sub-sectors are NGOs most active?  
3. Do you have any special policies, concerns or views regarding NGOs in 
Finland/region (Kenya/region)?  
4. What, in your view/experience, makes your working relationship with NGOs 
possible?  
5. What, in your view/experience, are the difficulties of working with NGOs?  
6. What would you say is the relevance for the need of a government policy on 
NGOs?  
7. Health sector reforms:  
- When started and rationale  
- Extent of reforms and current phase 
- Direction in the future 
8. What do you see as the future for government collaboration with NGOs in the 
health sector in the country? (What is the future Finnish welfare state going to 
look like?)  
 
Relevant documents: - legislations, policies, financial appropriations, data, reports, 
etc.  
 
 
Guide Questionnaire for NGO Officials  
 
1. Name of the Organization………………………………………………… 
2. Date of establishment……….…………….. 
3. What is your organizations purpose/mission? Give a brief historical detail and 
operational environment.   
4. What concrete activities do you undertake in health services provision? 
Describe program(s)/project(s). 
5. What concrete activities do you undertake in health promotion? Describe 
program(s)/project(s). 
                                                 
1 These lists are indicatory of the questions that were posed to various interviewees. However, they 
were not necessarily used in the format shown nor all the questions asked of the interviewee. Each 
interviewee session was utilized more in a discursive, rather than a question-answer, manner reflecting 
the specific encounter and adjusting to the need for relevance of the information sought. And as also 
noted in Part 1 page 18, follow-up questions were variously posed through repeated sessions, email or 
telephone. In short it would be impossible to list here all the questions the research asked.  
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6. How do you participate in health care policy-making? Describe processes and 
institutional dynamics.  
7. What is the size of your agency (in terms of, e.g., hospitals, health personnel, 
expenditure and other health facilities) 
8. What are the sources of your income? 
9. How has/is your organization collaborat(ed)ing with the government?  
- With what government agencies or programmes/projects?  
- What is the nature of this relationship? (Contracting, kind of grants, 
referrals, interactions, etc) 
- How long have you had this collaboration?  
- What has been the outcome of this collaboration?  
10. Notable implications of the collaborations on your organization. 
11. Notable implications of the 1990s health reforms on your organization.  
12. What are the challenges of working with government?  
- What would be the best way for collaborating with government?  
13. What are your views concerning having a government policy on NGOs?  
 
Relevant documents: - financial data, organizational data, reports, brochures, 
newsletters, magazines, etc.  
 
 
Discussion Points with Experts  
 
1. Terminology of use most fitting to the Third Sector in the country  
2. The Role of the Third Sector today in the country, particular reference to the 
health care sector. 
3. Are the ‘gaps’ in the welfare state increasing or decreasing? Why?  
4. The potential of NGOs (in filling gaps in the welfare state). 
5. Major organizations in the field of health 
6. Describe, if involved in, program(s)/project(s)  
7. On the organization of public and NGO health system (indicators, historical 
trends) 
8. Notable/major changes in the sector over the last 10 years or so: developments 
and reforms in the health sector. 
- When reforms started and rationale  
- Extent of reforms and current phase 
- Direction in the future 
9. The interaction points in the relation with the state  
10. The sticking points in the relation with the state 
11. Future trends in health care organization: the role of the state and NGOs.  
 
Relevant documents: - literature, policies, data, reports, etc.  
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Appendix 2:1 List of Persons/Institutions Consulted - Finland  
 
 
 Name  Institutional Affiliation Consultation Date 
1.  Janne Peräkylä  Senior Officer, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
(MSAH) 
November, 2002; 
February, 2003 
2.  Taru Koivisto  Senior Officer, Health Promotion, Department of Health 
(MSAH)  
December, 2002; 
February, March, 
April, 2003 
3.  Ritva Kujala  Senior Counsel, MSAH February, March, 
2003 
4.  Kari Vinni Director of Research and Development, MSAH February, 2003 
5.  Veli-Matti Risku Senior Inspector, MSAH March, 2003 
6.  Eero Lahtinen  Senior Medical Officer, Department of Health, MSAH March, 2003 
7.  Päivi Hämälainen  Ministerial Counsellor Health Affairs; Specialist of 
Public Health and General Practice, MSAH 
April, 2003 
8.  Tomi Stähl Rehabilitation Unit, KELA February, 2003 
9.  Antti-Huunan 
Seppäla 
Chief Physician, Rehabilitation KELA,  April, 2003 
10.  Timo Pohjolainen  Expert Physician in Rehabilitation, KELA  April, 2003 
11.  Raimo Viiansuo  Financial Advisor, Funding Activities, Finnish Slot 
Machine Association (RAY) 
November, 2002; 
February, March, 
April, 2003 
12.  Eero Linnakko  Planning Manager, Association of Finnish Local and 
Regional Authorities (AFLRA) 
April, 2003 
13.  Oiva Myllyntaus  Chief of Development, AFLRA March, 2003 
14.  Rolf Eriksson  Director of Development, AFLRA March, April, 
2003 
15.  Yrjo Lahtinen  Specialist Expert, Department of Health, AFLRA March, 2003 
16.  Miika Laine Special Advisor, Taxation, Finnish Tax Administration  September, 2003 
17.  Riita Lae  National Board of Patents and Registration April, 2003 
18.  Helena Mussalo-
Rauhamaa  
Senior Medical Officer, Southern Provincial State Office  December, 2002; 
March, 2003 
19.  Antero Heloma  Provincial Health Adviser, Southern Provincial State 
Office  
February, 2002; 
March, 2003 
20.  Elli Aaltonen  Director, Regional Unit for Social and Health Affairs, 
Eastern Provincial State Office  
January, 2003 
21.  Margit Päätalo Special Researcher, Social and Health Department, Oulu 
Province 
April, 2003 
22. Ari Vesikkala  Municipal Clerk, Kerava Municipality  February, March, 
2003 
23. Heini Parkkunen  Healthy City Co-ordinator, Department of Social and 
Health Services 
November, 
December, 2002 
24. Liisa Äyräs Secretary, Healthy City Network Project Office Turku  December, 2002 
                                                 
1 The lists have no specific name or date order other than that they start with interviewees at the 
national level through the provincial level, the municipality, NGOs, and ending with 
experts/commentators. 
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25. Matti Reinikka  Project Manager, Healthy Kainuu November, 2002 
26. Paula Käyhkö Health Planner, Department of Social and Health 
Services 
November, 2002; 
February, 2003 
27. Maria Hallman-
Keiskoski 
Head Nurse, Central Finland Health Care District February, 2003 
28. Leena Moisander  Legal Officer, Department of Health, Helsinki City  March, 2003 
29. Marja-Kirsti 
Eliasson 
Secretary, Helsinki City Healthy Cities Council, 
Department of Social Services 
April, 2003 
30. Sinikka Metsä-
Simola.  
Chief Medical Officer of Mental Health, Helsinki City 
Board, Department of Health 
March, 2003 
31. Mr. Jorma 
Lauharanta  
Senior physician, HUS Administration  March, 2003 
32. Erja Koistinen Doctor in Charge, Juuka Municipality, North Karelia  January, 2003 
33. Riitta Sarkela  General Secretary, Finnish Federation for Social Welfare 
and Health (STKL) 
November, 2002 
34. Anne Astikainen  Development Manager, ‘The House of Partnership’ 
Jyväskylä, STKL 
February, 2003 
35. Jouko Vasama  General Secretary, Social Welfare and Healthcare 
Organizations in Finland (YTY) 
December, 2002 
36. Virpi Dufva  Programme Officer, YTY December, 2002; 
March, April, 
2003  
37. Liisa Elovainio  General Secretary, Cancer Society of Finland November, 2002; 
February, 2003 
38. Riitta Kajantie Office Manager, Cancer Society of Finland February, 2003 
39. Pirkko Lahti  Executive Director, Finnish Association for Mental 
Health; President, World Federation for Mental Health 
November, 2002 
40. Klas Winell  Chief Physician in Rehabilitation, Finnish Federation for 
The Visually Impaired  
November, 2002 
41. Harri Vertio    Director, Finnish Centre for Health Promotion (FCHP) March, 2003 
42. Tarja Bergström  Funds for Health Promotion and Project Proposals 
Planner, Finnish Centre for Health Promotion (FCHP) 
February, 2003 
43. Vesa Korpelainen  Director, North Karelia Health Association & Centre  January, February, 
March, 2003 
44. Kerttu Perttilä  Development Manager, Stakes Health Promotion December, 2002 
45. Mikko Nenonen Chief Administrative Physician, Rheumatism Foundation 
Hospital  
March, April, 
June, 2003 
46. Viveca Hagmark  Director of Health Promotion, Folkhälsan  March, 2003 
47. Seppo Leisti  Chief Executive Officer, Orton Foundation Hospital April, 2003 
48. Heikki Teittinen  Financial Manager, Orton Foundation Hospital April, 2003 
49. Anneli Miettinen  Researcher, The Population Research Institute, The 
Family Health NGO - Väestöliito  
April, 2003 
50. Mervi Hara Action of Smoking and Health (ASH) August, 2003 
51. Voitto Helander Professor, Turku University  June, 2002 
52. Pekka Puska  Director, Non-communicable Diseases Prevention and 
Health Promotion Unit, WHO; Member, North Karelia 
Project Health Association 
January, 2003 
53. Jouko Kajanoja  Principal Researcher, Government Institute for 
Economic Research 
November, 2002 
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54. Markku 
Kiviniemi 
Research Director, Department of Political Science, 
University of Helsinki 
November, 2002 
55. Tapani Niskanen  Expert Planner, Unit for Statistics and Registers, 
STAKES 
February, March, 
April, 2003 
56. Anita Swahne  Information, STAKES March, April, 
June, 2003 
57. Martti Kekomäki  Professor, Department of Public Health, University of 
Helsinki 
March, 2003 
58. Ritva Laamanen Researcher, Department of Public Health, University of 
Helsinki 
February, 2003 
59. Nina Simonsen-
Rehn 
Researcher, Department of Public Health, University of 
Public Health  
February, 2003 
60. Päivi Krzywacki   Business Information system, Statistics Finland  February, 2003 
 
 
 338
Appendix 2: List of Persons/Institutions Consulted - Kenya 
 
 
 Name Institutional Affiliation Consultation Date 
1. John Kamigwi  Senior Economist, Planning and Systems Design Services, 
Health Sector Reform Secretariat (HSRS), MOH 
July-October, 
2002; May, 
2003 
2. Ibrahim Amira  Deputy Director of Medical Services (DMS) September, 
2002 
3. Mr. Katoni NGO coordination officer, HSRS, MOH October, 2002
4. Sam Munga Deputy Head, Kenya Healthcare Financing Program, MOH October, 2002
5. T.M. Okeyo Head, Department of Health Standards and Regulatory 
Services 
October, 2002
6. Joseph Mongela Director of Division of Health Education (DHE), MOH May, 2003 
7. Mr. Abdille  Health Care Financing Department, MOH May, 2003 
8. Mr. Muchiiri Deputy Chief Economist, National Health Accounts, MOH May, 2003 
9. Caroline Ngare Programme Officer, (VCTC), NASCOP, MOH May, 2003 
10. Hassan Ismail Acting Chief of Management and Personnel NHIF May, 2003 
11. Lawrence Ondari Financial Manager, NHIF May, 2003 
12. Jacinta Mutiku Information Officer, NHIF May, 2003 
13. Mr. Ngari  Information Officer, NHIF May, 2003 
14. Abdi Billow Director of Inspectorate, Local Government Ministry May, 2003 
15. Danson Chege Desk Officer (Inspectorate), Western Province, Local 
Government Ministry 
May, 2003 
16. I. N. Lukalo Executive Director, Non-Governmental Organization Co-
ordination Bureau 
May, 2001 
17. Koech A. R. Information Officer, NGO Coordination Board May, 2003 
18. Adangah Agisu Program Officer, National AIDS Control Council (NACC)  May, 2003 
19. John kariuki Licensing Officer, Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board 
(MPDB) 
May, 2003 
20. Peter Kiilu Provincial Officer, Office of President, Central May, 2001 
21. Kiritu Wamai Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Central Province September, 
2002 
22. Dr. Gisame  Provincial Medical Officer, Nairobi Province; MOH.   September, 
2002 
23. Olang’o Onundi  Provincial Medical Officer, Central Province September, 
2002 
24. Erastus Kihumba Provincial Health Officer, Central Province September 
, 2002 
25. Karuga Wachira  Provincial Health Records and Information Officer, Central 
Province  
September, 
2002; May, 
2003 
26. Mrs. Kiruki  Provincial Matron, Central Province September, 
2002 
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27. G. G. Mailu Provincial Planning Officer, Central province May, 2003 
28. John Gicire Provincial Planning Officer, Central Province September, 
2002 
29. Mutea Rukwaro  Provincial Director of Social Services (PDSS), Central 
province  
May, 2001; 
August, 2002; 
May, 2003 
30. William M. Karare  Provincial AIDS Coordinator, Central province May, 2003 
31. Samuel Mbugua  Area Manager, NHIF, Central Province  September, 
2002 
32. Mr. Chege Area Information Manager, NHIF, Central Province May, 2003 
33. Dr. Kimani District Medical Officer of Health (DMOH), Nyeri District, 
Central province  
September, 
2002; May, 
2003 
34. Dr. Gacuiri District Medical Officer of Health (DMOH), Thika District, 
Central Province 
September, 
2002 
35. Rose Maina District Public Health Education Coordinator, Thika District September, 
2002 
36. Mrs Maina  Head Nurse, Nyeri PGH  September, 
2002 
37. Kenneth Macharia District Development Officer (DDO), Nyeri District,  September, 
2002 
38. Kinyanjui Ngugi Program Coordinator (IFAD), Field Service Officer (FSO), 
Ministry of Finance, Nyeri District 
September, 
2002 
39. Joyce Muthama  Information and Publications Officer, National Council of 
NGOs 
May, 2001 
40. Mary Wambua Information and Publications Officer, National Council of 
NGOs 
July, 2002 
41. Mary Kiai Membership Liaison and Networking Officer, National 
Council of NGOs 
September, 
2002 
42. Margaret Ogola  National Secretary, Commission for Health and Family Life, 
Kenya Catholic Secretariat (KCS) 
September, 
2002 
43. Justice Koskei Health programs director, Commission for Health and Family 
Life (KCS) 
May, 2003 
44. Beatrice Aluvaala Programs Manager, Christian Health Association of Kenya 
(CHAK) 
September, 
2002 
45. Francis K. Echessa Management Information Systems Manager, CHAK  May, 2003 
46. J. A. Onyango.  Senior Program Officer, Family Planning Association of 
Kenya (FPAK)  
September, 
2002 
47. Mrs. Gicamba Health Officer in Charge, FPAK Family Health Clinic, Nyeri September, 
2002 
48. Dr. Abuya  Medical Officer of Health, Consolata (Mathari) Mission 
Hospital, Nyeri 
September, 
2002 
49. Dr. Karua Senior Physician, Consolata Hospital, Nyeri September, 
2002 
50. Sister Maina Hospital Matron, Consolata Hospital Nyeri September, 
2002; May, 
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2003 
51. Anthony Nyaga Statistician, Consolata Hospital, Nyeri September, 
2002; May, 
2003 
52. Ms. Susan Accountant, Consolata Hospital, Nyeri May, 2003 
53. Mr. Mathenge  Hospital Administrator, Tumutumu PCEA Mission Hospital, 
Nyeri  
May, 2003 
54. Jemimah Njoki Senior Nurse; Tumutumu PCEA Mission Hospital, Nyeri May, 2003 
55. Gathoni Mwangi  Project Coordinator, Prevention of Mother-To-Child 
Transmission Centre (PMTCTC), Karatina District Hospital 
September, 
2002 
56. Mr. Kimiru  Project Coordinator, Karatina Home-Based Care and 
Counselling Clinic (KHBCCC) 
September, 
2002 
57. Sam Onga’yo Program Officer Technical Support Team, AMREF September, 
2002 
58. Esther Gatu,  Program Coordinator, Policy and Advocacy May, 2003 
59. Pauline Irungu Program Officer, Kenya AIDS NGOs Consortium, Nairobi May, 2001 
60. Joyce Wangeci Assistant Resource Centre Officer, KANCO May, 2003 
61. Wairimu Mungai Program Director, WEM Integrated Health Services 
(WEMIHS) 
September, 
October, 
2002; May, 
2003 
62. Ms. Loise  Information Officer, WEMIHS May, 2003 
63. Peter Kivolonzi Regional Finance and Program Service Manager, Oxfam GB May, 2001; 
August, 2002 
64. Beth Mugo  Assistant Minister, Education Ministry; Member of 
Parliament, Dagoretti, Nairobi (then MP for Dagoretti) 
May, 2001 
65. Joseph Wang’ombe Professor, Department of Community Health, University of 
Nairobi  
September, 
October, 2002
66. Karuti Kanyinga Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi July-October, 
2002; May, 
2003 
67. Stephen Ndegwa Ndegwa Associates, Nairobi; Associate Professor, The 
College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA., USA.  
March, 2002 
68. Nyambura Githagui Social Development Expert, World Bank, Nairobi May, 2001; 
August, 2002 
69. Karanja Mbugua Training and Supervision Advisor (Amkeni Project), Family 
Health Division, National Family Welfare Center 
September, 
2002 
70. Betty Ndomo Program Specialist, Poverty Eradication Program, Office of 
the President  
August, 2002 
71. Owino Wasuna  Program Director (Health Finance and Policy), The Policy 
Project 
September, 
2002 
72. Ruth Nduati Senior Lecturer, University of Nairobi; NARESA PMTCT 
Kenya Project 
October, 2002
73. Elizabeth Muthuma Program Development Coordinator, Action Aid Kenya August, 2002 
74. Mr. Kilonzo Librarian, GTZ Library – Information on Division of Primary 
Health Care Kenya Family Health Program 
August, 2002 
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